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FOREWORDForeword
by
Angel Gurría, OECD Secretary-General
The OECD has been working on the definition and monitoring of official development assistance (ODA) and
other official flows for development. Most recently, we have been leading global efforts to ensure that official
development finance is fit-for-purpose in today’s quickly evolving development landscape: we are modernising
our development finance statistical systems and revising the definition of what qualifies as ODA.
Although ODA has recently reached record levels – despite budgetary constraints in many
OECD countries – its relative importance is shrinking in comparison to other flows and resources. Nowadays,
developing countries have more access to alternative sources of finance than ever before, including through
private investment and co-operation among developing countries. It is fundamental to ensure that public funds
are spent in a smart and strategic manner, and that they are used to mobilise other sources of finance to cover
the increasingly complex demands of sustainable global development.
At the OECD, we are using our wide range of expertise to mobilise resources for sustainable development.
Two years ago we put in place an ambitious Strategy on Development to leverage our cumulative experience and
expertise. Among many concrete initiatives, we are playing an important role in promoting foreign direct
investment in infrastructure, which is desperately needed in many developing countries and completely left out
of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). We also continue to look for new ways of capturing green
investment and promoting relevant policy frameworks to ensure that growth and environment goals go hand in
hand. Likewise, we are helping developing countries to finance their own development by improving their
taxation systems and practices through initiatives like Tax Inspectors Without Borders, as well as by avoiding
the loss of funds due to corruption and illicit financial flows. And we are contributing to global efforts to explore
how remittances, social business and philanthropic initiatives can support sustainable development in the most
effective way.
Yet, we recognise that for many countries – particularly those beset by conflict and fragility – ODA will
continue to play a vital role, and we are looking at how to channel an increased share of ODA to the countries
most in need. This is particularly important given the trend we have seen over the past three years of declining
levels of ODA going to the countries most in need, including sub-Saharan Africa and many fragile states.
Ending poverty, preserving the environment, combatting climate change, ensuring peace and security,
increasing resilience, and establishing a fair and equal trading system are no longer national issues. They are
challenges that must be addressed and supported at the global level.
The United Nations is leading the effort to establish the new set of Sustainable Development Goals that will
guide us beyond 2015, the deadline for the present set of MDGs. Mobilising a broad mix of resources is crucial
for the post-2015 world, where development goals will overcome the development-environment divide, merging
into a single global framework for sustainable development. Funding these new goals will require inputs from
across the board – from public and private sources and from all communities and countries.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 3
FOREWORDThe OECD will continue to be central to this endeavour, by monitoring and tracking the resources needed to
realise these goals. Perhaps more important, we will also apply our expertise to support the policies that will
make change happen. This Development Co-operation Report (DCR) 2014 illustrates our commitment to
these objectives.
Angel Gurría
OECD Secretary-GeneralDEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 20144
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EDITORIAL: MORE AND BETTER FINANCING FOR DEVELOPMENTEditorial:
More and better financing for development
by
Erik Solheim, Chair of the OECD Development Assistance Committee
There is plenty of money in the world that could be used for development. Just stopping the
enormous sums illegally flowing out of developing countries could provide billions of dollars for
poverty reduction. Redirecting fossil fuel subsidies to renewable sources of energy would reduce the
pace of climate change and more than double investments in green energy. Every child would be
enrolled in school and teachers celebrated as heroes if peace entrepreneurs were able to mobilise as
much money as war entrepreneurs. Money can be allocated and used much more effectively if we
choose to do so.
Poverty has been cut by half and millions of lives have been saved since the world mobilised
around the Millennium Development Goals. As these goals expire in 2015, world leaders will gather
at the United Nations (UN) to agree on a new set of Sustainable Development Goals covering areas
such as poverty reduction, education, health, equality and the environment. Whatever the goals,
political leadership, policies that work and financial resources will be needed to implement them.
Making the right political decisions is of utmost importance. All the amazing success stories of
recent decades have emerged from countries making the right political decisions. The Asian
economic miracles did not happen because of a great new invention, discoveries of valuable natural
resources or conquests. They were made possible by leaders who made good political decisions.
Deng Xiaoping took the People’s Republic of China in a new direction, which eventually brought
600 million people out of poverty. Koreamade smart choices that took it from being one of the poorest
countries in the world to one of the richest. Brazil would have continued down the road of ever
worsening inequalities had President Lula and the reformists not demanded equality through
minimum wages, cash transfer programmes for the poor and better public services. Indonesia,
Malaysia and Singapore provide other inspiring examples of leadership.
Implementing policies that work in various sectors and learning from each other are key to
success. Take the cases of Viet Nam and Ethiopia. In Viet Nam, high school students do better than
the average student in much richer OECD countries. It has been shown that countries that prioritise
teachers result in better student performance. Ethiopia has reduced child mortality by two-thirds
over two decades. How? By training thousands of health workers and deploying them across the
country. We should all learn from these successes and do more of what works.
But it is not only a question of making the right political decisions. Reducing extreme
poverty – and poverty at large – and driving economic growth in an inclusive and planet-friendly way
will require a great deal of money. This report is about how to mobilise the necessary resources to
tackle the challenges of the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 19
EDITORIAL: MORE AND BETTER FINANCING FOR DEVELOPMENTThe world is changing and so must development co-operation
Official development assistance (ODA) has been a tremendous success. We need more of it! A
new world record of USD 135 billion in development assistance was reached in 2013, debunking the
myth that development will be put on the backburner because of economic stress. The next time you
hear a minister, ambassador, development worker or journalist say that development assistance is
decreasing, please tell them that this is not true. ODA is increasing, and it has never been higher. The
United Kingdom fulfilled, for the first time, the international target of giving 0.7% of national income
as development assistance. Turkey managed the biggest jump in foreign development co-operation
spending in all of Europe – a 30% increase. Japan’s development co-operation also increased
substantially. The United Arab Emirates set a new world record in generosity by spending 1.25% of its
national income on development assistance.
Yet the geography of poverty is changing. Poor people used to live in poor countries, but today
there are 1 billion extremely poor people living inmiddle-income countries such as India and Nigeria.
While the relative importance of ODA compared to private investments is decreasing in these
countries, by becoming smarter – mobilising greater private flows by mitigating risk, leveraging
private investment and facilitating trade – it can continue to contribute to reducing poverty, wherever
it exists.
Despite this changing geography of poverty, however, it is inmany of the poorest andmost fragile
states that least progress is made. Within five years, most extremely poor people will be living in
fragile states. ODA remains of vital importance to the least developed countries and fragile states
because they have limited capacity to access other forms of financing, for instance to fund
infrastructure, basic health services and education. Yet many of these countries still do not receive
enough external support, and are even faced with declining assistance. Providers of development
co-operation must find a way to increase assistance to these countries. The existing UN target of
providing 0.15-0.20% of national income to the least developed countries is difficult to reach for
providers whose total ODA budgets are less than this. A different target, for example of 50% of ODA
directed to the poorest and most fragile countries, might make more sense.
In addition, there are many more resources available beyond ODA that can finance the
Sustainable Development Goals. Southern providers of development co-operation are increasingly
important. China is now an important provider of development assistance and accounts for 20% of all
foreign direct investment in developing countries. Turkey’s development programme is ambitious
and expanding – it has the greatest presence on the ground in Somalia and has been incredibly
generous to Syrian refugees. Arab nations are becoming world leaders in generosity towards others.
Brazil and Mexico use their resources and their own development experience to assist
Latin American neighbours. Foundations are also important players – the Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation now provides more money for development than many large European countries.
The way we measure and define development co-operation in the future should reflect the
changing world in which we live. ODA as a metric has served us well, but we need a measure that will
take account of the broader financial flows for development and encourage smarter development
co-operation – one that supports closer co-operation between new and old providers of development
finance. This new metric will complement the ODA measure, not replace it.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 201420
EDITORIAL: MORE AND BETTER FINANCING FOR DEVELOPMENTCountries are in charge of their own development
Countries must be in charge of their own development priorities. Used “smartly”, development
assistance can help them maximise the available public and private sources of development finance.
Countries’ own domestic resources, such as taxes, are the most important source of revenue, even in
the poorest countries. The OECD has rolled out two programmes – Tax for Development and Tax
Inspectors Without Borders – to improve tax revenue generation. A project assisting Kenya’s tax
administration returned an incredible USD 1 650 for every US dollar invested. Foreign direct
investments are much needed to build roads, ports and railways, and to create jobs. Development
assistance can help unleash private investment and improve the investment climate. At
USD 351 billion in 2012, the flow of remittances sent home to developing countries by migrant
workers was higher than development assistance and foreign direct investment combined. In fact,
this is by far the largest source of external finance for many countries. Yet charges for sending
remittances home are as much as 10%, adding up to USD 35 billion a year in transaction fees. Work is
in progress at theWorld Bank to halve these transfer costs – which would mobilise billions and make
a huge difference in people’s lives.
Developing countries are also losing billions of dollars every year to corruption, money
laundering and tax evasion. These billions fund crime and lavish lifestyles rather than schools and
hospitals. Outward or lost flows like these can be stopped by sharing information, streamlining
regulations and improving the capacity to investigate and prosecute financial criminals in developed
and developing countries alike.
Green finance is development finance
All green investments are good for development. There are 1.3 billion people in the world
without access to electricity. Any investment in renewable energy in a developing country would add
to existing electricity production capacity while also stimulating development. Climate adaptation
measures make sense for development too. Managing rivers and controlling floods saves lives and
money. The right decisions can mean that the human and economic costs of floods, cyclones and
other extreme weather events can be reduced, even as climate change exacerbates these events’
frequency and size. For example, the monsoon floods that killed hundreds of thousands in
Bangladesh a few decades ago would have caused much fewer casualties today, as the government’s
ability to evacuate people and control infectious diseases has improved.
It is indeed possible to protect the environment while reducing poverty and developing strong
economies. Brazil has reduced deforestation in the Amazon by 80% alongside rapid economic growth.
Ethiopia aims to become a middle-income country without increasing its greenhouse gas emissions.
If they can do it, others can too.
There are many sources of financing available to eradicate poverty and spur sustainable growth.
All we have to do is grab them. This report contains a wealth of ideas on how to do so.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 21
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The Millennium Development Goals come of age in 2015, yet many development challenges remain
and others are emerging. The post-2015 goals currently being discussed by the international
community under the auspices of the United Nations General Assembly will integrate social,
environmental and economic concerns into a single set of Sustainable Development Goals.
This Development Co-operation Report (the second in a trilogy on the post-2015 goals) asks what can
be done to mobilise the resources needed to finance the achievement of these goals?
How to fund sustainable development?
Official development assistance (ODA) has, until recently, been seen as the main source of funding
for development (Chapter 1). Many more resources will be needed, however, to finance a broader set of
global Sustainable Development Goals. At the same time, ODA is only one part of flows targeted to
support development: at nearly USD 135 billion in 2013, ODA represented only 28% of all official and
private flows from the 29 member countries of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC).
Overall in 2012, developing countries received USD 474 billion from DAC countries, including ODA as
well as “other official flows”: finance provided by public bodies at close to market terms and/or with a
commercial motive (Chapter 4); private finance at market terms, such as foreign direct investment
(Chapter 5); and private grants from philanthropic foundations and non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) (Chapters 8 and 9). This reflects the growing diversity in financial options available to
developing countries – options that are becoming increasingly innovative, and that have great potential
for leveraging even more finance (Chapters 6, 11 and 15).
The wealth of ideas contained in this Development Co-operation Report bears witness to a new era
of opportunity in development finance. Developing countries are supporting each other through
South-South co-operation (Chapter 3); foundations, direct giving (Chapter 8) and social business
(Chapter 16) are offering new options; and remittances frommigrant workers hold huge potential.Yet
not all these types of finance may be founded on the same core principles as ODA – nor may they all
have sustainable development as their goal.
All this calls for taking a fresh look at the role of ODA relative to other resources.
There are also other reasons – beyond financial ones – for reviewing the role of development
co-operation in the context of efforts to attain sustainable global development:
● Sustainable development is no longer a matter of the “North” giving “aid” to the “South”; it is a
question of balanced sharing of opportunities, responsibilities and options.
● More and more developing countries are fuelling their own development, and are providing
development co-operation themselves (Chapter 2).
● Poverty reduction and sustainable development increasingly hinge on progress towards resolving
“problems without passports” – war and conflict (Chapter 19), environmental and climate challenges
(Chapter 18), a precarious financial environment, unfair trade terms (Chapter 21) and infectious
diseases – problems that traditional development approaches are not equipped to tackle (Chapter 17).23
EXECUTIVE SUMMARYAddressing such global challenges requires the contribution of all actors – each of whom needs
to take responsibility for individual and collective action.
ODA still matters
In the context of these widening windows of opportunity and growing challenges, ODA remains
vital for sustainable development, especially when used strategically and “smartly”. For example:
● ODA can provide crucial funds and backing for the fragile and least developed countries, which find
it hard to attract or raise other resources (Chapter 19).
● ODA can be used to make investment attractive in high-risk situations by spreading and sharing
risk, and by creating incentives (Chapters 11, 12 and 15).
● ODA can help countries raise and manage their own domestic resources through capacity building
and sharing of good practice (Chapters 7 and 14).
● ODA can support the creation of a positive development and investment environment through
policy reform in areas such as investment and trade (Chapters 12 and 21).
Development will increasingly be sustained from within
Developing countries are increasingly using their potential to fuel their own development and
move out of “aid” dependency. They are doing so, for example, by:
● Building the capacity of their tax systems. In absolute numbers, tax revenues dwarf ODA: the total
collected in 2012 in Africa was ten times the volume of development assistance provided to the
continent (Chapters 1, 7 and 14).
● Finding creative ways of harnessing the expanding pool of remittances sent home by migrants
working overseas. Remittances are the largest source of external finance for many developing
countries, reaching USD 351 billion in 2012 – higher than both ODA and foreign direct investment
(Chapter 10).
● Creating the policies and environment required to attract investment by businesses in other
countries, including other developing countries (Chapter 12).
● Tackling corruption and the loss of money through illicit financial flows (Chapter 13).
Next steps
The world can fund sustainable development: the resources are out there. The challenge for the
global community is to take stock of the funding options available and to harness, co-ordinate and
track them to achieve the post-2015 goals. Some key actions highlighted in this report include:
● Target ODA where it is needed most – the least developed countries and fragile states – and use it
to mobilise other resources.
● Re-engineer the ODA concept to ensure it is fit for purpose in the current financial environment.
● Make innovative use of all sources of finance with potential for achieving the global post-2015
Sustainable Development Goals.
● Improve co-operation and mutual reinforcement among all financial providers on efforts targeted
at achieving the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals.
● Support local and global policy reform in the areas of tax, finance, investment and trade, and
ensure coherence among domestic and international policies.
● Step up the legislation and co-operation needed to stem illicit international flows.
● Be politically courageous and innovative in financing global goods such as a stable climate or peace
and security and start developing the structures and mechanisms needed to deliver them.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 201424
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How to better mobilise resources
for sustainable development
by
Raundi Halvorson-Quevedo, Hildegard Lingnau and Julia Sattelberger,
Development Co-operation Directorate, OECD
This is an exciting, and challenging, time for the global community as the details of
the post-2015 development agenda begin to crystallise. The signs are that it will be
a much broader approach than the Millennium Development Goals, applying to
developed and developing countries alike and embodying new concepts and ways of
viewing development. Such a holistic and ambitious agenda will require financing
to match. This first chapter of the Development Co-operation Report 2014
outlines the financing context and gives an overview of the many resources beyond
official development assistance (ODA) that can and should be tapped and
channelled to finance sustainable development. The world now faces the challenge
of mobilising and directing these resources to achieve global goals while keeping
ODA focused on where it can make the greatest difference. The OECD is currently
working to devise new measures of development finance to reflect these major
changes in the development finance landscape and to create the right incentives for
ODA to be used in a smart way to mobilise additional resources to finance
sustainable development.
This chapter also includes an opinion piece by Yun Byung-se, Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, on how Korea’s use of ODA can guide
other countries in their development.27
1. HOW TO BETTER MOBILISE RESOURCES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTTime is nearly up for realising the world’s first internationally agreed vision for reducing
poverty – the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The international community is currently
engaged in wide-ranging discussions and analysis to determine the scope, underlying principles,
priorities and means of implementation of the follow-up set of goals, slated for achievement by 2030.
Although negotiations about this post-2015 development agenda just began in September 2014 at the
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), the signs are that it will be a single and universal agenda
(HLP, 2013; UNGA, 2013a; UNGA, 2013b; UN OWG, 2014). While retaining the poverty reduction and
social development focus of the MDGs, it will integrate social, environmental and economic goals into
a single set of global Sustainable Development Goals. This represents a much broader approach than
the MDGs, applying to developed and developing countries alike and embodying new concepts and
ways of viewing development (Box 1.1). The new agenda will also aim at securing the global enabling
conditions for sustainable development, such as lasting, inclusive and sustainable economic growth;
resilient infrastructure; a stable environment and climate; peace and security; and a fair and equal
trading system.
Box 1.1. The changing development lexicon…
The new global agenda will require buy-in and support from all countries. It is no longer only a
question of the “North” giving “aid” to the “South”. The landscape has shifted and new realities need
to be reflected in new ways of thinking about – and acting upon – development:1
● From aid to development co-operation: The North-to-South approach is developing into a
universal “we are all in this together” vision, where problems are no longer perceived as being
located in the South and solutions in the North; rather, problems as well as solutions can be found
everywhere. OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members will continue to provide
development co-operation, but they are not the only ones. Today, the single biggest provider of
official development assistance (ODA) in relative terms (as a share of its gross national income) is
the United Arab Emirates, which is not a DAC member country.2 Many other forms of co-operation
also are on the rise, such as South-South co-operation, triangular development co-operation and
new multilateral initiatives such as the new BRICS3 Development Bank (see Chapter 3).
● From donor to provider: In the same vein, providers of development co-operation are no longer
seen as charitable “donors”, but rather as providers of diverse types of support (from technical
co-operation to concessional funding and many other means of implementing global goals). Such
solutions should ultimately benefit the world at large.
● From recipient to partner: Many of the countries that used to be called “recipient countries” are
today simultaneously providers and hosts of development co-operation. The post-2015 agenda will
call upon all countries to achieve the global goals through a partnership based on common
interests but differentiated responsibilities reflecting countries’ capacities.
1. For more information about the changing realities and how to live up to them see: Kaul and Conceicao (2006); OECD
(2007); Severino and Ray (2009); Severino and Ray (2010); ECDPM (2012); Greenhill and Prizzon (2012); Kharas and
Rogerson (2012); Greenhill and Ali (2013); World Bank (2013); UNGA (2013c); GPEDC (2011); WEF (2013); WEF (2014).
2. The United Arab Emirates became the first formal Participant in the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) on
1 July 2014 (www.oecd.org/dac/dac-global-relations/uae.htm).
3. The BRICS refers to the country grouping of Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, China and South Africa.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 201428
1. HOW TO BETTER MOBILISE RESOURCES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTA broader agenda will require broader finance
Such a holistic and ambitious agenda will require financing to match. In particular, to finance
poverty reduction and sustainable development, more resources are needed (UN ICESDF, 2014). It is
difficult to estimate the financing that will be needed to achieve the new goals before they have even
been agreed, but recent analytical work carried out by the European Union (EU) gives an idea of the
magnitude of finance available to developing countries to underwrite their development expenditures.
It is estimated that in 2010, public and private resources available to developing countries amounted to
approximately USD 7 129 billion (European Commission, 2013). Taking this as a reference point, it
becomes clear that official development assistance (ODA) – currently at around USD 135 billion a year –
can only make a small, albeit vital, contribution to international development finance (OECD, 2014a).
The money is there – according to the April 2014 IMF World Economic Outlook report, world savings
were estimated to be over USD 22 trillion in 2013 (IMF, 2014; see also UN ICESDF, 2014). This
Development Co-operation Report 2014 explores many resources beyond ODA that can and should be
tapped and channelled to finance sustainable development. The world now faces the challenge of
mobilising and directing these resources to achieve global goals, while keeping ODA focused on
where it can make the greatest difference.
A first step will be to get a handle on the relative weights of savings across the public and private
sectors, both internationally and domestically, in developing countries. The EU study suggests that
public finance from developing country domestic markets – 98% of which was tax receipts – amounted
to almost half of the resources on hand. Private investment – from both domestic and international
sources – accounted for 51% of the total, with almost three-quarters of this being provided by domestic
sources, including private households and businesses. Altogether, public and private resources from
developing countries themselves accounted for 84% of total available development finance in 2010
(European Commission, 2013). This emphasises the importance of efficient and effective tax systems,
financial markets and public administration in the developing world. On the other hand, public
international finance – grants, concessional and non-concessional funding from the development
assistance community – amounted to approximately 2% (European Commission, 2013).1
Where will the financing for the global Sustainable Development Goals come from?
Among the important sources of finance available to developing countries today, some have played
an important financing role for many years, including ODA (Chapter 2) and other official finance
(Chapter 4); foreign direct investment (Chapter 5); and finance raised and managed by the
non-governmental sector (Chapter 9). Other more recent sources are providing important and
complementary financial and technical support that can be harnessed for development. These include
South-South co-operation (Chapter 3); institutional investors, such as pension funds (Chapter 6);
developing countries’ own revenues raised through taxation (Chapter 7); funds raised by philanthropic
foundations (Chapter 8); and remittances sent home by migrants working overseas (Chapter 10). Each
of these sources of finance has distinctive attributes and motivations that determine their suitability
for different purposes. The overall sense is of a new, exciting but complex landscape, whose contours
are still to be fully fleshed out. Our challenge now – and the challenge of the international community
as a whole – is to explore their possibilities and harness them creatively to the full (UN OWG, 2014:
target 17.3 and UN ICESDF, 2014). This report aims to clarify them in as clear terms as possible.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 29
1. HOW TO BETTER MOBILISE RESOURCES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTIn my view:
Korea’s use of ODA can guide other countries
in their development
Yun Byung-se,
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea
Many countries have expressed great interest in Korea’s transition out of extreme poverty by using
ODA effectively to stimulate national development and sustainable growth. Of course, the global
development landscape continues to evolve and each country has its own unique historical,
geopolitical and socio-economic background. Nevertheless, I believe Korea’s development experience
offers some key insights.
First, the Korean government channelled ODA to rebuild the war-torn country and establish social
infrastructure for economic growth, while making efforts to mobilise other sources of development
finance and to achieve fiscal independence. For example, it created an enabling environment for
foreign private investment and also established a solid framework for the sustainable mobilisation of
domestic resources through a series of tax reforms.
Second, the government introduced policies to promote private investment and also systematically
built human capital by establishing private universities and public policy research institutions.
Third, Korea focused on the effective use of development resources. The government’s five-year
national economic development plans, initiated in the mid-1960s, effectively aligned ODA and other
development resources to Korea’s national priorities for economic development, enabling the country
to overcome abject poverty and build a strong foundation for sustainable development.
Lastly, Korea placed renewed emphasis on its historical and cultural values of learning and
education. This ensured the consistent development of human capital, even during the periods of
colonisation and the Korean War, thereby facilitating rapid reconstruction and economic take-off in
the post-war period. Indeed, this enabled Korea to overcome its development constraints, such as its
relatively small size and its lack of natural resources.
Between 1945 and the late 1990s, the total amount of ODA received by Korea reached approximately
USD 12.7 billion. Over the same period, Korea recorded an impressive 390-fold increase in its
per capita income, from USD 67 in 1953 to USD 26 205 in 2013. In other words, from use of grants for
post-war reconstruction in the 1950s to industrialisation founded on social and economic assistance
in the 1960s and 1970s, Korea’s experience was indeed the embodiment of the vision, “beyond aid,
towards development”.
The diversification of development resources, placing ODA at the core but with a limited timeframe,
and the sustainable mobilisation of domestic resources, were key prerequisites for the success of
these efforts.
In my view, Korea’s experience – taking ownership and successfully mobilising development
resources through the catalytic use of ODA – offers useful policy reference points for developing
countries’ implementation of the post-2015 development agenda. Development should be led by
developing countries themselves, taking a practical approach tailored to their own specific situations
and needs. Each country needs to strengthen its own capacity to establish effective policies and
institutions in support of its strategic vision for development on the ground. As a member of the
OECD Development Assistance Committee, Korea will continue to share its experience with the
international community when and where it can be useful.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 201430
1. HOW TO BETTER MOBILISE RESOURCES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTA decade of strong growth across the developing world has generated increased liquidity and a
large pool of assets (especially through domestic savings) that is being invested in national
development priorities. The MDGs have driven strong growth in national expenditures and
concessional funding in the social sectors – such as education and health – over the past 15 years.
Massive public and private investment in productive capacity in emerging economies has quickened
the pace of globalisation and fuelled a transformative shift in global manufacturing output from the
North to the South. This accelerated economic expansion has seen developing countries’ share in
global savings rise to 46%, nearly double the level of the mid-1960s (Bussolo and Dailami, 2013). Many
developing countries – particularly in the middle-income grouping – have been able to tap
international capital markets thanks to their dynamic growth, stronger governance capacity and
improved creditworthiness. Foreign direct investment has also risen strongly – in part due to
burgeoning South-South trade and investment flows. Today, approximately 30% of outward foreign
direct investment is from developing countries (Chapter 5).
All this means that development finance will increasingly come from developing countries
themselves – through greater efforts at collecting taxes and spending them effectively (Chapters 7
and 14); by stemming illicit financial outflows (Chapter 13); and by continuing the recent upward
trends in South-South foreign direct investment (Chapter 5) and trade (Chapter 21). South-South
co-operation – the exchange of resources, technology and knowledge among developing countries –
is also growing in importance; the BRICS are becoming especially active development financiers for
other developing countries (Chapter 3).
The chapters in this report present an array of creative new ways of raising money for
sustainable development and the emerging global goals. Some are already in operation – others need
more political support to get off the ground. From crowdfunding to vaccine bonds, advance market
commitments and international levies; from a carbon tax to green bonds and redirection of fossil fuel
subsidies – the potential outlined in this report is huge. It is estimated that innovative financing
mechanisms can raise over USD 600 billion every year – five times as much as ODA in 2012
(Chapter 15).
But these resources need to be better co-ordinated to serve global goals and the amounts
mobilised need to be measured and tracked. Above all, developing countries need to be ensured full
access to these diverse sources of finance.
A globalising world characterised by closer inter-linkages among countries, institutions,
companies and people creates problems that know no borders. Solutions will only be readily found
through international collective action to deliver much-needed global public goods such as stable and
efficient international financial markets, peace and security, a healthy environment and climate, fair
international trade (Chapter 21) and global knowledge for development. International consensus and
concrete collective action on global public goods have been elusive up to now (Chapter 17).
Today, approximately 30% of outward foreign direct investment is
from developing countries.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 31
1. HOW TO BETTER MOBILISE RESOURCES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTSmart ODA can have a multiplier effect
ODA remains an important source of finance to promote sustainable development in a post-2015
world. In order to live up to current challenges, ODA can also be used to mobilise more resources
(especially from the private sector) for sustainable development (the “In my view” box above outlines
Korea’s smart use of ODA). Such smart approaches include:
● using ODA better to support developing countries – and especially fragile states – in mobilising
their own domestic revenue through tax assistance, capacity development, partnership/twinning
arrangements and tailored tax advice (Chapters 14 and 20)
● using ODA to help support countries create a conducive environment for investment, including the
long-term financing required for infrastructure development (Chapters 6, 11 and 12)
● using ODA to support developing countries in making their growth green and inclusive (Chapter 18)
● agreeing on a target for international co-operation – such as 2% of GDP to fund global public goods,
global sustainable development and welfare – and on a mechanism for monitoring progress
(Chapter 17)
● developing a global tracking and co-ordination mechanism for new and emerging sources of
development finance (Chapter 15)
● using ODA to leverage resources from the private sector by diversifying and sharing risk
(Chapters 11, 12 and 15).
ODA providers also need to make a firm commitment to a concrete target for support to the least
developed countries and fragile states. The DAC is considering upgrading the ambition of the current
United Nations target for all development co-operation providers of giving 0.15-0.20% of their gross
national income as ODA for the least developed countries (see also UN OWG, 2014, target 17.2). There
is certainly room to improve, as collectively DAC members only reached 0.09% in 2012 (OECD, 2014b).
One suggestion supported by the DAC Chair would be to set a voluntary target of giving a significant
share of ODA (e.g. 50%) to countries most in need.
This Development Co-operation Report complements current OECD work on devising a new broader
measure of official support for development to reflect the major changes in the development finance
landscape (Box 1.2).
Box 1.2. The DAC’s work on new measures of development finance
At its 4-5 December 2012 High Level Meeting, the DAC acknowledged the need to modernise its
development finance framework to better reflect the new global development landscape, agreeing on
the following mandate.
Mandate
● Develop a proposal for a new measure of total official support for development – to complement,
not replace ODA – in order to better capture the full extent of official “donor efforts” and recipient
resource receipts.
● Investigate ways of representing both “donor effort” and recipient benefit of development finance.
● Establish, at the latest by 2015, a clear, quantitative definition of “concessional in character”* for
ODA loans to address recent concerns regarding ODA loans that, in the context of today’s
historically low international interest rate structures, can be provided at preferential rates to
developing countries – but on terms that permit donors to receive net income on the operation.
● In light of the above, put forward proposals to modernise the ODA concept.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 201432
1. HOW TO BETTER MOBILISE RESOURCES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTBox 1.2. The DAC’s work on new measures of development finance (cont.)
Objective
The main objective of modernising the DAC development finance framework is to adapt to today’s
realities of global development finance. This includes capturing new financial instruments and
providers, better valuing providers’ efforts and recipients’ perspectives, and ensuring that incentives
promote the most efficient uses of financial resources. Another objective is to strengthen the
credibility of the system to address growing criticism of the ODA measure over the past decade,
including members’ differing reporting practices on how to calculate the subsidy component of ODA
loans, which have cast doubt on ODA as a reliable indicator of provider effort.
Work up to now
In order to modernise ODA, the work of the OECD Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD) up
to now has focused on (Chapter 2):
● Investigating a shift from recording net financial flows as ODA to scoring only the grant element
(concessional or subsidy component) of loans and other financial instruments as ODA, as opposed
to their full face value.
● Using a more appropriate discount rate for calculating the grant element (as opposed to the current
10% rate); this would align with prevailing financial market conditions.
● Examining how to standardise the reporting of “in-donor” components of ODA (i.e. expenditures in
the providers’ own countries, such as first-year refugee costs, administrative costs, student costs)
to improve their legitimacy, transparency and comparability, thereby addressing criticisms of
“phantom ODA” (i.e. ODA that does not flow to developing countries).
● Looking at how to channel an increased share of ODA to the countries most in need, to counter the
trend of declining ODA levels to least developed countries.
In carrying out this work, the DAC has consulted with a range of international experts through an
Expert Reference Group on Development Finance; a recent report summarises the group’s final
conclusions and recommendations (OECD, 2014c).
A new headline statistical measure, total official support for development, is also being considered.
This new measure could include the non-concessional component of official development finance as
well as expenditures on peace and security, climate and other global challenges. It could help meet
the needs of the international community in monitoring the broader sustainable development
agenda after 2015. There is a consensus that the new measure should distinguish between official
flows and private flows mobilised by official action.
Partner countries’ perspectives
In close collaboration with the UN system, the OECD has also started a number of consultations to
better capture flows of development finance from partner countries’ perspectives. This could
contribute to a more comprehensive and transparent post-2015 statistical information and
monitoring system and help partner countries take a more strategic approach to financing their
development priorities.
Proposals for modernising the DAC statistical systemwill be presented for approval at the DAC High
Level Meeting in December 2014.
* See the Glossary for definitions.
Sources: OECD (2014b), “Modernising the DAC’s development finance statistics”, OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/dac/
externalfinancingfordevelopment/documentupload/SLM%20Dev%20Fin%20DAC(2014)9.pdf; OECD (2014d), “Scoping the new
measure of total official support for development (TOSD)”, OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/dac/stats/documentupload/DCD-
DAC(2014)35-ENG.pdf; OECD (2012), “2012 DAC HLM communique”, OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/dac/HLM%20Communique
%202012%20final%20ENGLISH.pdf.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 33
1. HOW TO BETTER MOBILISE RESOURCES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTThe time for ideas is now
This is an exciting and challenging time for the global community. The details of the post-2015
development agenda and the financing strategy underpinning it will be fleshed out over the coming
year. The new financing strategy will likely build on the financing for development agenda agreed at
Monterrey in 20022 and Doha in 2008,3 but will be a broader, more complex and innovative plan
setting out where the global development finance agenda is headed over the next 15 years. Together
these frameworks will shape the scope and focus of global progress for the next generation and
identify where and how the necessary finance will be mobilised and allocated.
The time for generating ideas and proposals is now. This report demonstrates that the resources
are there, but they need to be tapped and channelled to finance sustainable development and the
provision of global goods. To make this happen political leadership as well as incentives for
mobilising and channelling resources for sustainable development are needed.
The Development Co-operation Report 2014 provides key recommendations on how to get started,
move on andmake progress in this journey which is a challenge to all countries and all actors around
the world.
Notes
1. The remainder of available finance came from international private sources, including foreign direct and
portfolio investment, bank lending, remittances and philanthropies.
2. The Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development (2002), details in the Glossary.
3. The Doha Declaration on Financing for Development (2008), details in the Glossary.
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Chapter 2
Keeping ODA focused in a shifting world
by
Suzanne Steensen, Development Co-operation Directorate, OECD1
As the international community works towards a new global sustainable
development framework to replace the Millennium Development Goals, one of the
main questions is how it will be financed. The relative importance of official
development assistance (ODA) is declining for many developing countries – especially
middle-income ones – in comparison to other sources of external finance (low-interest
loans, direct foreign investment, official export credits, private grants,
remittances, etc.). This chapter argues that while 148 developing countries are eligible
to receive ODA, they are not all the same in terms of their needs and relative access to
ODA and other sources of external finance. By categorising these countries into
five groups according to their degree of fragility and income levels, the authors find
that ODA growth is slowing in those countries which need it most – fragile states and
least developed countries. They call for more to be done to target ODA where it is
needed most. The United Nation’s target of allocating 0.15-0.20% of gross national
income as ODA to least developed countries needs to be more closely monitored. In
middle-income countries, ODA can be better used for eliminating stubborn pockets of
poverty and inequality and leveraging other types of development finance, while
being careful that the increasing use of loans does not create unsustainable debt for
these countries.
This chapter also includes two opinion pieces by: 1) Gyan Chandra Acharya,
United Nations Under-Secretary-General, on how half of all ODA should go to
the least developed countries; and 2) Alicia Bárcena, Executive Secretary of the
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, on the structural
gap approach as a newmodel for co-operation with middle-income countries.39
I.2. KEEPING ODA FOCUSED IN A SHIFTING WORLDThe post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals will set a global agenda that holds the potential for
putting all developing countries on a path to prosperity and equality, with no country left behind. If
the international community wants to fulfil this potential and end poverty by 2030, then official
development assistance (ODA; see Box 2.1) needs to be put to the best possible use.
Today, the sources of finance for developing countries from beyond their borders – “external
finance” – are becoming increasingly varied and many question the continuing role of ODA (see
Chapter 1). Over the past decade, overall growth in foreign direct investment, portfolio investment
and other forms of private finance has outpaced ODA growth (Figure 2.1). Nonetheless, concessional
finance (Box 2.1) is still of vital importance for the world’s poorest countries and people. Using it in a
smart way, including for mobilising other kinds of finance, is imperative (Lomøy, 2013).
There are large differences in developing countries’ needs and access to finance
Better targeted ODA requires an in-depth analysis of which countries depend on it themost – and
these cannot be identified based on income per capita alone. Today, there are 148 countries on the
OECD’s DAC List of ODA Recipients, meaning they are eligible to receive ODA (Box 2.1). Yet, these
countries are extremely varied. For example, their annual per capita gross domestic product (GDP)
ranges from less than USD 300 to over USD 12 000.While some of these countries are classified by the
United Nations as least developed countries, the DAC list also includes lower middle-income and
upper middle-income countries as classified by theWorld Bank.2
Box 2.1. The vocabulary of official development assistance
The OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) currently comprises 28 OECD member
countries, as well as the European Union. The DAC monitors and shares statistics and information on
the architecture of official development assistance (ODA) and other flows of development finance to
help ensure that it is transparent and effective.
The DAC List of ODA Recipients shows all countries and territories eligible to receive ODA. These
consist of all low- and middle-income countries based on gross national income per capita as
published by the World Bank, with the exception of G8 members, EU members and countries with a
firm date for entry into the EU. The list also includes all of the least developed countries as defined by
the United Nations. For more information, see www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclist.
ODA describes financial and technical support provided by official agencies, including state and
local governments, or by their executive agencies to countries and territories on the DAC’s List of ODA
Recipients and to multilateral development institutions. This support is administered with the main
aim of promoting the economic development and welfare of developing countries and finance is
concessional in character (provided at far lower than market rates, for longer terms and with
conditions which allow grace periods for payments), including a grant element of at least 25%.
For more details see the Glossary at the end of this report.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 201440
I.2. KEEPING ODA FOCUSED IN A SHIFTING WORLDSome of the countries on the DAC List of ODA Recipients are defined as fragile states. These
countries are simply less equipped to deal with volatile changes, whether political, environmental or
economic (see Chapter 20). The OECD DAC maintains a list of states considered to be fragile, which
currently includes 51 countries and economies.3 While some providers target their concessional
funding to fragile states, this is also a very diverse grouping, whose per capita income ranges from
USD 216 (Democratic Republic of Congo) to USD 5 620 (Libya).
Another sub-set of countries on the DAC List of ODA Recipients may also receive concessional
loans from the International Development Association (IDA).4 These are mainly countries that are
assessed as lacking access to international financial markets.
This chapter examines the composition of external development finance (including ODA) for
five groups of countries that result from the overlaps between the various classifications outlined
above (Figures 2.2 and 2.3):
● Group 1 (fragile, least developed countries): 33 fragile, least developed countries that are eligible
to receive concessional lending from the IDA; these are primarily low-income and lower middle-
income countries in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia.5
● Group 2 (non-fragile, least developed countries): the 15 remaining least developed countries,
which are not fragile but are eligible to receive concessional lending from the IDA; these countries
are primarily concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa.
● Group 3 (other fragile): 16 fragile, primarily lowermiddle-income countries that are eligible to receive
concessional lending from the IDA; the countries in this group are scattered across the world.
Figure 2.1. The relative weight of ODA in external financing
to developing countries, 2000-11
Notes: Total external financial resources include bilateral ODA, other official flows (OOF), private grants, private flows at market
terms and remittances from DAC countries, and concessional and non-concessional outflows from multilateral agencies.
From 2005 onwards, private grants are based on estimates from the Hudson Institute’s Centre for Global Prosperity, which uses a
more generous definition than DAC statistics, including, for example, the imputed value of volunteer time.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933121221
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 ● Group 4 (mainly lower middle-income countries): 22 countries, primarily lower middle-income
countries and upper middle-income countries in Asia or the Americas, that are also on the IDA list.
● Group 5 (mainly upper middle-income countries): the remaining 60 countries on the DAC List of
ODA Recipients, primarily upper middle-income countries in the Americas and Asia, which are
neither fragile nor IDA eligible.
This grouping allows some interesting patterns to emerge (Figure 2.3).
Figure 2.2. Sub-groupings of ODA-eligible countries
Notes: In theory, the overlaps across these lists would allow for eight different groups. However, no country belongs to the group consisting of
least developed countries that are not IDA eligible; and in two other cases, the groups are populated by very few countries, which would not al
a proper statistical analysis of their characteristics or external financial resources. From these two cases, the following countries/economies hav
reallocated: 1) Equatorial Guinea is included in the “mostly upper middle-income countries” group despite the fact it is still a least developed co
2) Egypt, Iraq, Libya and Syria are included in the “other fragile” category, despite the fact that they are not IDA eligible. In addition, the Dem
Republic of Korea and theWest Bank and Gaza Strip have been excluded from the analysis because of a lack of data.
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I.2. KEEPING ODA FOCUSED IN A SHIFTING WORLDFigure 2.3. ODA-eligible sub-groups at a glance: Characteristics and finance flows
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The categorisation in Figure 2.3 gives a more detailed picture of ODA dependence. While it is
often argued that the relative importance of ODA is diminishing, in actual fact, this is not true at all
in some countries; in others the decline is so small that it is still not enough to break dependence.The
uneven distribution of external financial flows across groups of developing countries is shown in
Figure 2.4.
Least developed countries are the most dependent on ODA
Of all developing countries, least developed countries – both fragile and non-fragile – are the
most heavily ODA-dependant. In 2011, ODA still represented over 70% of the USD 70 billion of
financial inflows to least developed countries (Figure 2.4). This was well above the average of 16% for
all ODA recipients that same year and is explained by least developed countries’ low capacity to
attract other forms of external finance. In 2011, private market flows still accounted for only 15% of
total external finance to least developed countries; remittances accounted for an estimated 10%,
while the shares of other official flows6 (3%) and private grants (1%) were even smaller.
Middle-income countries still face many development challenges
For many middle-income countries – Groups 4 and 5 – the relative importance of ODA has
diminished significantly. In 2011, it accounted for only 18% of total external finance for these
two groups (Figure 2.4). ODA volumes were also less than 5% of the size of their domestic tax
revenues, compared to 46% in least developed countries (Figure 2.3). Nevertheless, these groups of
countries are home to most of the world’s poor, and therefore poverty reduction and a fairer
distribution of wealth remain important development challenges for them. ODA can play an
important role, targeting stubborn pockets of poverty in these countries and leveraging other flows
(see the “In my view” box contributed by Alicia Bárcena).
Figure 2.4. External finance to developing countries, 2000 and 2011
Notes: LDC: least developed country; LMIC: lower middle-income country; UMIC: upper middle-income country.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933
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ODA can play an important role in middle-income countries, targeting
stubborn pockets of poverty and leveraging other flows.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 201444
I.2. KEEPING ODA FOCUSED IN A SHIFTING WORLDIn my view:
The Structural Gap approach offers a new model
for co-operation with middle-income countries
Alicia Bárcena,
Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
Middle-income countries differ widely in their reliance on official development assistance (ODA).
While for some, ODA represents less than 1% of their gross national income, for others it is more
than 30%. This divergence reflects countries’ differing capacity to access financial resources and
capital markets.
The DAC List of ODA Recipients (Box 2.1) shows all countries and territories eligible to receive
official development assistance. The list includes low- and middle-income countries, as well as the
least developed countries, defined according to their gross national income (GNI) per capita. As we
review the future of ODA, we need to ask: Is per capita income the best criterion for allocating official
development assistance? And how can we deal with the heterogeneity of middle-income countries?
First, the use of income per capita as an allocation criterion relies on two assumptions:
1. That as countries increase their income per capita they will be able to mobilise a larger pool of
international and domestic resources to finance their development needs and become less
dependent on ODA.
2. That income levels reflect a given stage of social and economic development.
Evidence shows that a country’s capacity to access external resources depends on many factors
besides income per capita.These include conditions outside their control, such as country risk ratings
and perceptions, external demand for the products from that country and country size
(i.e. population). Similarly, domestic resource mobilisation depends on numerous factors, including
levels of savings, development and strength of financial markets, and the capacity and willingness of
the government to levy taxes and collect duties (Chapters 7 and 14). Evidence also shows that despite
similar income levels, countries may have different development realities. For example, people may
vary widely in their access to social protection mechanisms, formal financial institutions and quality
education, as well as in their resilience to economic and social shocks.
Second, far from being a homogeneous category, middle-income countries are a widely
heterogeneous social and economic grouping with a large diversity of needs. For example, in 2012
income per capita in these countries ranged from USD 1 006 to USD 12 275.
As a way forward, ECLAC proposes the Structural Gap approach as an alternative criterion to that of
per capita income (ECLAC, 2012). This approach is based on the premise that there is no single
classification criterion applicable to all countries and underscores the fact that income level cannot
be equated with development level. It identifies key areas where there are obstacles to sustained,
equitable and inclusive growth in middle-income countries (or “gaps”): equality and livelihoods,
investment and savings, productivity and innovation, infrastructure, education, health, taxation,
gender and the environment. Countries themselves are responsible for identifying the main gaps that
hamper their social and economic development.
In my view, the debate on the future of ODA can benefit from the Structural Gap approach, which
offers a basis for inclusive and egalitarian co-operation. It should be part of the post-2015 framework,
helping to reorient co-operation away from the “donor-recipient” dichotomy towards a new model of
co-operation among equals, following the principle of common-but-differentiated responsibilities.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 45
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121297ODA growth is slowing in those countries that need it most
Between 2000 and 2011, ODA grew by 63% overall, but this growth was unevenly distributed
across developing countries (Figure 2.5). While ODA increased considerably for fragile states
(Groups 1 and 3), its growth was only modest for the non-fragile, least developed countries (Group 2).
Over the past three years, how ODA is prioritised across developing countries has started to shift.
ODA growth in least developed and fragile middle-income countries is slowing down (Groups 1, 2
and 3), while it is increasing for other middle-income countries (Groups 4 and 5; Figure 2.5). Projections
from the OECD/DAC’s Forward Spending Survey indicate that this trend will continue (for example, see
OECD, 2013b). Nonetheless, this may run counter to commitments made by ODA providers, such as to
the UN target for ODA to least developed countries of 0.15-0.20% of gross national income (GNI) and the
DAC 1978 Recommendation on theTerms and Conditions of Aid, under which providers agreed to raise
the overall grant element of their ODA/concessional funding to 86%, with special provisions for least
developed countries (and see Gyan Chandra Acharya’s “In my view” box).
These trends are mainly explained by the low interest rates of recent years, allowing loans from
market-raised funds by a few large DACmembers to qualify as ODA because they meet the ODA grant
element test.7 This means that ODA loans are growing faster than ODA grants (grants: from 7%
in 2000-07 to 3% in 2008-11; loans: from -0.1% in 2000-07 to 9% in 2008-11). Since ODA loans are
typically offered to middle-income rather than least developed countries, this explains how, overall,
growth in ODA to middle-income countries is surpassing growth in ODA to least developed countries.
Over the past decade, the external debt of several developing countries has diminished
considerably, partly thanks to debt forgiveness initiatives. Care is needed tomake sure that the surge in
loans does not reverse this situation.Vigilance is also needed to ensure that governments’ spending on
poverty reduction and development is not undermined by their loan repayment obligations.
Figure 2.5. How is ODA growing across the country groups?
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933
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ODA growth in least developed and fragile middle-income countries is slowing
down, but increasing in other middle-income countries.
ODA loans are growing faster than ODA grants: the surge in loans must not
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Half of all ODA should go to the least developed countries
Gyan Chandra Acharya,
United Nations Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for the Least Developed
Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States
The UN classifies as “least developed countries” those nations that are at the bottom of the
development ladder from all perspectives. The category was created in recognition of the deep-seated
structural constraints these countries face, resulting in low per capita income, weak human capital
and high economic vulnerability. Without help, they are unable to adequately address their
development challenges, irrespective of the efforts they may make. Moreover, they are the most
exposed to economic shocks and degradation of natural capital, including through climate change.
Their need for enhanced and targeted support from the international community is obvious.
Of the 48 least developed countries, 34 are in Africa, 13 in the Asia Pacific region, and 1, Haiti, in
Latin America and the Caribbean. Together they are home to about 900 million people, with a relatively
high share of young people among their populations. Over the past decade, the least developed
countries have made progress in many of the areas targeted by the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs): they have reduced child and maternal mortality, increased enrolment in primary education,
and improved gender equality and women’s empowerment. Yet they still have a very long way to go,
and around 50% of their population remain poor.
These countries hold great potential and are rich in human and natural resources – two inseparable
characteristics for their people, who live close to nature. A holistic focus on improving health and
education, building productive capacity and protecting natural capital would greatly contribute to
transforming their economies, enabling them to leapfrog to green economies with relatively few
trade-offs.
The least developed countries are and will continue to be – at least in the short and medium term –
among the countries most dependent on ODA. This source of development finance constitutes more
than 50% of their inflows and public finances and except in the mineral-rich countries, foreign direct
investment in these countries is minimal. While they have been gradually widening their domestic
resource base through tax reforms, on average across the least developed countries the ratio of
government revenues to GDP stands at about 13% and gross domestic savings reach only 15% of GDP.
Yet the investment required for poverty eradication and sustainable development is at least 25-30% of
GDP over a long period of time (Commission on Growth and Development, 2008).
In my view – which is also shared by the least developed countries – much of this shortfall must be
filled by ODA. From both a moral standpoint, and in the interest of the long-term well-being of the
global community, those that are in danger of slipping should be given foremost priority. It is urgent
that the level, quality and focus of ODA to the least developed countries be scaled up and
consolidated. Channelling 50% of total ODA to the least developed countries will be an important step
in that direction. At the same time, ODA can have a strong leveraging impact on other sources of
development finance (Chapter 11).
In this day and age it is unacceptable that so many remain below the poverty line in the least
developed countries. We have the means to help them.We need to summon the necessary collective
will to do so. The alternative is continued deprivation for a large number of people, which also
represents a threat to global peace, security and environmental sustainability.
Source: Commission on Growth and Development (2008), The Growth Report: Strategies for Sustained Growth and Inclusive
Development, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, Washington, DC, https://
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Traditional development co-operation providers are offering more non-concessional lending and
market-like financial instruments to developing countries. This provides an opportunity to explore
how official financing (whether concessional or non-concessional) can better catalyse resources for
development in diverse country contexts. Understanding this better will help shape the priorities for
ODA, using it more innovatively by exploring how resources can be better leveraged and allocated
(discussed more fully in Chapter 1).
As new sources of development finance emerge, there is scope to target concessional funding
better – among and within countries. Developing countries that rely less on concessional finance,
such as manymiddle-income countries, will still need external finance to meet sustainable goals and
to reduce poverty and inequalities. At the same time, countries that are not able to attract significant
volumes of external flows other than ODA, and for which ODA is the largest and least volatile source
of finance – such as the least developed countries and fragile states – will still need to rely on
concessional funding for some time. Otherwise, these countries – many of which are already falling
behind on global development goals – will fall even further.
Finally, developing countries need better information on the entire palette of financial resources
available to them to finance their development agendas. Increasing the detail and comprehensiveness
of existing reporting to the OECD would allow for a more complete picture of total global concessional
financing for sustainable development (Box 2.2). This increased transparency would also improve
accountability and provide the public, policy makers and the academic community with reliable data
for their debates, decision making and research. To this end, a new and broader framework for
financing for sustainable development, taking into account both providers’ and recipients’
perspectives, is being developed by the UN and by the DAC (see also Box 1.1 in Chapter 1).
Box 2.2. Concessional development finance provided by non-DAC countries
An increasing number of non-DAC member countries provide concessional finance that could be
considered eligible for recording as ODA. This includes OECD countries that are not members of the
DAC (currently Chile, Estonia, Hungary, Israel, Mexico and Turkey); Arab donors (notably Kuwait,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates); and the “BRICS” (Brazil, the Russian Federation,
India, China and South Africa). These countries’ development co-operation programmes have very
varied objectives, volume and instruments – be they financial flows, exchanges of knowledge and
experience, or the provision of goods – but they all aim to foster sustainable development and reduce
poverty. (Part IV of this Development Co-operation Report provides more information on these countries’
development co-operation programmes.)
There are currently no complete or internationally comparable statistics available on the flows of
concessional finance from the totality of non-DAC countries, as many of them do not report to any
international statistical system. Some of them have national reporting systems that provide useful
information, although not in a format that makes it easily comparable with other countries’
contributions. For others, only rough and incomplete estimates are available. Only 17 non-DAC
member countries report their development finance statistics to the DAC, some at the aggregate level,
others in considerable detail. The concessional finance for development from these countries
amounted to USD 6.5 billion in 2012, compared to USD 126.9 billion by DAC countries. A cautious
estimate by the OECD indicates that concessional finance for development from non-DAC countries
that do not report to the OECD DAC amounted to USD 5.1 billion in 2012.
In addition, some of these countries provide other types of finance that are not considered to meet
the criteria of ODA – for instance non-concessional loans, co-operation through religious entities or
some peace and security expenditures.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 201448
I.2. KEEPING ODA FOCUSED IN A SHIFTING WORLDKey recommendations
● Use the post-2015 process to refocus ODA levels, modalities and distribution, targeting ODA where
it is most needed so as to increase its effectiveness.
● Monitormore attentively the target of allocating 0.15-0.20% of GNI as ODA to least developed countries.
● Domore to increase the catalytic effect of official development finance, including by supporting the
provision of global public goods (see Chapter 17) and helping middle-income countries face their
sustainability, poverty and inequality challenges.
● Improve monitoring of how much, and in what form, ODA actually reaches developing countries
and how effective it is in different country contexts, such as fragile states and middle-income
countries. At a minimum, such analysis should include assessments of: the sectoral composition
of ODA allocations, their modalities (grants/loans) and the proportion of ODA that actually reaches
developing countries.
● Gain a more comprehensive understanding of how the entire palette of external financial
resources contributes to development, including financial instruments that are not ODA and
concessional development finance provided by countries that are not DAC members.
● Continue to monitor developing countries’ external debt to ensure that the increase in lending to
developing countries does not endanger debt sustainability.
Notes
1. The author wishes to thank Piera Tortora and Fredrik Ericsson for their contributions to this chapter. Box 2.2
was contributed by Willem Luijkx and Talita Yamashiro Fordelone of the Development Co-operation
Directorate, OECD. This chapter is an excerpt from OECD (2013c). For the full analysis, please refer to that
publication.
2. The World Bank country groups are: low income (GNI per capita of USD 1 035 or less); lower middle-income
(GNI per capita of USD 1 036-4 085); upper middle-income (GNI per capita of USD 4 086-12 615); and high
income (GNI per capita of USD 12 616 or more). See http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications.
3. The list of fragile states used by the OECD for its analysis of financial flows in fragile states is neither an official
DAC list nor an official definition. In practice, it is the result of a compilation of two lists: theWorld Bank/African
Development Bank/Asian Development Bank Harmonised List of Fragile Situations, and countries in the “alert”
and “warning” categories on the Failed States Index, developed by the Fund for Peace (http://ffp.statesindex.org).
4. TheWorld Bank’s fund for poor countries.
5. Least developed countries (LDCs) can also be classified as lower middle-income as the LDC classification does
not take income alone into consideration (see the Glossary).
6. Other official flows, or OOFs, are defined as transactions by the official sector which do not meet the
conditions for eligibility as ODA, either because they are not primarily aimed at development or because they
are not sufficiently concessional. See Chapter 4 for more details.
7. The grant element is a calculation reflecting the financial terms of a commitment: interest rate, maturity and
grace period (interval to first repayment of capital). It measures the concessionality of a loan, expressed as the
percentage by which the present value of the expected stream of repayments falls short of the repayments
that would have been generated at a given reference rate of interest. Only loans bearing a grant element of at
least 25% can qualify as ODA (OECD, 2014).
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Chapter 3
Growing dynamism in South-South
co-operation
by
Sachin Chaturvedi, Research and Information System for Developing Countries, India
South-South co-operation – the exchange of resources, technology and knowledge
among developing countries – is increasingly significant for promoting development.
While traditional forms of South-South co-operation (trade, investment and
technology sharing) are still relevant and growing, new approaches are also emerging
that are helping to remodel the development finance landscape. The search for options
that can help to end dependence on long-established financial mechanisms is in full
swing, including bilateral currency swaps, South-South trust funds and new financial
institutions. Such promising developments point to a new era for South-South
co-operation involving deeper engagement, especially in the international finance
domain, which can only strengthen the ability to deliver sustainable development in
the future.51
I.3. GROWING DYNAMISM IN SOUTH-SOUTH CO-OPERATIONOver recent years South-South co-operation1 has evolved significantly, with a deepening of
engagement across a range of sectors, from trade to investment and technology development. It has
also moved beyond traditional government-to-government co-operation to involve the private sector,
civil society and other non-state actors. Finally, new approaches to financing are emerging, including
currency exchange, South-South trust funds and development banks such as the BRICS2 Development
Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Bank.While the participation of all developing countries in this new
wave of opportunity may not be uniform, these initiatives are promoting a growing sense of optimism.
This chapter describes the latest trends in South-South co-operation.
South-South co-operation is remodelling the development finance landscape
The rising volume of development assistance from leading “Southern” providers has expanded
global development financial flows. For example, Brazil’s international development co-operation
grew from USD 160 million in 2005 to nearly USD 923 million in 2010 (Milani, 2014; IPEA, 2014). The
People’s Republic of China operates one of the biggest development co-operation programmes in the
South; it has already provided a total of USD 41.08 billion as concessional funding, comprising grants,
interest-free loans and concessional loans (Hong, 2011).
At the 6th Summit of Heads of State and of Government of BRICS, held in Fortaleza, Brazil in
July 2014, the BRICS Development Bank was formally launched as the New Development Bank with
initial capital of USD 50 billion.3 This bank intends to complement other sources of development
finance by mobilising resources to support infrastructure and sustainable development projects in
the BRICS countries, as well as in other developing countries. The member countries have displayed
their willingness to work as a group to promote growth in the South, demonstrating their ability to
deliver mutual benefits and collective gains. At present, China and the Russian Federation are the
only two BRICS countries able to maintain a healthy current account surplus. Apart from US treasury
bonds, they will see the BRICS Development Bank as an option for investing these surpluses. This will
not be the case, however, for other countries such as India, which will be investing borrowed
resources in the bank (Roy, 2014). The bank’s membership and shareholder base will be broad and it
will promote equal representation through core principles, such as one-member-one-vote.
The South is not a homogenous group, but comprises countries at different stages of
development, moving at varied speeds. For this reason, the structure of the bank will be participatory,
encouraging other developing countries to join as equal partners. Each member is expected to hold
an equal amount of equity in the bank and if anymember invests more of their surpluses, this should
be used for lending rather than increasing their stake in the bank. This will also prevent the
governance structure from being solely based on the economic weight of its members and maximise
the bank’s reach, giving it much greater economic influence. Furthermore, the bank will restrict
membership to developing countries only – no developed country or multilateral development bank
will be admitted as a stakeholder of the institution. Of course, the admittance of developed countries
China’s development co-operation programme is one of the biggest
in the South, having already provided a total of USD 41.08 billion
in concessional funding.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 201452
I.3. GROWING DYNAMISM IN SOUTH-SOUTH CO-OPERATIONor multilateral development banks controlled by developed countries could give the BRICS Bank
superior leveraging power thanks to their attractive rating profiles, but this would be at the cost of
significant interest in and control of the new entity by developed countries, which would seriously
dilute the branding of the institution as a bank for, of and by the developing world (Roy, 2014).
In parallel, China is laying the groundwork for its Asian Infrastructure Development Bank, whose
core focus will be on financing infrastructure to enhance regional connectivity in Asia. The bank will
have an initial capital of USD 50 billion (Shan, 2014). China claims the bank will not compete with
traditional multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund or the
Asian Development Bank.While these institutions also have infrastructure development as their top
priority, it is expected that the opening up of another channel for developing countries to finance
their infrastructure requirements will offer new options and hopes for bridging resource gaps.
Another novel financial arrangement is the India, Brazil and South Africa Fund (IBSA Fund). This
fund was established in 2004 to identify new opportunities for contributing to international efforts to
combat poverty and hunger (IBSA, 2004). The fund has accumulated nearly USD 18 million. Working
in partnership with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the fund supports
projects – mostly in Africa – that address both social and economic inequality. The specific objectives
of the three countries are reflected in the fund’s priorities, which range from promoting food security
to addressing HIV/AIDS and improving access to safe drinking water; all aim to contribute to the
Millennium Development Goals (IBSA, 2011).
Currency swaps capture new opportunities for mutual benefits
The recent wave of “currency swap” arrangements (Box 3.1 and Table 3.1) is further strengthening
South-South co-operation, enabling developing countries to forge new economic relations. Currency
swaps help ensure that bilateral trade is unaffected by global financial conditions.
The Asian Infrastructure Development Bank will have an initial capital
of USD 50 billion.
Box 3.1. What are currency swaps?
Developing countries are increasingly entering into currency swap arrangements that allow them
to promote trade and investment in local currencies. In most currency swap arrangements, countries
do business in their local currencies at predetermined and fixed exchange rates, preventing the
erosion of domestic currency as a result of trade imbalances. In this way, currency swaps defend
against international liquidity shocks and lower the transaction costs involved in bilateral exchanges
among domestic firms.
For example, the Indian Ministry of Commerce has prepared a list of 23 countries with which India can
enter into currency swap arrangements. The list includes a mix of oil-exporting and non-oil-exporting
countries, among them Angola, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Oman, the Russian Federation, South Africa,
Thailand andVenezuela.
India also helped Bhutan overcome a currency crisis in late 2013, when a sudden rise in imports
from India led to a severe depletion of Indian rupee reserves in Bhutan (The Economic Times, 2013). The
government of India provided an INR 10 billion soft loan through its credit-line facility to ease the
situation. Bhutan also took advantage of the currency swap arrangement that the two countries
signed in 2013 to borrow INR 5 billion (Reserve Bank of India, 2013).DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 53
I.3. GROWING DYNAMISM IN SOUTH-SOUTH CO-OPERATIONThe growth in currency swaps among Southeast Asian countries is largely seen as an outcome of
the Chiang Mai Initiative, set up after the 1997 East Asian crisis. The initiative drew attention to the
interdependence of developing country economies (West, 2014). It has since evolved into a
multilateral currency swap arrangement among the ten members of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN)4 plus the People’s Republic of China (including Hong Kong, China), Japan and
South Korea. It draws on a foreign exchange reserves pool initially worth USD 120 billion, which
doubled to reach USD 240 billion in 2012.
Increasing South-South investment flows reflect deeper integration
Historically, foreign direct investment outflows from developing countries have been low in
comparison to those of developed countries, although this trend seems to be reversing. The share of
developing countries in global foreign direct investment outflows has grown fivefold over the past
three decades – from 6% in 1980 to 31% in 2012 (UNCTAD, 2013a; and see Chapter 5).
Yet, while the relative volume of foreign direct investment outflows from developing countries
remains small, these funds have become increasingly relevant for promoting economic growth in
Southern economies. One interesting aspect of foreign direct investment from developing countries
is that it is largely destined for other developing countries. In this way, the rapid economic growth
experienced by some developing countries has provided opportunities for other Southern countries.
South-South foreign direct investment flows are growing at an annual average rate of 21% (Figure 3.1).
The combined value of foreign direct investment outflows from the BRICS skyrocketed from
USD 7 billion in 2000 to USD 126 billion in 2012, with nearly 58% being received by developing
countries (see Chapter 5). Further, 43% of foreign direct investment from the BRICS to developing
economies was intra-regional in character (UNCTAD, 2013b).
South-South co-operation includes skills and trade, not just finance
South-South co-operation takes many forms other than finance. It has helped expand the scale
and nature of development co-operation, enabling providers to move beyond concepts of human
resource development centred around training programmes alone. In emerging economies such as
Table 3.1. Some recent South-South currency swap arrangements
Bilateral partners Monetary arrangement
2011 China-Thailand CNY 70 billion/THB 320 billion
2011 South Korea-China KRW 64 trillion/CNY 360 billion
2012 China-Malaysia CNY 180 billion/MYR 90 billion
2013 China-Brazil CNY 190 billion/BRL 60 billion
2013 South Korea-Malaysia KRW 5 trillion/MYR 15 billion
2013 South Korea-the United Arab Emirates KRW 5.8 trillion/AED 20 billion
2014 South Korea-Indonesia KRW 10.7 trillion/IDR 115 trillion
Sources: Bank of Thailand (2011), “The establishment of a bilateral local currency swap agreement between the People’s Bank of
China and the Bank of Thailand”, Press Release, 22 December, Bank of Thailand; Financial Times (2011), “South Korea doubles
currency swap deal with China”, Financial Times, 26 October 2011; Bank Negara Malaysia (2012), “Bilateral currency swap
arrangement agreement with the People’s Bank of China”, Press Statements, 8 February, Bank Negara Malaysia; Bank Negara
Malaysia (2013), “Bilateral currency swap arrangement with Bank of Korea”, Press Statements, 20 October, Bank Negara Malaysia;
Banco Central do Brasil (2013), “The Central Bank of Brazil and the People’s Bank of China establish a currency swap agreement”,
Press Release, 26 March, Banco Central do Brasil; Bank Indonesia (2014), “Bilateral local currency swap arrangement with the Bank
of Korea”, Press Release, 6 March, Bank Indonesia; Bank of Korea (2013), “The Bank of Korea and Central Bank of the United Arab
Emirates announce the establishment of a KRW/AED Swap Arrangement”, Press Releases, 13 October, Bank of Korea.
South-South foreign direct investment is growing at an annual average rate
of 21%.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 201454
I.3. GROWING DYNAMISM IN SOUTH-SOUTH CO-OPERATIONBrazil, China, India and South Africa, progress has helped them build their development co-operation
efforts, introducing new modalities that have opened up avenues for other developing countries. For
instance, in 2008, India announced its Duty FreeTariff Preference for Least Developed Countries, with
a tariff reduction spread over five years (2008-12). The scheme is open to 49 of the least developed
countries (including 34 in Africa). Both China and India provide preferential buyer’s credits to
promote investment in the production sectors of their partner countries; these credits create a
win-win opportunity for both providers and development partners, as goods, services, machinery
and equipment as well as consultancy services are exported to partner countries under agreements
based on principles of mutual gain.
This is not to say that programmes for capacity development, training and scholarships are not still
important; in fact, they have seen impressive growth. For instance, the Indian Technical & Economic
Cooperation Programme (ITEC), India’s flagship scholarship and fellowship programme launched
in 1964, began by offering 1 400 training slots to students from other developing countries; today it
provides more than 10 000 scholarships annually to students from 167 countries. China also provides
training to more than 15 000 people from other countries every year. The focus of these
programmes – in areas such as computer engineering, statistics, chartered accountancy, industrial
surveys, civil aviation, telephone mechanics, fisheries, legislative procedures and textile industrial
technology – reflects the new strengths of these countries.
Trade among developing countries has also helped provide new opportunities for economic
growth that bypass trade restrictions imposed by developed countries. South-South trade as a share
of world trade grew from 8% in 1980 to 27% in 2010; over the same period, North-South trade fell
from 46% to less than 30% (UNDP, 2013).
Figure 3.1. Growth in South-South foreign direct investment, 1990-2009
Source: Author’s own calculations based on the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development statistics, http://unctad.org/
en/pages/Statistics.aspx (accessed 20 May 2014).
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933121316
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
%
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
 2
00
9
19
94
19
93
19
92
19
91
19
90
South-South foreign direct investment (left-hand axis)
FDI flows (in USD million) 
South-South foreign direct investment as a % of world foreign direct investment
South-South trade grew as a share of world trade from 8% in 1980
to 27% in 2010, while North-South trade was falling.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 55
I.3. GROWING DYNAMISM IN SOUTH-SOUTH CO-OPERATIONIn the absence of domestic frontiers of innovation similar to those available in developed
countries, developing countries previously relied extensively on imported capital goods
(e.g. machinery, tools, computers or other equipment used to produce goods for sale). Until the
mid-1990s, developed countries were the favoured source for high-skill intensive manufacturing
goods; through these imports, developing countries were able to learn and innovate.5
Over the years, trade in capital goods among developing countries has climbed steadily (from 35%
in 1995 to 54% in 2010).6 This reflects the strengthening of South-South trade relations since the
late 1990s. In particular, developing countries in East and Southeast Asia have substantially
strengthened their trade ties with other developing countries, and now import most of their high-tech7
manufactured goods from this grouping (65% and 55% respectively). Other countries have also reduced
their dependence on developed countries for high-tech goods.
In 2010, developing countries exported 62% of their high-tech manufactured goods to other
developing countries (see Endnote 6). This rise in South-South high-tech exports can be explained by
the combined effect of the technology spillovers from imports of high-tech goods described above, as
well as trade liberalisation, lowering of tariffs and removal of quantitative restrictions on imported
capital goods. As a result, several developing countries have successfully diversified their production
base, reorienting it away from traditional primary exports to manufacturing and services-based
industries. This shift, however, is still largely confined to a small group of developing economies.
Civil society is strengthening South-South co-operation
Some Southern civil society organisations (CSOs) are also becoming active players in other
developing countries. They have enhanced their expertise in key relevant sectors, ranging from
health, water and sanitation, and microfinance to capacity building and training. CSOs work at the
grassroots level and often develop innovative approaches that have high impact. The political
mobilisation and involvement of civil society in South-South co-operation has increased considerably
and Southern countries are now treating civil society as important development actors, not simply as
subcontractors.
The emerging Southern providers of development co-operation – including Brazil, China and
India – are actively involving their civil society in promoting development for all. For example, India’s
policy for economic and development co-operation explicitly focuses on bilateral channels, but at the
same time recognises the role of civil society as a development actor that should be engaged by the
development partner itself (Vaes and Huyse, 2013). In Bangladesh, BRAC (formerly the Bangladeshi
Rural Advancement Committee), the largest non-profit organisation in the developing world, places
great emphasis on providing medical care to low-income populations. BRAC has evolved a holistic
approach to addressing poverty by providing micro-loans, education, health services, jobs and
human rights education in countries across the South. Similarly, Brazilian CSOs are increasing their
presence and co-operation in Africa. A study of Brazil’s international development efforts suggests
that “a growing number of Brazilian public national institutions or organi[s]ed civil society, in its
diverse categories, have incorporated overseas activities as part of their daily work routines”
(Tomlinson, 2013). Brazilian CSOs and social movements also have been important in articulating the
demands of smallholders in policy.
South-South co-operation is founded on equity and mutual benefit
South-South co-operation continues to evolve both in terms of magnitude of flows and forms of
delivery. Recent improvements in the economies of the emerging economies are allowing them to
support the development of other countries and deliver appropriate solutions. In order to spread and
sustain this co-operation, partners should continue to embrace the two basic principles of
egalitarianism and mutual benefit. Emerging economies, in particular, will need to pay closerDEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 201456
I.3. GROWING DYNAMISM IN SOUTH-SOUTH CO-OPERATIONattention to the principle of egalitarianism in order to spread and sustain the spirit of South-South
co-operation over the long run. It needs to be ensured that these are balanced, win-win partnerships
through which the benefits are shared among all the development partners.
Key recommendations
● Continue to embrace the partnership principles of egalitarianism and mutual benefit in spreading
and sustaining South-South co-operation.
● Support trade among developing countries as a key way to provide new opportunities for economic
growth.
● Enable more developing countries to diversify their production base away from traditional primary
exports to manufacturing and services-based industries.
● Recognise the key role of civil society organisations in South-South development.
Notes
1. The exchange of resources, technology and knowledge among developing countries, also known as countries
of the global South.
2. BRICS: Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, China and South Africa.
3. The decision to set-up a BRICS-led Development Bank was made at the 5th BRICS summit held in Durban,
South Africa in March 2013.
4. ASEAN is a political and economic organisation of ten countries in Southeast Asia: Brunei, Cambodia,
Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar (Burma), Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam. Its aims
include accelerating economic growth, social progress, socio-cultural evolution, protection of regional peace
and stability, and opportunities for member countries to discuss differences peacefully.
5. Prebisch (1959) was one of the first to argue that developing countries could realise large gains by integrating
their domestic markets and building competitive manufactured goods.
6. Author’s own calculations based on the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development statistics,
http://unctad.org/en/pages/Statistics.aspx (accessed 20 May 2014).
7. Used in this chapter to refer to high-skilled, technology-intensive manufactured goods.
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Chapter 4
The growing development potential
of other official flows
by
Alexander Klein, Cécile Sangaré and Giovanni Maria Semeraro,
Development Co-operation Directorate, OECD
The development finance landscape has changed dramatically over the past
two decades, with the relative importance of official development assistance (ODA)
declining in comparison to other external finance available to many developing
countries. Since 2008, “other official flows” (beyond ODA) – provided at close to
market terms and/or with a commercial motive – from public bodies in OECD
Development Assistance Committee member countries and multilateral institutions
have made up, on average, one-third of all official flows to developing countries.
This chapter outlines recent trends in these other official flows, their development
potential and impact. International financial institutions are the largest providers of
non-concessional development finance, representing almost two-thirds of their
operations in 2012; more than 95% went to middle-income countries. Officially
supported export credits, although commercially motivated, can also help finance
large projects in developing countries. These flows deserve greater consideration in
developing countries’ search for external financial resources.59
I.4. THE GROWING DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL OF OTHER OFFICIAL FLOWSUntil recently, the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has centred its development
co-operation policy recommendations on official development assistance (ODA), with little
consideration of other official financial flows1 to developing countries, despite their potential
developmental motivation and impact. Since 2008, other official flows have come to represent, on
average, one-third of all official flows (finance extended to developing countries by public institutions
from DAC members and multilateral institutions; see Figure 2.1, Chapter 2).
Since the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development (see Glossary), discussions on
external resources for development have increasingly paid attention to sources of finance other than
official development assistance. These discussions have gained new momentum in the light of
efforts to design a new set of Sustainable Development Goals to replace the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs) when these expire in 2015. The broadening of the debate on development finance
echoes the rapid evolution of the development financing landscape since the MDGs were agreed, and
the fact that many countries, especially in the middle-income group, now have access to a much
more diverse range of sources of finance – domestic and international, public and private. In addition,
the global financial crisis has reduced the volume of private investment in developing countries,
resulting in an increasing demand for risk-mitigation instruments to unlock private investment and
increase access to finance (see Chapters 11 and 12).
This chapter outlines how other official flows fit into this changing landscape, with a special
focus on non-concessional finance from national and international development finance institutions
(Box 4.1) to support private sector development. The chapter also gives an overview of officially
supported export credits, which can also help finance large projects in key sectors of developing
countries’ economies.
Other official flows are gaining importance in the development finance landscape
Since the global financial crisis of 2008, non-concessional funding from national and
international development finance institutions, as well as from other development co-operation
actors focusing on private sector development, has played a critical role in catalysing private
investment and helping to fill funding gaps, in particular those affecting infrastructure and trade.
In addition, many development finance institutions are increasingly investing in investment
funds in order to support private sector development and compensate for the shortfall of private
equity in developing countries.
The development potential of other official financial flows has been rather
overlooked.
Official guarantees for development mobilised over USD 15 billion of private
financing between 2009 and 2011.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 201460
I.4. THE GROWING DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL OF OTHER OFFICIAL FLOWSGuarantee schemes2 (whether developmentally or commercially motivated), have also played a
key role in minimising the impact of the crisis on trade finance and the availability of liquidity,
thus enabling the launching of development-relevant projects in developing countries. A recent
DAC survey has highlighted that guarantees extended with a development motive mobilised
over USD 15 billion of private sector flows to/in developing countries between 2009 and 2011
(Mirabile et al., 2013; see also Chapter 11).
Many countries that are not members of the DAC have also been important providers of
development co-operation for decades (see Box 2.2 in Chapter 2).These include the BRICS – Brazil, the
Russian Federation, India, China and South Africa – as well as countries providing Islamic finance
(explained in Chapter 11).3 Their involvement unlocks an attractive source of finance for many
countries (for example, BRICS’ financing to developing countries reached over USD 4 billion in 2012).
Over the past ten years, these development partners have grown rapidly in number; in some cases
their levels of development co-operation now exceed those of individual DAC members. In particular,
some of these countries are also helping to transform the development finance landscape through
alternative co-operation strategies andmodalities, such as South-South co-operation (see Chapter 3).
The development community is also increasingly looking at official institutional investors as
potential sources of long-term investment in developing countries (see Chapter 6). For instance,
sovereign wealth funds are state-owned investment funds that invest globally in real and financial
assets such as stocks, bonds, real estate or precious metals, or in alternative investments such as
private equity fund or hedge funds. They are created either to ensure that a country’s resources are
preserved for future generations or to stabilise government fiscal and/or foreign exchange revenues
and their macroeconomic balance. Total assets managed by sovereign wealth funds have been
growing rapidly over the past few years, reaching a record high of USD 6.1 trillion at the end of 2013.
Box 4.1. What are “development finance institutions”?
National and international development finance institutions are specialised development banks or
subsidiaries set up to support private sector development in developing countries. They are usually
majority owned by national governments and source their capital from national or international
development funds or benefit from government guarantees. This ensures their creditworthiness, which
enables them to raise large amounts of money on international capital markets and provide financing
on very competitive terms.
National or bilateral development finance institutions are either independent institutions, such as
the Netherlands Development Finance Company (FMO), or part of larger bilateral development banks,
such as the German Investment and Development Company (DEG), which is part of the German
development bank KfW. They are both among the largest development finance institutions
worldwide.
Multilateral development finance institutions are the private sector arms of international financial
institutions that have been established by more than one country, and hence are subject to
international law. Their shareholders are generally national governments, but could also occasionally
include other international or private institutions. These institutions finance projects in support of
the private sector through mainly equity investments, long-term loans and guarantees. They usually
have a greater financing capacity than bilateral development banks and also act as a forum for close
co-operation among governments. The main international financial institutions with a private sector
arm are the World Bank Group through the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the European
Investment Bank (EIB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the African Development Bank
(AfDB) and the Islamic Development Bank (IDB).DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 61
I.4. THE GROWING DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL OF OTHER OFFICIAL FLOWSInternational financial institutions are by far the largest providers of other official flows
International financial institutions can offer developing countries either concessional or
non-concessional finance depending on the country’s income group classification (see Chapter 2).
In 2012, both types of financing amounted to USD 70 billion (gross disbursements), slightly more than
the previous year, following a substantial decrease from peak volumes reached in 2009 and 2010
(Figure 4.1). TheWorld Bank Group4 and the regional development banks are, in terms of volume, the
most prominent providers of multilateral development finance.
International financial institutions’ concessional financing (i.e. ODA-like financing) – either grants
or highly concessional loans – is mainly allocated to least developed and low-income countries, while
their non-concessional operations (or other official flows) tend to target middle-income countries.
These institutions use a wide range of financial options for their non-concessional operations,
increasing their financial offer beyond traditional development finance to include instruments such as
loans at close to market terms (including syndicated loans), mezzanine finance, equity investment,
risk-mitigation instruments (e.g. guarantees), trade finance and shares in investment funds (all these
terms are explained in Chapter 11 or the Glossary). A third type of finance offered by these providers is
called “blended finance”. This combines a concessional and a non-concessional component to soften
the terms and conditions of the final financial package (e.g. lower interest rate, longer tenor or pay-back
period). Blended finance is gaining importance in some international financial institutions’ portfolios
(e.g. the International Finance Corporation, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
and regional development banks such as the IDB).
Figure 4.1. Share of non-concessional financing in international financial institutions’
total operations, 2000-12
Gross disbursements, USD billion, constant 2012 prices
Notes: IBRD: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; IDB: Inter-American Development Bank; ADB: Asian
Development Bank; IFC: International Finance Corporation; EBRD: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; AfDB:
African Development Bank. IBRD and the IFC are part of theWorld Bank Group.
Source: OECD (2011a), “Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: Disbursements”, OECD International
Development Statistics (database), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en; OECD (2011c), “Detailed aid statistics: Other official flows
OOF”, OECD International Development Statistics (database), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00075-en; OECD (2012), “Creditor Reporting
System: Aid activities”, OECD International Development Statistics (database), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00061-en.
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ICsIn 2012, non-concessional financing represented almost two-thirds of international financial
institutions’ total financing, and more than 95% of it was extended to middle-income countries.
Brazil, Mexico, India, Turkey and the People’s Republic of China benefited the most, receiving a total
of USD 16.4 billion (Figure 4.2). IBRD and the ADB were the largest multilateral providers of
non-concessional finance: USD 15.1 and 6.9 billion respectively in 2012 (Table 4.1). International
financial institutions’ non-concessional finance was mostly (77%) allocated to infrastructure projects
in the economic (e.g. transport, energy) and social (e.g. health, water supply and sanitation) sectors
(Figure 4.3).
Figure 4.2. Geographical allocation of international financial institutions’ operations, 2012
Gross disbursements, USD billion
Notes: LDCs: least developed countries; Other LICs: other low-income countries; LMICs: lower middle-income countries and territories; UMICs
middle-income countries and territories.
Source: OECD (2011a), “Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: Disbursements”, OECD International Development St
(database), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en; OECD (2011c), “Detailed aid statistics: Other official flows OOF”, OECD International Devel
Statistics (database), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00075-en; OECD (2012), “Creditor Reporting System: Aid activities”, OECD International Devel
Statistics (database), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00061-en.
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121373Development finance institutions help fill the gap between public aid
and private investment
Economic growth is critical for creating jobs and reducing poverty. Yet the private sector in
developing countries is held back by poor access to finance, inadequate infrastructure, a poor
investment climate, a large informal sector and a lack of skilled workers. A more enabling
environment could allow the private sector to contribute to sustainable development in many ways,
from economic growth to environmental sustainability. This is why today private sector growth is
targeted across the development agenda (IFC, 2011).
Table 4.1. Non-concessional financing by international financial institutions, 2012
Gross disbursements
International financial institutions Non-concessional financing, USD billion % of total financing
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/International Development Association 15.14 60
Asian Development Bank 6.90 79
Inter-American Development Bank 6.51 80
International Finance Corporation 6.41 100
African Development Bank 3.51 65
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 3.34 100
Islamic Development Bank 1.30 82
European Investment Bank 0.76 11
OPEC Fund for Agricultural Development 0.45 60
International Fund for Agricultural Development 0.06 10
Caribbean Development Bank 0.04 36
Source: OECD (2011a), “Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: Disbursements”, OECD International Development St
(database), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en; OECD (2011c), “Detailed aid statistics: Other official flows OOF”, OECD International Devel
Statistics (database), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00075-en; OECD (2012), “Creditor Reporting System: Aid activities”, OECD International Devel
Statistics (database), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00061-en.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933
Figure 4.3. International financial institutions’ operations by sector, 2012
Commitments
Source: OECD (2011b), “Detailed aid statistics: Official bilateral commitments by sector”, OECD International Development Statistics (database),
dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00073-en; OECD (2012), “Creditor Reporting System: Aid activities”, OECD International Development Statistics (database),
dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00061-en.
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In 2012, more than 95% of the international financial institutions’
non-concessional funding went to middle-income countries.
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dfi-National and international development finance institutions can play a valuable role in
stimulating growth directly by addressing employment, poverty reduction and inclusive growth, or
indirectly by addressing important challenges such as climate change, food security and
environmental sustainability (Box 4.2). Furthermore, support from development finance institutions
can be a major ingredient of growth strategies, for instance by mobilising investment, promoting
technology transfer, supporting labour market standards, promoting exports and encouraging
savings (World Bank, 2008). These institutions can also give firms access to long-term loans as well as
equity capital in situations where private financing is discouraged by high risk. The current gradual
withdrawal of capital from developing countries, especially the rapidly growing economies,
highlights the value of such long-term finance, which can help to stabilise an economy during
economic downturns (World Bank, 2014; and see Chapter 6). In high-risk countries and sectors, equity
investment or mezzanine finance can bring both development results and commercial viability.
Furthermore, it offers the opportunity for these institutions to transfer knowledge in management
Box 4.2. Africa, energy and the European Development Finance Institutions
National and international development finance have the potential to enforce compliance with environmental a
social standards. They share common environmental and social guidelines, such as the IFC Performance Standards
Environmental and Social Sustainability (IFC, 2012); the World Bank Environmental, Health and Safety Sec
Guidelines1 and the conventions of the International Labour Organization. By following these guidelines, they tar
job quality and inclusiveness in business activity (IFC, 2011).
For example, the association of European Development Finance Institutions (EDFI) is a group of 15 bilate
institutions operating in developing countries. They are mandated by their governments to finance and invest
profitable private sector enterprises in order to foster growth in sustainable business, help reduce poverty and, t
larger extent, contribute to achieving the MDGs by promoting economically, environmentally and socially sustaina
development (EDFI, 2013).
Although investing globally, Africa is a key priority for the EDFI, which in 2013 invested EUR 975 million in the Afric
Caribbean and Pacific and Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regions. The EDFI member institutions often join for
to finance larger projects, thus increasing their development impact and spreading risk.This is important becausema
energy infrastructure projects require economies of scale to be bankable, and because long-term funding is scar
especially in Africa, where the country risks are often considered too high for commercial banks to provide funding.
The European Financing Partners (EFP), established in 2004, is an example of such collaboration involving t
European Investment Bank and 12 other development finance institutions. Together they promote private sec
development in African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. An independent evaluation of EFP-financed energy proje
in sub-Saharan Africa showed that the EDFI provided finance on terms unavailable from commercial lenders, as w
as key advisory support (Dalberg, 2012). For example, in Kenya, the EFP invested in Olkaria III – an independe
geothermal power producer – and Rabai Power, the most efficient thermal plant in Kenya. The EFP invested in the
projects because they were less attractive to commercial lenders (e.g. high perception of risks). The resulting n
electricity generation should help support hundreds of thousands of additional jobs and will lead to national c
savings in the tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars. For example, Olkaria III has allowed economic bene
from lower costs and higher reliability: the plant added 3.5% in national capacity, is currently supplying 6% of Keny
energy consumption and helped reduce load shedding2 in the country while reducing environmental impacts.
The EDFI’s growing portfolios – from EUR 21.7 billion in 2010 to EUR 28.1 billion in 2013 – reflect the increasi
importance of private sector support in the development agenda. But they also demonstrate the economica
sustainable way these institutions work: the EDFI’s profits are retained and reinvested in new development projec
which contribute to increasing its portfolios over long-term profitable periods.
1. Available at www.ifc.org/ehsguidelines.
2. Voluntary blackouts to safeguard electricity consumption.
Source: Adapted from Meyer, C. (2012), “EDFI: Africa and energy access – Financing impact”, CFI.Co online, 26 July, http://cfi.co/africa/2012/07/e
africa-and-energy-access-financing-impact.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 65
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urestandards, accounting and corporate social responsibility.5 Finally, in addition to their own funds,
development finance institutions help to bring in financing from other investors, who are often
reassured by the image of viability that these institutions can lend to a firm, sector or country.
Development finance institutions’ support to the private sector represents a significant share of
capital flows to developing countries, reaching USD 18.6 billion in commitments in 2012, 68% of
which were provided by international financial institutions. These operations represented one-third
of international financial institutions’ non-concessional operations and were mainly allocated to
lower and upper middle-income countries, with Turkey, India and Mexico being the top recipients
(Figure 4.4).The share of their private sector operations has followed an upward trend since the global
financial crisis. The IFC and EBRD were by far the largest multilateral providers in this domain. The
main sectors that benefitted from these operations were economic infrastructure (60%) and
production and services (35%).
Officially supported export credits can be critical for financing large projects
in developing countries
Projects in developing countries may also be financed through export credits extended by official
export credit agencies. Export credit agencies provide government-backed loans, guarantees and
insurance to corporations working internationally. These credits are commercially motivated and
have no explicit objective of promoting economic development and welfare in host economies.
However, by mitigating risks for investors and enabling production and large infrastructure or energy
projects (e.g. roads, dams or hydroelectric plants) to evolve, these flows play a critical role in
providing access to capital in developing countries (Figure 4.5). For this reason, officially supported
export credits deserve more attention in broader analyses of developing countries’ external
finance – even if they are not official development finance.
Figure 4.4. International financial institutions’ non-concessional operations with the private sector,
Source: OECD (2011a), “Detailed aid statistics: ODA Official development assistance: Disbursements”, OECD International Development St
(database), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en; OECD (2011c), “Detailed aid statistics: Other official flows OOF”, OECD International Devel
Statistics (database), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00075-en; OECD (2012), “Creditor Reporting System: Aid activities”, OECD International Devel
Statistics (database), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00061-en; OECD (2011b), “Detailed aid statistics: Official bilateral commitments by sector”
International Development Statistics (database), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00073-en.
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I.4. THE GROWING DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL OF OTHER OFFICIAL FLOWSOECD member countries’ export credit agencies follow environmental and anti-corruption
standards developed by the Working Party on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees,6 as well as the
financing guidelines of the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits which came into
existence in 1978 and has been signed by most OECD countries.7 In order to avoid potential trade
distortions (e.g. through the use of financial subsidies), the main purpose of the arrangement is to
provide a framework for: 1) the orderly use of officially supported export credits (e.g. minimum
interest rates, risk fees and maximum repayment terms); and 2) the orderly use of tied aid (see the
Glossary). It also ensures fair competition, based on the price and quality of the exported goods.
In recent years, export credit volumes have been decreasing to developing countries, from
USD 75 billion in 2010 to USD 55 billion in 2012 (in terms of gross disbursements), according to DAC
statistics. During this period, Japan, followed by Germany, Canada, the United States and France,
were the main DAC providers of export credit financing to developing countries (Figure 4.6). Among
developing countries, middle-income countries were the main beneficiaries, with Turkey, India,
Mexico, Brazil and China being the largest recipients in 2011 and 2012 (receiving a total of
USD 31 billion; Figure 4.7).
Figure 4.5. Which sectors benefit from export credits in developing countries?
Commitments 2010-12
Source: Export Credit Group statistics.
Figure 4.6. Main DAC providers of export credit financing, 2010-12
Gross disbursements
Notes: DAC and Export Credit Group (ECG) statistics on officially supported export credits differ to some extent and for some
countries.While DAC statistics cover disbursements on operations with a maturity of one year and above, the ECG data represent
export credit commitments with a maturity of two years and above.
Source: DAC aggregate geographical tables.
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I.4. THE GROWING DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL OF OTHER OFFICIAL FLOWSKey recommendations
● Give greater attention to other official flows in countries’ development co-operation strategies as a
relevant alternative and complement to ODA.
● Prioritise the effective use of other official flows in emerging economies to free up ODA for the
poorest countries.
● Do more to exploit the potential of other official flows for engaging the private sector for
development, in particular:
❖ Development finance institutions’ non-concessional financing, while avoiding market
distortions in developing countries.
❖ Official funds extended with a clear commercial motive and close to or at market conditions,
such as export credits, for financing productive sectors and large infrastructure projects.
Notes
1. Other official flows are defined as transactions by the official sector which do not meet the conditions for
eligibility as ODA, either because they are not primarily aimed at development or because they are not
sufficiently concessional. Concessional finance refers to loans provided at lower than market rates for
developing countries, for longer terms and with conditions which allow grace periods for payments. For more
details see the Glossary.
2. Guarantees act as a type of “insurance policy” against the risks of non-payment, facilitating financial flows to
developing countries and high-risk sectors.
3. A set of very specific financial instruments used in the Islamic world.
4. Comprising the International Development Association (IDA), the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC).
5. With equity investments development finance institutions are usually provided a seat on the board of directors.
6. Also known as the Export Credit Group (ECG). All OECD countries, with the exception of Chile and Iceland, are
members of this OECD body. For more information, see www.oecd.org/tad/xcred/ecg.htm.
7. Available at: www.oecd.org/tad/xcred/theexportcreditsarrangementtext.htm.
Figure 4.7. Top 10 beneficiaries of export credits, 2011 and 2012
USD billion, current prices
Notes: DAC and Export Credit Group (ECG) statistics on officially supported export credits differ to some extent and for some
countries.While DAC statistics cover disbursements on operations with a maturity of one year and above, the ECG data represent
export credit commitments with a maturity of two years and above.
Source: DAC aggregate geographical tables.
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Chapter 5
Putting foreign direct investment
to work for development
by
Michael Gestrin, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, OECD
Foreign direct investment in developing countries can create jobs, develop
technology and new productive capacity, and help local firms access new
international markets. Over the past two decades, developing countries have
steadily increased their share of global foreign direct investment. In 2012 for the
first time, their share exceeded that of developed countries, making foreign direct
investment by far the biggest source of international capital flows to developing
countries (60% on average). This chapter reviews the trends in foreign direct
investment in developing countries, and their implications. Foreign direct
investment has displayed volatility at the global level, although developing
countries have been cushioned to some extent by the increase in South-South
investment, especially by the People’s Republic of China. In 2012, China was the
fifth largest outward investor in the world, accounting for 5% of global flows.
Regional shares are uneven, however, with Africa receiving the lowest share by far
of global investment flows. There is also an increase in the phenomenon of
“investment de-globalisation”, which is weakening the economic linkages between
developed countries and the rest of the world.71
I.5. PUTTING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT TO WORK FOR DEVELOPMENTIt has long been recognised, including in the 2002 Monterrey Consensus on Financing for
Development (see Glossary), that private international investment has a positive role to play in
supporting long-term sustainable development. Foreign direct investment1 (FDI) represents by far the
biggest international capital inflow into developing countries (USD 600 billion in 2012 or 60% of all
international capital flows to developing countries). It is often viewed as one of the more stable
sources of private international investment, as compared to portfolio investment (investment in
another country’s securities, such as stocks and bonds). At a micro-level, the main reason for this is
that foreign direct investment reflects the long-term investment decisions of firms seeking to bolster
existing – or to establish new – productive capacity in international markets.
The relatively stable nature of foreign direct investment is one reason that it is viewed as one of
the most development-friendly sources of private investment. This, and the fact that it is usually
associated with job creation, technology transfer and new productive capacity.When it involves firms
with international coverage, it can help local firms access new international markets through the
intra-firm trade linkages generated by the operations of multinational enterprises.
However, the past two decades have demonstrated that this type of investment can also be
volatile. After reaching a record USD 1.4 trillion in 2000, global foreign direct investment flows fell by
56% over the following two years, due in part to the bursting of the dot-com bubble. Then, after
breaching the USD 2 trillion mark in 2007, foreign direct investment fell by 40% during the first
two years of the global financial crisis. Six years later, in 2013, it was still down by 30%.
This chapter examines the trends in foreign direct investment in developing countries and the
implications of these ups and downs.
Foreign direct investment to developing countries is on the rise
The two boom-and-bust cycles that have characterised global foreign direct investment flows
over the past 20 years are shown in Figure 5.1, as well as foreign direct investment inflows into
developing countries and their share of the global total between 1990 and 2012.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the counter-cyclical nature of developing countries’ share in global foreign
direct investment inflows, which tends to shrink during global boom years and grow when global
foreign direct investment is declining. In the three years leading up to the peak of global foreign direct
investment in 2000, developing countries’ share of these global flows was cut in half, from around
40% to 20%. Over the following three years (2000-03), as global flows declined by 57%, developing
countries’ share again rose to around 40%. The same pattern repeats itself in the years leading up to
and following the 2007 peak.
Foreign direct investment is characterised by cycles of boom and bust:
after passing USD 2 trillion in 2007, it fell by 40% during the first two years
of the global financial crisis. Six years later, in 2013, it was still down by 30%.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 201472
I.5. PUTTING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT TO WORK FOR DEVELOPMENTNevertheless, developing countries have enjoyed more stable foreign direct investment cycles
than the developed countries, growing less rapidly during the boom periods but falling less violently
during recessions. This finding is encouraging from a development perspective and runs counter to
the commonly held assumption that developing countries are the first places where multi-national
enterprises cut back when times get tough. For example, Figure 5.1 shows a strong increase in the
share of global foreign direct investment received by developing countries during the global financial
and economic crisis (2008 onwards). This strong performance occurred as outward foreign direct
investment from OECD countries, the source of around 80% of the world’s foreign direct investment,
declined by almost USD 800 billion. Thus while OECD countries’ share dropped 57% below 2007 levels
in 2012, foreign direct investment inflows into developing countries were up 19% over the same
period – an increase of over USD 100 billion.
The main explanation for this somewhat paradoxical combination is the increase in so-called
South-South foreign direct investment over that period – in other words, international investment from
developing countries going to other developing countries. Today, approximately 30% of outward foreign
direct investment is from developing countries, compared with an average of around 15% over the past
two decades, and these flows are more likely to go to developing countries than developed countries.
The People’s Republic of China alone accounts for around 20% of all foreign direct investment to
developing countries. In 2013, 75% ofAfrica’s inward international mergers and acquisitions came from
developing countries, with over half of this coming from China (discussed below).
Developing countries’ share was also quite high in the mid-1990s, mainly because of the
important role of the extractive industries and oil in total foreign direct investment over this period.
The more recent growth in the share of foreign direct investment going to developing countries has
been driven to a greater extent by investment in manufacturing.
Figure 5.1. Inward FDI into developing economies, 1990-2012
Source: OECD (2014), Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Statistics – OECD Data, Analysis and Forecasts website, www.oecd.org/
investment/statistics; UNCTAD (2014), UNCTADstat website, http://unctadstat.unctad.org.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933121468
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I.5. PUTTING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT TO WORK FOR DEVELOPMENTChina accounts for a large share of both inward and outward foreign direct investment
The significant increase in both inward and outward foreign direct investment to and from
developing countries over the past few years largely reflects the increased activity of China in this
sphere. While China has always tended to attract more investment than other emerging
countries – such as Brazil, India, the Russian Federation and South Africa (collectively known as the
BRICS; Figure 5.2) – its ascendance as the largest outward investor among developing countries began
with the global financial crisis (Figure 5.3). Indeed, by 2012 China had become the fifth largest
outward investor in the world, accounting for 5% of global flows.
Africa receives the lowest share of foreign direct investment
What is the regional picture of FDI? Figure 5.4 shows that in 2012 Asia received the lion’s share of
global investment flows at 30%, followed by Latin America and the Caribbean at just under 20%.
Africa received around 5%.2 Despite Africa’s relatively low share, its FDI-to-GDP ratio of 2.7% shows
that its level of flows are proportional to the size of its economy. The FDI-to-GDP ratio for Asia is
higher, at 3.8%, while the ratio for Latin America is 2.5%. Seventeen African countries received more
than USD 1 billion in foreign direct investment in 2012 (see Chapter 12).
Figure 5.2. The BRICS’ share of G20 inward
foreign direct investment
Notes: BRICS: Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, China and
South Africa; G20: a grouping of 20 major economies
(19 individual countries – Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada,
China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Mexico, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South Africa,
Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States – and the
European Union).
Source: OECD (2014), Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Statistics
– OECD Data, Analysis and Forecasts website, www.oecd.org/
investment/statistics.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933121487
Figure 5.3. The BRICS’ share of G20 outward
foreign direct investment
Notes: BRICS: Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, China and
South Africa; G20: a grouping of 20 major economies
(19 individual countries – Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada,
China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Mexico, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South Africa,
Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States – and the
European Union).
Source: OECD (2014), Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Statistics
– OECD Data, Analysis and Forecasts website, www.oecd.org/
investment/statistics.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933121506
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I.5. PUTTING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT TO WORK FOR DEVELOPMENTInvestment appears to be “de-globalising”
The global financial and economic crisis that started in 2008 gave rise to the first recorded decline
in global foreign direct investment stocks since 1990, from USD 16.6 trillion to USD 15.6 trillion
between 2007 and 2008. The developed countries accounted for over 70% of this decline. A decline in
global investment stocks represents a reduction in the investment-based economic linkages between
countries, a phenomenon that could be described as “investment de-globalisation”.3 Data on outflows
suggest that this trend is accelerating.4
A comparison of the current foreign direct investment recession with the previous one
between 2001 and 2003 suggests that investment de-globalisation is a new phenomenon. When
foreign direct investment flows collapsed during its first major recession in 2000-03, global foreign
direct investment stocks continued to grow by over 10% annually and not a single country recorded a
decrease in its inward or outward foreign direct investment stock positions. How could this happen?
Foreign direct investment data are usually presented either in terms of flows (the inward or outward
amount for a country during a given period of time, usually a year) or in terms of stocks (the current
cumulative value of all foreign direct investment). Even when flows decline, they are usually still
contributing to foreign direct investment stocks, just at a slower rate. This underscores what an
unusual economic event a decline in stocks represents. For stocks to decline, foreign direct
investment flows need to become negative, which happens when foreign investors sell more foreign
assets than they acquire, and repatriate the proceeds.
Firm-level data on international mergers and acquisitions suggest that the phenomenon has
also been affecting developing countries. This is reflected by the sharp increase in the ratio of
international divestment5 to international mergers and acquisitions after 2008. In the five years
from 2004 to 2008, the ratio of international divestment to international mergers and acquisitions in
developing countries was 50%; in the subsequent five years, this ratio increased to 77%, reaching a
record 93% in 2013 (Figure 5.5).
Just as firms engage in international mergers and acquisitions to acquire international assets,
international divestment is also a natural part of the international activities of multinational
enterprises. During different phases of an economic cycle, the relationship between international
mergers and acquisitions and international divestment tends to change.When economic conditions
are good, firms tend to expand through mergers and acquisitions. But during crises, firms tend to
economise by divesting themselves of non-core assets. This explains why, during the foreign direct
Figure 5.4. Regional shares of inward foreign direct investment, 1990-2012
Source: UNCTAD (2014), UNCTADstat website, http://unctadstat.unctad.org.
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I.5. PUTTING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT TO WORK FOR DEVELOPMENTinvestment boom years leading up to the crisis – 2005-07 – the ratio of international divestment to
international mergers and acquisitions was on average 36%. During the three years from 2008
to 2010, once the economic crisis was in full swing, this ratio increased to 45%, reaching 50% by 2013.
The rising levels of international divestment in developing countries do not necessarily
represent investment de-globalisation, since they could entail the transfer of ownership of assets
from one international investor to another. However, from a development perspective, international
divestment is relevant for at least two reasons, which are explained below.
First, the transfer of ownership of an asset from one international investor to another is less
likely to bring as many development benefits as the acquisition of a domestic asset by an
international owner. The latter will usually increase access to international markets and provide the
local facility with newmanagement and productionmethods. Furthermore, mergers and acquisitions
often entail capital infusions as part of the deal and are often accompanied by complementary
investments by the multinational enterprise involved, such as upgrading of infrastructure essential
for the economic activity in question and, in some cases, even the construction of new infrastructure,
such as rail lines or port facilities.
Second, irrespective of who is buying divested assets (domestic or international buyers),
divestments reduce the net international mergers and acquisitions a country receives,6 which is a
more meaningful measure of new economic linkages being created between the domestic economy
and the rest of the world. This is illustrated in Figure 5.6 for China, which shows the gross value of
international mergers and acquisitions received, international divestment, and the resulting value of
net international mergers and acquisitions, which is much reduced since the peaks of 2007 and 2010.
The development impact of foreign direct investment partly depends on the extent to which it
creates new linkages to the global economy. In the case of China, the gap between net international
mergers and acquisitions and gross international mergers and acquisitions remained quite small up
to 2008, but then rapidly widened as international divestment soared. Further analysis would be
required to understand what might cause such a sharp increase in international divestment, but
what is clear from this is that after 2008, international mergers and acquisitions in China seem to
have become more volatile in contrast to an earlier phase during which international investors were
more clearly building up their capacity in the Chinese market.
Figure 5.5. International mergers and acquisitions versus international divestment
in developing countries, 2004-13
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Dealogic,M&AAnalytics’ (database).
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I.5. PUTTING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT TO WORK FOR DEVELOPMENTOne might assume that the sort of dynamics illustrated in Figure 5.6 will have little development
impact for most developing countries, as many of them receive the majority of their international
investment in the form of greenfield investments.7 However, if international divestment continues to
rise and investment de-globalisation proves to be a longer term structural trend, the implications
could be profound since foreign direct investment has grown over the past decades to become the
largest source of international capital for many countries.
Better news is that China’s outward investment shows no signs of reversing course, which is
reassuring given how important Chinese investments have become for developing countries (Figure 5.7).
Figure 5.6. China’s net inward international mergers and acquisitions, 1996-2013
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Dealogic,M&AAnalytics’ (database).
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933121563
Figure 5.7. China’s net outward international mergers and acquisitions
and divestment, 2003-13
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Dealogic,M&AAnalytics’ (database).
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933121582
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I.5. PUTTING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT TO WORK FOR DEVELOPMENTBut as it matures, could China’s outward investment eventually follow the general trend and
start to increase its share of international divestment? While international divestment is a natural
part of the international business environment, for individual developing countries the significant
increase in the ratio of international divestment to international mergers and acquisitions might
herald a more disruptive phase of investment globalisation characterised by restructuring and
adjustment as new sources of international investment emerge and others retreat.
How can the positive aspects of foreign direct investment be harnessed?
For international investment to support long-term sustainable development, the challenge for
governments will be to harness the positive side of its dynamism, and to minimise its more disruptive
and negative effects, as for example when jobs are lost as a result of offshoring,8 through appropriate
adjustment programmes and policies. Part of the solution will involve taking whole-of-government
approaches to improving domestic and international policy frameworks for investment, the focus of
Chapter 12 in this volume.
The development co-operation community may need to think about a new role for official
development assistance (ODA) as a source of counter-cyclical financing as developing countries
become more exposed to the volatility of foreign direct investment, one of the downsides of greater
reliance on private flows.
Key recommendations
● Harness the positive aspects of the dynamism inherent in foreign direct investment and minimise
its more disruptive and negative effects.
● Increase the development impact of foreign direct investment in developing countries by
improving domestic and international policy frameworks for investment (discussed in Chapter 12).
● Consider a new role for ODA as a source of counter-cyclical financing to cushion the volatile nature
of foreign direct investment.
Notes
1. Foreign direct investment is investment by individuals or firms from one country into another, either by buying
an existing firm (through mergers and acquisitions), setting up a new operation (greenfield investment) or by
expanding the operations of an existing business. The three main components of foreign direct investment are
equity investment, inter-company loans and re-invested earnings.
2. See www.unctadstat.unctad.org.
3. This expression has also been used by Joachim Fels, head of global economics at Morgan Stanley, in 2013. See:
www.businessinsider.com/economist-worries-about-de-globalization-2013-10.
4. In 2012, six OECD countries experienced declines in their net foreign asset positions amounting to a combined
USD 42 billion. Between 2008 and 2011, total declines in net foreign assets positions of OECD countries only
amounted to USD 17.7 billion.
5. Divestment or divestiture is the reduction of some kind of asset for financial, ethical or political objectives or
sale of an existing business by a firm. A divestment is the opposite of an investment.
6. Net international mergers and acquisitions are calculated as the value of international mergers and
acquisitions received less the value of assets that international investors divest from a country.
7. Greenfield investment is the creation of a new facility (as opposed to investment in an existing facility).
8. Offshoring is the relocation by a company of a business process from one country to another – typically an
operational process, such as manufacturing, or supporting processes, such as accounting.
Are we entering a more disruptive phase of investment as new sources
of international investment emerge and others retreat?DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 201478
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Chapter 6
Are institutional investors the answer
for long-term development financing?
by
Raffaele Della Croce, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs,1 OECD
Developing countries need long-term investors to help finance activities that
support sustainable growth such as infrastructure, including low-carbon
infrastructure. With USD 83.2 trillion in assets in 2012 in OECD countries alone,
institutional investors – pension funds, insurers and sovereign wealth funds –
represent a potentially major source of long-term financing for developing countries.
Despite the recent financial crisis, the prospect for future growth for institutional
investors is unabated, especially in developing countries. But although interest is
growing, the overall level of institutional investment in infrastructure remains
modest and major barriers to investment still exist. Greater growth will depend on
policy and structural reforms to create a more favourable investment climate, build
private sector confidence and ensure that global savings are channelled into
productive and sustainable investments.
This chapter also includes an opinion piece on long-term investment by
Sony Kapoor, Managing Director of Re-Define, on promoting long-term
investment in developing country infrastructure.79
I.6. ARE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS THE ANSWER FOR LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT FINANCING?Long-term finance plays a pivotal role in fulfilling physical investment needs across all sectors of
the economy (OECD, 2013c). It is also essential for the development of small and medium-sized
enterprises, especially young, innovative, high-growth firms. Addressing the challenge of climate
change and other pressures on the environment will require long-term investments in renewable
energy and low-carbon technologies (G20/OECD, 2013). However, many countries find it hard to secure
long-term investment in these sectors.
For example, the OECD estimates the total requirement for global infrastructure investment for
transport; electricity generation, transmission and distribution; water; and telecommunications to be
around USD 71 trillion by 2030 – about 3.5% of global gross domestic product (GDP) over the same
period (Schieb, 2007).2 Achieving a low-carbon energy sector globally will require an additional
cumulative investment of USD 36 trillion by 2050, including USD 7.35 trillion in the power sector, of
which USD 1.2 trillion would be needed in the People’s Republic of China (IEA, 2012; and see Box 6.2).
Such levels of investment cannot be financed by traditional sources of public finance alone. The
impact of the financial crisis has exacerbated the situation further, reducing the scope for public
investment in infrastructure within government budgets. The result has been a widespread
recognition of a significant infrastructure gap and the need for greater recourse to private sector
finance (OECD, 2013c).
The credit crisis has weakened the capacity of traditional providers of long-term finance – banks –
to provide long-term financing. Can institutional investors (Box 6.1) fill the gap?They offer a potentially
large and diversified source of long-term financing for physical and intangible investment needs
across all sectors in developing countries. This is specifically the case for key drivers of growth,
competitiveness and employment, such as infrastructure, company equipment, education and skills,
research and development, and new technology.
Institutional investors play a key role in channelling savings into productive long-term
investments, especially those that can be difficult to finance because they are “illiquid”.3 Given the
low interest rate environment and volatile stock markets of recent years, institutional investors are
increasingly looking for new sources of long-term, inflation-protected returns. Investments in real,
productive assets such as infrastructure could potentially provide the type of income these investors
require (OECD, 2013c).
This chapter explores the current trends and future scope for institutional investment in
emerging economies in particular, and asks what policy support frameworks would be required to tap
this promising source of finance.
Achieving a low-carbon global energy sector will require an additional
cumulative investment of USD 36 trillion by 2050.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 201480
I.6. ARE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS THE ANSWER FOR LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT FINANCING?Institutional investment is on the rise
Institutional investors – particularly pension funds, insurance companies and mutual funds – are
increasingly important players in financial markets. In OECD countries alone, these institutions held
USD 83.2 trillion in assets in 2012 (Figure 6.1). The annual inflow of new funds is also substantial. For
instance, pension funds collected about USD 1 trillion in new contributions in 2012.
Box 6.1. Who are the institutional investors and how do they work?
Traditionally, this heterogeneous group of public and private investors – in particular, pension
funds, life insurers and sovereign wealth funds – has been seen as a source of long-term capital with
investment portfolios built around the two main asset classes – bonds and equities – and an
investment horizon tied to the often long-term nature of their liabilities.
Over the last decade, institutional investors have been looking for new sources of long-term,
inflation-protected returns. Asset allocation trends observed over recent years show a gradual
globalisation of portfolios with an increased interest in emerging markets and diversification in new
asset classes. However, although growing rapidly, investment in infrastructure is still limited,
representing around 1% of total assets on average across the OECD (OECD, 2013a).
Pension funds start collecting contributions when individuals enter the workforce and may only
start paying benefits 30 to 40 years later with the assets accumulated. With USD 22 trillion in assets
held by autonomous pension funds in OECD countries and annual contribution in-flows of around
USD 1 trillion, pension funds could be key sources of capital for development.
Public pension reserve funds are set up by governments or social security institutions to contribute
to the financing of the relevant pay-as-you-go pension plans. Some of the world’s largest public
pension reserve funds (including the pension plans for California’s state teachers and public
employees) actively target infrastructure projects in developing countries.
Life insurance companies also tend to have long-term liabilities, especially as major providers of
annuities and similar retirement products. Some of the major insurance companies around the world
have made commitments to green infrastructure investment.
Mutual funds offer a simple way for people to invest their money. A mutual fund – most often
consisting of a mixture of stocks, bonds, cash and other securities – pools the assets of multiple
investors. The total amount is invested by a fundmanager into a variety of holdings. Investing in such
a wide array of stocks and bonds would not be possible for the average investor without the help of a
mutual fund.
Sovereign wealth funds are special-purpose investment funds or arrangements owned by a central
government whose purpose is either to ensure that a country’s resources are preserved for future
generations, or to stabilise government fiscal and/or foreign exchange revenues and macroeconomic
aggregates. Sovereign wealth funds and public pension reserve funds are becoming major players in
international financial markets. Assets under management by such funds have been growing rapidly
and in January 2014 accounted for more than USD 6 trillion according to the Sovereign Fund Institute.
Source: G20/OECD (2013), “G20/OECD High-Level Principles of Long-Term Investment Financing by Institutional Investors”,
OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/daf/fin/private-pensions/G20-OECD-Principles-LTI-Financing.pdf; OECD (2013c), The Role of Banks,
Equity Markets and Institutional Investors in Long-Term Financing for Growth and Development, Report for G20 Leaders, OECD, Paris,
www.oecd.org/daf/fin/private-pensions/G20reportLTFinancingForGrowthRussianPresidency2013.pdf.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 81
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with assets representing over 60% of GDP in countries such as Canada, the Netherlands, the
United Kingdom and the United States. In non-OECD countries, institutional investors tend to be less
established, although some important exceptions include Brazil and South Africa, which have
well-developed pension fund and mutual fund industries (Figures 6.2 and 6.3). Among non-OECD
countries, South Africa has one of the largest pension fund industries – both in absolute terms and in
relation to its economy; at over 80% of GDP (Figure 6.3), it is on a par with the top OECD countries.
Emerging economies are also home to some of the largest sovereign wealth funds in the world.
Figure 6.3 shows that despite the recent financial crisis, growth by institutional investors is
unabated, especially in countries where private pensions and insurance markets are still small in
relation to the size of their economies. In 2012, the average share of pension funds in GDP in
OECD countries was 77%, while in non-OECD countries it was 33%. Emerging market and developing
economies generally have an even greater opportunity to develop their institutional investment
sectors as their financial systems are largely bank-based. Sovereign wealth funds and public pension
reserve funds are growing rapidly in developing and emerging economies. Nonetheless, although
growing rapidly, institutional investment in infrastructure is still limited.
Figure 6.1. Total assets by type of institutional investor in the OECD, 2001-12
USD trillion
Notes: Book reserves are not included in this figure. Pension funds and insurance companies’ assets include assets invested in
mutual funds, which may be also counted in investment funds.
1. Data include Australia’s Future Fund, Belgium’s Zilverfonds (2008-12), Canada’s Pension Plan Investment Board, Chile’s Pension
Reserve Fund (2010-12), France’s Pension Reserve Fund (2003-12), Ireland’s National Pensions Reserve Fund, Japan’s
Government Pension Investment Fund, Korea’s National Pension Service (OECD estimate for 2012), New Zealand’s
Superannuation Fund, Norway’s Government Pension Fund, Poland’s Demographic Reserve Fund, Portugal’s Social Security
Financial Stabilisation Fund, Spain’s Social Security Reserve Fund, Sweden’s AP1-AP4 and AP6, the United States’ Social
Security Trust Fund.
2. Other forms of institutional savings include foundations and endowment funds, non-pension fund money managed by banks,
private investment partnership and other forms of institutional investors. BRICS: Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, China
and South Africa.
Source: OECD (2013a), OECD Pension Market in Focus 2013 (brochure), OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/pensions/PensionMarketsInFocus2013.pdf.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933121601
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Despite the recent financial crisis, growth by institutional investors
is unabated.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 201482
I.6. ARE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS THE ANSWER FOR LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT FINANCING?There are several barriers to “North-South” investment
The willingness of institutional investors and the private sector to finance major investment
projects is heavily influenced by the perceptions of a country’s investment climate (see Chapter 12) and
the broad suite of policy settings and institutions that underpin a country’s economy and political
processes. In addition to the lack of large and deep local markets in developing countries, there are
often restrictions on investment, such as heavy bureaucracy and controls, and weak financial
infrastructure. In Peru, for example, the contractual process for a road concession can last up to 5 years
and involves more than 20 government departments (Stewart and Yermo, 2012). Infrastructure, in
particular, is considered to be vulnerable to high political, regulatory and execution risk, especially in
developing countries (see the “In my view” box).4 In addition to the policy environment, other factors
preventing foreign investments are inflation and currency risk,5 potentially restrictive investment
requirements, and lack of local capacity and expertise. Furthermore, infrastructure investments in
developing countries tend to involve new infrastructure (“greenfield” investment), which is more risky
than the “brownfield” projects (investing in existing infrastructure) that are frequent in the more
mature OECD economies (Stewart andYermo, 2012; OECD, 2012).
Lack of objective, high-quality data on pension funds’ asset allocations and their returns on
investment is another barrier. This makes it difficult to assess the risks of infrastructure investments
and to compare returns with investment in other assets. Without such information, investors are
reluctant to make allocations. Whilst some countries collect such data, there is no international,
official, accurate data on alternative investments such as hedge funds, private equity, real estate,
infrastructure or commodities.The OECD has begun to collect this data and tomake such comparisons.
Figure 6.2. The growing importance of pension funds, 2008 and 2012
USD trillion
1. Data refer to 2011. BRICS: Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, China and South Africa.
Source: OECD (2013a), OECD Pension Market in Focus 2013 (brochure), OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/pensions/PensionMarketsInFocus2013.pdf.
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I.6. ARE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS THE ANSWER FOR LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT FINANCING?Policy reform can remove barriers to institutional investment
The OECD suggests that governments can take a number of key actions to address the barriers
described above and facilitate institutional investors’ investment, including in low-carbon projects
(Box 6.2).
G20 leaders have highlighted the importance of long-term financing, focusing on infrastructure
investment, to foster long-term growth. The OECD, within the framework of its project on Institutional
Investors and Long-Term Investment, is participating in this work. The aim of the project is to promote
long-term investment, such as for infrastructure, by addressing both potential regulatory obstacles and
market failures. Many of the largest institutional investors across the world are already collaborating
with the OECD on the project. In November 2012, G20 finance ministers and central bank governors
requested that the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the OECD, the Financial Stability
Board, the United Nations and other relevant international organisations assess the factors affecting
Figure 6.3. Importance of pension funds relative to the size of the economy
in selected non-OECD countries, 2012
% of GDP
Note: Reference to Kosovo is without prejudice to its status under international law.
1. Data refer to 2011.
2. Source: AIOS.
3. Data refer to 2010.
4. Source: HANFA.
5. Source: Ministry of Finance. Data only refer to the mandatory part of the Russian system.
6. Source: MOHRSS.
Source: OECD (2013a), OECD Pension Market in Focus 2013 (brochure), OECD, Paris,www.oecd.org/pensions/PensionMarketsInFocus2013.pdf.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933121639
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I.6. ARE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS THE ANSWER FOR LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT FINANCING?In my view:
The OECD must take charge of promoting long-term
investment in developing country infrastructure
Sony Kapoor,
Managing Director, Re-Define International Think Tank
The world of investment faces two major problems.
Problem one is the scarcity – in large swathes of the developing world – of capital in general, and of
money for infrastructure investments in particular. Poor infrastructure holds back development,
reduces growth potential and imposes additional costs, in particular for the poor who lack access to
energy, water, sanitation and transport.
Problem two is the sclerotic, even negative rate of return on listed bonds and equities in many OECD
economies. The concentration of the portfolios of many long-term investors in such listed securities
also exposes them to high levels of systemic, often hidden, risk.
Most long-term investors would readily buy up chunks of portfolios of infrastructure assets in
non-OECD countries to benefit from the significantly higher rate of return over the long term, and to
diversify their investments. At the same time, developing economies, where neither governments nor
private domestic markets have the capacity and depth to fill the long-term funding gap, are hungry
for such capital.
So what is stopping these investments?
Financial risks in developing countries are well known and often assumed to be much higher than
in OECD economies. Also, investing in infrastructure means that investors will find it hard to pull
their money out on short notice, and therefore such investments pose liquidity risks.
Despite these easy answers, however, there are three significant caveats.
First, the events of the past few years have demonstrated that on average, political risk and policy
uncertainty in developing countries as a whole have fallen, especially in the emerging economies.
Second, OECD economies are also exposed to serious risk factors, such as high levels of
indebtedness and demographic decline. As the financial crisis demonstrated, they are also likely to
face other “hidden” systemic risks not captured by commonly used risk models and measures.
Third, the kind of risks that dominate in developing countries, such as liquidity risks, may not be
real risks for long-term investors (e.g. insurers or sovereign wealth funds). Given that the present
portfolios of these investors are dominated by OECD country investments, any new investments in
the developing world may look more attractive and may actually offer a reduction of risk at the
portfolio level.
So I ask again: Why aren’t long-term investors investing in developing country infrastructure in a
big way?
The biggest constraint is the absence of well-diversified portfolios of infrastructure projects and the
fact that no single investor has the financial or operational capacity to develop these. Direct
infrastructure investment, particularly in developing countries, is a resource-intensive process.
The G20, together with the OECD and other multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, can
facilitate the development of a diversified project pipeline on the one hand, together with
mechanisms to ease the participation of long-term investors on the other. This work will involve
challenges of co-ordination, more than commitments of scarce public funds.
In my view, the OECD – which uniquely houses financial, development, infrastructure and
environmental expertise under one roof – must take charge.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 85
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and the establishment of aWorking Group on Investment and Infrastructure that will analyse obstacles
and limitations delaying long-term financing and determine a work plan for the G20.
The OECD has also developed High-Level Principles on Long-Term Investment Financing by
Institutional Investors (endorsed by G20 leaders in September 2013). The next step will be to identify
approaches to implement them, which will be the task of the next G20 Leaders’ Summit, in
November 2014 in Brisbane, Australia (G20/OECD, 2013).
Box 6.2. Stepping up institutional investment in low-carbon finance
In the wake of the economic and financial crisis, some traditional sources of low-carbon finance
and investment – governments, commercial banks and utilities – face significant constraints.
Alternative sources will be needed not only to compensate for these constraints, but also to ramp up
low-carbon investments. Institutional investors offer a potential source. These investors are already
actively engaged, for example, in wind power in Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, the
Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States; solar photovoltaics in Australia,
Canada, Germany, Japan, South Africa and the United States; and sustainable agriculture in Brazil.
Although there are pockets of significant activity, institutional investments in low-carbon areas are in
general minimal to date. A number of obstacles stand in the way, some of them general to
infrastructure, others more specific to low carbon. Many institutional investors have yet to conclude
that low-carbon investments offer sufficiently attractive, risk-adjusted financial returns. This is due to
misaligned policy signals, such as continuing support for fossil fuel use and production, low or no prices
on greenhouse gas emissions, and unpredictable changes in policies for renewable energy generation
and other regulatory policies, with unintended consequences. In addition, many institutional investors
still lack the knowledge and suitable investment channels or vehicles to access green infrastructure in
a way that aligns with their varying sizes, operational models and investment objectives.
The OECD suggests that governments can take a number of key actions to address these barriers
and facilitate institutional investment in low-carbon projects:
● Ensure a stable and integrated policy environment which provides investors with clear and long-term
incentives and predictability.
● Address market failures (including a lack of carbon pricing) that result in investment profiles that
favour polluting or environmentally damaging infrastructure projects over green infrastructure
investments.
● Provide a national infrastructure road map that would give investors confidence in government
commitments and demonstrate that a pipeline of investable projects is forthcoming.
● Facilitate the development of appropriate financing vehicles or de-risking instruments (e.g. green
bonds), or of markets for instruments or funds with appropriate risk-return profiles.
● Reduce the transaction costs of green investment by fostering collaborative investment vehicles
among investors and helping to build in-house expertise.
● Promote public-private exchange on green investment by creating or supporting existing platforms
for dialogue among institutional investors, the financial industry and the public sector.
● Promote market transparency and improve data by strengthening formal requirements for
institutional investors in infrastructure and green projects to provide information on their
investments.
Source: Adapted from Kaminker, C. et al. (2013), “Institutional investors and green infrastructure investments: Selected case
studies”, OECD Working Papers on Finance, Insurance and Private Pensions, No. 35, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/
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I.6. ARE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS THE ANSWER FOR LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT FINANCING?The OECD is currently working on a major G20/OECD project on the analysis of government and
market-based incentives for long-term investment financing. It involves developing a taxonomy of
instruments and incentives for stimulating financing for infrastructure. They include the wide range
of options available to private investors for accessing the asset class, focusing on new forms of
investment (equity and debt); and the risk mitigation mechanisms (instruments and incentives,
public and private) the public sector can use to leverage private sector financing in infrastructure, in
particular, targeting institutional investors (for example, guarantees, grants, fiscal incentives).
Developing countries themselves can become a source of investment
In addition to North-South investing, domestic pension funds in developing economies could
provide an important source of infrastructure and development capital for their own development
priorities. It could be argued that developing countries are better placed to make such investments,
having closer knowledge of their local markets and projects, and no currency risk or overseas
investment restrictions. International experience in countries such as Chile andMexico suggests that
institutional investors, especially pension fund assets, have been instrumental to the growth of the
financial markets, and, in turn, to the provision of development finance. South-South investing is
also likely to rise in importance (see Chapter 3), with pension funds, sovereign wealth funds and
other institutional investors supplying much-needed capital to their own regions as well as to other
emerging markets (Stewart and Yermo, 2012).
Some developing countries have taken bold steps by establishing sovereign wealth and pension
fund systems, but often investments are restricted and there is limited scope for channelling these
growing pools of assets into infrastructure development. Latin American and South African pension
funds have the highest allocations to infrastructure projects – as high as 3% of total assets in
countries such asMexico and Peru, and 4% in South Africa. Countries with no pension fund allocation
to infrastructure include China, India, Indonesia and Nigeria (Stewart and Yermo, 2012).
Governments need to establish the appropriate regulatory, supervisory and tax frameworks to
allow such investors to grow. For example, improving investment conditions and enhancing local
market liquidity through government bonds6 would create important preconditions for the growth
and development of corporate bond markets, which would ultimately facilitate infrastructure,
mortgage and asset-backed financing. For example, the success of infrastructure bonds in Chile and
Peru stems partly from the presence of various guarantees. In Peru, pension funds were first allowed
to invest in infrastructure bonds in 2001; these bonds are issued by the project operator as the project
advances and carry a government certificate of completion (Certificate of Recognition of Annual
Payment for Works). Peruvian pension funds have also established an infrastructure trust fund to
invest in project debt and take-up of these bonds has been relatively fast (Stewart and Yermo, 2012).
In Africa, with the main exception of South Africa, pension funds are at an early stage of
development and infrastructure project investments are practically non-existent and highly
restricted by regulations. However, change is under way. For instance, Kenya is looking to the
pensions industry to fund the country’s infrastructure and domestic needs. Since 2009, the
government has issued 5 infrastructure bonds targeted at specific infrastructure projects; the bonds,
with maturities ranging from 8-20 years, have been packaged with more incentives than normal
government bonds.These bonds have been popular with pension funds, which have taken significant
portions of the total issue. In addition, a Kenyan energy generating company – Kengen Ltd – issued an
infrastructure bond in 2009 to fund a number of new projects. The bond was able to raise
KES 25 billion (Kenyan shilling) against a target of KES 15 billion. Pension schemes accounted for
around 40% of the total take-up (Stewart and Yermo, 2012).DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 87
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● Ensure a stable and transparent regulatory environment for infrastructure projects in developing
countries.
● Develop a national, long-term strategy for the infrastructure sector in developing countries that
lasts beyond the political cycle. A specific pipeline of projects also needs to be developed, ensuring
a steady flow of investments opportunities.
● Promote appropriate financial risk transfer in infrastructure projects and investments.
● Create a policy environment that is conducive to institutional investment in low-carbon
infrastructure projects.
● Develop appropriate financing vehicles. After careful analysis of the most efficient ways to use
public funds to leverage private sector finance, governments can issue or support instruments with
appropriate risk-return profiles and can provide risk mitigation and credit enhancement tools.
● Investigate regulatory barriers. Governments may encourage further investigation to ascertain
whether regulatory and other instruments (such as some accounting and solvency rules) are
unintentionally and unnecessarily preventing pension fund investment in infrastructure.
● Foster collaborative mechanisms between investors. Governments can facilitate the establishment
of joint ventures between public and private pension funds to pool their resources and facilitate
investments in infrastructure and green projects.
● Collect international, official, accurate and comparable data on alternative investments and their
returns.
Notes
1. This chapter is based on the work of the OECD Institutional Investors and Long-Term Investment project. For
more information on this project, see www.oecd.org/finance/lti.
2. Similar figures reported by McKinsey Global Institute and based on three alternative estimation methodologies
estimate the infrastructure needs to 2030 at between USD 57 and USD 67 trillion, excluding the needs for social
infrastructure (Dobbs et al., 2013).
3. Illiquid assets cannot easily be sold or exchanged for cash without a substantial loss in value.
4. Such risks can be addressed to some extent by multilateral guarantee schemes, such as the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), which is part of the World Bank Group. MIGA protects foreign direct
investment in some of the world’s poorest countries against various political risks such as expropriation,
breach of contract, exchange rate or capital controls, war and terrorism (Stewart and Yermo, 2012).
5. A form of risk – particularly relevant for developing countries with volatile financial markets – that arises from
the change in price of one currency against another.Whenever investors or companies have assets or business
operations across national borders, they face currency risk if their positions are not hedged.
6. A debt security issued by a government to support government spending, most often issued in the country’s
domestic currency.
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Chapter 7
Tax revenues as a motor for sustainable
development
by
Gregory De Paepe and Ben Dickinson,
Development Co-operation Directorate and Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, OECD
Tax revenues are critical to sustainable development because they provide
governments with independent revenue for investing in development, reducing
poverty and delivering public services as well as increasing state capacity,
accountability and responsiveness to their citizens. Yet, while OECD countries
collect on average 34% of their gross domestic product as tax, developing countries
achieve only half this rate. This chapter reflects on the potential within many
developing countries to increase tax income and outlines the challenges to doing so,
such as weak administrations, corruption, poor governance, low tax “morale” and
poor compliance, compounded by difficulties in taxing multinational enterprises.
This chapter also includes an opinion piece by Abdalla Hamdok, Deputy
Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission forAfrica, on
how better taxation can help Africa fund its own sustainable development.91
I.7. TAX REVENUES AS A MOTOR FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTTaxation is one of the most important ways in which developing countries can mobilise their own
resources for sustainable development. It supports the basic functions of an effective state – enabling
it to raise the resources needed to deliver essential services – and creates the context for economic
growth. At the same time, it is a catalyst for governments that are more responsive and accountable
to their citizens, and for expanding state capacity (OECD, 2008a).
The United Nations considers that achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) will
require developing countries to raise at least 20% of their gross domestic product (GDP) in taxes. Yet
half of all sub-SaharanAfrican countries still mobilise less than 17% of their GDP in tax revenues, and
several Asian and Latin American countries fare little better. Some low-income countries, therefore,
may need to raise their tax-to-GDP ratios by almost four percentage points. This chapter examines
why it is important for developing countries to increase their tax base, explores some key challenges
and makes recommendations for improving how taxation and revenue spending can contribute to
sustainable development. A companion chapter later in this volume (Chapter 14) outlines in detail
the role of development co-operation in supporting tax reform.
Taxation plays a central role in promoting sustainable development
Tax revenues are the most fundamental component of home-grown revenues, and they grow
in importance as a country develops (see the “In my view” box). Taxation offers an antidote to
developing countries’ dependence on external concessional finance and provides the fiscal reliance
and sustainability needed to promote growth (OECD, 2008b). It strengthens the effective functioning
of the state and reinforces the social contract between governments and citizens. The taxation
process also helps to build effective and accountable states, as reforms that begin in the tax
administration may spread to other parts of the public sector.
Thus, strengthening domestic resource mobilisation is not just a question of raising revenue: it
is also about designing a tax system that promotes inclusiveness, encourages good governance,
responds to society’s concerns over income and wealth inequalities, and promotes social justice.
More fundamentally, the centrality of taxation in the exercise of state power means that more
efficient, transparent and fairer tax systems, and less corrupt tax administrations, can spearhead
improvement on wider governance issues.
Achieving the MDGs will require developing countries to raise at least
20% of their gross domestic product in taxes.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 201492
I.7. TAX REVENUES AS A MOTOR FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTDeveloping countries face “taxing” challenges
“Tax effort” – the ratio of actual to potential tax revenues – is not low in all developing countries,
but significant additional revenue could be raised in those countries where performance is weakest.
For example, total collected tax revenue was ten times the volume of total official development
assistance (ODA) flows to Africa in 2012 (OECD/AfDB/UNDP, 2014). Yet at the country level, significant
disparities are evident: that same year, 32 African countries collected less than USD 1 of tax per
person per day. Those with the lowest tax-to-GDP ratios also tend to be those with the lowest effort.1
Several countries – including Burundi, El Salvador, Rwanda and the Solomon Islands – have shown
that substantially increasing domestic revenues is feasible. One good performer, for instance, has
increased its tax-to-GDP ratio from 6% in 1990 to around 17% today. Other countries have achieved
sustained revenue increases to 4-5% of GDP in just a few years. Common keys to success include
sustained political commitment at the highest levels, administrative reforms that are aligned closely
with policy changes and strong leadership by the revenue administration (Box 7.1) – all of which can
encounter powerful opposition.
Many of the tax challenges2 faced by developing countries affect more advanced economies as
well, but the specific challenges that loom especially large in developing countries include:
● Weak tax administrations.Awell-functioning tax administration is critical to mobilising domestic
resources in developing countries. Yet many administrations are staffed by poorly trained and
low-paid officials, have structures that do not encourage an integrated approach to all taxes and do
not strike the right balance between enforcement and taxpayer services.The design of a tax system
should, therefore, consider the ability of the tax administration to manage it.
● Low taxpayer morale, corruption and poor governance. Research shows a significant correlation
between tax morale – people’s willingness to pay taxes – and tax compliance (Torgler, 2011). High
levels of corruption are strongly associated with low state revenue, as are other poor governance
indicators (weak rule of law, political instability). The centrality of tax collection as an exercise of
state power gives governance issues in tax collection great importance.
In 2012, 32 African countries collected less than USD 1 of tax per person
per day.
Box 7.1. Tax reform: The governance dimension in Rwanda
In Rwanda, personal backing from the President coupled with the United Kingdom’s Department
for International Development’s (DFID) support to the Rwandan Revenue Authority (RRA) contributed
significantly to the country’s strong increase in tax revenue. Domestic revenue increased from 9% of
GDP in 1998 to 14.7% in 2005 and the costs of tax collection were also reduced. This success was
founded on strengthened internal organisational structures and processes, as well as increased
accountability in relationships with partners, such as central and local government, the growing
community of tax professionals and taxpayers themselves. The RRA now plays an important role in
strengthening relationships between citizens and the state, helping to build a “social contract” based
on trust and co-operation.
Source: OECD (2008a), Governance, Taxation andAccountability: Issues and Practices, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series, OECD,
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I.7. TAX REVENUES AS A MOTOR FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT● Prevalence of “hard-to-tax” sectors, including small businesses, small farms and professionals.This is
particularly important where administrative capacity and incentives to comply are weak. While the
informal sector is extensive in developing countries – contributing around 40% of GDP on average and
up to 60% inmany – it is arguably not in itself the problem: even though small traders and professionals
may be informal, their income and sales are likely to bewell below any reasonable tax threshold. Much
of the most serious evasion is by qualified professionals. The issue is perhaps better framed as one of
non-compliance. Estimates of non-compliance are scarce, but value-added tax (VAT) “gaps” have been
put at 50-60% in some developing countries, compared to 7-13% in developed countries.
● Dealing with natural resource wealth. Many resource-rich countries struggle to design and
implement fiscal regimes that are not only transparent, but also capable of raising reasonable
public revenue from their natural and mineral resources. This issue is being brought to the fore by
recent discoveries of natural resource endowments in developing countries.
● Geographical and historical factors. A wealth of geographical or historical factors may affect a
country’s ability to collect taxes. Small islands, for example, are better able to impose taxes at the
border than are landlocked countries. Post-conflict countries with shattered administrations and
tax bases face particular difficulties in mobilising domestic revenue (see Chapter 20), while
successor states3 are often especially eager to establish investor-friendly reputations. History also
plays a role, such as a legacy of legal traditions that reflect various colonial pasts with diverse
revenue approaches and performances.
Aside from these internal challenges, the external environment also influences tax capacity. For
example, many countries continue to depend heavily on trade tax revenues,4 yet trade liberalisation
no longer allows them to tariff imports and exports, obliging them to seek other sources from which
to recover tax revenue. Striking the right balance between using tax incentives to create an attractive
tax regime for domestic and foreign investment, and securing the necessary revenues for public
spending, is another key policy dilemma. Competition among developing countries for investment
can trigger a “race to the bottom” in offering potential foreign investors the most beneficial tax rates.
Developing countries also face challenges in designing and implementing effective transfer pricing5
and information exchange regimes, and more generally in improving transparency. These issues are
being addressed by the OECD/G20 work on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) and on tax
information exchange (see Chapter 14 for more details).
In examining the challenges faced by developing countries, it is also important to stress that
increased revenue is not in itself sufficient to foster sustainable development, and therefore is
not the only consideration in assessing tax systems and their performance. How the revenue is
distributed – to ensure equity, promote inclusiveness and effectively address social pressures – is
equally important. Sustainable development also requires analysis of the potential role of taxation in
reducing environmental damage or unsustainable resource use.
The quality of tax measures also matters: measures to increase revenue by further taxing readily
compliant taxpayers can worsen distortions and perceived inequities; conversely, reducing reliance
on trade taxes can bring real structural gains that outweigh short-term revenue difficulties.
The quality of tax measures matters as much as the quantity of revenue
raised.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 201494
I.7. TAX REVENUES AS A MOTOR FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTIn my view:
Africa can fund its own sustainable development
Abdalla Hamdok,
Deputy Executive Secretary, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
Africa is on the path to sustainable long-term growth, opening up a number of investment
opportunities. Development co-operation has helped to promote this growth and is expected to
continue to do so, but the resources required for Africa’s sustainable development will not come from
aid. Africa must look within, generating financial resources from its own economies.
The potential for Africa to raise substantially more domestic financial resources – and to finance its
development from these resources – is huge. Concrete results are within reach, even within a short
time horizon, if the appropriate innovations and support are put in place.
Government tax revenue constitutes the most significant source of domestic resources for the
implementation of development programmes on the continent and there is significant potential for
scaling up returns. The lesson emerging from country experiences is that by focusing on expanding
the tax base, improving tax administration and tapping relatively underutilised sources of taxation,
African countries can increase tax revenue significantly.
Domestic revenues mobilised in Africa today are in excess of USD 520 billion, compared to
USD 50 billion received in aid. What’s more, African central and reserve banks hold more than
USD 400 billion in international reserves and Africa’s pension fund assets are growing at a staggering
pace. The World Bank estimates that Africa’s diaspora remittances soared to USD 40 billion in 2012
and they have the potential to grow to USD 200 billion over the next decade. Added to this is the
potential that can be realised by addressing the losses to the continent through illicit financial flows.
For Africa to own its development, however, the continent needs to define a new robust threshold
for domestic resource mobilisation that will enable the implementation of at least 70-80% of its
development programmes and projects. This means devising new and innovative domestic resource
mobilisation instruments and strengthening the effectiveness and efficiency of existing systems. It
also means deepening reform in the areas of governance, institutional and macroeconomic policy,
and legal and regulatory frameworks to provide an overarching enabling environment for investment
and mobilisation of domestic resources. In addition, there is a need to accelerate regional integration
and to reform specific laws governing investment of public funds – such as through public pension
funds and international reserves of central/reserve banks.
The capacity of a country or a region to mobilise domestic resources is determined by the size of the
economic activities it generates, its economic growth performance, its ability to raise and manage tax
revenues, and the competence of its financial system. In my view, Africa has the potential to draw on
its own capacity to finance its growth and development, and is on the road to doing so. Innovation
and efficiency will be central to making this happen.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 95
I.7. TAX REVENUES AS A MOTOR FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTThe development community could do more to support tax systems
While domestic political will and leadership are the primary drivers of capacity development,
partnershipswith international organisations can play an important role in strengthening domestic tax
systems, especially by providing technical assistance. Some development co-operation providers have
been active for many years in offering tax advice to developing countries. Nonetheless, until recently,
tax as a development issue has been somewhat neglected by much of the international community,
despite some high rates of return and evidence of success (see Chapter 14). Currently, only around
0.1% of ODA (excluding from the International Monetary Fund) goes to support the development of tax
systems in developing countries (Figure 7.1). Chapter 14 outlines ways in which development
co-operation can help developing countries address some of the challenges outlined here.
While the challenges are substantial, there are also grounds for optimism. The impetus for
change is increasingly coming from developing countries and regions themselves. Several African
and Latin American countries have made significant advances in improving their tax systems, often
in the most challenging of governance environments (see Chapter 20). In Africa, the African Tax
Administration Forum – driven, managed and operationally funded by Africans – provides a key
platform for peer learning, capacity development and dialogue on domestic and international tax
issues. In the Americas, the Centro Interamericano de Administraciones Tributarias (CIAT) is a
well-established platform for regional action. Other regions have similar organisations and
international organisations and development co-operation agencies are increasingly strengthening
their support to them.
Only 0.1% of ODA supports tax systems in developing countries.
Figure 7.1. Official development assistance for tax-related activities, 2004-12
Note: The data do not include figures from the International Monetary Fund.
Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System statistics.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933121658
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
0.25
0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05
0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Commitments to tax activities Share of tax support in total ODA
USD million % of total ODADEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 201496
I.7. TAX REVENUES AS A MOTOR FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTKey recommendations
● Build the capacity of tax administrations on international tax policy, transfer pricing and exchange
of information to face the emerging challenges from globalisation, including the taxation of
multinational enterprises and international tax evasion.
● Confront tax base erosion by improving transparency and clarity in the provision, administration
and governance of tax incentives and preferential tax treatments.
● Involve civil society and business associations in effective tax bargaining to increase tax
compliance and clarify the links between tax and expenditure.
● Make consistent and detailed data sets on domestic revenue collection publicly available to inform
policy discussions and reform.
Notes
1. In one study, out of 15 developing countries with tax-to-GDP ratios below 15%, for instance, 13 had estimated
effort below their group median; raising it to the median would increase their revenue by an average of about
3% of GDP.
2. Much of this section is drawn from the “Report to the G20 DevelopmentWorking Group by the IMF, the OECD,
UN andWorld Bank: Supporting the Development of More Effective Tax Systems”.
3. A new, smaller country formed after a larger country has been divided up.
4. According to the International Monetary Fund (2011), in sub-Saharan Africa, trade taxes still account for
one-quarter of all tax revenue.
5. A transfer price is the price charged by a company for goods, services or intangible property to a subsidiary or
other related company. Abusive transfer pricing occurs when income and expenses are improperly allocated
for the purpose of reducing taxable income (OECD Glossary of Tax Terms). See also Box 14.3 in Chapter 14.
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Chapter 8
Foundations as development partners
by
Bathylle Missika and Emilie Romon, Development Centre, OECD1
Philanthropic foundations play an important role in sustainable development – not
only in mobilising financial resources, but also as development actors in their own
right. Until recently, however, official development agencies and foundations have
followed parallel paths without much collaboration. Yet, including foundations more
strategically in development policy processes can reinforce their role as partners,
rather than solely as financiers. Foundations have advantages over official
development co-operation providers that include greater operating freedom, capacity
for innovation and risk-taking, and ability to leverage additional funding. This
chapter outlines some ways forward for enhancing collaboration and joint funding,
building on each other’s comparative advantages and shared thematic interests.99
I.8. FOUNDATIONS AS DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSPhilanthropy is often thought of as “the rich giving to the poor”. A different way of looking at it is
society investing in its future. Modern philanthropy emerged at the beginning of the 20th century in
the United States when Rockefeller and Carnegie set up the first largeAmerican foundations. As early
as World War I, these foundations began to engage beyond national borders, indicating an interest
and willingness to invest in social progress overseas, particularly in developing countries.
Because foundations’ strategic priorities and activities vary greatly – ranging from advocacy to
implementing their own projects (OECD, 2003) – it is difficult to formulate a global definition that
encompasses their diverse natures. Yet they can be broadly described as independent, non-profit
organisations with their own resources that work locally, regionally and internationally to improve
the lives of citizens by running and funding activities in numerous areas, from youth empowerment
and education to health and climate change (European Foundation Centre, 2014).
This chapter takes stock of how the relationship between foundations and the development
community has evolved in the context of development co-operation and proposes ways in which it
could continue to evolve for the benefit of sustainable development.
Foundations are increasingly prominent in development co-operation
Attempts at systematically strengthening co-operation among official development co-operation
providers and foundations are only fairly recent. Over the past decade – with only a few exceptions –
development agencies and foundations have worked on parallel tracks without much collaboration.
Providers of official development assistance remain more prominent in terms of funding and
priority setting, including in discussions in bodies such as the Development Assistance Committee
(DAC). Interestingly, neither the Millennium Declaration nor the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for
Development (see Glossary) – the two major global declarations of recent times on development goals
and financing – made mention of the role of foundations in achieving the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs). Similarly, foundations have focused on their own priorities, sometimes intersecting with
those of traditional development actors, but have been reluctant to engage with what they have seen as
“bureaucratic and inefficient partners”. This has led to a “clash of civilisations” among actors who do
not speak the same language and choose to work independently from one another rather than
collaborate. The outcome in some cases has been duplication of work (Green, 2013). It was only in 2011,
in the Busan Partnership agreement,2 that foundations were recognised as significant contributors to
development, although only from a financial perspective: as providers of additional funding for
development co-operation.
Development agencies and foundations have mostly worked on parallel tracks
without much collaboration.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014100
I.8. FOUNDATIONS AS DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSToday, foundations’ broader role in global development efforts is increasingly acknowledged and
valued. The report of the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Agenda clearly
acknowledges that their role as central actors in development co-operation goes far beyond the
financial (HLP, 2013). This recognition was confirmed at the First High-Level Meeting of the Global
Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC; see Box 8.1), which acknowledged the
“added value that philanthropic foundations bring to development co-operation” (GPEDC, 2014). This
is reflected in the decision of the Steering Committee of the Global Partnership to offer them a full
member seat as of June 2014.3
The recent global economic crisis and its effects on official development assistance (ODA) might
explain this emerging recognition and appetite for enhanced collaboration. Increasing budgetary
pressure has forced most official providers of concessional funding to reduce their spending and seek
alternative sources of development funding (Chapter 2). In parallel, the growing contributions of large
foundations to international development goals have given the sector as a whole greater visibility.
Although the philanthropic contribution to development is hard to quantify, available data suggest that
it has nearly multiplied by ten in less than a decade. According to OECD-DAC statistics, it was around
USD 3 billion in 2003 (OECD, 2003), rising to USD 29.75 billion in 2012, including grants from
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (Figure 8.1; see also Chapter 9).While the Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation was the fourth largest provider in the health sector (including reproductive health) in 2012
(OECD, 2014), the majority of philanthropic organisations cannot yet match its endowment, influence
or ability to leverage partnerships with a wide range of development actors.
Philanthropy’s contribution to development has nearly multiplied by ten in less
than a decade.
Box 8.1. The OECD Global Network of FoundationsWorking for Development
The Global Network of Foundations Working for Development (netFWD) is a group of foundations
committed to optimising the impact of philanthropy for development by sharing experiences and
lessons, influencing policy and developing innovative partnerships. Together with major
philanthropic actors,1 netFWD developed a set of “Guidelines for Effective Philanthropic Engagement”
to help foundations working with or in developing countries improve the impact of their development
efforts. The guidelines aim to enhance collaboration between the philanthropic sector and
governments on shared goals with the view of increasing the effectiveness of philanthropic
contributions to global efforts to promote human well-being and development. These voluntary and
non-binding measures contribute to the ongoing efforts to strengthen development effectiveness and
mutual accountability in the spirit of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Busan
Declaration for Effective Development Co-operation. They are explicitly cited in the Communiqué of
the First High-Level Meeting of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, which
was released in April 2014 in Mexico (GPEDC, 2014). They represent a real step forward, as foundations
have neither committed to implementing the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) nor supported
the previous series of declarations on development effectiveness (at Rome, Paris and Accra).2
For more information, see www.oecd.org/site/netfwd.
1. Key partners include the European Foundation Centre (EFC), the STARS Foundation, the United Nations Development
Programme and theWorldwide Initiative for Grantmaker Support (WINGS), as well as the Rockefeller Foundation.
2. For more details of all the declarations on effective development co-operation, see www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 101
I.8. FOUNDATIONS AS DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSMany foundations are increasingly recognising the importance of actively positioning
themselves in the global development debate to maximise the impact of their operations (OECD
netFWD, 2014a). While few participated in the discussions that led to the development of the MDGs,
a growing number of them are now engaging significantly in the post-2015 discussions. For instance,
the Bellagio Initiative, supported by the Rockefeller Foundation, has proposed 12 development goals
across 3 main areas: basic services, human capital and effective provision of public goods (CIGI, 2012).
In addition, in 2013 a series of high-level dialogues brought together major philanthropic actors, the
United Nations and other development stakeholders to discuss the role of foundations in the
post-2015 framework.4 This has helped to further identify the drivers behind foundations’
engagement in development, as well as put greater emphasis on a number of common themes which
can lend themselves to deepened collaboration. They are also increasing their participation in
platforms for dialogue and knowledge-sharing (such as the one described in Box 8.1). Yet, while
realising the benefit of locating their work more effectively within a global framework, foundations
also highlight their interest in wielding a significant influence in designing this framework – as actors
in their own right (DCPB et al., 2013).
Foundations have important qualities as development actors
Philanthropic actors have important comparative advantages over other development finance
providers. For example, foundations enjoy greater freedom in the way they operate.They are not bound
to electoral/political government cycles nor are they under the same pressure as private investors from
their shareholders to deliver immediate financial returns in the companies or social purpose
organisations in which they invest. This flexibility – together with their ability to devote “patient
capital”5 to testing innovative practices that can then be scaled-up through multi-stakeholder,
cross-sector partnerships – has led some to see foundations’ funding as “development risk capital”.
They are able to build close relationships with their grantees – whom they often prefer to call partners –
providing them with the long-term technical knowledge and management capacity they require to
achieve self-sufficiency (OECD netFWD, 2014a; and Box 8.2). Foundations have not yet achieved their
full potential as risk-takers, however; they tend to avoid investments in fragile and conflict-ridden
environments, for example.
Figure 8.1. Philanthropy: A small slice of the external finance pie
Total net resource flows from DAC donors to developing countries, 2012 (net disbursements, USD billion)
Source: OECD (2014), “Detailed aid statistics: Official and private flows”, OECD International Development Statistics (database),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00072-en.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933121677
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I.8. FOUNDATIONS AS DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSFoundations’ comparative advantage and value as development partners also include their
unique potential to leverage funds and build multi-stakeholder partnerships around important
development issues. For instance, the proximity of corporate foundations with the private sector
allows them to tap into private flows at market terms which, including foreign direct investment,
amounted to USD 307.77 billion in 2012 (Figure 8.1).
Often established by famous personalities or companies, foundations can also advocate and
mobilise financial and non-financial support from governments, high net-worth individuals and the
private sector for their personal causes. In Brazil, for example, the Instituto Ayrton Senna is a strong
promoter of the importance of social and emotional skills in fostering children’s lifetime success and
social progress. Along with the Brazilian Ministry of Education and the OECD Centre for Educational
Research and Innovation (CERI), it set up a high-level policy forum on “Skills for Social Progress” in
March 2014 involving ministers and high-level officials from 14 countries (OECD netFWD, 2014b).
Foundations can also help develop and test innovative approaches and more “business-like”
instruments for development financing. An example is development impact bonds – these allow
private investors to provide up-front funding that can later be reimbursed by public actors (be they
development agencies or developing country governments) if the initiative proves successful.
Box 8.2. Foundations’ shift towards long-term and co-ordinated engagement
In the Middle East, a country’s specific socio-economic issues are often defined by whether it is an
oil economy or not. Nonetheless, there are common needs across the region: large youth populations
struggling to find jobs; the need to promote enterprise, moving away from growth that is led by the
public sector; and better quality output from the educational system.
Arab philanthropic capital is an important resource for the Middle East region, estimated at over
USD 770 million* in 2012 in the Gulf alone. Foundations in the Middle East and North Africa, not
dissimilar to their global counterparts, are increasingly moving away from traditional philanthropic
models of short-term, multi-sector grant-making to look at more focused portfolios in which grants
are provided together with technical support, under longer term commitments.
Emirates Foundation has adopted this approach. As an independent philanthropic foundation set up
to improve the welfare of young people across the United Arab Emirates, its portfolio comprises six
programmes for supporting young people, including through volunteering, work readiness and
financial literacy. Ultimately, the goal is to create independent entities – essentially social enterprises –
that are financially and operationally viable without grant support from the foundation. Each
programme will continue until the social issue it seeks to address has been mitigated.
The concept of social enterprises – taking a business-based approach to creating long-term
measurable and sustainable social value (see Chapter 16) – is gaining traction in the region, with
various Arab social entrepreneurs pioneering new models of social innovation. At the same time, the
philanthropic sector is becoming increasingly cohesive, with organisations such as the Arab
Foundations Forum (AFF) uniting philanthropic entities from across the region with a view to sharing
lessons learnt, exchanging ideas on best practice and providing opportunities for direct collaboration.
The shared challenges facing Arab countries require social solutions that are scalable and
replicable. Many regional foundations are addressing these needs through fora such as the AFF, which
allow them to share expertise and avoid “reinventing the wheel”.
This consolidation will stand the region’s philanthropists in good stead for supporting broader
developmental goals and ensuring that the growing pool of Arab philanthropic capital is spent wisely
and effectively.
* See the Coutts Million Dollar Donors Report, 2013 at http://philanthropy.coutts.com/middle-east-(gcc)/findings (accessed
15 May 2014).
Source: Contributed by ClareWoodcraft-Scott, Chief Executive Officer, Emirates Foundation for Youth Development.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 103
I.8. FOUNDATIONS AS DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSThe new profile of philanthropy also includes entrepreneurs who have emerged over the past
decade, often from the information and communication technologies sector (e.g. Microsoft, eBay),
who want to apply their recipes for success to philanthropic giving. The arrival of these new leaders
on the philanthropic scene has been accompanied by a rise in the importance of innovative
operational approaches, sometimes referred to as “venture philanthropy”6 or “impact investment”.
These ways of operating seek to mobilise large amounts of underutilised or potential philanthropic
capital for development purposes, and to make more efficient use of these resources for heightened
social impact (Bishop and Green, 2008).
Two myths undermine effective co-operation between foundations
and the development community
Aside from the factors outlined above, there are twomyths that tend to stand in the way of better
mutual understanding and co-operation between foundations and the development community.
Myth one: Foundations have almost unlimited resources
Many outside the philanthropic sector assume that foundations have access to vast amounts of
funding. The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation’s considerable assets of USD 34 billion in 2011 and its
significant contribution to the global health agenda have contributed to this misconception. Data
show, however, that in fact, this is not the case. For example, according to the Foundation Center, less
than a dozen US foundations enjoy an endowment superior to USD 5 billion and a large majority of
them worldwide function with financial resources below USD 1 billion (Foundation Center, 2014).
Thus, what some see as philanthropy’s potential to compensate for decreasing official
development finance over the medium to longer term is largely overstated (Figure 8.1). Even when
grants to NGOs (which are funded from various sources, from the general public to private sources)
operating in developing countries are added to the total contribution of philanthropy to development,
this only represented 6% of total flows from DAC providers to developing countries (in 2012). ODA, on
the other hand, constituted 27% (USD 126.94 billion). Despite recent increases in foundations’
funding for development, therefore, philanthropic giving and investments are unlikely to catch up
with official development co-operation any time soon.
Myth two: Foundations have the same priorities as the development community
It is often assumed that the priorities and goals that will be set out in the post-2015 framework,
supported by global alliances of development co-operation providers and developing countries such
as the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, are likely to rally the whole
philanthropic community. Foundations, however, have interests and priorities that may or may not
intersect with those of the broader development community (Box 8.3). Issues of governance, for
example, are gaining increasing importance in the post-2015 framework, but have not attractedmuch
philanthropic engagement; less than 3% of total funding from US foundations is dedicated to
concerns such as elections, access to information, democracy or municipal reform (Foundation
Center, 2014).
Philanthropy’s contribution to development only represented 6% of total flows
from DAC providers to developing countries in 2012,
while ODA constituted 27%.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014104
I.8. FOUNDATIONS AS DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSInstead, foundations tend to support their own areas of interest, often defined by the corporate
interests of the firms that have created them or the personal “vision” of their founders. In long-
established family foundations, descendants usually remain loyal to the founder’s wish, although
sometimes with slight diversions or even significant reforms. Alternatively, they may prioritise areas
of intervention in which they have acquired influence and a solid network of contacts and partners.
Box 8.3. The role of US foundations in supporting the Millennium Development Goals
In 2012, the 1 000 largest US foundations provided international support totalling USD 5.9 billion. Of
this total, 44%, or USD 2.6 billion, focused on priorities consistent with the MDGs (see table below).Yet
despite the substantial share of foundation giving that aligns with the MDGs, a 2008 report by the
Foundation Center showed that grant makers have mixed perspectives on the goals. According to
interviews with 20 leading international funders, including large private and public US foundations,
interviewees were generally aware of the goals but did not take the MDG framework into account
when developing their grant-making agendas (Atienza et al., 2008). Many viewed the MDGs as a
positive development and said that they provided new opportunities for partnerships and for building
on government investments. However, some interviewees found the MDGs to be particularly weak in
their area of activity, while others had already established MDG-consistent priorities before the goals
were announced.
The survey showed possible pathways for encouraging greater alignment with global development
goals. Specifically, in 2008 a set of leading international funders was asked which internal and
external factors had most affected their funding priorities over the last four years. Among the
external factors, respondents most often cited “new funding partnerships” and “major natural
disasters abroad”. These findings suggest that engaging in partnerships with foundations to identify
and develop shared priorities would provide an opportunity for greater formal alignment around the
MDGs. Drawing on the knowledge of the philanthropic sector and involving more foundations in the
early planning processes for the post-2015 development agenda could strengthen philanthropic
contributions’ implementation of the global development goals.
Source: Contributed by the Foundation Center, see http://foundationcenter.org.
US foundation grants relevant to the Millenium Development Goals, 2012
Foundation giving for programmes related to the Millenium Development Goals, circa 2012
Amount (USD) Number of grants Number of foundations
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger 750 956 676 1 674 290
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education 44 666 866 328 95
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women 324 946 712 350 59
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality 449 928 774 321 51
Goal 5: Improve maternal health 305 618 010 231 43
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases 514 940 261 434 50
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability 634 879 633 1 732 241
Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development1 373 249 304 370 113
Notes: Except for Goals 7 and 8, estimates are based on international grants for developing countries and, where
appropriate, global health grants. Grants related to multiple goals are counted more than once.
1. Figures represent a conservative estimate based on international grants related to the following activities: projects
involving explicit partnerships; global poverty; global action; trade-related issues; debt relief; telecommunications; and
grants to multilateral organisations, such as theWorld Bank and the United Nations’ agencies.
Source: Foundation Center (2014), based on all international grants of USD 10 000 or more awarded by a sample of 1 000 of
the largest US foundations. International grants include funding directly to cross-border recipients and to US-based
international programmes. Some foundations are represented with 2012 grants data, while the balance are represented
with 2011 data.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 105
I.8. FOUNDATIONS AS DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSThe second reason why foundations may not fully align with agreed development goals such as
the MDGs stems from their still limited inclusion in, and sense of ownership of, major international
development processes. When foundations are approached by the development community, this
often comes late in the process, when strategies and programmes have already been agreed and
when the missing piece of the puzzle is financing.
Collaboration can be strengthened in several ways
To build global co-operation among development stakeholders and foundations, it will be
fundamental to increase the strategic involvement of philanthropy. At the same time, there is
growing awareness in the philanthropic sector that “to achieve their potential, in scale and impact,
foundations (…) must be willing to let go of some of their autonomy to work more cohesively with
partners across sectors and disciplines” (OECD netFWD, 2014a).
Trying to learn each other’s “language” and getting to know one another better are prerequisites for
effective partnerships. This could happen by participating in initiatives at the national, regional or global
levels that seek to bring together foundations and governments. For instance, the Portuguese government
has established a dialogue frameworkwith development stakeholders including the philanthropic sector.
This is an interesting collaborative practice that could be replicated in other countries.
Foundations’ comparative advantages, especially their capacity for innovation and leveraging
additional funding, could be better used by the development community. For instance, the so-called
“venture philanthropists” provide social purpose organisations with first-stage, seed capital. Yet, in
order to grow until they are self-sustainable, these organisations need later-stage investors such as
traditional development co-operation providers to scale up their reach to other regions or sectors
(OECD netFWD, 2014a). Official development co-operation providers could benefit by identifying
successful initiatives led by foundations in their partner countries and bringing them to scale in
collaboration with other stakeholders, such as national partners.
Before formalising or systematising any kind of relationship, governments and foundations could
first test collaboration by partnering around an issue or country of common interest. Indeed, concrete
initiatives are more likely to attract foundations than an abstract agreement. For example, the Better
Than Cash Alliance is a coalition of bilateral and multilateral development co-operation agencies
(e.g. USAID, the United Nations Capital Development Fund), foundations (e.g. Ford Foundation, the
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and the Omidyar Network) and private sector actors (e.g. Citi,
MasterCard and Visa), united around a specific issue: the promotion of electronic payments in
developing countries.7
Key recommendations
● Use joint initiatives to help the development community and foundations become better acquainted,
such as the recently developed “Guidelines for Effective Philanthropic Engagement” (Box 8.1).
● Draw on the comparative advantages of each to increase funding opportunities and impact, with
foundations providing activities with seed capital and official development co-operation helping to
scale them up.
● Build concrete partnerships around specific issues or countries rather than on abstract agreements.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014106
I.8. FOUNDATIONS AS DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSNotes
1. The authors would like to thank Federico Bonaglia (acting Deputy Director of the OECD Development Centre)
for reviewing and contributing to the draft of this chapter.
2. The Busan Partnership agreement was the outcome of the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held
in Busan, Korea in 2011. This new broad and inclusive partnership for development co-operation sets out
four common principles: 1) ownership of development priorities by developing countries; 2) a focus on results;
3) inclusive development partnerships; and 4) transparency and accountability to each other.
3. The Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation was formed following the Fourth High
Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan to act as a forum for advice, shared accountability and shared
learning and experiences to support the implementation of the Busan Partnership agreement principles.
See http://effectivecooperation.org.
4. The Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation, OECD Global Network of Foundations Working for Development
(netFWD), UNDP, UNDESA and the Worldwide Initiative for Grantmaker Support (WINGS) co-organised
two events, one inApril and the other in September 2013, on the role of foundations in the post-2015 framework.
5. “Patient capital” usually encompasses several factors, such as a longer investment timeframe, higher risk
appetite, availability to for-profits and not-for-profits, and belowmarket returns with above-market social and
environmental outcomes (OECD netFWD, 2014a).
6. In the development context, venture philanthropy is an entrepreneurial approach to philanthropy that
combines a variety of financial and non-financial resources to identify, analyse, co-ordinate and support self-
sustaining, systemic and scalable (for and not-for profit) solutions to development challenges aimed at
achieving the greatest impact (OECD netFWD, 2014a).
7. See their website at http://betterthancash.org.
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Chapter 9
The changing role of NGOs and civil society
in financing sustainable development
by
Sarah Hénon, Judith Randel and Chloe Stirk, Development Initiatives
The role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society in financing
sustainable development is important, but it is changing. While domestic resource
mobilisation and international commercial flows are growing very rapidly, they are
not equally available to all. NGO finance, capacity and expertise are critical for
populations at risk of being left behind. This chapter outlines the scale and trends in
resources raised and mobilised by NGOs and civil society, and identifies a rise in
direct giving by the public. It finds that the classifications of countries into
“developed” and “developing”, and models based on raising money in the “North”
and spending it in the “South” do not fit well with the distribution of poverty across
and within countries. New business models are needed. To achieve the post-2015
global goals, civil society finance and expertise are needed, along with new
cross-border partnerships between organisations working on similar issues,
supported by increased transparency and civil society space.109
I.9. THE CHANGING ROLE OF NGOS AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN FINANCING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTProjections for poverty and financing make it clear that resources provided through official
development assistance (ODA) on the one hand, and civil society or non-governmental organisations
(CSOs and NGOs)1 on the other, are – and will remain – vital to the achievement of poverty eradication
by 2030.2 While domestic resource mobilisation and international commercial flows are increasing
very rapidly,3 not all countries have the capacity or the means to access these resources. For these
populations, NGO finance and ODA remain critical.
Nonetheless, funds raised from the public by traditional NGOsmay well be peaking, especially as
opportunities for direct giving increase. In response to concerns about the potential for growth in
existing markets, NGOs are actively seeking out new markets in middle-income countries.
Another aspect of change is the blurring of the old North-South, donor-recipient divide. This
dynamic, which has governed development co-operation for the past 50 years, no longer holds
true – and has not held true for some time. Many countries today are simultaneously providers and
recipients of development co-operation, and developing country domestic institutions – governmental
and non-governmental – are increasingly significant in terms of resources and leadership. An approach
whereby NGOs raise money in the “North” and spend it in the “South” is no longer adequate for
addressing the new geography of poverty.
All of this means that the role of NGOs and civil society is changing fast. While NGOs, and in
particular large international ones, are important implementing partners and sources of finance for
fighting extreme poverty (see Box 9.1 for examples), the part they will play in mobilising resources for
the post-2015 global goals will not be met through business as usual.
In this changed environment, this chapter asks: how can NGOs and civil society best contribute
to mobilising the resources needed to achieve global goals?
Estimates of how much NGOs mobilise directly from the public differ
When the journalist Zeinab Badawi was moderating the opening session of the first High-Level
Meeting of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation,4 she challenged a speaker:
“You just described farmers’ groups as civil society.Wouldn’t they see themselves as private sector?”
Actually they are both.
In a similar fashion, the sharp distinctions between CSOs, consultancies, businesses and
government are also blurred in practice. Providers of development co-operation often contract work
out to large NGOs, seeing them as suppliers. Yet the same ODA providers may act as partners, each
following their own agenda. Similarly, when we talk about money raised from the public, we are
probably thinking about contributions to NGOs; but some governments also raise voluntary
contributions from the public, particularly for humanitarian crises. Finally, individual direct giving
through all sorts of private channels is significant, if largely invisible in the data. In practice, funds
flow in several directions among foundations, non-governmental and civil society organisations,
multilateral organisations and governments.This can result in both double counting of resources and
in flows that are never captured in accounting systems.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014110
I.9. THE CHANGING ROLE OF NGOS AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN FINANCING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTThere are, therefore, big differences in the estimates of the total volume of funding raised from
private sources by NGOs and CSOs, even if this is limited to Development Assistance Committee
(DAC) member countries. In 2011, the DAC estimated funds raised from the public directly by NGOs to
be USD 32 billion (Figure 9.1),5 equivalent to 24% of total ODA that same year. Yet these flows are
reported to the DAC by member countries based on estimates, or on calculations from NGOs’ annual
statistical reports, and therefore may understate what in reality these organisations raise (OECD,
2011). The Center for Global Prosperity estimates the figure for 2011 to be USD 58.9 billion, while
Development Initiatives (DI) puts it at USD 26 billion for the same year, which amounts to 57% of total
private development assistance raised by companies, foundations and NGOs in DAC member
countries (Adelman et al., 2011).
Box 9.1. Large NGOs are major development players
The largest global international NGO, World Vision International, had 46 000 staff and a global
budget of USD 2.57 billion in 2010, 80% of which came from private sources (Worthington and Pipa,
2010). In 2012,World Vision International’s total income from private sources (including foundations)
exceeded the ODA provided by each of 13 individual DAC development co-operation providers (see
figure below) and the combined ODA of the 7 smallest of these DAC providers. In 2012, UNICEF’s total
income from private sources (including foundations) was greater than the ODA of 11 individual DAC
providers.* In the same year, Médecins Sans Frontières’ income from private sources was greater than
the ODA of ten DAC providers. If these three NGOs were a single DAC member, their combined private
development assistance in 2012 would have made them the 11th largest DAC provider.
HowWorld Vision International’s income from private sources compares
to ODA of selected DAC development co-operation providers, 2012
Source: Development Initiatives based on the Global Humanitarian Assistance NGO dataset and OECD-DAC statistics.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933121734
* UNICEF – the United Nations Children’s Fund – is included as an NGO as it raises funds from the public.
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The DAC estimates that funds raised directly by NGOs in member countries
were USD 32 billion in 2011 – equivalent to 24% of total ODA.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 111
I.9. THE CHANGING ROLE OF NGOS AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN FINANCING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTData based on a sample of 31 largemainly international NGOs, themajority of which (29) are based
in DAC member countries, show that contributions by individuals remain by the far the largest source;
the most significant growth in private giving to NGOs is in contributions from foundations (Figure 9.2).
Private giving from countries outside the DAC – which is on the increase – also is likely to be
under-reported. Funds mobilised from the public in countries which are not DAC members have a
stronger component of giving by corporations, wealthy individuals and foundations, and are
currently much more focused on needs in their own countries. In seven large countries (Brazil, the
People’s Republic of China, India, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates),
Figure 9.1. Funds raised from private sources by NGOs based
in DAC member countries, 2008-12
USD billion, current prices
Source: OECD (2011), “Detailed aid statistics: Official and private flows”, OECD International Development Statistics (database),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00072-en.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933121696
Figure 9.2. Sources of private giving to NGOs, 2006-11
Source: Development Initiatives (2014), Measuring Private Development Assistance: Emerging trends and challenges, Development
Initiatives, Bristol, available at: http://devinit.org/report/measuring-private-development-assistance-emerging-trends-challenges.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933121715
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
23.8
22.0
30.8
32.0
29.8
USD billion
20 000
18 000
16 000
14 000
12 000
10 000
8 000
6 000
4 000
2 000
0
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Total in-kind
Corporate
Other private (unaccounted for)
Total other/undefined
Foundations and trusts
Own source
Total public sources
Individuals
Other private (declared as other private)
USD millionDEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014112
I.9. THE CHANGING ROLE OF NGOS AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN FINANCING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTfunds mobilised for international development were estimated to be at least USD 1.4 billion in 2011.
However, this was in the context of contributions for domestic causes at around USD 35 billion a year
(Development Initiatives, 2013).
Direct giving is growing fast
Individuals have been providing resources, solidarity and support across borders for centuries,
but the rise of the Internet, mobile phone technology and social media over the past decade has
significantly increased the ways in which individuals can give. Yet precisely because these gifts are
“individual”, they are often not visible. For instance, Kiva (www.kiva.org) and Zidisha (www.zidisha.org)
are among the many Internet-based platforms that are now being used by individuals to give money.
By leveraging the Internet and a worldwide network of microfinance institutions, Kiva lets
individuals lend as little as USD 25 to micro-entrepreneurs around the world. Both the volumes and
numbers of Kiva users have increased rapidly: to date 1.2 million people have used this platform to
lend in over 70 countries, providing USD 552 million since October 2005, when Kiva was founded
(Figure 9.3).
Launched in 2009, Zidisha took Kiva’s model further by allowing individuals to lend money
directly to entrepreneurs in developing countries, without the need for a local microfinance
intermediary. Since then, just under USD 2 million has been provided to entrepreneurs through
Zidisha, which has 7 761 registered lenders.6 These are just two examples of the growing
phenomenon of “crowdfunding” (Box 9.2).
There is a range of other web-based platforms with slightly different approaches. GiveAid Direct
(www.giveaiddirect.com), for example, allows individuals the opportunity to directly support people
(e.g. by providing money for school fees) or to fund specific projects (such as procuring health
equipment).
The rise of these individual giving websites has revealed substantial potential, but it is not clear
yet whether this direct giving will replace contributions channelled through NGOs or add to them.
Either way, greater direct public engagement will play a part in a development landscape wheremany
more actors – more government departments, more businesses, more individuals – are getting
involved.
Figure 9.3. Kiva lending volume and total number of active lenders, 2011 versus 2012
Source: Author’s calculations based on Kiva 2012 Annual Report, www.kiva.org/annualreport (accessed 17 April 2014).
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933121753
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I.9. THE CHANGING ROLE OF NGOS AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN FINANCING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTBox 9.2. Crowdfunding sustainable development
The concept of “crowdfunding” – enabling large numbers of people to invest small amounts of
money in a charity or business venture using online platforms – is increasingly drawing attention as
an innovative way of tapping new sources of funding. Crowdfunding was initially used in
philanthropy to collect donations. It then spread to consumer products in the form of pre-funding of
products or projects (e.g. music, film), often providing some form of “reward” for investors, which has
clear monetary value. Credit-based crowdfunding – or crowdlending – offers backers an interest rate
in exchange for their loans e.g. to microbusiness. Equity crowdfunding – or crowdinvesting – is an
investment in a start-up in exchange for an equity share of the company. These investments are
typically made through dedicated web platforms which pool the funds; however, this form of
crowdfunding is relatively new. According to industry estimates, from 2011 to 2012 the funding
volume of global crowdfunding almost doubled, from USD 1.5 billion to USD 2.7 billion, before rising
to an estimated USD 5.1 billion in 2013 (Massolution, 2013). The majority of crowdfunding platforms
are based in the United States, followed by Europe. Although a newer phenomenon in the developing
world, there are some crowdfunding platforms in developing countries.
Crowdfunding could become a new source of financing for development by providing platforms for
people all over the world to contribute to philanthropic projects and ventures in developing countries.
For example, the crowdfunding platform Indiegogo provides a channel for funding development
projects such as Bamboo Lota. This project was designed to address deforestation and poverty in
Malawi through the introduction of fast-growing bamboo charcoal instead of other forms of charcoal
commonly used by poor families in the country. The project team raised money to conduct fieldwork
andmeet with government officials and NGOs in Malawi, build a kiln sourced from local resources for
the community to create bamboo charcoal, and educate locals on the bamboo-to-charcoal process.
Within three years, the government was actively investing in bamboo.
Such examples show the potential of lending, donation and reward-based crowdfunding models for
providing innovative financing for development. Equity crowdfunding is more complex. While
proponents of equity crowdfunding see great potential, envisaging that it will allow businesses to
raise capital quickly and efficiently (Neiss, 2011), there are also many potential pitfalls. Equity
crowdfunding essentially enables unsophisticated investors to inject money directly into young risky
companies with the expectation of a financial return (NESTA, 2012b). In a number of countries this
would require changes in current securities laws* (NESTA, 2012a). While a lot of attention has been
given to recent legislation in the United States that will allow equity crowdfunding, this type of
investment is not yet legal in many countries. There are active equity crowdfunding platforms in
Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, but many of these are new (a
number of them only launched in 2012) so there is not yet much experience or evidence on how these
are working (De Buysere, 2012) and what it might mean in terms of investor protection.
In short, crowdfunding could be used to generate new resources to finance sustainable development.
While this potential should be reflected in the ongoing discussions of how to finance the post-2015
goals, there are still many challenges to be addressed, particularly for equity crowdfunding (Isenberg,
2012). The key will be to develop appropriate legal frameworks and build the necessary systems and
trusted platforms to connect potential investors to appropriate ventures (World Bank, 2013).
* Those seeking equity investment must produce a prospectus approved by an authorised person and can only offer shares
to sophisticated investors.
Source: This box was contributed to the chapter by Karen Wilson, Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry at
the OECD.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014114
I.9. THE CHANGING ROLE OF NGOS AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN FINANCING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTNGOs manage and mobilise more than they raise
NGOs manage more money than they raise. They implement development programmes for
governments and other providers to the order of USD 20 billion; this means that around 13% of ODA
is channelled directly through NGOs. The United Nations organisations and foundations also
implement programmes through NGOs. Most of this goes to large international NGOs; NGOs from
developing countries receive only 9% of all ODA spent through NGOs.
The volume of the funds NGOs manage gives them a seat around the table to discuss
development priorities, data and information about delivery on the ground and impacts on target
populations. Yet that voice is largely dominated by governments and a few large international NGOs.
NGOs also mobilise more than they raise. Together with the OECD, their consistent, long-term
monitoring of the performance of DAC development co-operation providers helps hold them to their
commitments – such as the United Nations target of giving 0.7% of gross national income as ODA and
the G8 Gleneagles commitments to sub-Saharan Africa (see Chapter 2). While the data show that
providers vary in their success in living up to these commitments, it is hard to imagine that targets
set in 1970 and 2005 would still have traction in 2014 without this assiduous monitoring of
performance and the persistent advocacy by NGOs. Having said that, there are limits to the extent to
which NGOs have been able to counteract strong political pressure to reduce ODA.
Public and political awareness of and perception of development needs are also driven by NGO
campaigning and engagement, from television advertising to organising visits for members of
parliament to poor communities. For example, decades of development education – both formal and
informal – in the United Kingdom, spearheaded by NGOs, have helped to lay the foundations of public
understanding and support that has made the achievement of the 0.7% target a reality in that
country, even at a time of budget austerity.
Yet while these activities clearly boost social concern and provide a vehicle for international
solidarity, they can also have downsides. Emphasis on the 0.7% target has led tomuch attention being
given to whether or not certain finance “counts” as ODA, rather than focusing on how to mobilise
additional funds. Similarly, the role of NGOs in mobilising resources and public concern for some
developing countries (often driven by immediate fundraising imperatives) can lead to the creation of
a distorted image of these countries, creating a climate that discourages investment there and
impairing the realistic assessment of associated risks and opportunities.
Transparency and accountability are crucial
Raising and mobilising resources is one thing, but allocating them effectively is equally critical.
With funds raised from the public of around USD 30 billion, and responsibility for managing other
resources too, getting maximum value for every dollar spent by NGOs is important – especially because
those resources are focused on the most vulnerable people. Transparency can make a big contribution
to effectiveness. If NGOs have access to information on what other providers are doing, they can
allocate their ownmoneymore effectively. Similarly, transparency on the scale and distribution of NGO
finance can drive investments that complement each other and help prevent duplication.
Governments of developing countries report that obtaining timely and forward-looking data
from providers – including transparency on NGO spending – is a key priority for them because it helps
ministries and others to make better decisions. Access to these data – and the capacity to use them –
is critical to drive accountability. Nonetheless, the very CSOs that advocate for transparency and
NGOs implemented development programmes to the order of USD 20 billion
in 2011 – equivalent to 13% of total ODA.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 115
I.9. THE CHANGING ROLE OF NGOS AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN FINANCING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTaccountability often have a particularly challenging relationship with government and often operate
in environments where there is limited space available for civil society.7 NGOs are often worried that
governments will use information on their spending to curtail their room for manoeuvre, especially
since some governments view these organisations with suspicion – as extensions of the political
opposition or as representatives of provider interests.
What do we know about how NGOs allocate their resources? Like ODA, NGO private funding
comes in different forms. Around one-fifth is in the form of gifts in-kind (food, clothing,
commodities, etc.) and again like ODA, not all NGO funding actually reaches developing countries. For
example, data suggest that at least 15% of funds privately raised in the United States for international
co-operation actually stay in that country, being spent on activities such as student support. We do
not know what proportion of the funds raised from the public by NGOs actually is spent on “technical
co-operation” – the provision of know-how, capacity, personnel and skills – and just as with ODA, we
do not have good data on transaction costs.
However, NGO transparency is increasing. Currently, 168 NGOs publish their data to the
International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI).8 While these data are of variable quality, looking at
one of the best,WaterAid, makes clear the value of increased transparency (Figure 9.4). Users can see
which types of organisationsWaterAid uses to implement its work in various countries; in Malawi for
example, WaterAid allocates half its money through government, while in Madagascar, the vast
majority is spent through the private sector. Drilling down further in the IATI data, the specific
locations and target populations are also identified; for instance, in Madagascar WaterAid helped
218 600 people in the urban commune of Antananarivo and provided 2 416 people with water and
1 409 with sanitation in Beravina.9 The added value of this data includes better understanding of
what works, more opportunity to make all resources more coherent and effective, and greater
opportunity for local populations to demand accountability.
Figure 9.4. WaterAid’s international funded activities by country
and implementing organisation
In pounds sterling (GBP)
Source: Author’s calculations based on WaterAid Data 2010-13 from IATI registry, www.iatiregistry.org/publisher/wateraid (accessed
April 2014).
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933121772
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I.9. THE CHANGING ROLE OF NGOS AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN FINANCING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTNew business models are needed for the new global goals
The big question is how can this mixed bag of public engagement and resource mobilisation
make the strongest contribution to the achievement of global targets for sustainable development?
Policies are required that actively promote civil society engagement, funding and advocacy for
common problems – whether nutrition, disability or financial inclusion. The geography of poverty is
shifting and today large numbers of extremely poor people live in countries that are experiencing
rapid and consistent growth (OECD, 2013). The likelihood is that in the future, the people who are “left
behind” – in terms of income and other forms of poverty – will not only be concentrated in a few
countries, but spread across many. These people will share certain characteristics: they are likely to
have been excluded for reasons of gender, ethnicity, disability or health, or they will be trapped in
multidimensional poverty. CSOs across the world hold particular expertise in policies and
programmes that benefit vulnerable groups such as these. Making progress will rely on the
experience and capacity of these organisations.
The rise of domestic giving and of domestic social change organisations in many countries such
as Brazil, India andMexico also offers great scope for increasing and sustaining resources for progress
against poverty. Creating an enabling environment, including through tax and other incentives for
mobilising individual and corporate resources, offers the potential to generate increased finance. As
domestic organisations become more visible and stronger, it is likely that they will be increasingly
used as implementing agencies for international development providers, having a stronger voice in
resource allocation and mobilisation. However, the political imperatives for governments in provider
countries to support their own national NGOs are likely to remain strong.
It is not clear whether the aggregate amounts of money available for meeting the global goals, or
the extent of public engagement with them, will be stronger if NGOs are working in a framework that
is based on shared problems across 200 countries, versus raising funds in one place to be spent in
another. But achieving universal goals should be accelerated by policies that actively promote civil
society engagement, funding and advocacy on common problems across boundaries.
It is also unclear whether the rise of direct giving will replace contributions channelled through
NGOs or add to them. Individual giving websites have revealed their potential, but precisely because
they are individual and private, the scale of giving is often invisible. Yet we know that in many
societies there is widespread public involvement in international co-operation – be it through church
groups, community and business links, individual support for students, volunteers or educational
exchanges. Whatever form it takes, greater direct public engagement will continue to be part of an
environment in which more actors – more government departments, more businesses, more
individuals, more CSOs – are playing a part.
At the same time, there is huge potential for CSOs to mobilise more than they raise, but in a
different framework. The increased opportunities for private giving and micro-investment, as well as
the growth of remittances (Chapter 10), all offer potential for greater resourcemobilisation and public
engagement. Until now, CSOs have focused energy and attention on holding governments to their
commitments. In the future, they may devote more energy to shaping the way in which the private
sector contributes to the achievement of global goals. These efforts need to have a much stronger
focus on “inclusive partnerships” that facilitate real collaboration in the fight to overcome poverty
and inequality.
Over time, the boundaries separating civil society and NGOs from other development
co-operation providers are likely to become more – not less – blurred. This will make joined-up
working critical for releasing more value from available resources. For that, transparency and access
to information are key.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 117
I.9. THE CHANGING ROLE OF NGOS AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN FINANCING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTKey recommendations
● Promote and support civil society engagement, funding and advocacy for addressing common
factors linked to extreme poverty in all countries – whether nutrition, disability or financial
inclusion.
● Ensure NGOs and civil society have political space and a key voice in discussing development
priorities as well as data and information about delivery on the ground and impacts on target
populations.
● Support joined-up working between NGOs, governments, the private sector and others through
greater transparency and accountability, specifically through publishing data to the International
Aid Transparency Initiative so that they can be used alongside data from all other providers.
Notes
1. While the terms non-governmental organisation (NGO) and civil society organisation (CSO) are often used
interchangeably, CSOs generally encompass a larger cross-section of civil society groups which contribute to
development. These range from global networks such as the Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness,
to international organisations such as Action Aid International, to development NGOs with headquarters in
development co-operation provider countries, trade unions, community-based and faith-based organisations
around the world. The DAC statistical reporting directive defines the term NGO broadly as any non-profit
entity without significant government-controlled participation or representation. See also OECD (2011).
2. See Chapters 1, 2 and 8 in this volume.
3. For example, see Chapters 5 and 7 in this volume.
4. Held in Mexico City, 15-16 April 2014.
5. The calculations for this figure include aid to CSOs in developing countries.
6. According to Zidisha statistics, www.zidisha.org/index.php?p=43 (accessed 11 June 2014).
7. In his April 2013 report to the UN Human Rights Council, Maina Kiai, Special Reporter on the rights to freedom
of peaceful assembly and of association, draws the attention of the UN system to “increased control and
undue restrictions in relation to funding received [by NGOs]” (Kiai, 2013). CIVICUS has noted threats to civil
society in 87 countries ranging from registration restrictions to serious limits on freedom of association, and a
particular focus on restrictions of civil society access to foreign funding (cited in CSO Partnership for
Development Effectiveness, n.d.).
8. The IATI is a voluntary, multi-stakeholder initiative that seeks to improve the transparency of aid,
development and humanitarian resources in order to increase their effectiveness in tackling poverty. The IATI
brings together provider and host countries, civil society organisations and other experts in aid information.
See more at: www.aidtransparency.net.
9. For more information, see WaterAid’s page on the IATI Registry, www.iatiregistry.org/publisher/wateraid. All
publishedWaterAid IATI data can be found at http://datastore.iatistandard.org/api/1/access/transaction.csv?reporting-
org=GB-CHC-288701&stream=True.
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Chapter 10
What place for remittances
in the post-2015 framework?
by
Kathryn Nwajiaku, Jolanda Profos, Cécile Sangaré and Giovanni Maria Semeraro,
Development Co-operation Directorate, OECD
In 2012, developing countries received at least USD 351 billion in remittances
(funds sent by people living and working abroad to their home countries).
Remittances represent one of the largest, and fastest growing, sources of external
income for these countries. While the motivation for sending remittances, and their
impact, can vary, their development potential is increasingly acknowledged and
scrutinised. This chapter explores how remittances can be tracked better, analyses
the extent to which they promote development, and outlines the main steps and
obstacles to realising their developmental potential. It also shares a range of
innovative ways to catalyse and optimise the use of remittances, including
matching them to achieve greater development impact and gain the confidence of
international capital markets.
This chapter also includes an opinion piece by Mthuli Ncube, Chief Economist
and Vice President of the African Development Bank, on harnessing the
potential of remittances in Africa.121
I.10. WHAT PLACE FOR REMITTANCES IN THE POST-2015 FRAMEWORK?Over recent years, remittances (funds sent by people living and working abroad to their home
countries) have increased rapidly. Today, they represent the largest source of external finance for
many developing countries. According to World Bank data, worldwide remittances to developing
countries1 reached their highest level in 2012, at USD 351 billion; this puts them ahead of official
development assistance (ODA) and foreign direct investment (Figure 10.1).
In the context of the current global financial crisis, remittances represent an important source of
finance for many developing countries, especially as they tend to rise during downturns in the
receiving economy – unlike capital flows such as foreign direct investment, which tend to fall.
Moreover, while private capital mainly flows to emerging countries (Chapter 2), remittances are
particularly important in poor countries, where they can represent up to almost half of gross
domestic product (GDP) (Tables 10.1 and 10.2). They are also an important contributor to resilience in
the face of economic or humanitarian crises.
Since the 2002 Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development (see Glossary), there has
been growing recognition among the international development community that remittances could
be better harnessed for economic growth and welfare in developing countries. This chapter explores
how remittances can be tracked better, analyses the extent to which they promote development, and
outlines the main steps and obstacles to realising their developmental potential.
Figure 10.1. Remittances: A major source of external finance
for developing countries, 2000 and 2012
USD billion, constant 2012 prices
1. Includes bilateral and multilateral outflows to developing countries (including ODA).
2. Includes personal transfers and compensation of employees.
Sources: DAC statistics;World Bank migration and remittances data, available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.CD.DT
and http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/0,,contentMDK:22759429~pagePK:64165401~
piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883.00.html.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933121791
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Remittances are the largest source of external finance for many developing
countries, reaching USD 351 billion in 2012 – higher than ODA
and foreign direct investment.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014122
I.10. WHAT PLACE FOR REMITTANCES IN THE POST-2015 FRAMEWORK?Remittances are on the rise, but their full scale is uncertain
Worldwide remittances to developing countries increased from USD 123 billion to
USD 351 billion between 2000 and 2012 (Figure 10.1).2 Over the same period, ODA flows (concessional,
cross-border, bilateral and multilateral) rose from USD 84 billion to USD 132 billion. While the share
of ODA in total developing countries’ external finance fell from 20% in 2000 to 14% in 2012, the share
of total worldwide remittances increased from 29% to 37%.TheWorld Bank estimates that worldwide
remittances to developing countries will continue to increase and will reach USD 540 billion by 2016
(World Bank, 2013a).
Table 10.1. Remittances as a share of developing countries’
gross domestic product, 2005-12
As a % of GDP, by income group and region
Grouping
Personal remittances Personal transfers
Average Maximum
Standard
deviation
Average Maximum
Standard
deviation
Income LICs 7.1 52.0 10.1 7.0 51.7 10.2
LMICs 7.8 43.8 8.0 5.8 24.4 5.9
UMICs 4.1 33.5 5.9 3.9 32.2 5.4
Regions Africa 3.7 43.8 6.2 2.8 16.8 3.4
America 5.9 24.4 6.3 5.8 24.4 6.3
Asia 7.5 52.0 9.5 7.2 51.7 9.7
Europe 9.7 34.5 8.7 6.3 19.1 5.5
Oceania 9.1 33.5 10.2 7.9 32.2 10.6
Other LDCs 5.6 43.8 8.0 4.3 24.4 6.2
Fragile states 5.5 25.3 6.3 5.0 24.4 5.7
Notes: LDCs: least developed countries; LICs: low-income countries; LMICs: lower middle-income countries and territories; UMICs:
upper middle-income countries and territories. Standard deviation represents how far (on average) values are from the average of
each group. Personal transfers (workers’ remittances) are a sub-category of personal remittances (see Box 10.1).
Source: World Bank data, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator; http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.CD.DT; http://
data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.CD; http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD.
Table 10.2. Top 10 recipients of personal remittances, 2005-12
As a % of GDP
Top 10 recipients of personal remittances Top 10 recipients of personal transfers
Tajikistan 40.7 Tajikistan 40.6
Lesotho 33.7 Tonga 25.8
Moldova 27.9 Kyrgyz Republic 22.3
Tonga 23.2 Haiti 21.6
Kyrgyz Republic 22.3 Samoa 20.9
Haiti 21.6 Nepal 19.3
Samoa 21.0 Honduras 18.3
Lebanon 20.8 Lebanon 18.2
Nepal 20.2 El Salvador 17.1
Honduras 18.4 Guyana 16.4
Source: World Bank data, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator; http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.CD.DT; http://
data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.CD; http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD.
The share of ODA in developing countries’ resource receipts fell
from 20% in 2000 to 14% in 2012, while the share of remittances increased
from 29% to 37%.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 123
I.10. WHAT PLACE FOR REMITTANCES IN THE POST-2015 FRAMEWORK?These statistics on remittances, however, should be read with caution. First, they include
worldwide remittances (i.e. from all sending countries) and thus do not fully compare with the
development-oriented flows in Figure 10.1, which, for the most part, come only from OECD
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) member countries. According to World Bank estimates,3
remittances from DAC countries to developing countries in 2012 amounted to USD 191 billion,
representing 20% of their total resource receipts.
Moreover, the way remittances are measured may result in overestimations. For example,
“compensation of employees” (workers’ gross earnings) are counted as remittances (Box 10.1), even
though migrant workers’ earnings may be entirely or partly spent in the host country and therefore
never sent home; the same is true for the income of non-migrants, e.g. locally recruited staff of
embassies, consulates and international organisations treated in the balance of payments4 as
extraterritorial entities. Although balance of payment categories are well defined (Box 10.1), their
differing implementation worldwide may also affect data comparability.5
On the other hand, remittance measurements do not capture transfers through informal
channels, such as cash carried by people travelling home or sent by mail. These flows are likely to
represent one-third to one-half of worldwide remittances, but are not recorded in official statistics.
They are called a variety of names, such as hawala, hundi or fei qian.6
Remittances make up a large share of developing countries’ gross domestic product
Remittances represented on average 2.2% of all developing countries’ GDP between 2005 and 2012,
and are especially important as a share of GDP in low-income and lower middle-income countries
(7% and 5.8% respectively between 2005 and 2012; Table 10.1). On average, European developing
countries7 seem to be the most dependent on remittance flows (9.7% of their GDP between 2005
and 2012). Over the same period, the ratio of personal remittances to GDP of the top ten recipient
countries ranged between 41% and 18% (Table 10.2). In terms of the ratio of personal transfers (workers’
remittances) to GDP, a sub-category of personal remittances (Box 10.1), the five largest recipients over
the same period were Tajikistan, Tonga, the Kyrgyz Republic, Haiti and Samoa.
The links between remittances and development are complex
Although remittances clearly constitute a major financial resource for developing countries, the
different motivations behind these flows and their varying impact on economic growth and welfare
suggest that they cannot be considered as development finance.
The decision to remit is complex – motivations range from altruism to self-interest. They may be
driven by the aspiration of eventually inheriting, or by the desire to entrust the migrant’s assets to
relatives. Nevertheless, the amount of remittances received tends to decrease as the domestic income
of a family rises; it also decreases over time asmigrants’ attachment to their family gradually weakens.
At the same time, the decision for one familymember tomigratemay be the result of a family decision,
with remittances being the mechanism for redistributing the gains to the whole family.
Informal transfers of remittances amount to between one-third and one-half
of worldwide remittances, but go unrecorded.
Remittances to low-income countries make up around 7% of their GDP
on average.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014124
I.10. WHAT PLACE FOR REMITTANCES IN THE POST-2015 FRAMEWORK?It is reasonable to assume that remittances sent by migrants to their families back home help
them to meet their basic needs and thus have an overall impact on poverty reduction (Adams, 2005).
Yet, the microeconomic and macroeconomic impacts of remittances are not clear cut; neither is the
extent to which these flows contribute to development. Remittances are traditionally perceived to be
spent on direct consumption (medicines, food, car, etc.), rather than on productive investment, a
situation which can lead to dependency on continuing remittances. Nonetheless, research in
Guatemala suggests that remittances contribute to increasing households’ spending on education
Box 10.1. Who measures remittances and how?
The sixth edition of the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Balance of Payment Manual and
International Investment Position Manual (IMF, 2009b; known as BPM6) defines remittances as “household
income from foreign economies arising mainly from the temporary or permanent movement of
people to those economies. Remittances include cash and non-cash items that flow through formal
channels, such as via electronic wire, or through informal channels, such as money or goods carried
across borders…”. One of the key outcomes of recent methodological work carried out on remittances
has been the replacement of the concept of “migrant” in the balance of payment framework on
remittance data (see below) with the concept of residency. This definition includes flows beyond
those resulting from the movement of persons and is no longer based on the concepts of migration,
employment or family relationships.
The BPM6 addresses the definitional issues associated with international labour mobility and
remittances, while the publication International Transactions in Remittances: Guide for Compilers and Users
(IMF, 2009a) provides practical guidance to improve the quality of estimates for those using
remittance statistics. Known as the RCG, this guide is jointly published by the IMF, the World Bank,
Eurostat and the OECD.
The main source of remittance data today is the World Bank.* These data are mainly derived from
three IMF balance of payments components:
1. Personal transfers: All current transfers in cash or in kind received by resident households from
non-resident households.
2. Compensation of employees: The earnings of workers residing abroad for less than 12 months,
including the value of in-kind benefits.
3. Capital transfers:The wealth of individuals whomove their residency from one country to another
for a period of at least one year. Capital transfers capture two different types of transactions:
1) return home assets: the assets accumulated during their stay by non-residents returning to their
home country; and 2) change in residency status: individuals’ change of residence from
one country to another, which, therefore, may not involve real financial flows.
The Global Remittances Working Group contains a voluntary group of experienced compilers of
remittance data led by theWorld Bank and established to co-ordinate at international level the work
on remittances, including improving methodology and data. This encompasses measuring
North-South, South-South, intra-regional and internal remittances; standardising information
collection on migration and remittances in household surveys and censuses; and collaborating with
other institutional efforts to improve data on migration.
For more information, see http://go.worldbank.org/SS0MQSBFM0.
* For example, see http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.CD.DT.
Source: IMF (2009a), International Transactions in Remittances: Guide for Compilers and Users, International Monetary Fund,
Washington, DC; IMF (2009b), Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual, International Monetary
Fund, Washington, DC; International Finance Corporation (2009), “Global Remittances Working Group”, The
World Bank, http://go.worldbank.org/SS0MQSBFM0; Lemos, F. and J. Reinke (2007), “The Luxembourg Group on
Remittances”, www.cemla-remesas.org/medicion/PDF/seminario2007/LuxembourgGroup.pdf; IMF (2006), “Luxembourg Group
on Remittances: Progress report”, 19th Meeting of the IMF Committee on Balance of Payments Statistics, Frankfurt,
Germany, 23-26 October, International Monetary Fund, www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/bop/2006/06-03.pdf.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 125
I.10. WHAT PLACE FOR REMITTANCES IN THE POST-2015 FRAMEWORK?more than on consumption (Adams, 2005). Empirical studies also show a positive correlation between
remittances and health (e.g. Hildebrandt and McKenzie, 2005), in particular infant mortality; while
others establish a direct link between increases in remittance inflows and levels of investment
(Leon-Ledesma and Piracha, 2004).
One of the most controversial aspects of remittances is probably their impact on inequality.
World Bank research in Ghana and Guatemala found that remittances were responsible for a “slight
increase in income inequality” (Adams, 2005); other studies in Egypt, Pakistan and the Philippines
concluded that remittances had a negative effect on rural income distribution because of the limited
number of beneficiaries.
On the other hand, at the macroeconomic level, remittances help to alleviate credit constraints
and reduce macroeconomic volatility; protect consumption against negative shocks; enhance
investment in human and physical capital; increase consumption and leisure, thus improving welfare;
increase public debt sustainability; reduce country risk by lowering the marginal cost of servicing debt;
and increase tax collections on consumption (IMF, 2008). Yet, the IMF cautions against two phenomena
that can undermine the potential of remittances for increasing national productive capital:
1. “Dutch disease”, which describes the apparent relationship between a large inflow of foreign
currency (e.g. through remittances) and a decline in the manufacturing or agricultural sector. The
assumption is that an increase in revenues makes a nation’s currency stronger compared to that of
other nations (manifest in the exchange rate); this in turn makes the nation’s other exports more
expensive, reducing the competitiveness of the manufacturing sector and deteriorating the trade
balance (increasing imports and decreasing exports) (Acosta et al., 2007).
2. Moral hazard,8 in which the increase of income from remittances allows people to work less
(thereby diminishing labour supply). This also relates to uncertainties over whether remittances
will be invested in productive activities.
While it would not be appropriate, therefore, to include remittances in measures of development
finance, remittances nevertheless represent a huge potential source of financing for productive
investment and welfare development. For this reason, development co-operation actors (both
providers and hosts) should pay more attention to these flows as part of developing countries’
resource receipts (see the “In my view” box).
There are several obstacles to the use of remittances for financing development
There are two significant obstacles which prevent developing countries frommaking the most of
remittances: the temptation to tax them and the costs of sending remittances home. Most experts
today advise against taxing remittances, as this could affect recipient countries negatively in several
ways. The tax would be additional to any income and sales taxes migrants already pay in their host
country, reducing their incentive to send remittances home or driving these flows underground. A
shift to informal channels could hinder efforts to achieve financial inclusion of migrants and their
dependents, and to leverage remittances (Mohapatra, 2010b). Finally, taxes are difficult to impose and
require extensive information-sharing among governments. Some countries already impose hidden
taxes through overvalued official exchange rates for remittance transfers (Cuba, for instance, levied a
10% penalty exchange fee from 2006 to 2010).
The macroeconomic impacts of remittances in developing countries are many
and varied.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014126
I.10. WHAT PLACE FOR REMITTANCES IN THE POST-2015 FRAMEWORK?The second obstacle is the high cost of transferring remittances from one country to another.
Lowering these costs would be an important way for providers of development assistance to help
increase and facilitate transfers of remittances. During the first four months of 2013, the global
average cost of sending remittances fell from 9% of their value to 8.6%, while the cost of remitting
from G20 countries declined for the first time in three years, from 9% to 8.2% (Figure 10.2). Further
reductions in the cost of transferring remittances would bring significant benefits, particularly for the
more expensive South-South transfers, which, excluding remittances through informal channels,
represented 10-29% of developing countries’ remittance receipts in 2005. A lack of competition in the
remittance market, a lack of financial development in general and high foreign exchange
commissions at both ends of the transaction chain keep South-South transfers’ costs high (Ratha and
Shaw, 2007).
The G8 and G20 have endorsed the objective of the Global Remittances Working Group (Box 10.1)
to co-ordinate international remittance initiatives and support remittance markets; both groups have
pledged to reduce the global average costs of transferring remittances from 10% to 5% by 2014 (G20,
2011). Although remittances are not part of their own development finance efforts, members of the
OECD DAC also recognise the need to facilitate the circulation of remittances through formal channels
so as to encourage savings and increase countries’ creditworthiness on international capital markets.
Figure 10.2. The cost of sending USD 200 from G20 countries is falling
Sending cost as a % of remittance value
Source: World Bank (2013b), “An analysis of trends in the average total cost of migrant remittance services”, Remittance Prices
Worldwide Report 7, TheWorld Bank,Washington, DC.
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G20 countries have pledged to reduce the global average costs of transferring
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I.10. WHAT PLACE FOR REMITTANCES IN THE POST-2015 FRAMEWORK?In my view:
We need to harness the potential of remittances in Africa
Mthuli Ncube,
Chief Economist and Vice President, African Development Bank
Over the past decade, remittances sent to Africa have grown rapidly and are a major source of
foreign exchange. Currently, official figures show them to be the largest international flow of financial
resources to Africa, and this does not include remittances sent informally, which are unrecorded but
estimated to amount to up to 75% of the recorded flows.
Compared to other international financial flows, remittances are relatively stable. Like foreign
direct investment in Africa, they declined after the global financial crisis; but remittances rebounded
quickly and between 2010 and 2012 they exceeded both foreign direct investment and official
development assistance.
The increasing financial weight of remittances compared to other external flows to Africa – and the
positive role that they can play in development – have drawn heightened attention from policy
makers. Yet for Africa’s policy makers to maximise their development impact, it is critical that they
understand the basic characteristics of this source of foreign exchange.
Policymakers who aim to raise the volume of remittances need firstly to understand the factors – aside
from the costs of transmission – that canmotivate or discourage senders.An empirical analysis of the key
macroeconomic factors driving remittances in Africa between 1990 and 2011 found that inflation and
depreciation of the nominal exchange rate reduced the transmission of remittances through formal
channels (Ncube and Brixiova, 2013). A stable macroeconomic environment conducive to growth,
coupledwith consistent policies, is therefore essential to increase inflows of remittances, as well as other
foreign capital.
Compared to other private capital flows, remittances are a less volatile source of foreign exchange,
making them suitable for longer term purposes such as financial sector development. Remittances
are also a key source of financing for trade, and therefore can reduce the need for external borrowing
by generating foreign exchange. In countries where remittances account for a large and rising share
of GDP, they can reduce the relative debt burden by expanding the tax base, thus helping countries on
their path to high and inclusive growth. In Egypt, for example, rapidly growing remittances helped to
ease debt sustainability pressures by expanding the tax base (Ncube and Brixiova, 2013).
In my view, the development potential of remittances is far from being realised. Policy makers and
the private sector can do much to turn this around. For example, in Africa – where domestic savings
are low – they can encourage receiving households to either save larger shares of their remittance
income in the formal financial sector or to invest it in productive capital. Remittances can also be
used to securitise1 sovereign external loans2 and improve countries’ credit ratings (Ketkar and Ratha,
2001). This has been done in other regions, especially in Latin America, but so far rarely in Africa.
1. Securitisation is the process by which certain types of assets are pooled so that they can be repackaged into interest-
bearing securities – financial instruments that can be readily bought and sold in financial markets, the way stocks,
bonds and futures contracts are traded.
2. Sovereign debt is debt owned or guaranteed by a particular government. It is technically owed by a government and not by
the citizens of the country issuing the sovereign bonds.A government issues bonds in a currency that is not its own, and then
sells those bonds to foreign investors; this is what makes the debt external, as purchasers are from outside the country.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014128
I.10. WHAT PLACE FOR REMITTANCES IN THE POST-2015 FRAMEWORK?Countries are already taking steps to harness their remittances for development
Recognising the untapped development potential of remittances, over the past decade a number
of countries have taken steps to offset the negative effects on growth and fiscal revenue incurred
when workers migrate, tapping into remittances as an additional source of state revenue. This
section highlights two of the most promising approaches: leveraging and matching remittances.
● Leveraging remittances to facilitate access to international capital markets. Channelling
remittances through national commercial banks in developing countries gives developing countries
greater leverage to access development financing. By providing banks with access to additional
foreign currency, remittances improve countries’ overall credit rating and enhance the ability of
banks to raise lower cost and longer term financing on the international capital markets for bond
financing, bank loans and foreign direct investment (Ketkar and Ratha, 2010). By serving as collateral,
remittances can be used by banks to “securitise” future remittance receipts and raise financing for
infrastructure and development projects (Ratha and Mohapatra, 2007). Brazil, Jamaica, Kazakhstan,
Mexico, Peru and Turkey are among the countries that have such schemes. The United States has
struck an agreement to assist Ecuador and Honduras to securitise remittances under the Building
Remittance Investment for Development Growth and Entrepreneurship (BRIDGE) initiative
(Mohapatra, 2010a).
● Subsidising or matching remittances. A number of countries have tried matching remittances with
grants to enhance their impact. For example, since 2002, under its “3×1 programme”, Mexico has
been matching remittances sent by nationals via hometown associations with investments in high
out-migration areas. For every Mexican peso provided by migrants, the federal, state and municipal
governments each contribute an additional peso (IDB, 2012). The funds are to be used for water,
sewers, roads and other infrastructure projects (Passel and Cohn, 2009). Several development
co-operation agencies also support hometown associations to promote community financing of
infrastructure. Switzerland, for instance, has pooled ODAwith remittances fromAlbanian emigrants
and with budgetary resources from the Albanian government to finance public service investments
(e.g. solid waste management, water and sanitation) in the northern Albanian commune of Shkodra
(OECD, 2010). A study of El Salvador households showed that subsidies for remittances used to pay
for education led to increased educational investment, particularly for girls (Ambler et al., 2014).
Key recommendations
● Give more attention to remittances when analysing the bigger picture of developing countries’
external resources, even if remittances are not technically development finance.
● Accelerate international efforts to lower the costs of sending remittances.
● Learn from the experiences and good practices of countries sending and receiving large amounts
of remittances about how to leverage these flows to achieve greater development impact and gain
the confidence of international capital markets (e.g. by supporting and subsidising remittances).
Notes
1. Including Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, which are not on the DAC List of ODA Recipients, but are classified
by theWorld Bank as developing countries.
2. Composed of personal transfers and compensation of employees; see Box 10.1.
3. See theWorld Bank Bilateral Remittance Matrix 2012 at: http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/
EXTDECPROSPECTS/0,,contentMDK:22759429~pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883.00.html.
4. Balance of payments accounts are an accounting record of all monetary transactions between a country and
the rest of the world.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 129
I.10. WHAT PLACE FOR REMITTANCES IN THE POST-2015 FRAMEWORK?5. For example, some central banks record almost all migrants’ remittances under “compensation of employees”.
Some others do not record “migrants’ transfers” in the balance of payments capital account.
6. Hawala is said to derive from a Hindi word meaning “in trust”, or from an Arabic word meaning “change” or
“transform”. It refers to an informal, unregulated underground banking system of fund transfer, widely used by
expatriate workers from South Asia to send money to their families. It enables individuals to transfer sizable
sums of cash from one country to recipients in another country without the funds ever crossing borders. It is
similar to the method called “flying money”, or fei qian by ancient Chinese (source: United Nations Multilingual
Terminology Database, http://unterm.un.org).
7. For example, those included in the DAC List of ODA Recipients, at: www.oecd.org/dac/stats/DAC%20List%20used
%20for%202012%20and%202013%20flows.pdf.
8. A moral hazard occurs when there is a tendency to be more willing to take a risk because the potential costs
or burdens of taking such risk will be borne, in whole or in part, by others (source:Wikipedia).
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Using financial instruments to mobilise
private investment for development
by
Mariana Mirabile, Cécile Sangaré and Claudia Schmerler,
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This chapter describes a range of financial instruments increasingly used by public
development finance providers to mobilise resources for investment in developing
countries. It focuses on the functioning of pooling mechanisms, guarantees and
equity investments, and their potential to mobilise private investment in key sectors
such as infrastructure.
This chapter also includes two opinion pieces. The first is by Pierre Jacquet,
President of the Global Development Network, on how official development
assistance should be used to enhance risk sharing between the private and
public sectors. The second is by Owen Barder of the Center for Global
Development on stimulating private investment by ensuring genuine
returns for success.135
II.11. USING FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS TO MOBILISE PRIVATE INVESTMENT FOR DEVELOPMENTDevelopment agencies and bilateral andmultilateral development finance institutions (see Chapter 4)
have been exploring a range of ways to leverage private finance for development by sharing the risk and
reducing any costs involved.This chapter outlines and explains three promising approaches:
1. Pooling mechanisms: Pooling numerous types of finance from both public and private sources can
result in larger volumes of investment capital and/or longer term loans.
2. Guarantee schemes: Guarantees can improve a project’s financial viability and lessen the risk
involved, thereby attracting additional investment.
3. Equity and mezzanine finance: By investing in risk capital, public investors can reduce the risks
for other investors, thereby promoting additional finance alongside their investment.
All of these financial instruments can help build the confidence of potential private investors in
situations that might otherwise seem too costly and/or too risky. Yet to be effective, they need to be
accompanied by policy reform to create a conducive business environment – e.g. with sound
regulatory and legislative frameworks, reliable payment mechanisms, clear underlying tariffs and
transparent bidding processes – for public and private investment. The question of how to create an
enabling environment for investment through policy reform is discussed in Chapter 12.
Pooling resources allows for large-scale investment
Developing countries need investment in infrastructure. Yet the large volumes of finance
required, coupled with the risky and often long-term nature of infrastructure projects, can make
these unattractive to private investors operating alone. Bilateral and multilateral providers of
development co-operation are exploring ways to use public funds to bring public and private finance
on board through financial solutions such as blended loans, syndicated loans and securitisation – all
explained below.
Blended loans are helpful for financing low-return projects
Blended loans offer a middle ground between pure grant and finance at market rates; they
mobilise public finance by mixing budget funds (i.e. grants or subsidised loans) with additional funds
raised from other sources (e.g. capital markets). Blending loans in this way can generate much larger
financial packages than can be made available only through grants. This is especially useful for
projects that are economically viable and have a clear developmental impact, but that do not
generate high enough returns to be bankable on commercial terms, given perceived risk levels.
Because they combine a concessional1 and a non-concessional component, blended loans soften
the terms and conditions of the financial package (e.g. lower interest rates, longer tenor). In this way,
they make a loan “cheaper” for the borrower. This may also help to attract private equity finance to
underpin the overall finance package.
Blending grants and market loans can generate much larger financial
packages than can be made available only through grants.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014136
II.11. USING FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS TO MOBILISE PRIVATE INVESTMENT FOR DEVELOPMENTBlended mechanisms are increasingly used by multilateral development banks (e.g. the
World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank Group), the European Union (Box 11.1) and bilateral
development finance institutions (e.g. European Investment Bank, Agence Française de
Développement, or the German government-owned development bank – KfW).
Lenders can reduce their risk through syndicated loans
A syndicated loan is provided by a group of lenders (the “syndicate”), spreading the borrowing across
lenders who would not have been able to provide the same loan amount and/or terms on their own.
Syndicated loans are commonly used by multilateral development finance institutions (see
Chapter 4). They are made up of two parts: a loan provided by a development finance institution (the
“A lender”) and one or more loans made by commercial banks or institutional investors (the
“B lenders”). Because of their special relationships with their borrowing governments, multilateral
development finance institutions benefit from tax immunity and “preferred creditor” status (member
governments grant the loan providers preferential access to foreign currency in the event of a foreign
exchange crisis). When financial institutions participate as B lenders in a syndicated loan they
benefit from this same status, thus taking on less risk than if they were to lend on their own.
Participation by a development finance institution in the syndicate can also lower borrowing costs
and allow developing countries a longer repayment period.
Box 11.1. How the European Union leverages additional financing for development
Investment needs in European Union (EU) partner countries are substantial – far higher than can be
covered by governments’ own resources (e.g. ODA). Blending is an important vehicle for leveraging
additional resources and thereby for strengthening the impact of EU action. By blending EU grants
with non-grant financing, additional public and private resources can be leveraged to drive
sustainable inclusive economic growth as a basis for poverty reduction.
Over the past seven years, seven EU regional blending facilities have been established. Close to
EUR 2 billion in EU grants went to support more than 200 investments in economic and social
infrastructure as well as private sector development. EU grants were blended with loans and equity
from public finance institutions, contributions from partner countries, as well as private resources.
This blending of different financial resources is helping to unlock investments with an estimated
volume of EUR 40 billion.
While so far most of the leveraged financing is public, realising the potential of blending to mobilise
private financing will also be important to support local businesses and help fund infrastructure
projects, which are subject tomany risks that deter private investment. Risk-sharingmechanisms can
mitigate those risks, leading to lower financing costs. They can also make local financial markets
more inclusive, allowing direct financing for previously unserved local businesses.
In December 2012, the EU Platform for Blending in External Co-operation was launched to increase
the effectiveness of blending in EU external co-operation. The work of the platform includes
reviewing existing blending mechanisms, enhancing the technical and financial analysis of projects,
developing indicators for measuring results, and assessing the potential and risk of private financing.
Source: This box was provided by EuropeAid.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 137
II.11. USING FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS TO MOBILISE PRIVATE INVESTMENT FOR DEVELOPMENTAttracting new sources of financing through securitisation schemes
Securitisation is the process of pooling assets, such as loans, and re-packaging them into
marketable securities. The main objective of securitisation is to make additional capital available to
borrowers who cannot grow further, either because they are not able to access affordable bank loans
given their risk profile or because they have reached maximum debt-to-equity leverage2 or debt
exposure limits. When the pooled assets are sold, they are removed from their balance sheet. By
transforming them into tradable securities, they become attractive to other investors. Although its
use by development finance institutions is limited, partly because of the negative experience with
subprime mortgage backed securities in the United States, securitisation is extensively used in
Islamic finance to issue asset-backed securities in a form called “sukuk”.
Sukuk comply with sharia requirements of risk-taking and sharing of profit and losses (value and
income depend on the performance of the underlying assets), and thus have the potential to attract
Islamic investors, who are a growing source of financing for many developing countries. For example,
in 2009 the Central Bank of Kenya issued its first infrastructure bond for a total amount of
USD 222.8 million, of which nearly USD 12 million was a sukuk tranche (MIFC, 2013).
Guarantee schemes reduce investor risk
Guarantee schemes3 – a mainstay of international financial markets for many years – help
mobilise finance by transferring or mitigating risks that private investors would not be able or willing
to take. Guarantees act as a type of “insurance policy” against the risks of non-payment, facilitating
financial flows to developing countries and high-risk sectors (see the “In my view” box by
Pierre Jacquet). They are particularly beneficial to developing country businesses, which often lack
creditworthiness in the eyes of private investors (Box 11.2).
Although the use of guarantees for development purposes by development finance institutions
has expanded in recent years, its potential remains largely untapped (Mirabile et al., 2013). A recent
OECD survey of resources mobilised4 by guarantees for development purposes revealed that:
● While guarantees for development supported USD 15.3 billion in private investment in developing
countries between 2009 and 2011,5 this amount was marginal when compared to ODA. For
example, net ODA in 2011 alone was USD 134 billion – more than 20 times the volume of risks
covered by development guarantees.
● Most of the private capital mobilised by guarantees was sourced from banks, investment funds or
companies domiciled in OECD economies. This points to the scope for making greater use of
development guarantees to tap local savings and capital markets in developing countries.
● Most development guarantees surveyed covered risks in middle-income countries, where
conditions are well-suited for the use of market-based instruments to mobilise private capital.
Furthermore, financial services, infrastructure and industry accounted for more than 70% of the
resources mobilised.
Securitisation can attract Islamic finance – a growing source of financing
for many developing countries.
Guarantees for development supported USD 15.3 billion of private investment
in developing countries between 2009 and 2011.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014138
II.11. USING FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS TO MOBILISE PRIVATE INVESTMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT● Middle-income countries in Africa benefitted most from guarantees, followed by Asia and Eastern
Europe: contracts issued in Africa were significantly smaller than those issued in other regions,
however.
● More than half of the resources mobilised were guaranteed by international financial institutions;
this is likely a result of their: 1) strong treasury and co-financing operations; 2) leading role in
infrastructure/big ticket investments; and 3) comparatively larger average guarantee exposures.
Box 11.2. International Finance Corporation’s partial credit guarantees
International Finance Corporation (IFC) guarantees are a key instrument both to provide clients
with access to funding that they would otherwise find more difficult (or impossible) to obtain and to
facilitate the development of local capital markets in emerging countries. IFC guarantees can be used
on both bond and loan instruments, and for both local and foreign currency cross-border
transactions. Partial credit guarantees generally are – in the IFC’s view – the most appropriate
instrument for meeting client needs and promoting the development of local capital markets;
however, in selective cases, the IFC can also provide full guarantees.
Guarantees have important uses and benefits for both borrowers and investors.
For borrowers, IFC guarantees:
● enable clients to achieve higher credit ratings on bond issuances
● assist first-time bond issuers to establish their name in the market with key institutional investors
● improve bond placement outcomes for clients, as investors often value the full due diligence the
IFC performs on each client and the surveillance it provides for the life of the transaction
● facilitate borrowers’ access to investment funds outside the formal banking system (such as
pension funds); allow the IFC to mobilise local currency resources for clients.*
For investors/lenders, IFC guarantees:
● provide local pension funds and insurance companies with high-quality instruments that meet
their credit quality requirements, in which they would not have been able to invest otherwise
● help banks to lendmore by reducing the amount of risk borne by the bank on loans to the IFC’s clients.
Importantly, the IFC views its guarantees primarily as market access, credit enhancement and
exposure management products, and not necessarily as money-saving structures for clients. Because
the IFC evaluates and prices its guarantees based on an individual assessment of the credit risk of the
client and other relevant factors – and charges fees based on this assessment – there may not always
be significant cost savings for the client relative to other financing alternatives. The value of the
guarantee lies, rather, in the benefits outlined above, backed by the IFC’s long-standing global
expertise in working with arrangers, credit rating agencies and other capital market participants to
structure efficient transactions that meet the needs of both borrowers and investors/lenders.
* Where it is not possible to hedge an IFC-funded local currency loan or bond investment.
Source: Copyright [2014] International Finance Corporation.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 139
II.11. USING FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS TO MOBILISE PRIVATE INVESTMENT FOR DEVELOPMENTIn my view:
ODA should be used to enhance risk sharing
between the private and public sectors
Pierre Jacquet,
President of the Global Development Network
An important argument in favour of redefining official development assistance (ODA) is that its
current definition, based on grants and concessional loans above a given degree of concessionality,
somehow pre-determines the nature of what it should be used to finance. In other words, the
instrument drives the content: grants and loans naturally call for concrete counterparts in the form
of development projects elaborated in order to request such ODA support. This encourages donor
governments in their natural tendency to think of themselves as direct and autonomous development
actors and to feel accountable for that role.
Such an instrumentally pre-determined approach to ODA presents substantial drawbacks. Given
the political pressure to declare high figures for ODA, it discourages the use of taxpayer money for any
non-ODA declarable instrument. Yet, current ODA-declarable instruments are not adequate to
catalyse and attract other actors and potential funders. Expanding the range of declarable
instruments toward more innovative development finance could help further mobilise market forces
and private investments behind development objectives.
Some private decisions not to invest in developing countries may be informed by proper and
well-documented risk analysis, in which case no compensatory public action is justified on economic
grounds. Some, however, may be based on market failures; for instance, a lack of proper information,
of contract enforcement mechanisms, of expected profitability due to insufficient complementary
investments or of proper insurance mechanisms. In these instances, there is a strong case for using
public money to create risk-sharing mechanisms between the private and the public sectors.
The mission of the private sector is not to promote public goods, whether local or global; but the
provision of such goods will often benefit from the technical andmanagerial savoir-faire, as well as the
financial might, of the private sector. Creating opportunities for revisited “public-private
partnerships” will have to rest on complex contractual relations that involve formulation and
implementation challenges. Public money may help reconcile private profitability objectives with the
additional costs involved in providing public goods benefits.
In my view, risk mitigation is at the core of a modernised, reinvented role for ODA. Better risk analysis
and coverage is likely to attract private investment and support local entrepreneurship.This is based on
the underlying assumption that available market instruments and spontaneous private decisions do
not allow for mitigating risks in an effective way, and that this results in under-investment. For
example, farmers in poor developing countries may not be able to use their future crop, considered as
too risky, as collateral and may as a result be too constrained financially to buy the fertilisers necessary
to increase production. Offering a guarantee may help.
More generally, ODA should be used to provide insurance, guarantees, risk-sharing instruments,
debt instruments with “counter-cyclical provisions” to smooth various external shocks (for example,
diminution of the required debt service in years in which a shock affects the debtor’s capacity to
pay), etc. There are market-based ways to account for the modernised use of ODA. Significant
capacity development would be needed in development agencies to permit careful assessment of
potential market failures, as well as careful risk and moral hazard management. Errors may be made
along the way, but the promise of engaging new markets and private actors makes these efforts to
modernise more than worthwhile.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014140
II.11. USING FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS TO MOBILISE PRIVATE INVESTMENT FOR DEVELOPMENTPublic sector investment in risk capital mobilises additional finance
Investment in risk capital – equity6 andmezzanine tranches – is key for new or expanding private
companies to start a business, provide a stable long-term funding basis and protect creditors who
ground part of their lending decision on the availability of significant equity. Nonetheless, this type
of investment is often deemed too risky by the private sector unless the public sector steps in to share
the risk (though there are different ways of viewing this support – see the “In my view” box by
Owen Barder further below).
Public investors can take equity stakes directly in a company by purchasing a share of ownership,
or indirectly by investing in equity or debt funds.7 Doing so reduces the risk for creditors, who will be
repaid before equity holders. Higher equity capital allows the investee company8 to improve its
solvency, meaning it can acquire debt from domestic or international commercial banks. Highly rated
investors (e.g. development finance institutions) increase the creditworthiness of the investee
company because of their prudent financial management and adherence to sound governance
standards (see Chapter 4). They are also expected to support the company, even in challenging times.
Investment funds can either have a flat structure – in which all shares have the same profile with
respect to risks, profits and losses – or else structure the capital into tranches, with different levels of
“seniority” (i.e. order of repayment in the event of sale or bankruptcy; Figure 11.1). Structured
investment funds allow investors to invest according to the risk they can carry and returns they seek.
The most “junior” tranche of capital (Figure 11.1) absorbs the highest risk. Investors in this tranche
thus provide a “first-loss guarantee” to other investors in more senior tranches. Investors in the next
(and riskier) tranche provide an additional risk cushion to more senior investors above them. This
mechanism effectively spreads the risk and creates new investment opportunities for private
investors by creating tranches with risk and return profiles that match their investment criteria.
Figure 11.1. Risk levels of structured capital
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II.11. USING FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS TO MOBILISE PRIVATE INVESTMENT FOR DEVELOPMENTIn my view:
Returns for success are the best means
of stimulating private investment
Owen Barder,
Center for Global Development
Promoting private investment may be an effective way of accelerating economic development and
access to public services for the poor. Donors and multilateral finance agencies have reported to the
OECD that they have used loan guarantees to bring in USD 15.3 billion from the private sector
between 2009 and 2011.
But are guarantees the best way to crowd in private investment?They make sense if you believe the
market overestimates the risks of investing in developing countries and that official agencies
systematically judge these risks better. Even if you believed both parts of this, though, wouldn’t you
first want to exhaust other options to achieve the same results without paying to protect investors
from risks?
Private investment stimulates positive social benefits – such as jobs and economic infrastructure –
which go beyond private returns. But when social returns exceed private returns, the private sector
will tend to invest too little. The most effective policy response to this is normally boosting returns,
not mitigating risk. There are ways that governments can do this, some of which have been pioneered
by the Center for Global Development.
Development impact bonds, for example, are being implemented to improve education outcomes in
Rajasthan and tackle sleeping sickness in Uganda by guaranteeing public payments for private
success. The Advance Market Commitment (AMC) for vaccines has given pharmaceutical companies
reason to invest in research and development for vaccines that would otherwise not pass the cost
hurdle because their main customers are poor. Such contracts reward the private sector for what
they achieve.
Schemes that provide rewards are often a better way to attract private investment because they
encourage investors to take risks, recognise failure, adapt and learn. By contrast, it is difficult to see
how guarantees that reduce risk to investors won’t simultaneously weaken the private sector’s
incentives to do well the very things we want them to do.
Loan guarantees also tend to be blunt instruments: they are offered to a particular firm, which requires
policy makers to pickwinners. Mechanisms that augment returns, by contrast, can be open offers, leaving
it to themarket to determinewho provides the service and receives the subsidy.These payments can also
be more tightly targeted at social benefits for the highest priority beneficiaries, whereas it is hard to vary
the benefits of loan guarantees in proportion to the achievement of social objectives.
Increasing the returns for success is also politically attractive. Paying out only if a project delivers results
is much easier to defend to a sceptical public than loan guarantees that bail out failed investments.
If we really want to see greater private investment in developing countries, we have more powerful
tools available than using aid to make projects viable. For example, opening our markets to exports
would generate billions of dollars of new investment, without requiring public agencies to pick
winners or set aside capital for guarantees.
In my view, OECD countries can do much more to boost private investment by improving their own
policies: deploying better technology transfer and intellectual property regimes, opening their data,
investing in research and development, reducing agricultural subsidies, tackling corruption and
improving international tax co-operation. These policies, more than aid-financed subsidies, can drive
truly transformational increases in investment, innovation and growth that will benefit rich and poor
countries alike.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014142
II.11. USING FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS TO MOBILISE PRIVATE INVESTMENT FOR DEVELOPMENTMezzanine finance refers to the layer of financing between an institution’s senior debt and
equity. It is often a more expensive financing source for a company than senior debt because in the
event of default, the mezzanine financing is only repaid after all senior obligations have been
satisfied. However, it is a less expensive alternative to equity, as mezzanine financing is repaid before
direct equity investments are serviced.
Development co-operation agencies typically invest in the most risky (junior or first loss)
tranche, while development finance institutions (the private sector arm of providers’ development
co-operation) invest in the mezzanine tranche. Together they provide sufficient protection to attract
additional private investment into the more senior tranches of the fund (Box 11.3).
Key recommendations
● Expand the use of different financial instruments beyond grants and concessional loans where
market conditions allow (e.g. in productive sectors) to complement and save scarce concessional
funds for interventions that do not generate (enough) financial returns to support the use of
market-based instruments but require more concessional finance instead. These include
investments in the social sector or in high-risk environments.
● Support policy reform to create a conducive business environment for public and private
investment, including sound regulatory and legislative frameworks, reliable paymentmechanisms,
clear underlying tariffs and transparent bidding processes (the subject of Chapter 12). This will
maximise the mobilisation potential of the instruments described in this chapter.
Box 11.3. Mezzanine finance and renewable energy in Latin America
In Latin America and the Caribbean, a key barrier to affordable financing for renewable energy
project developers and small businesses has been high collateral* and project equity requirements for
bank loans. To address these barriers, and to mobilise commercial and development bank debt from
both local and international sources, the recently established Central American Renewable Energy
and Cleaner Production (CAREC) Facility provides innovative, “mezzanine” financing for renewable
energy, energy efficiency and clean production projects in seven countries (Belize, Costa Rica,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama). Mezzanine financing serves as a bridge to
help entrepreneurs access bank loans by, for example, offering unsecured loans or additional project
equity. The fund’s USD 20 million capital will be used to co-finance energy projects with local banks,
and is expected to leverage over USD 65 million in private investment for clean energy projects.
Several projects have already been financed through CAREC. In Guatemala, an investment of
USD 2.5 million was approved in 2006 for Bioenergia, a company that recycles biogas from distilleries.
In Honduras, two projects have been financed: a 13.5 megawatt (MW) hydroelectric plant to supply
households and industries in Intibuca and a 9.5 MW private grid-connected hydroelectric plant. In
Costa Rica, investment was approved in 2010 for a beef-rendering plant that uses bi-products to
process meat and bone for animal consumption.
* In lending agreements, collateral is a borrower’s pledge of specific property to a lender to secure repayment of a loan.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 143
II.11. USING FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS TO MOBILISE PRIVATE INVESTMENT FOR DEVELOPMENTNotes
1. Concessional loans are provided at far lower than market rates for developing countries, for longer terms and
with conditions which allow grace periods for payments.
2. The debt-to-equity ratio is calculated by dividing total liabilities by total equity. The debt-to-equity ratio is a
financial leverage ratio. Financial leverage ratios are used to measure a company’s ability to handle its
long-term and short-term obligations.
3. In this chapter, guarantee schemes refer to guarantees and insurance.
4. The amount mobilised by guarantees was defined as the face value of the loan for which a guarantee is issued.
5. Only institutions with a developmental mandate were included in the sample.
6. Equity is ownership interest in a company, represented by the shares issued to investors.
7. Equity funds invest in the equity of companies while debt funds provide debt instruments to their clients.
8. The company seeking investors.
References
IDB (2012), “IDB loan to improve municipal solid waste management in Bolivia”, IDB News Release,
10 December 2012, Inter-American Development Bank, available at: www.iadb.org/en/news/news-releases/2012-
12-10/bolivia-to-improve-solid-waste-management-in-cities,10253.html (accessed 12 May 2014).
MIFC (2013), Sukuk: Growing Relevance in Infrastructure Development, Bank Negara Malaysia, Malaysia International
Islamic Finance Centre, Kuala Lumpur, available at: www.mifc.com/index.php?ch=28&pg=72&ac=53&bb=uploadpdf.
Mirabile, M., J. Benn and C. Sangaré (2013), “Guarantees for development”, OECD Development Co-operation Working
Papers, No. 11, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k407lx5b8f8-en.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014144
Development Co-operation Report 2014
Mobilising Resources for Sustainable Development
© OECD 2014PART II
Chapter 12
Creating an environment for investment
and sustainable development
by
Carole Biau and Mike Pfister, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, OECD1
The increasing share of global foreign direct investment to developing countries is not
evenly spread, with Africa receiving the lowest portion despite its plentiful investment
opportunities. This chapter explores the obstacles to investment in developing countries
and analyses the ingredients of a conducive investment climate. These include creating
regulatory and legal capacity for managing investment inflows, promoting and
facilitating investment, attracting private investment in infrastructure, strengthening
the links between investment and trade, and promoting responsible business conduct by
multinational enterprises. However, attracting investment is not the end of the story:
sustainable development depends as much on the quality of investment as on the
quantity. Policy makers in host countries must therefore harness investment inflows so
they generate maximum development benefits through employment, technology
transfer, competitiveness and growth of domestic enterprises and industries.
This chapter also includes an opinion piece by JustinYifu Lin, Honorary Dean
at the National School of Development, Peking University, and former Chief
Economist of the World Bank, on how any developing country can undergo
dynamic structural transformation.145
II.12. CREATING AN ENVIRONMENT FOR INVESTMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTForeign direct investment (FDI) is a vital source of external capital for most developing countries (see
Chapter 5). Over the past two decades, developing countries have collectively received an increasing
share of global foreign direct investment. The analysis in Chapter 5 illustrates that while these
countries only received 20% of global foreign direct investment in 1990, this had risen to over 50%
by 2012. This includes a 19% increase over just five years (2007-12). This trend is a result of a variety of
factors, including the recent economic downturns in industrialised countries, the rise of “South-South”
investment (Chapter 3) and improving investment environments in developing countries.
The trend, however, has not been uniform across developing countries or regions. As Chapter 5
points out, while Asia receives 30% of the foreign direct investment going to developing countries, the
share is under 20% for Latin America and the Caribbean and 5% for Africa. Certain African countries
are clearly performing well in terms of FDI-to-GDP ratios, yet the continent arguably attracts less
foreign direct investment than one would expect given its multitude of investment opportunities and
the attractive market size of many African countries.
This is where the domestic regulatory framework of host countries comes into play, and where
the role of developing country policy makers is crucial. This chapter explores how the investment gap
in developing countries can be narrowed, addressing “push” and “pull” factors simultaneously.
Dealing with the push factors means unlocking the supply of finance, including from institutional
investors (e.g. pension funds, insurance companies and mutual funds; see Chapter 6); innovative
forms of concessional and non-concessional financing from bilateral and multilateral providers,
including from development finance institutions (Chapters 4 and 15). The pull factors are the
conditions that will attract investors to developing country locations.
However, attracting investment is not the end of the story: sustainable development depends as
much on the quality of investment received as on the quantity. Policy makersmust harness investment
inflows to generate the maximum development benefits through employment, technology transfer,
competitiveness, and growth of domestic enterprises and industries in host countries. The experience
of developing countries over the past few decades, as analysed by the OECD Investment Policy Reviews
(see Box 12.1),2 suggests that the benefits of inward direct investment are not automatic; they depend
crucially on the overall policy environment for the investment.
Drawing on OECD experiences in various developing countries, this chapter looks into
five dimensions of investment policy that are key for sustainable development:
1. creating regulatory and legal capacity for managing investment inflows
2. promoting and facilitating investment
3. attracting private investment in infrastructure
4. strengthening the links between investment and trade
5. promoting responsible business conduct by multinational enterprises.
Sustainable development depends as much on the quality of investment
as on the quantity.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014146
II.12. CREATING AN ENVIRONMENT FOR INVESTMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTThese elements are all inter-linked features of a healthy investment climate (Box 12.1) and
therefore have important, long-term implications for developing countries’ ability to mobilise
investment for development.
For several years now, and with an ever-increasing number of partners internationally – including
developing countries – the OECD Investment Division has been providing targeted policy guidance in
this domain. It offers various policy instruments to assist host countries in enhancing investor
protection standards, to multiply business linkages and to better capture the potential positive
spillovers of investment. The OECD’s regional investment programmes offer mechanisms to combine
such country-level work with regional dimensions (Box 12.2).3
Box 12.1. The Policy Framework for Investment
The Policy Framework for Investment (PFI) is a comprehensive, systematic approach to assessing
investment and business climates, and for designing reforms to improve them. It helps countries to
create the conditions that will enable them to mobilise private investment for economic growth,
gender empowerment, sustainable development and poverty reduction. Developed in 2006 by a task
force representing some 60 economies, as well as business, labour, civil society and international
organisations, it covers ten policy areas recognised as foundations for a healthy environment for
investors, from small and medium-sized firms to multinational enterprises:
1. investment policy
2. investment promotion and facilitation
3. trade policy
4. competition policy
5. tax policy
6. corporate governance
7. responsible business conduct
8. human resource development
9. infrastructure and financial sector development
10. public governance.
The framework has assisted dozens of developing country governments – from Botswana to
Myanmar and Zambia – engaged in domestic reform, regional co-operation or international policy
dialogue on investment. It is also useful to investment promotion agencies; to providers of
development co-operation, as they assist developing countries in improving their investment climate;
and to businesses, trade unions and civil society, in their dialogue with governments. The framework
guided OECD Investment Policy Reviews of close to 30 countries at varying levels of development and
across all continents. At the regional level, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) is
using it as a reference for its Regional Investment Policy Framework; the Secretariat of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has partnered with the OECD since 2012 in a similar approach.
The PFI is currently being reviewed and updated by a global task force co-chaired by Finland and
Myanmar. This review is guided by the Advisory Group on Investment and Development, a joint body of
the Investment and the Development Assistance Committees. It is also informed by extensive feedback
from developing countries. Aiming for completion in 2015, the updated framework contributes to the
post-2015 sustainable development agenda.
For more information, see www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/pfi.htm.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 147
II.12. CREATING AN ENVIRONMENT FOR INVESTMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTRegulations and good legal capacity can encourage investors
The quality of investment policies directly influences the decisions of all investors, be they small
or large, domestic or foreign. Transparency, property protection and non-discrimination are
investment policy principles that underpin efforts to create a sound investment environment for all.
Laws and regulations dealing with investments and investors, including small and medium
enterprises, must be clear, transparent and readily accessible without imposing unnecessary
burdens. A policy of timely, adequate and effective compensation for expropriation,4 consistent with
international investment law, is also a pre-requisite for most investment. In the case of foreign
investment in particular, discriminatory restrictions on international investment (such as limits on
ownership by foreign companies in certain sectors of the economy) can be substantial obstacles.
While most countries have reduced these restrictions substantially, some persist in industries across
the globe. Developing countries, in particular, need to be transparent about these restrictions; they
also should review them periodically to assess their costs against their intended benefits.
For example, ex ante screening of investment inflows can limit investment, especially when it is
not transparent. While the majority of OECD countries have significantly reduced their screening of
investment,5 the picture across developing and emerging economies is mixed. Zambia, for example,
has a largely open investment regime with limited screening (OECD, 2012); Myanmar, on the other
Box 12.2. Improving the regional investment environment
in the Middle East and North Africa
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region needs private investment, both domestic and
foreign, to provide new engines of growth and dynamism. Some of the region’s biggest challenges lie
in strengthening the process of change; maintaining, supporting and tracking progress in
implementing policy; and building capacity. The MENA-OECD Investment Programme supports
reform efforts by MENA governments to enhance the investment climate by:
● promoting investment and strengthening the employment potential of foreign direct investment
● catalysing entrepreneurship and development of small and medium enterprises
● creating a level playing field for business
● supporting women’s economic integration.
In Egypt, the programme is rebuilding investor confidence by assisting in the design of a roadmap
for reform. Launched in May 2014, Egypt’s Business Climate Review focuses on investment policies
and public-private partnerships. The review builds on a comprehensive analysis of the business
environment covering 12 dimensions, such as investment policies, small and medium enterprises,
anti-corruption, infrastructure, tax policies and human capital. The recommended reforms include a
revision of the legal investment framework, improvements in transparency and predictability of
procedures, the gradual phasing out of recently introduced capital transfer restrictions on businesses
and capacity development for ministries involved in public-private partnerships.
Improving the business environment in resource-rich, post-conflict economies is a central theme of
the MENA-OECD Investment Programme’s work in Iraq and Libya. In both nations, security problems
and restrictive, unclear, inconsistently implemented regulations converge with high levels of
perceived corruption, insufficient infrastructure and a dominant public sector to discourage
investment. Work with the government of Iraq centres on enhanced investment policies, capacity
development and the establishment of investment zones targeting specific sectors. These zones offer
a separate, radically simplified regulatory framework and a range of investor services and
infrastructure. Work in Libya focuses on improving the business environment through the
development of small and medium enterprises.
For more information, see www.oecd.org/mena/investment.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014148
II.12. CREATING AN ENVIRONMENT FOR INVESTMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENThand, has a strict screening mechanism through the Myanmar Investment Commission. Although
socio-economic conditions may seem to justify such a centralised approach in countries like
Myanmar, where line ministries are still developing their capacities to effectively manage investment
approval mechanisms, discretion should be used in taking a centralised approach as the efficiency of
the system is, above all, what matters. Centralised investment screening can unduly stretch the
capacity of a single agency, constraining its ability to effectively manage increasing investment flows
(OECD, 2014c). This can result in a focus on big investment projects, to the detriment of smaller
investments that could bring a number of development benefits beyond employment, including new
technology and know-how.
Good laws, and the capacity to enforce them, are fundamental
Particular attention also must be paid to the enforcement of investment-related laws. For
example, while many countries have laws and regulations to protect intellectual property rights, they
often lack effective enforcement mechanisms; this can discourage foreign direct investment in
innovation and technology transfer. Systems of contract enforcement and dispute resolution are also
important in keeping possible disputes from escalating, with high potential costs for the host
government. Indeed delegating an investment dispute to the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes entails heavy administrative and arbitrator fees, as well as a variety of other
costs (such as attorneys’ fees, expert and witness costs, etc.) incurred all the way through to the final
arbitration award.
More also needs to be done to establish timely, secure and effective methods of registering
ownership of land and other forms of property. In many African countries, the absence of accurate
and comprehensive land registration systems considerably lowers the incentives for landowners to
register their plots and to make long-term investments and upgrades in their property; in Tanzania,
for instance, only 2% of land is currently registered (OECD, 2013b). The insufficient transparency or
coherence of land compensation systems is another considerable deterrent for domestic and foreign
investors alike. Land administration is often subject to a mixture of community, tribal and common
law (such as in Mozambique), and application procedures can vary from one land authority to the
next within the same country. This is the case in Indonesia, where land rights are part of a complex
framework that hinders physical infrastructure development (OECD, 2010).
Finally, the capacity of the domestic legal system is of critical importance to the overall
investment policy framework. Over the past decades, international investment agreements,
including bilateral investment treaties and free-trade agreements, have been used to strengthen
investment ties among countries, including developing countries. Developing countries need to be
aware of the benefits and risks of entering such treaties, and to ensure they have adequate capacity
to negotiate and implement them. This is especially important given the recent trend towards giving
host countries more leeway to protect domestic interests in treaty negotiations.
Attracting investment is one thing, making it work for development is another
To be effective, measures to attract investment must anticipate potential market failures (such as
inadequate supportive infrastructure, costly and lengthy business establishment procedures, low
competitiveness in domestic markets, etc.) and be developed in a way that will leverage the strong
points of a country’s investment environment (see the “In my view” box). This involves both promotion
and facilitation – two very different sets of activities. The former is about promoting a country or a
region as an investment destination while the latter is about making it easy for investors to set up shop
or expand their existing investments. The importance of good and appropriate investment promotion
and facilitation cannot be underestimated; in fact, poorly designed investment promotion and
facilitation measures can be costly and ineffective and limit benefits to development.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 149
II.12. CREATING AN ENVIRONMENT FOR INVESTMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTInvestment promotion can play a critical role in developing countries’ economic performance
and most developing countries have established dedicated investment promotion agencies. Many of
these agencies are highly dynamic and internationally active, such as the Mauritius Board of
Investment or the Malaysian Investment Development Authority, both of which have representations
in foreign countries. The underlying principle of good promotion, however, is that it can only be as
effective as the quality of investment and investment-related policies.
In Southeast Asia, for example, the promotion and attraction of export-oriented foreign direct
investment enabled countries like Malaysia and the Philippines to shift quickly towards a
manufacturing-based economy through foreign direct investment in which economic growth was
driven by rapidly expanding exports. The record from this export performance speaks for itself, but so
too does the manifest failure in many cases to translate this success into something more durable. Not
only have exports been limited to a small number of products (usually intermediate ones) and sectors,
but often these export sectors have been virtual foreign enclaves within their host countries. This is a
particular riskwhen export development is geographically concentratedwithin special economic zones
or export processing zones. Unless careful attention is paid to fostering upstream and downstream
business linkages between these high-growth sectors or zones and the rest of the economy, there are
often limited returns for the host country. Such caveats deserve careful consideration by governments,
in order to enhance the sustainability of their approach to fostering innovation and export upgrading
through special economic zones and industrial parks (see the “In my view” box).
Good investment facilitation requires effective one-stop shops with single-point authority (OECD,
2014c). It is also vital to provide after-care services to investors (in the form of post-establishment
follow-up, trouble-shooting and assistance from the national investment promotion agency) that will
help in retaining them. The experiences of the People’s Republic of China andViet Nam – illustrated in
Figure 12.1 – show how difficult it is to sustain high investment flows after a period of liberalisation.
Many countries have failed to turn export success based on foreign direct
investment into something more durable.
Figure 12.1. Share of foreign direct investment in gross fixed capital formation1
in China and Viet Nam
1. The ratio of gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) to GDP represents the amount of value-added in total domestic production
that has been invested rather than consumed (notably in the form of land improvements, machinery and equipment
purchases, and physical infrastructure). The ratio illustrated in Figure 12.1 (FDI-to-GFCF) in turn shows how much of this GFCF
is created thanks to FDI.
Source: UNCTADStat (2012), http://unctadstat.unctad.org.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933121848
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II.12. CREATING AN ENVIRONMENT FOR INVESTMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTWhere challenges such as export promotion, business registration or land allocation are not well
co-ordinated among the various authorities, business facilitation efforts can be undermined.
Frequent performance evaluation of these agencies and strong communication with the business
community are essential for creating a good investment climate; at the same time, investment
promotion agencies can play an essential role as policy advocates. The Joint Economic Council of
Mauritius, for example, has earned widespread acclaim for fostering smooth and effective dialogue
between the public and private sectors (OECD, 2014b).
Incentives should be carefully designed
Developing countries frequently use tax incentives to attract investment. This in some cases has
stimulated a detrimental “race to the bottom” among countries competing to attract the same
investors without giving due attention to whether investment inflows proportionally increase as a
result. There has been a dramatic increase in the number of tax incentives offered in sub-Saharan
Africa, for instance: 69% of the countries in the region offered tax holidays in 2005, compared to 45%
in 1980 (Keen and Mansour, 2009). This trend has only been rectified somewhat in recent years: in
countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) between 2004 and 2014, the
number of countries offering tax incentives dropped from 9 to 7 for tax holidays, from 9 to 6 for export
incentives, and from 9 to 5 for initial capital allowance (OECD, 2014e). This gradual re-positioning on
tax incentives partly results from the realisation that such schemes have jeopardised the fiscal
revenues of several countries. Often, investment incentives to attract investors to countries have little
added value but represent a high opportunity cost on funds that could be more productively used
elsewhere to support more sustainable investment. Moreover, in many developing countries,
excessive discretion granted to the relevant decision makers and low transparency in the award of
investment incentives blurs the picture for investors and revenue authorities alike and may create
opportunities for corruption. A regional approach to avoiding “beggar thy neighbour” investment
incentives could deliver good results.
Developing country governments have much room for improvement in establishing reliable and
centralised mechanisms for evaluating the costs and benefits of investment incentives, their
appropriate duration, transparency and impact on national economic interests and on other
countries. These efforts are particularly important given that research shows that tax incentives are
rarely the tipping factor behind an investment decision in a developing country. A large majority of
investors covered by investor motivation surveys of the World Bank’s Investment Climate Advisory
claim that in the majority of cases (for instance over 90% in Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda) they
would have invested even if incentives were not provided (World Bank, 2013). The OECDTask Force on
Tax and Development (see Chapter 14), in its advisory capacity to the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal
Affairs and the Development Assistance Committee, addresses these challenges within the
“Statebuilding, Taxation and Aid” pillar of its work programme.
To make the most of foreign investment inflows, developing country governments also need to
promote investment linkages between foreign affiliates and local enterprises and to address specific
investment obstacles faced by small and medium-sized enterprises (Box 12.3). In many countries,
investment linkages are addressed on a mostly ad hoc basis, without a dedicated capacity-development
programme to help domestic companies find business opportunities. For instance, foreign investors may
be obliged to sub-contract a minimum share of work to domestic firms (in Tunisia, the public
procurement regime insists on 20% going to Tunisian enterprises); or domestic entrepreneurs may be
Most investors would invest in developing countries without the aid
of tax incentives.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 151
II.12. CREATING AN ENVIRONMENT FOR INVESTMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTgiven price preferencemargins when bidding for sub-contracts and public procurement contracts. In the
longer term, suchmeasures are often self-defeating. For countries that do use them, it remains important
to carefully structure such preference schemes to avoid compromising the quality of procured goods or
deterring foreign investors.
Creating fertile ground for infrastructure investment is a priority
Infrastructure has a strong impact on a country’s investment attractiveness. The extensiveness
of the road network, the efficacy of the port system and the length of container wait times, for
instance, have clear implications for the timely and cost-effective delivery of goods – it is estimated
that each day in transit costs 0.6-2% of the value of traded goods (Hummels and Schaur, 2012).
Likewise, water infrastructure has important implications for agricultural production and health.
Reliable power supplies are also key: in Nigeria, reliance on private electricity generators adds about
40% to the cost of goods and services and it is estimated thatmore reliable power supplies could boost
annual GDP growth by 3-4 percentage points (OBG, 2012).
Addressing the growing “infrastructure gap” is a priority for many developing country governments
and given their limits of public funds, private investment has an important role to play (see Chapter 6).
Yet, following decades of growth, over recent years private investment in developing country
infrastructure has faltered.
One key step in addressing this gap is to make the market structure attractive for private
investors by creating a level playing field between public and private providers of infrastructure
services. This involves ensuring predictable pricing and competitive infrastructure markets through
sound market regulation.
Secondly, developing country governments can help create more space for private investment in
infrastructure by improving the governance of state-owned operators and limiting their monopoly
powers. When inefficiently run, state-owned operators can adversely affect the quality of network
management, deterring private investment. Inefficiencies in employment, bill collection and
maintenance together with system losses (such as water leakage, or electricity lost during distribution
and transmission through power lines) cost about USD 12 billion annually in Africa (Trebilcock and
Mota Prado, 2011). For instance, the Tanzanian government was forced to bail out six state-owned
infrastructure operators in 2008/09 at a cost of USD 36 million; verification of the performance of the
country’s 170 privatised state-owned enterprises in 2012 revealed that over half were making losses
(OECD, 2013b).
Box 12.3. The OECD’s role in ensuring good business conduct
by multinational enterprises
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are far-reaching recommendations for responsible
business conduct (OECD, 2011). They are adhered to by 46 governments – representing all regions of
the world and accounting for 85% of foreign direct investment – which encourage their enterprises to
observe the guidelines wherever they operate. The guidelines cover business ethics on employment,
human rights, environment, information disclosure, combating bribery, consumer interests, science
and technology, competition and taxation. Each adhering country has to set up a national contact
point responsible for promoting the guidelines nationally and investigating breaches of the guidelines
by companies operating in or headquartered in that country. A great majority of such breaches occur
in developing countries. Through its Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from
Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, the OECD also supports companies potentially sourcing minerals
or metals from high-risk areas to respect human rights and avoid contributing to conflict.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014152
II.12. CREATING AN ENVIRONMENT FOR INVESTMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTThirdly, the regulatory framework for infrastructure investment needs to bemore predictable and do
more to address the risky nature of long-term infrastructure projects. Private participation in
infrastructure delivery (in particular through public-private partnerships) is a relatively recent form of
procurement in many countries. Over the past two decades, 37% of public-private infrastructure projects
have been conducted in lower middle-income countries, and only 4% in low-income developing
countries, where the risks are perceived to be higher (Rosenstock and Trebilcock, 2013). To limit risks for
private investors, laws and regulations, as well as institutional roles and responsibilities, need to be clear
and understood by all parties. Public sector capacity for project design and implementation is also
indispensable to avoid fiscally unsustainable contracts and costly contract renegotiations.
Finally, cross-border infrastructure investment presents unique opportunities for many
developing countries. Large infrastructure projects that are not economically viable in individual
countries can become highly valuable on a regional scale. Nonetheless, the complications of
cross-border infrastructure projects – such as overlapping authority and sovereignty issues – should
not be under-estimated and may explain the vast deficit in regional infrastructure. For instance, the
Mmamabula Energy Project in Botswana (a planned 1 200 megawatt capacity power station and
integrated coal mine project that is intended to provide power to South Africa) is currently on hold
due to regulatory changes regarding power purchase agreements in South Africa. Regional
harmonisation of infrastructure investment frameworks (including regulation and tariff-setting,
procurement procedures and investment dispute resolution) is crucial to the success of many
regional infrastructure projects currently in the pipeline for developing countries.
The OECD Investment Division has developed several tools to help governments attract and
manage more private participation in infrastructure, including the OECD Principles for Private Sector
Participation in Infrastructure (OECD, 2007), the OECD Checklist for Public Action on Private Sector
Participation in Water Infrastructure (OECD, 2009) and the Policy Guidance for Investment in Clean Energy
Infrastructure (OECD, 2014d). This latter policy guidance is a non-prescriptive tool to help
governments – especially in developing and emerging countries – to mobilise private investment in
clean energy infrastructure, including in renewable energy and energy efficiency in the electricity
sector. The OECD will adapt the guidance to specific country contexts to help them make the most of
their clean energy investment potential.
It is important to tap the synergies between trade and investment
Many developing country governments are looking to promote the competitiveness of their
domestic exports and enhance their attractiveness as investment destinations by diversifying not
only their products, but also their markets. In small countries especially, stimulating investment
relies to a large extent on creating investment opportunities within export-oriented industries and on
prospects for integrating production into global value chains (see the “In my view” box).
Tapping the possible synergies between trade and investment requires careful co-ordination and
alignment of trade and investment strategies to ensure that they are complementary, and that they
tackle shared structural bottlenecks and diversify export sectors as well as destination markets.
Trade facilitationmeasures are an evident first step and are the focus ofmany aid-for-trade initiatives
(see Chapter 21). Other steps include investing in trade infrastructure, building a human resource
Inefficient infrastructure management and maintenance costs Africa about
USD 12 billion every year.
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Any developing country can undergo dynamic structural
transformation, starting now
Justin Yifu Lin,
Honorary Dean at the National School of Development, Peking University,
and former Chief Economist of TheWorld Bank
Any developing country – even those with poor infrastructure and a weak business environment –
can start on a path to dynamic structural transformation and growth today. How? By facilitating
technological innovation and development in industries where it has a comparative advantage.
Take China. At the time of its transition to a market economy in 1979, the business environment
was poor, infrastructure was very bad and China lacked the capacity to take advantage of its cheap
labour market to produce goods for export. To overcome these obstacles, the Chinese government – at
all levels and in all regions – encouraged foreign investment in special economic zones and industrial
parks. This enabled China to rapidly develop labour-intensive light manufacturing and become the
world’s factory.
The same approach can work in other developing countries. For instance, in August 2011 the late
Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi visited China. Aware of Ethiopia’s labour cost advantages and
China’s plans to relocate its shoe industry because of rising wages, he invited Chinese shoe
manufacturers to invest in Ethiopia. Managers of Huajian, a designer shoe manufacturer, visited
Addis Ababa in October 2011 and – convinced of the opportunity – opened a shoe factory near Addis
in January 2012, employing 550 Ethiopians. Huajian more than doubled Ethiopia’s shoe exports by the
end of 2012 and by December 2013, the workforce had expanded to 3 500 (by 2016 it is expected to
reach 30 000).
Before this, like almost all other African countries, Ethiopia had found it difficult to attract export-
oriented foreign direct investment in light manufacturing. The immediate success of the Huajian shoe
factory transformed foreign investors’ impression of Ethiopia, helping them to see it as a potential
manufacturing base for exports to global markets. Over just three months in 2013, 22 factory
compounds in the new industrial park of Bole Lamin were leased to export-oriented factories.
As long as it is carefully embedded within the broader economy so as to avoid creating isolated
“enclaves” of productivity and growth (see above), this type of investment can help to fuel modern
economic growth, funding improvements in infrastructure and institutions as well as structural
changes in technology and industries to reduce the costs of production and increase output values. In
any country, these enhancements in labour productivity can fuel a continuing increase in per capita
income.
In my view, development finance can have the largest possible impact on accelerating a developing
country’s structural transformation, job generation and poverty reduction when the country uses
these flows to remove infrastructure bottlenecks and develop industries that draw on the country’s
comparative advantages. This pragmatic approach will allow these countries to capture China’s
relocation of 85 million labour-intensive manufacturing jobs, allowing them too to grow as
dynamically as the East Asian economies.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014154
II.12. CREATING AN ENVIRONMENT FOR INVESTMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTbase with the skills required to meet the needs of niche export and investment sectors, and reducing
excess regulatory red tape for investors. Malaysia’s experience with skills enhancement and
co-ordinating the links among the government, the private sector and training institutes can offer a
useful example for developing countries (OECD, 2013a). Aligning labour supply with demand also
requires strong statistical capacity to evaluate and forecast market trends and to inform the design of
national curricula.
Finally, despite the multiplication of trade and competitiveness strategies across developing
countries, long-term vision is limited in many cases. Focusing on a few key market areas that offer
long-term potential can help in tapping comparative advantage, adding value or latching onto global
value chains.
Responsible business conduct is essential to the international investment climate
Multinational enterprises can contribute significantly to development and economic growth in
both their home and host countries through job creation, human capital development, efficient
distribution of capital and the transfer of technology, knowledge and skills. By their nature,
multinational enterprises often span multiple cultural, legal and regulatory environments. Although
many demonstrate high standards of business conduct, weak regulatory and institutional
frameworks and poor rule-of-law, can lead to the neglect of these standards.
When governments provide an enabling environment for responsible businesses, they are more
likely to attract and keep high-quality investors (Box 12.3). In turn, firms that maintain high
responsible business standards are more likely to bring lasting benefits to employees, customers and
the societies in which they operate, in turn building their own reputation (OECD, 2013a).
Key recommendations
● Promote investment for development by addressing “push” and “pull” factors simultaneously:
unlocking the supply of finance (from institutional investors, domestic capital markets, as well as
innovative forms of concessional and non-concessional financing from bilateral providers and
development finance institutions) while creating the conditions that will attract investors to
developing country markets.
● Follow the Policy Framework for Investment (Box 12.1) to create a conducive environment for
attracting foreign direct as well as domestic investment, by ensuring effective and transparent
regulations on (among others): investment restrictions, access to land, core standards of investor
protection and the administration of tax incentives for investment. These regulations must be
accompanied by sound enforcement capacity within the public sector.
● Enhance the potential of infrastructure markets in developing countries, not merely as enablers of
investment in other sectors of the economy, but as investment opportunities in their own right.
Infrastructure markets can be made more attractive to private investors by improving the
efficiency and governance of state-owned infrastructure providers, and more generally creating a
level playing field between public and private infrastructure operators.
● Make sure that foreign investment works for development by promoting linkages between foreign
affiliates and local enterprises, and creating investment and local employment opportunities
within export-oriented industries.
● Improve responsible business conduct, especially by multinational enterprises, by adhering to and
implementing the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Box 12.3).DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 155
II.12. CREATING AN ENVIRONMENT FOR INVESTMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTNotes
1. Carl Dawson, Geraldine Ang and Karim Dahou also contributed to this chapter.
2. Country reports presenting an overview of investment trends and policies in the countries reviewed. See
www.oecd.org/investment/countryreviews.htm.
3. See www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investmentfordevelopment.
4. Expropriation is the act of taking privately owned property by a government to be used for the benefit of the
public. In several countries, the government has the right to take property through “eminent domain” – but
this must to subject to timely, adequate and effective compensation.
5. See the OECD FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index: www.oecd.org/investment/fdiindex.htm.
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Chapter 13
Fighting corruption
and illicit financial flows
by
Alessandra Fontana, Development Co-operation Directorate, OECD
Corruption and the illicit transfer of funds out of developing countries can
undermine sustainable development by reducing the resources available for
essential public services, undermining a country’s capacity to attract investors and
fuel the economy, and weakening the trust between citizen and state. As illicit flows
are often transnational problems, all countries involved – whether developing or
OECD – need to work together. This chapter reviews OECD country performance in
tackling money laundering and bribery and in repatriating stolen assets. It looks at
what could be done to close legal loopholes, strengthen political will and enforce
more serious penalties for non-compliance. Development co-operation can also do
more to help developing countries fulfil their own responsibilities, such as
strengthening governance systems for detecting and reducing corruption;
requesting asset repatriation; and bringing to justice those found guilty of
corruption, theft of public resources and money laundering.157
II.13. FIGHTING CORRUPTION AND ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWSIn developing countries, where there is high demand for increased domestic resource mobilisation
to finance development, illicit financial flows drastically reduce the availability of such revenues in
the following ways:
● Funds that should circulate in the country’s economy as investment and taxes paid into public
coffers end up abroad.
● Public funds are syphoned off through embezzlement instead of being spent on public services.
● Public funds are wasted in overpriced works by unfit companies chosen after having paid hefty
bribes; these bribes may also be syphoned abroad.
These are just a few examples of how illicit financial flows reduce the resources available to
developing countries. The consequences, to name just a few, include fewer hospitals and schools,
fewer police officers, and fewer roads and bridges to facilitate trade. The existence of this criminal
activity also demands the reallocation of state resources from other public investment in order to
fight such activity (UNODC, 2011). Finally, money laundering is harmful to the financial sector as it
undermines the capacity to attract investors and to fuel the economy.
It is impossible to quantify the dimension of illicit flows or the quantity of goods and services
citizens could have received had these funds been put to proper use for development. Nonetheless, it
has been estimated that every USD 100 million recovered could fund full immunisations for
4 million children or provide water connections for some 250 000 households (World Bank and
UNODC, 2007).
To take stock of the state of play and to highlight how OECD countries can support developing
countries’ efforts to limit illicit flows, the OECD has issued the report Illicit Financial Flows from
Developing Countries: Measuring OECD Responses (OECD, 2014). It assesses OECD countries’ compliance
with international standards, and shows that there are important gaps to be filled if these flows are
to be combatted effectively. This chapter summarises the findings from Illicit Financial Flows from
Developing Countries on:1
● complying with anti-money laundering standards
● reducing bribery payments
● freezing and repatriating stolen assets
● supporting developing countries.
Many OECD countries are susceptible to money laundering
International standards for controlling money laundering2 are set by the Financial Action Task
Force (FATF) and comprise the most comprehensive anti-money laundering regime to date. By strictly
implementing the FATF’s 40 recommendations on combating money laundering, OECD countries can
help to curb illicit flows (FATF, 2012).3
Every USD 100 million of recovered stolen assets could fund full
immunisations for 4 million children or provide water connections
for 250 000 households.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014158
II.13. FIGHTING CORRUPTION AND ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWSIn reviewing OECD country compliance with these recommendations,4 Illicit Financial Flows from
Developing Countries, however, finds that numerous weaknesses in OECD countries’ systems are
allowing illicit funds from developing countries to enter. FATF reviews also show that OECD countries’
performance varies and that, in general, their systems are at a high risk of being abused for
laundering illicit flows.5 The identification of politically exposed persons involved in financial
transactions taking place in their jurisdictions is one of the areas where OECD countries fare the
worst.6 Such people are naturally at greater risk of corruption; therefore the financial transactions in
which they are engaged should be scrutinised more closely. This is not because of a presumption that
all politically exposed persons are corrupt, but because they act in public office positions in which
they may be responsible for managing large sums of money, for example, and therefore may be
exposed to opportunities for corruption. Over one-third of OECD countries fail to require the
application of additional due diligence measures when a business is dealing with politically
exposed persons.
OECD countries also score poorly against the recommendations for clearly ascertaining the
actual owners of companies and trusts being set up in their jurisdictions. Criminals wishing to hide
their fundsmay set up companies or trusts as a façade; it is not always straightforward to identify the
ultimate beneficiary or owner of a trust or company.
Another problematic area is OECD countries’ performance in regulating how “designated
non-financial businesses and professions” ensure that they are not used as a channel to launder
funds.This term refers to businesses and professions such as real estate agents and lawyers that may
be used as conduits for illicit activity on behalf of others. For example, these businesses may buy real
estate or conduct business on behalf of criminals engaging in money laundering. This is why it is
important to enforce the FATF recommendation that requires these professionals to collect sufficient
documentation to identify who they are engaging in business with, and to report to the authorities
any suspicion that their client is attempting to launder funds.
Progress on fighting foreign bribery is mixed
The 1999 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (OECD, 2011) has been signed by all 34 OECD countries,
plus Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, the Russian Federation and South Africa. It commits
signatory countries to: 1) make bribery a criminal offence; 2) prosecute individuals and companies
that offer, promise or give bribes to foreign public officials; and 3) penalise offenders, including
through fines or imprisonment.7 The convention’s 40 signatory countries include those responsible
for the largest global flows of foreign direct investment, especially through the activities of large
multinational enterprises. The global reach of such companies means they are constantly exposed to
potentially corrupt situations. The OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business
Transactions is responsible for monitoring the implementation and enforcement of the convention,
as well as of the 2009 Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officals
in International Business Transactions and related instruments. Monitoring is done through peer review
and is considered by Transparency International to be the “gold standard” of monitoring.
Progress on implementing the Anti-Bribery Convention is mixed, with more than half of all
OECD countries having made no prosecutions whatsoever (Figure 13.1). A number of gaps in
OECD countries’ legal frameworks prevent the effective application of their anti-bribery regimes.
These include overly narrow interpretations of foreign bribery or the imposition of an impractical
burden of proof (e.g. the requirement to prove that a public official has directly intervened in the
Over one-third of OECD countries fail to require due diligence measures
for businesses dealing with politically exposed persons.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 159
II.13. FIGHTING CORRUPTION AND ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWSawarding of a contract subsequent to a bribe). Short-term statutes of limitations can also be an
obstacle given the length of time required to bring such cases to court. Finally, weak sanctions often
fail to provide an effective deterrent to those tempted to pay bribes overseas.
Nonetheless, figures from the Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions
show that between 1999 and the end of 2012, 216 individuals and 90 legal entities were sanctioned
through criminal proceedings for foreign bribery in 13 OECD countries; at least 83 of the sanctioned
individuals were given prison terms. Another 44 individuals and 95 legal entities in 3 signatory
countries have been sanctioned in criminal, administrative and civil cases for other offences related
to foreign bribery, such as money laundering or false accounting. Around 320 investigations are still
ongoing in 24 countries, and criminal charges have been filed against 166 individuals and entities in
15 countries. OECD countries need to increase their investigative and prosecutorial efforts, as well as
resources for the public agencies handling bribery cases.
Figure 13.1. Total number of individuals and legal persons sanctioned or acquitted
for foreign bribery, 1992-2012
Notes: DPA: deferred prosecution agreements; NPA: non-prosecution arrangements.
Source: OECD (2014), Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: Measuring OECD Responses, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/
10.1787/9789264203501-en.
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II.13. FIGHTING CORRUPTION AND ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWSAnother way to increase the number of cases unearthed is to establish “whistleblower
protection”, which can increase the amount of information passed to the authorities.Whistleblowers
are individuals willing to provide information to public authorities about corrupt or criminal
transactions. These individuals usually require protection to safeguard them from retaliation. Finally,
it is important that sanctions are severe enough to work as a deterrent for companies considering
paying bribes abroad.
Greater political will is needed for recovering illicit assets
Resources for financing development can also be made available by finding illicit assets held in
OECD countries, then freezing and repatriating them (known as asset recovery). OECD countries have
made onlymodest progress in repatriating stolen assets –many have not frozen any corruption-related
assets to date. Nonetheless, a stock-taking undertaken by the OECD and the World Bank Stolen Asset
Recovery (StAR) Initiative of member countries’ commitments on asset recovery found that
between 2010 and June 2012, a total of approximately USD 1.4 billion of corruption-related assets had
been frozen and a total of USD 147 million returned to a foreign jurisdiction (OECD andTheWorld Bank,
2014; see also Figure 13.2).8
The majority of returned assets and 86% of the frozen assets went back to non-OECD countries.
This is a sign of progress, since a previous survey showed that asset recovery mainly benefited
OECD countries (OECD andTheWorld Bank, 2011). Switzerland froze the most assets, followed by the
United Kingdom and the United States. These countries, which all have large financial centres, have
made asset recovery a political priority, witnessed by their stated commitments to do so at recent
G8 and G20 meetings and the amounts frozen and returned. Belgium, Canada, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands and Portugal also froze some assets during this period.
Between 2010 and June 2012, approximately USD 1.4 billion of stolen assets
had been frozen and USD 147 million had been returned.
Figure 13.2. Recovered stolen assets, 2006-12
Source: OECD and The World Bank (2011), Tracking Anti-Corruption and Asset Recovery Commitments: A Progress Report and
Recommendations for Action, OECD and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, available at:
www.oecd.org/dac/governance-development/49263968.pdf; OECD/The World Bank (2014), Few and Far: The Hard Facts on Stolen Asset
Recovery, TheWorld Bank,Washington, DC, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264222311-en.
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II.13. FIGHTING CORRUPTION AND ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWSPolitical will is the most important element in the quest to recover stolen assets. Indeed, the
countries showing the greatest results have all implemented comprehensive policies that identify
asset recovery as a priority and have committed the resources necessary to achieve results. Other
OECD countries can improve their performance by:
● adopting and implementing comprehensive strategic policies to combat corruption and recover assets
● ensuring that laws effectively target corruption and asset recovery
● providing the necessary powers to public authorities in OECD countries to rapidly trace and freeze
assets (Box 13.1)
● implementing institutional reforms that encourage the active pursuit of cases of stolen assets
● developing capacity
● improving trust and co-operation with foreign counterparts
● ensuring adequate funding for domestic law enforcement efforts
● fostering international co-operation in kleptocracy9 cases
● collecting relevant data to measure results.
“Smarter” development co-operation can help developing countries reduce corruption
There are no categories or standards against which to measure development co-operation
targeted at controlling illicit financial flows. Development Assistance Committee (DAC) statistics on
official development assistance (ODA) do not explicitly categorise development programmes in the
area of illicit financial flows. The existing activities in this area are likely to be subsumed under areas
such as public finance management, anti-corruption organisations, and legal and judicial
development. OECD analysis for the recent report Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries
attempted to estimate this by looking at data on amounts spent by development co-operation
agencies on projects in developing countries that have the potential to affect illicit financial flows
(e.g. projects to reinforce the judiciary or to improve anti-corruption authorities, etc.). In 2011, on
average 11% of ODA was dedicated to projects and programmes that may have an impact of illicit
financial flows (OECD, 2014).
Box 13.1. The time-consuming process of asset recovery
Courts in OECD countries responsible for issuing asset freezing and confiscation orders first need
evidence that the assets in their territory are linked to a crime. This evidence, in many cases, needs
to be collected in the asset source country (a developing country, for example). The developing
country, in this case, needs to collect and send this evidence to the authorities involved in the asset
freezing in the OECD country, so an order to confiscate the funds can be issued. This is a lengthy and
difficult process given the high profile of some of the individuals involved in committing such crimes.
Sometimes by the time the court in the OECD country finally gets the evidence, the assets have
already been shifted elsewhere. Current policy debates are trying to improve these processes by
exploring whether these procedures should be changed in order to allow funds to be frozen at a
quicker pace.
In 2011, on average only 11% of ODAwas dedicated to targeting relevant illicit
financial flow areas.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014162
II.13. FIGHTING CORRUPTION AND ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWSThere may be a scarcity of resources even in developed countries for some of the reforms needed
to control illicit financial flows (outlined above). ODA can be used in innovative ways to increase
the resources available for this, including, for example, funding investigative authorities in
OECD countries whose work contributes to the return of funds to developing countries.There are also
smart ways in which development agencies can support developing countries in their fight against
illicit financial flows. These include:
● Hiring or training staff in the relevant public sector authorities in developing countries to promote
the technical skills needed.
● Helping to build developing countries’ investigative capacity to tackle economic crime (Box 13.1).
● Supporting the institutions and actors working to build political commitment.
● Raising the problem of illicit financial flows in political dialogue with developing countries in order
to ensure that they also engage in addressing their part of the challenge (see next section).
● Supporting civil society organisations that hold political leaders to account.
● Pushing the knowledge frontier, e.g. by funding relevant academic and policy research.
● Conducting risk assessments in developing countries to identify the biggest source of illicit
financial flows so they can allocate scarce funds to tackling it. Without understanding which
processes are most vulnerable, developing countries may waste money, for example, improving
one particular authority when their main vulnerability is in a different one.
Developing countries need to strengthen their own governance systems
While this chapter has mainly focused on the responsibilities of providers of development
co-operation, it is important to emphasise that this is a shared agenda; corruption and illicit financial
flows need to be addressed by developing and developed countries alike. Unilateral efforts will not
succeed.
Developing countries also need to strengthen their own anti-money laundering mechanisms and
institutions to prevent illicit flows from leaving their financial systems in the first place. For instance,
they are responsible for establishing mechanisms that make bribery difficult and risky. Even the best
anti-money laundering regime cannot address money laundering when corrupt individuals at the
highest political levels control the very institutions supposed to exert control over them, or when these
officials abuse channels such as state banks. Moreover, developing countries that wish to see funds
frozen and repatriated from developed countries need to request and engage in the legal processes that
lead to repatriation (Box 13.1). This involves collecting evidence and, more importantly, bringing to
justice those found guilty of corruption, theft of public resources and money laundering.
It is clear from this discussion that policies to fight illicit financial flows are closely linked to
policies for improving governance in developing countries – these have been part of the activities of
the international development community for a long time. High levels of corruption combined with
weak institutions are drivers of illicit flows and these are often symptoms of deeper governance
failures. Ultimately, the fight to control illicit outflows from the developing world must focus on
building responsive, effective institutions that deliver services to their population; this, in turn,
should encourage citizens and companies to engage in legal activities, report their earnings and pay
their taxes and dues in accordance with national laws. As development agencies engage with
developing countries in partnerships to reduce illicit financial flows, they should not forget that these
efforts are part of broader governance and institution-building efforts.
Policies to fight illicit financial flows are closely linked to policies for improving
governance in developing countries.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 163
II.13. FIGHTING CORRUPTION AND ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWSKey recommendations
● Fighting money laundering: OECD countries should enforce the standards set by the Financial
Action Task Force more strictly, particularly in conducting due diligence of politically exposed
persons and establishing the real ownership of companies and trusts.
● Fighting international bribery payments: OECD countries should put in place systems that more
actively and effectively sanction overseas bribery payments. They should also provide better
protection for whistleblowers.
● Improving asset recovery: OECD countries should establish legal and operational frameworks,
supported by dedicated staff, to investigate and prosecute offenders and to respond rapidly to a
developing country’s requests for mutual legal assistance or to an urgent request to freeze assets.
They should also improve information sharing among jurisdictions and institutions and encourage
and support developing countries in investigating corruption and managing returned assets.
● Making better use of development co-operation: Development co-operation agencies should
promote stronger political commitment to tackling illicit financial flows and the stricter
implementation of standards among OECD countries, while helping developing countries
implement their responsibilities through capacity development and good governance support.
Notes
1. This chapter does not discuss reducing tax evasion, as this is touched on in Chapter 14 of this volume.
2. Money laundering is the process through which criminal money passes in order for its true origin, nature and
ownership to be concealed. This is done for the purpose of hiding the criminal origin of the funds.
3. The Financial Action Task Force (on Money Laundering) is an intergovernmental organisation founded in 1989.
The objectives of the FATF are to set standards and promote effective implementation of legal, regulatory and
operational measures for combating money laundering, terrorist financing and other related threats to the
integrity of the international financial system.The FATF Secretariat is housed at the OECD headquarters in Paris.
4. It should be noted that the FATF updated the recommendations in 2012, but since assessments of the
implementation of the 2012 standard only started in 2014, the OECD assessment was based on the 2003
recommendations.
5. FATF reviews for each country can be accessed by selecting the chosen country at: www.fatf-gafi.org/documents/
documents.jsp?lang=en.
6. Politically exposed persons are individuals who are or have been entrusted with prominent public functions.
They include heads of state or of government, senior politicians, senior government members, judicial or
military officials, senior executives of state-owned corporations and important political party officials.
Establishing business relationships with politically exposed persons, as well as with their family members or
close associates, may involve risks that should be closely monitored.
7. The convention defines bribing a foreign public official as “intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue
pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that
official or for a third party, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of
official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the conduct of
international business” (Article 1, OECD, 2011).
8. Funds frozen but not yet returned may be waiting for prosecution and sentencing to take place (see Box 13.1).
This processmay take a long time depending on the complexity of the case and how difficult it is to get evidence.
9. Kleptocracy is a form of political and government corruption where the government exists to increase the
personal wealth and political power of its officials and the ruling class at the expense of the wider population,
often without even the pretence of honest service. This type of government corruption is often achieved
through the embezzlement of state funds.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014164
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Chapter 14
Supporting countries in growing
their tax base
by
Gregory De Paepe and Ben Dickinson,
Development Co-operation Directorate and Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, OECD
Countries’ capacity to raise sufficient revenue of their own is critical for sustainable
development. Yet developing countries face many hurdles in increasing their
tax-to-GDP ratios. This chapter illustrates how development co-operation offers large,
but largely untapped, potential for supporting tax system reform. A range of
well-designed and co-ordinated development co-operation approaches, from budget
support to technical assistance, have had positive results, including in the most
challenging of contexts, such as Afghanistan. Technical assistance is becoming more
innovative, as the Tax InspectorsWithout Borders initiative, currently being piloted by
the OECD shows. International co-operation is also key in ensuring that developing
countries do not lose much-needed revenue to emerging global challenges, such as the
taxation of multinational enterprises.
This chapter also includes an opinion piece by Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala,
Nigeria’s Co-ordinating Minister for the Economy and Minister of Finance,
on the importance of realising the potential of taxation.167
II.14. SUPPORTING COUNTRIES IN GROWING THEIR TAX BASEChapter 7 explored why domestic tax systems are crucial to sustainable development: they provide
governments with the resources needed to tackle poverty and deliver public services, while
increasing state capacity, accountability and responsiveness. It also outlined the many obstacles
faced by developing countries in increasing their tax-to-GDP ratios.
This chapter describes the ways in which development co-operation is helping to support
domestic resource mobilisation in developing countries, as illustrated by the recent OECD report
Tax and Development: Aid Modalities for Strengthening Tax Systems (OECD, 2013a). It also looks at new
challenges arising from the rapidly changing external environment – such as the taxation of
multinational enterprises – and how international co-operation is helping to tackle these.
Support to tax systems can take many forms
Budget support creates powerful incentives for reform
Budget support involves the transfer of resources from a development co-operation agency or
group of agencies – either earmarked for a certain sector (sector budget support) or unearmarked
(general budget support) – directly to a developing country’s national treasury. This approach creates
a unified framework for financing that is fully aligned with the priorities, needs and systems of the
host country. It can be a useful mechanism for turning the spotlight on tax performance and creating
incentives for improving the tax system, while addressing interactions between taxation and
governance (Box 14.1).
Pooled funding and bilateral support can both have advantages
When development co-operation providers pool their funding, this enables better co-ordination.
For example, basket funding involves placing providers’ funds in a segregated account for a designated
purpose, such as a tax programme, rather than passing them into the host government’s general
budget. By establishing a unified arrangement for planning, implementation and monitoring, basket
funding is eminently well suited to co-ordinating providers’ support to tax programmes. It minimises
duplication of effort and aligns support with the country’s strategy for tax reform. Often providers and
countries decide the strategic priorities jointly, then providers link their funding to implementation.
On the other hand, bilateral projects, when a host country engages with only one provider, still
account for a large share of aid flows. Bilateral tax programmes can be highly effective if the host
country shows strong ownership and leadership (Box 14.2). In countries where there is one dominant
bilateral tax programme, co-ordination is not much of a problem. Yet, if multiple development
co-operation providers pursue parallel tax projects in a single country, there is a risk of fragmentation,
inconsistency and high costs to the local government. Co-ordination in establishing a coherent division
of labour can help multiple providers support the tax system effectively.
Budget support can provide powerful incentives for improving the tax system.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014168
II.14. SUPPORTING COUNTRIES IN GROWING THEIR TAX BASEBox 14.1. How budget support helped Afghanistan broaden its revenue base
The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund was established in 2002 in response to a firm request
from the Afghan government for a single source of untied aid. Administered by the World Bank, it
involves co-ordinated international action by 16 development co-operation agencies.
The programme has two parts. The first is a “matching grant”, or variable tranche of budget support
linked to the country’s performance in revenue collection; performance is measured against a target
set by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The second part is a structural reform fund with
three “themes”: enhancing domestic revenue generation, improving public sector governance and
enabling private sector development. For each theme, Afghanistan must meet benchmarks to trigger
the release of funds – i.e. specific and verifiable actions relating to the respective reforms. For
example, in 2010/11, customs reforms under the revenue theme involved submitting quarterly
reports on a set of performance indicators and rolling out an automated system for customs data to
one new customs post.
At the time the trust fund was created, Afghanistan’s public finance management systems were
dysfunctional, with a tax-to-GDP ratio of less than 3%. Since the incentive programme took effect,
revenues have consistently exceeded programme targets, reaching 8.9% of GDP in 2009/10. The review
attributed the revenue increase to the success of offices focusing on large andmedium-size taxpayers
in harnessing scarce resources for maximum impact. Another factor was the more efficient collection
of sales tax, income tax and customs duties (World Bank and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2010).
Source: OECD (2013a), Tax and Development: Aid Modalities for Strengthening Tax Systems, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/
10.1787/9789264177581-en.
Box 14.2. Bilateral support for tax reform in El Salvador
In the early 2000s, the tax-to-GDP ratio in El Salvador was stuck at around 11% and import duty
revenues were set to decline as a result of free-trade agreements. Looking for ways to increase
revenues without increasing tax rates, the government embarked on a series of reforms to modernise
the tax administration. These included introducing information technology (IT) systems, improving
taxpayer services, expanding public information on the tax system and upgrading professional skills
within the tax service.
These reforms improved tax compliance, boosting the tax-to-GDP ratio to 14.1% by 2007. The
economic crisis brought this ratio down in 2009 – but only to 13% – before it rebounded to 13.8%
in 2010. There were also huge improvements in virtually every indicator of tax collection efficiency.
For example, the new IT systems reduced the average time for processing an income tax return from
4 hours to just 40 minutes; and the introduction of automated calls brought in 10 000 additional tax
returns in the first 4 months (DAI, 2010).
These tax reforms were driven by the El Salvador government, which also set out the funding
priorities. Bilateral assistance from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
was the predominant source of support – USAID advisors and consultants were involved in all aspects
of the reform programme. Indeed, during the period of the Tax Policy and Administration Reform
(2005-10), no other providers (apart from intermittent IMF missions) directly supported the tax
authorities. At the ministry level, however, the Inter-American Development Bank provided funding
for an integrated tax and customs IT system, while theWorld Bank supported the Tax Analysis Unit.
Source: OECD (2013a), Tax and Development: Aid Modalities for Strengthening Tax Systems, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/
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II.14. SUPPORTING COUNTRIES IN GROWING THEIR TAX BASETechnical and in-kind support can bring high returns
Rather than funding tax systems, some development co-operation agencies deliver technical
services and investments directly through in-kind support, e.g. through twinning or pairing
arrangements for the secondment of experienced tax officials. The Tax Inspectors Without Borders
concept has been developed to provide assistance for targeted tax audits in developing countries across
the globe (Box 14.3). This initiative, being developed by the OECD Tax and Development Task Force,
aims to bring tax audit experts from both developed and developing countries with advanced tax
systems together with local officials in tax administrations that require support; they work together
directly on solving audit issues, transferring knowledge and skills in the process (OECD, 2014).
Although Tax Inspectors Without Borders is still in the pilot stages, similar audit assistance
programmes have shown strong results – not only in terms of increased tax revenue, but also in
strengthening capacity. This, in turn, improves the quality and consistency of tax audits while
increasing citizens’ confidence in the tax administration. Colombia increased its tax revenue by 76%
(from USD 3.3 million in 2011 to USD 5.83 million in 2012) through a capacity development programme
for tax administrators that cost USD 15 000. This programme of assistance helped the country to pass
revised transfer pricing legislation in line with international standards.1 Similarly, a USD 20 000 tax
support programme in Kenya led to an increase of USD 33 million in tax revenue between June 2012 and
June 2013 – a rate of return of USD 1 650 of revenue for every USD 1 spent.2 This kind of support can
also be highly responsive to host country needs (see the “In my view” box).
Box 14.3. Tax InspectorsWithout Borders: An innovative OECD approach
to improve audit skills and tackle tax avoidance
Developing countries and development partners have for a long time identified the mobilisation of
domestic financial resources for development as a priority, and in a changing era, taxation has taken
on a higher profile as a means to support this goal.
The demand for assistance from developing countries is changing too, as globalisation poses new
challenges and opportunities in international taxation, particularly transfer pricing and tax information
exchange. On the supply side, many countries that once required development co-operation are now
active providers of assistance themselves on tax matters, adding a positive dynamic to international
knowledge building.
TheTax InspectorsWithout Borders concept was developed against this background.Tax Inspectors
Without Borders began on a trial operational basis at the end of 2013, with a number of pilot projects
planned for 2014. It aims to facilitate targeted tax audit assistance programmes in developing
countries across the globe. Tax audit experts will work directly with local officials in developing
country tax administrations on current audits and audit-related issues concerning international tax
matters and sharing general audit practices for specific cases.
Tax Inspectors Without Borders offers a new form of direct assistance, using a “learning by doing”
approach to solve audit issues and transfer knowledge and skills. These programmes can complement
existing training by introducing a real life, practical component. Using the Tax Inspectors Without
Borders tools to put in place a simple but effective framework to address potential issues such as
confidentiality and conflict of interest, experts can now work on audit files alongside local tax officials.
Source: OECD (2014), “Tax Inspectors Without Borders. A learning by doing approach to tax audit assistance”, Briefing Note,
OECD, Paris, available at: www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-global/tax-inspectors-without-borders-summary.pdf.
Kenya achieved a rate of revenue return of USD 1 650 for every
USD 1 of development co-operation spent on tax reform.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014170
II.14. SUPPORTING COUNTRIES IN GROWING THEIR TAX BASEIn my view:
Development depends on realising the potential of taxation
Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala,
Co-ordinating Minister for the Economy and Minister of Finance, Nigeria
Developing country governments would do well to strengthen their tax systems so they can
mobilise the domestic resources they need to finance their own development. This is particularly true
for African countries, where the recent trend of decreasing official development assistance (ODA)
shows no sign of reversing.
In developing countries in general, revenue administration is often hampered by weak
organisational structures, low capacity of tax officials and a lack of modern, computerised,
risk-management techniques. The value-added tax “gap” alone is estimated at around 50-60% in
developing countries, compared with only 13% in developed countries. The International Monetary
Fund (IMF) estimates that for many low-income countries, an increase in tax revenues of about 4% of
GDP is attainable. Since the 1990s, many African countries have made progress in improving their
domestic tax capacities and receipts. Despite these improvements, however, there are still many
revenue leaks that need to be plugged.
In Nigeria, we aremaking concerted efforts. Following the recent revision of our GDP to USD 510 billion,
our tax-to-GDP ratio declined from 20% to about 12%, several points below the 15% tax-to-GDP threshold
recommended by the IMF for satisfactory tax performance.Yet with our increasingly diversified economy,
there is room to greatly improve our tax administration capacity and increase our tax revenues.
A recent diagnostic exercise to examine the bottlenecks in our tax collection processes revealed
some interesting findings. For example, about 75% of our “registered” firms were not in the tax
system. Moreover, about 65% of Nigeria’s registered taxpayers had not filed their tax returns over the
past two years. With the support of external consultants, we are introducing remedial measures to
improve tax performance and estimate that we can raise an additional USD 500 million in non-oil tax
revenues in 2014.
The international community has an important role to play in supporting such efforts by
developing countries, and evidence shows that this can yield impressive returns. The OECD has found
that every USD 1 of ODA spent on building tax administrative capacity can generate as much as
USD 1 650 in incremental tax revenues. Yet to date, only limited funds have been targeted at
improving tax institutions and tax policies.
To support the broader goal of mobilising financing for the post-2015 development agenda, ODA can
also be used in many other creative ways, for instance to leverage private financial resources
(Chapter 11).
In my view, realising the full potential of domestic resource mobilisation in developing
countries – and in Africa in particular – is central to discussions on financing the post-2015
development agenda. It will be particularly important to deploy a greater proportion of ODA in
low-income countries to support their tax administration efforts. Realising this potential will require
strong commitment and leadership from developing country policy makers, as well as the support of
the international community.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 171
II.14. SUPPORTING COUNTRIES IN GROWING THEIR TAX BASEGlobal processes are needed to address international tax matters
Globalisation poses new challenges and opportunities for international tax matters and the
demand for assistance from developing countries is growing. For instance, a growing number of
developing countries have signed the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax
Matters, which provides for all possible forms of administrative co-operation between states in the
assessment and collection of taxes, in particular with a view to facilitate tax information exchange to
combat tax avoidance and evasion.
The G20 has identified base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) as a serious risk to tax revenues,
sovereignty and fair tax systems worldwide. Base erosion and profit shifting is an issue which harms
developed and developing countries, arising from deficiencies of current international tax rules and
standards. These enable multinational companies to take advantage of tax rates that are lower than
in the country where the activities take place and value is created by artificially shifting profits across
borders. For some of the poorest countries, which rely very heavily on tax revenue frommultinational
companies, base erosion has a particularly significant effect on vital tax revenues. If the largest and
most high-profile taxpayers are seen to be avoiding their tax liabilities, confidence and effectiveness
of the tax system are undermined.
The OECD and G20 economies are working together to address BEPS issues, providing consistency
for both business and tax sovereignties. In 2013, the OECD launched a 15-point Action Plan to provide
governments with the domestic and international tools they need to combat profit shifting (OECD,
2013c). The Action Plan recognises that greater transparency and improved data are needed to evaluate
and stop the growing disconnect between where profits are made and where they are reported for tax
purposes. In September 2014, the OECD/G20 BEPS Project delivered the first batch of deliverables, with
phases 2 and 3 scheduled to be finalised by September and December 2015 respectively.
Acknowledging that developing countries face specific policy issues and implementation
challenges that are not always shared with developed countries, the G20 mandated the OECD to
report on the main sources of base erosion and profit shifting for developing countries and set out a
new agenda for addressing BEPS issues in developing countries. Based on intensive consultations
with developing countries, the report highlights the actions developing countries have taken, many
with international support, that indicate there are opportunities to raise additional revenues from
addressing BEPS issues and to create a more certain and stable investment climate for business. The
report sets out how the G20 can assist developing countries address the challenges posed by these
BEPS issues and the need for developing countries to have a voice in the process.
International progress is also being made in the fight against tax evasion. In July 2014 the OECD
developed and endorsed a proposal for a new single global standard for automatic exchange of
information in response to a request by G20 leaders at their summit in September 2013. The standard
calls on jurisdictions to obtain information from their financial institutions and automatically
exchange that information with other jurisdictions on an annual basis, which involves the systematic
and periodic transmission of “bulk” taxpayer information by the source country to the residence
country concerning various categories of income (e.g. dividends, interest, royalties, salaries,
pensions, etc.).DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014172
II.14. SUPPORTING COUNTRIES IN GROWING THEIR TAX BASEDeveloping countries stand to gain from the implementation of this new global standard in their
fight against illicit financial flows, by increasing their revenue collection and deterring tax evasion.
G20 governments have mandated the OECD-hosted Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of
Information for Tax Purposes working with the OECD Task Force on Tax and Development3 to help
developing countries identify their need for technical assistance and capacity building in order to
participate in and benefit from automatic exchange of information. In September 2014, the Global
Forum presented its roadmap to the G20 spelling out how developing countries can overcome
obstacles to participate in the automatic exchange standard andmeet its requirements.The roadmap
describes a stepped approach for how developing countries can participate in the new standard and
includes an outline for pilot projects to be undertaken between developing and developed country
partners, working with the Global Forum Secretariat, to address awareness and capacity constraints.
It is expected that pilot projects with a number of developing countries will be launched at the
beginning of 2015.
How tax support is delivered is also important
Each of the above instruments can play a distinct and valuable role in supporting tax systems and
enhancing linkages between taxation and governance. But results also depend on the context in which
instruments are used. This section outlines some principles to guide how tax support is delivered.
Tailor support to each country’s needs and priorities
Experience in supporting tax reform echoes lessons learnt from other policy areas: local
leadership, locally designed solutions and approaches that are sensitive to each country’s
socio-economic environment are critical.When supporting tax reform, it is important that support is
tailored to local government preferences and to prevailing local conditions.
It is also important to view tax systems as part of each country’s broader economic governance
framework. This means that the development of good tax systems needs to go hand in hand with
reinforcing the linkages between the revenue and expenditure sides of the public finance equation.
This can be done by combating corrupt practices, linking support in the revenue area with other
public financial management reforms, reinforcing the role of audit institutions, bolstering
parliamentary scrutiny over both revenue and expenditures, and supporting non-state actors to
monitor the effective use of public revenues.
A few basic principles can guide effective support to tax reform
Recent stocktaking by OECD countries, developing countries, business and civil society has
helped to formulate a set of draft “Principles for International Engagement in Supporting Developing
Countries in Revenue Matters” (OECD, 2013b). These principles offer guidance for development
co-operation agencies, revenue authorities and finance departments on how to work together to
support host country-led domestic resource mobilisation. They also can help developing countries
engage effectively with international partners on revenue issues (Box 14.4).
View tax systems as part of each country’s broader economic governance
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II.14. SUPPORTING COUNTRIES IN GROWING THEIR TAX BASEDevelopment agencies need to set a good governance example
Development agencies frequently secure tax exemptions from developing countries on
ODA-financed inputs. These typically include exemptions from income tax on the salaries of staff
based in the developing country; taxes on goods and services provided; value-added taxes on local
purchases; and customs duties and excise taxes on imports. These exemptions can undermine the
legitimacy of local institutions and discourage voluntary compliance by local taxpayers. They can
also distort the local market when goods and services imported from provider countries receive
preferential tax treatment over domestically produced goods and services.
Evidence suggests that tax exemptions are also a significant budgetary issue for host countries.
For example, in Tanzania, customs exemptions for development co-operation providers accounted
for around 17% of the gross value of imports in 2005 (OECD/AfDB/ECA, 2010). Developing countries
argue that removing exemptions would widen the tax base, boost the credibility of both the revenue
administration and the development agencies, simplify tax systems, and encourage voluntary
compliance by local and multinational taxpayers (OECD/AfDB/ECA, 2010). This is a challenging policy
area for development agencies but as aminimum, full transparency of exemptions claimed should be
a feasible next step.
Supporting tax systems in fragile states is especially urgent
Fragile states – countries and economies marked by conflict, instability and poor governance –
are furthest from achieving the Millennium Development Goals, but they find it much harder than
others to access resources to finance their development.These states need to boost domestic revenue
generation as a source of social spending, and also as a cornerstone of statebuilding (see Chapter 20
on fragile states). Experience shows that even in immediate post-conflict periods, support to revenue
collection can pay dividends; for example, in Burundi and Rwanda, donor support to revenue
Box 14.4. International support to developing countries in revenue matters:
A summary of draft principles
1. Follow the leadership of government and co-ordinate at the country level.
2. Do no harm.
3. Take a “whole-of-government” approach to maximise policy coherence and development
co-operation effectiveness.
4. Take account of international aspects of taxation.
5. Balance revenue collection imperatives with fairness, equity and governance considerations.
6. Encourage transparency in revenue matters.
7. Strengthen revenue and expenditure linkages.
8. Promote sustainability in revenue collection systems.
9. Encourage broad-based dialogue on revenue matters that includes civil society, business and
other stakeholders.
10. Measure progress and build the knowledge base on revenue matters.
Source: OECD (2013b), “Draft Principles for International Engagement in Supporting Developing Countries in Revenue
Matters”, OECD, Paris, available at: www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-global/Principles_for_international_engagement_May2013.pdf.
Customs exemptions for development co-operation providers accounted
for around 17% of Tanzania’s gross value of imports in 2005.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014174
II.14. SUPPORTING COUNTRIES IN GROWING THEIR TAX BASEauthorities significantly improved tax collection. However, many development co-operation
providers are hesitant about providing support and funding to government systems in such risky
contexts. The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States – endorsed by 41 countries and
organisations in 2011 – recognises these fears, but emphasises that the risk of not engaging in fragile
states outweighs the risks of getting involved (International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and
Statebuilding, 2011).
Key recommendations
● Step up efforts for more and better development co-operation support to tax matters, in line with
best practice, as set out in the OECD “Draft Principles for International Engagement in Supporting
Developing Countries in Revenue Matters”.
● Customise support to fit country conditions; there is no “one-size-fits-all” approach to tax reform.
● Ensure host-country ownership and leadership; concessional finance alone cannot “buy” effective
and lasting reforms.
● Support developing countries in becoming parties to the “Multilateral Convention on
Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters” to tackle tax evasion and avoidance.
● Remember that how revenue gets collected is as important as how much gets collected.
● Provide assistance to developing countries to ensure they can participate in and benefit from the
OECD/G20 BEPS Project.
● Provide assistance to developing countries to identify their need for capacity building in order to
participate in and benefit from the new standard in automatic exchange of information for tax
purposes.
● Strengthen linkages between taxation and governance by supporting institutions and
organisations outside the revenue system, such as the justice system, parliament and civil society.
● Ensure that providers lead by example by being transparent about their tax exemptions for
ODA-funded staff salaries, goods and services.
● Prioritise fragile states for urgent support to tax reform.
Notes
1. Reported by Colombia to the OECD Task Force on Tax and Development plenary meeting in Korea,
October 2013.
2. Reported by Kenya to the OECDTask Force on Tax and Development plenary meeting in Korea, October 2013.
3. The OECD Task Force on Tax and Development was created in 2010 and brings together the Committee on
Fiscal Affairs and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Its members – OECD and developing
countries, international and regional organisations, civil society and business – meet every year, most recently
in Seoul, Korea in October 2013. Co-chaired by South Africa and the Netherlands, the role of the Task Force is
to advise the OECD committees on delivering a tax and development programme to improve the enabling
environment for developing countries to collect taxes fairly and effectively.
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Chapter 15
Innovating to finance development
by
Julia Benn and Mariana Mirabile, Development Co-operation Directorate, OECD
Innovative financing for development initiatives aim to narrow the gap between the
resources needed to achieve the Millennium Development Goals and the resources
actually available. While there is no agreed definition of innovative financing for
development, existing initiatives can be broadly classified as those aiming to raise
new funds for development (“innovative sourcing”) and those which optimise the
use of traditional funding sources (“innovative spending”). Innovative financing for
development initiatives have so far mobilised only part of the shortfall they aim to
eliminate. However, their potential is still to be exploited. An array of mechanisms
with large fundraising potential has been proposed over the past decade. Out of
these initiatives, a tax on transactions in the financial markets has gained new
political momentum and is already being implemented in a few countries. It is
estimated that this mechanism, if implemented in G20 countries, could make
available over USD 50 billion for development every year.
This chapter also includes an opinion piece by Philippe Douste-Blazy,
United Nations Under-Secretary-General and Special Advisor on Innovative
Financing for Development, on how innovative financing can put the
world’s wealth to work for all people.177
II.15. INNOVATING TO FINANCE DEVELOPMENTThe pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) has shown just how wide the gap is
between the resources needed and the resources available to finance development. Innovative
finance for development initiatives were conceived to narrow this gap, with the idea that innovation
could be used to ensure that part of the wealth generated through globalisation, rather than
benefitting just a few, should be used to the benefit of many.
Innovative financing for development is an evolving concept
No internationally agreed definition of innovative finance for development exists. Initiatives
tagged as “innovative” by some stakeholders may not be considered so by others. At present,
innovative finance for development comprises many very different initiatives. For example, some
earmark resources or make them available quickly, others correct market failures or modify the risk
profile of a specific sector, and yet others mobilise domestic resources. Financial engineering
mechanisms – such as blended finance, syndicated loans, guarantees or mezzanine finance
(Chapter 11) – are also regularly referred to as innovative because of their increased use to leverage
resources in the development context.
Figure 15.1 summarises how innovative financing for development has been defined by the
Leading Group on Innovative Financing for Development (LG),1 the OECD, the United Nations and the
World Bank.
The term “additional” in particular – included in both the OECD andWorld Bank definitions – can
be ambiguous and difficult to measure (Box 15.1).
The international community – at the latest annual plenary session of the Leading Group, held
in Nigeria in January 2014 – agreed that a common definition of innovative financing for development
is needed to be able to track amounts mobilised by these initiatives in the post-2015 era. This
agreement was reinforced at the Leading Group’s expert workshop (“Preparing for 2015: The Role of
Innovative Financing in Sustainable Development and Climate Change”) held in Paris in June 2014.
The pursuit of the MDGs has shown how wide the gap is between
the resources needed and the resources available.
A common definition of innovative finance for development is needed.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014178
II.15. INNOVATING TO FINANCE DEVELOPMENTFigure 15.1. Varying definitions of innovative financing for development
Sources: Leading Group website, http://leadinggroup.org/rubrique172.html; Sandor, E. (2011), “Mapping innovative finance for
development mechanisms”, OECD Journal: General Papers, Vol. 2010/1, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/gen_papers-
2010-5kgc6cl2x95d; United Nations (2012), World Economic and Social Survey: In Search of New Development Finance, United Nations,
New York, www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wess/wess_current/2012wess.pdf; World Bank (2010), Innovative Finance for
Development Solutions: Initiatives of theWorld Bank Group, TheWorld Bank,Washington, DC, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/CFPEXT/
Resources/IF-for-Development-Solutions.pdf.
Box 15.1. The thorny issue of measuring additional finance
The term “additional” may have different meanings. It might refer variously to:
1. More resources for development, be they official development assistance (ODA) or other types of
finance originating from non-traditional sources of finance.
2. Flows beyond ODA, that do not count against the 0.7% ODA/GNI target (see Chapter 2).
3. Flows (ODA or other) that would not have been available otherwise, or that would have become
available only at a later stage.
Measuring “additionality” statistically is even less straightforward. Monitoring “flows beyond ODA”
would be problematic as some of the flows mobilised by innovative mechanisms meet the ODA
criteria and are thus included as ODA. Monitoring flows that “would not have been available
otherwise” or that “would have become available at a later stage” is even more complicated, as
assessing their additionality requires knowing what would have happened in the absence of the
innovative initiative. The only form of additionality that seems to be traceable is the case where
“additional flows” are understood as flows originating from non-traditional sources of finance
(i.e. outside development co-operation budgets), regardless of their ODA eligibility ex post. The
international solidarity levy on air tickets (Box 15.2) is an example of a mechanism that generates
such additional, but ODA-eligible, flows.
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Innovative financing for development refers to:
Financial solutions to development challenges that remain insufficiently addressed by traditional aid flows. 
There are two sub-categories of innovative financing: 1) innovative sources which help generate new financial 
flows for sustainable development that may come from various economic sectors; 2) innovative mechanisms 
which help maximise the efficiency, impact and leverage of existing resources.
Mechanisms for raising funds or stimulating actions in support of international development that go beyond 
traditional spending approaches and share the following characteristics: 1) official sector involvement; 
2) cross-border transfer of resources to developing countries; 3) mobilise additional finance; and 4) are 
operational.
Initiatives that share the following characteristics: 1) official sector involvement; 2) cross-border transfer 
of resources to developing countries; and 3) innovation, in the sense that mechanisms are used in a new context 
or incorporate innovative features with respect to traditional finance.
Any financing approach that helps to: 1) generate additional development funds by tapping new funding sources 
(e.g. by looking beyond budget outlays) or by engaging new partners (e.g. emerging donors, private sector); 
2) enhance the efficiency offinancial flows, by reducing delivery time and/or costs; 3) make financial flows 
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II.15. INNOVATING TO FINANCE DEVELOPMENTInnovative development finance is already in action
Innovative spending initiatives have been successful in optimising the use of traditional sources
in a myriad of ways in the health sector. For example:
● Tackling disease outbreaks by “front-loading” finance. Front-loading resources means making
funds available earlier than usual. By converting development co-operation providers’ future ODA
commitments into bonds, finance that would have been available in 20 years’ time is made available
today as these commitments are sold to themarket and converted to cash themoment they are sold.
For example, the International Finance Facility for Immunization (IFFIm)2 has front-loaded large
volumes of funds for immunisation programmes by selling “vaccine bonds” in capital markets
backed by long-term pledges from providers of development co-operation. With administrative
support from theWorld Bank, the IFFIm issues bonds in international capital markets that are to be
serviced and repaid fromODA allocations earmarked in advance for this purpose. IFFIm thus borrows
ODA from the future, to spend it today. The front-loading allows higher value for money because
when fighting epidemics, a big initial push is usually more successful than years of marginal effort.3
Furthermore, such large investments open up possibilities for bargaining with pharmaceutical
companies to reduce the price of vaccines due to high volumes purchased, further increasing the
efficiency of the resources spent. The resources generated by the bonds’ sales are used to support
immunisation programmes through the GAVI Alliance.
● Encouraging vaccine development through advance market commitments. Advance market
commitments encourage private companies to invest in the development of affordable vaccines
tailored to the needs of developing countries by using legally binding agreements to guarantee that
high volumes of that vaccine will be bought by institutions such as UNITAID (Box 15.2). How do
they work? By subsidising the purchase of vaccines by developing countries (up to a fixed number
of sales or a fixed total amount), development co-operation providers ensure a market for private
sector vaccine manufacturers that would not otherwise have existed. Once this fixed number of
sales or total amount has been reached, manufacturers who benefited from the subsidy are
contractually obliged to either sell the vaccines to developing countries at an affordable price or to
license their technology to other manufacturers. For example, pneumococcal vaccines are new,
complex vaccines that would normally reach low-income countries 10-15 years after their
introduction in industrialised countries. Thanks to the pneumococcal advance market
commitment, children in over 25 countries are being immunised against the main cause of
pneumonia today.4
● Swapping debt for health. Debt2Health is an innovative financing initiative of the Global Fund to
FightAIDS,Tuberculosis andMalaria. Official development co-operation providers agree to grant debt
relief in exchange for a commitment by the developing country to invest the equivalent amount in its
national health programmes, through an approved Global Fund grant. In this way, Debt2Health
reallocates resources from debt repayments towards life-saving investments in health.
Advance market commitments have encouraged the development
and production of vaccines tailored to the needs of, and affordable to,
developing countries.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014180
II.15. INNOVATING TO FINANCE DEVELOPMENTThe potential of innovative financing is still largely untapped
To date, the resources mobilised by innovative finance for development initiatives amount on
average to USD 2 billion every year. This is equivalent to a small fraction (about one-seventieth) of the
amount allocated as ODA in 2012 (Figure 15.2).5
How much more could potentially be mobilised through innovative financing mechanisms? The
United Nations’ estimates suggest that over USD 600 billion could be mobilised every year,
i.e. five times as much as ODA in 2012 (Figure 15.2). The potential stems from an array of “innovative
sourcing” options proposed over the past decade, which could take advantage of potentially large
untapped sources of revenue (Table 15.1). Particularly interesting in the current environment of
spending cuts are taxes on financial and currency transactions and on greenhouse gas emissions (see
Chapter 18), as well as the creation of new international liquidity through the issuance of special
drawing rights by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).6
Box 15.2. UNITAID and France’s solidarity levy on air tickets
UNITAID is a global health initiative established in 2006 by the governments of Brazil, Chile, France,
Norway and the United Kingdom. It provides sustainable funding for medicines, diagnostics and
prevention for HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. UNITAID’s key source of income is through the
international solidarity levy on airline tickets. Currently collected in 9 out of 29 UNITAID member
countries – Cameroon, Chile, Congo, France, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Niger and the Republic of
Korea – this nationally implemented and internationally co-ordinated tax on airline ticket sales
collects USD 224 million every year, generating funds for UNITAID and IFFIm (UNITAID, n.d.; see figure
below).*
How the airline levy works
In France, this levy is called the “solidarity levy on airline tickets” and is charged to each passenger
departing French soil. Domestic/intra-European Union economy class passengers are charged EUR 1
and international economy passengers are charged EUR 4. For first and business class, the rate is
EUR 10 for domestic/intra-European Union and EUR 40 for international flights. In January 2013,
France’s Directorate General for Civil Aviation announced that EUR 1 billion had been collected since
the inception of this tax in 2006. In his speech to the 67th United Nations General Assembly in
September 2012, French President François Hollande said that the success of UNITAID has influenced
France to push for a tax on financial transactions.
* Funds raised are an estimation from UNITAID 2012 Financial Statement, available at: www.unitaid.eu/images/budget/Dec-
31-2012_Financial_Statements.pdf.
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➊
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➋
The annual resources mobilised by innovative financing for development
average USD 2 billion – equivalent to only a small fraction of the ODA
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II.15. INNOVATING TO FINANCE DEVELOPMENTThe tax on transactions in the financial market – the financial transaction tax – is already being
implemented in some countries and is being discussed at the European level.7 The financial
transaction tax is a levy applied on specific types of monetary transactions, such as the purchase of
shares, bonds, traded funds and derivatives. The tax generates substantial additional public revenue,
part of which could be used to finance development. In the Leading Group’s 2014 annual plenary
session, the international solidarity levy on air tickets was referred to as “the pilot for the financial
transaction tax”. Given the success of this pilot, it may now be time to scale up (see Box 15.2 and the
“In my view” box).
Figure 15.2. Potential of “innovative sourcing and spending” mechanisms
USD billion
Sources: DAC statistics; United Nations (2012),World Economic and Social Survey: In Search of New Development Finance, United Nations,
New York, www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wess/wess_current/2012wess.pdf.
Table 15.1. Proposed innovative financing mechanisms for development
Initiatives Potential amount mobilised a year (USD billion)
New special drawing rights issuance (as reserve to free up domestic resources) 160
Special drawing rights used as development finance 100
Carbon taxes – USD 25 per tonne of CO2 emitted 250
Billionaire’s tax 40
Currency transaction tax 40
Financial transaction tax 15
REDD+1 30
Total 635
1. REDD+ is the UN Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation.
Source: Based on United Nations (2012), World Economic and Social Survey: In Search of New Development Finance, United Nations,
New York, www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wess/wess_current/2012wess.pdf.
Proposed innovative financing for 
development mechanisms: Potentially 
USD 635 billion per year 
Existing innovative financing for 
development mechanisms: 
USD 1.9 billion per year 
Official development assistance: 
USD 127 billion in 2012 
Even at very low rates, the proceeds from a tax on financial transactions
in G20 countries could amount to over USD 350 billion a year,
part of which could be allocated to development.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014182
II.15. INNOVATING TO FINANCE DEVELOPMENTIn my view:
Innovative financing can put the world’s wealth to work
for all people
Philippe Douste-Blazy,
United Nations Under-Secretary-General
and Special Advisor on Innovative Financing for Development
Many industrialised countries are facing heavy debt and slow economic growth, so it is no surprise
when the media admonish that there is no money for global development and social needs. Yet the
global economy produces astonishing wealth. There are more billionaires across the globe today than
ever before – the number of wealthy individuals increased by 28% between 2009 and 2011 – and many
companies are making astronomical gains. The way wealth is generated, where it is generated and
how it is distributed is changing, however, and this affects both the haves and have-nots.
To meet the needs of the poorest people on our planet, we will need to harness the opportunities
offered by the changing global economy. This means being innovative in how we finance
development. It means bringing on board new, sustainable revenue flows – derived directly from the
revenue and capital that characterise the 21st century global economy – to complement official
development assistance (ODA). It is true that the excesses of financial innovation have brought the
world economic system to the brink, but it is also true that financial innovation can be used for the
good of humanity.
For example, take the international solidarity levy on air tickets. Many people have no idea when
they board a plane from Chile, France or Morocco – or from six other countries – that their airline
ticket helps UNITAID buy AIDS medicine for children (see Box 15.2). Yet travellers have generated
more than EUR 2.5 billion, thanks to which 8 out of 10 children in the world with AIDS are receiving
treatment and some 350 million people have access to anti-malaria treatments – a disease that kills
one child every 40 seconds. UNITAID raises and spends its funds in ways that create leverage in the
marketplace for the interests of patients in the poorest countries of our planet – and ultimately for the
security of us all.
The UNITAID example can be applied to other sectors of the global economy – for example, to the
extractive industries. In Africa, oil and gas generate almost USD 150 billion in revenue per year. As a
member of the Advisory Board of the Innovative Finance Foundation (IFF)* – which generates funding
for social infrastructure – I proposed examining the feasibility of using innovative instruments such
as a micro-levy on Africa’s extractive industries to combat stunting (reduced growth rates resulting
from malnutrition). Stunting affects a staggering 165 million children under five years of age, more
than 90% of whom are in the developing world; the highest rates are in Africa (36%) and Asia (27%)
(UNICEF/WHO/World Bank, 2011). The IFF’s initial research indicates that such action could not only
generate funding for health and education, it could also support governments in good natural
resource management.
In my view, innovative financing is about making capitalism work better for all people, so that they
can share equitably in the world’s wealth for their health, education, nutrition and other development
needs. It enables everyone to participate in the global economy, no matter where they live.
* See www.innovativefinance.org.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 183
II.15. INNOVATING TO FINANCE DEVELOPMENTA UNITAID report estimates that even at very low rates (0.2% per equity transaction and
0.001-0.01% for debt securities), the proceeds from a tax on financial transactions in G20 countries
could amount to over USD 350 billion a year (UNITAID, 2011). France has committed to allocate 15% of
the amount leveraged through such taxes to finance development; if this percentage, as an average,
were to be allocated across all of the G20 countries, more than USD 50 billion of additional
resources – or 25 times the resources mobilised by all the innovative mechanisms in place today –
would become available every year (Figure 15.3).
Key recommendations
● Agree on an international definition of innovative financing for development to facilitate
discussions and estimations of the amount of resources these initiatives may be able to mobilise.
● Classify innovative financing for development initiatives into those aiming to raise new funds for
development (“innovative sourcing”) and those aiming to optimise the use of traditional funding
sources (“innovative spending”).While innovative spending is important, more innovative sourcing
initiatives are needed to increase the resources available to fund global Sustainable Development
Goals.
● Focus on and proritise those initiatives that can be realistically scaled up and that are proven, such
as the financial transaction tax.
● Continue to explore other options for how international financing for development initiatives
could be used to fund action in priority areas such as climate change.
Figure 15.3. Annual mobilisation potential of financial transaction taxes
1. Assuming 15% of the tax is allocated to development.
Source: Based on United Nations (2012), World Economic and Social Survey: In Search of New Development Finance, United Nations,
New York, www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wess/wess_current/2012wess.pdf; UNITAID (2011).
Financial transaction tax implemented in G20 countries: USD 50 billion1
Existing innovative financing for development mechanisms: 
USD 1.9 billion per year DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014184
II.15. INNOVATING TO FINANCE DEVELOPMENTNotes
1. The Leading Group on Innovative Financing for Development is a platform bringing together 64 member
countries with differing levels of development, as well as international organisations and non-governmental
organisations. It seeks to promote the implementation and definition of innovative financing mechanisms
around the world.
2. See: www.iffim.org.
3. Such a push can meaningfully disrupt the spread of the disease by reducing both the number of contagious
people and the prevalence of pathogens (Douste-Blazy and Altman, 2010).
4. For more information, see www.gavialliance.org/funding/pneumococcal-amc.
5. This calculation only includes initiatives that meet the OECD definition (Figure 15.1). The total is thus an
underestimation of the total amount that would have beenmobilised by innovative financing for development
initiatives if the United Nations or theWorld Bank definitions were taken into account.
6. Special drawing rights represent a claim to currency held by IMF member countries which may be exchanged
for euro, Japanese yen, British pounds sterling or US dollars.
7. Eleven countries (Austria, Belgium, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, the Slovak Republic,
Slovenia and Spain) have decided to implement – through enhanced co-operation – a European directive on
the taxation of financial transactions. A recent meeting of the Economic and Financial Affairs Council
(May 2014) reached agreement on the modalities of the future tax, which will exclude derivative products.
However, there is no consensus yet on the allocation of the future revenues of the tax (Council of
the European Union, 2014).
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Chapter 16
Enhancing the contribution of social
business to sustainable development
by
Kerstin Humberg, engagement manager, international business consultancy
and Linda Kleemann, Kiel Institute for theWorld Economy, Germany
Social business is receiving increasing international attention, but what exactly is
it? What can it contribute to poverty reduction, and how does it foster human
development? This chapter illustrates how social businesses can create new sources
of income, raise productivity, reduce “aid” dependency and provide low-income
consumers with access to products and services for their basic needs. Yet they are
not a panacea: establishing a commercially viable business that contributes to
human development is a complex task involving a number of risks, which are
exacerbated by a lack of start-up finance and favourable policies. Some of the
limitations and risks could be mitigated through cross-sector partnerships, the
creation of an enabling environment by development partners, a deliberate
regulatory framework and rigorous monitoring and evaluation.
This chapter also includes an opinion piece by MuhammadYunus, Founder
and Managing Director of the Grameen Bank, on why development without
sustainability is meaningless.187
II.16. ENHANCING THE CONTRIBUTION OF SOCIAL BUSINESS TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTSince Muhammad Yunus, the founder of the Grameen Bank1 in Bangladesh, publicly coined the
term through his Nobel lecture in December 2006, “social business” has become a popular buzzword.
But what is social business and what can it contribute to poverty reduction and human development?
The OECD was among the first international organisation to conceptualise social entrepreneurship,
using a definition that remains a reference point for policymakers and practitioners: “Any private activity
conducted in the public interest, organised with an entrepreneurial strategy but whose main purpose is
not the maximisation of profit but the attainment of certain economic and social goals, and which has a
capacity of bringing innovative solutions to the problems of social exclusion and unemployment” (OECD,
2000).This definition is very similar to MuhammadYunus’ notion of social business (see Box 16.1 and his
“In my view” box later in this chapter).
Strictly speaking, Yunus’ social business approach represents a specific sub-set of social
entrepreneurship. While a social enterprise in its broad sense may be for-profit or non-profit,
commercially viable or subsidised, a social business complying with Yunus’ concept is based on a
commercially viable business model, while at the same time adhering to the non-distribution
constraint2 of non-profit organisations (unless ownership is given to the company’s target
beneficiaries). All those who design and run social businesses could thus be called social
entrepreneurs, but not all social entrepreneurs are engaged in social business, as social enterprises
may depend on donations or include conventional dividend payments to shareholders.
Box 16.1. Two types of social business
Yunus distinguishes between two types of social business:
● Type 1: A “non-loss, non-dividend company” that creates social benefits through the nature of its
products, services and/or operating systems.
● Type 2: A profit-maximising company owned by its poor or otherwise disadvantaged target
beneficiaries, or by a dedicated trust.
In Yunus’ view, it is crucial to be clear that social business excludes the pursuit of individual profit
by the company’s founders and shareholding investors, beyond the return of their original
investment, to maximise the company’s social and environmental value-creation potential.
Source: Yunus, M. (2010), Building Social Business – The New Kind of Capitalism That Serves Humanity’s Most Pressing Needs, Public
Affairs, New York; Yunus, M. (2007), Creating aWorldWithout Poverty: Social Business and the Future of Capitalism, Public Affairs,
New York.
Social business contributes to human development by enlarging people’s
choice in an economically, environmentally and socially sustainable way.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014188
II.16. ENHANCING THE CONTRIBUTION OF SOCIAL BUSINESS TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTToday, both terms social business and social enterprise tend to be used to refer to all kinds of
hybrid organisations, ranging from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with income-generating
activities to socially responsible businesses that pursue social and environmental benefits in addition
to profits. In order to promote some standardisation of terms and fill the gap in Yunus’ definition on
the question of what “social” is, we propose the following universal definition of social business:
“A business that contributes to human development by enlarging people’s choice in an economically,
environmentally and socially sustainable way.3 Its norms and standards are context-specific and
result from societal negotiation.”
Social entrepreneurship is widespread and varied in developing countries
Detailed data on the extent and impact of social business are scarce. The Global Entrepreneurship
Monitor Report on Social Entrepreneurship shows that between 0.4% and 4% of the working-age
population in emerging and developed markets can be considered social entrepreneurs
(Terjesen et al., 2011). While this figure is not definitive and only offers a proxy for the prevalence of
social business, it shows that the general idea of social entrepreneurship seems to be widespread and
can, in principle, be replicated in a variety of places.
Reports and case studies illustrate three dominant modes of social business in developing
countries:
1. Social businesses that are founded and funded by local elites who have studied or have spent part
of their working life abroad before bringing back home the idea of solving social problems through
business. They are well educated, comparatively wealthy and have good international networks.
2. Social businesses that are founded by international elites who have a history in a particular
country, often having worked as employees of international organisations, development agencies,
NGOs or multinational corporations.
3. Social businesses established by multinational corporations as a testing field for market entry, as a
corporate social responsibility scheme4 or as an entry point for transforming the whole business.
Social business has some advantages over conventional development co-operation
What are the strengths of the social business approach compared to conventional development
co-operation? In principle, social businesses offer a wide range of opportunities. Real-life examples
such as Grameen Danone Foods Ltd in Bangladesh (see Box 16.2) exemplify how they can:
● mobilise private sector resources
● create new employment and income opportunities
● enlarge poor consumers’ choices of products and services
● foster bottom-up growth
● overcome charity approaches to development
● turn poor people from “aid” recipients into market participants
● achieve a win-win-situation of profitability and social value creation at the same time.
One major advantage social business has over development co-operation is the combination of a
long-term perspective (rather than a short-term, project approach) with a business case built on
market dynamics, thus increasing the likelihood that products or services offered to target
beneficiaries are actually in demand. In a social business initiative, “the poor” are regarded as active
market participants, for example as employees who can add to value creation or as consumers who
are willing to pay if they get value for money at an affordable price. In this way, social business
initiatives can enlarge poor consumers’ choice of products and services.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 189
II.16. ENHANCING THE CONTRIBUTION OF SOCIAL BUSINESS TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTIn my view:
Development without sustainability is meaningless
MuhammadYunus,
Nobel Peace Prize-winning founder of Grameen Bank
Over the past three decades there has been a feeling of uneasiness about development programmes
based on handouts, charity and safety nets. It is no longer an issue of debate: development without
sustainability cannot be meaningful or have an impact.
TheYunus Centre’s social business work in Bangladesh and around the world puts sustainability at
the core. Social business is cause-driven. It is profitable, but its investors are not interested in
personal profit; once they recoup their investment, any additional profits are ploughed back into the
business for its expansion and improvement. The objective is to attain one or more social goals, with
profit seen only as a means to ensure the sustainability of the business.
The social businesses founded by the Yunus Centre range from small, single-entrepreneur
businesses to large joint ventures with multinational companies. For example, in 2006 Grameen
joined forces with one of the world’s major food producers – Groupe Danone – to produce a yoghurt
fortified with micro-nutrients that could reduce child malnutrition in Bangladesh (see Box 16.2). Kids
love this delicious and healthy product. Neither Danone nor Grameen take dividends from the
company and the creativity and energies of the board, management and staff are focused on the
social goal, without losing sight of the need to cover the costs of the enterprise and expand.
Grameen borrower families in Bangladesh number more than 8 million. Thanks to the efforts of the
Grameen Bank, thousands of their children have received education – in many cases for the first time
in their families – reaching high-school, college and university. Many have become engineers and
doctors. Even so, despite these qualifications, many are unable to secure employment because of the
acute shortage of jobs. Grameen has launched a campaign to redirect these minds away from the
traditional job market to futures based on entrepreneurship. These nobin udyokta (in Bangla, “new
entrepreneurs”) insist: “We are not job seekers, we are job givers.” Grameen companies invest social
business funds in their enterprises without any expectation of returns beyond the original capital.
After the young entrepreneurs pay back the equity, they become owners of their own social
businesses. By continuing to grow the business, they generate employment for others and build
financial security for themselves and their families. This formula of turning the unemployed into
entrepreneurs is a potent way of tackling the persistent social problem of unemployment which even
plagues industrialised countries.
In my view, social business offers an effective way to solve some of our most intractable problems.
I would like to urge OECD countries to explore this path towards sustainable development, promoting
the creation of social business funds by businesses, governments, foundations and individuals. This
will empower entrepreneurs – young and old – to create businesses that can solve the problems of
their own communities. Every profit-making business can create a parallel social business to solve a
small slice of any mega problem. I invite OECD countries to try it.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014190
II.16. ENHANCING THE CONTRIBUTION OF SOCIAL BUSINESS TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTIntegrating the poor into value chains that did not exist before can also generate new income and
employment opportunities, although the extent to which this actually happens depends on the type
of business model. How social business can provide employment opportunities, including for
disadvantaged individuals, has been analysed recently by the OECD through a survey of social
enterprises and social economy organisations, mostly in OECD countries (Buckingham andTeasdale,
2013). By improving stakeholders’ capabilities (e.g. in terms of better health and productivity) and
contributing to development, social business initiatives also may foster growth from the bottom up,
in contrast to top-down macroeconomic strategies.
Self-sustainable social business solutions are particularly promising in three regards. First, if
commercial viability is achieved, this relieves executives from fundraising and dependency on
financial development “aid”. Second, sufficient profits allow successful initiatives to be scaled up and
replicated. Thirdly, social value creation – responding to poor or disadvantaged people’s needs as the
primary business driver – allows the social-minded entrepreneur to innovate and take advantage of
previously untapped business opportunities, entering new markets that are judged unprofitable or
too risky for conventional businesses.
Box 16.2. Grameen Danone’s learning curve
Grameen Danone Foods Ltd was launched in July 2006 as a private limited company in rural
Bangladesh. The company was set up as a 50/50 joint venture between Grameen Group and Group
Danone Asia Pte Ltd, a subsidiary of the multinational food producer Groupe Danone. Grameen
Danone’s aim is to alleviate malnutrition among needy children by selling fortified yoghurt at an
affordable price. But experience has shown how challenging it is to combine these objectives with
business solvency. During the start-up phase, GrameenDanonewas confrontedwith several challenges:
low demand in the rural target market, a lack of sales and distribution channels to reach poor and
extremely poor consumers, and high operating costs in the absence of a functioning cold chain.
To ensure the yoghurt’s affordability, Grameen Danone tried to keep the initial price as low as
possible by focusing on a one-product-fits-all solution. When this proved to be counterproductive,
Grameen Danone decided to diversify its product portfolio by expanding to urban markets with the
aim of boosting the plants’ capacity utilisation and allowing for economies of scale.
Today, Grameen Danone has had a fairly successful record in job and income creation. Nonetheless,
while this has boosted the income and food security of salespersons and micro-farmers, it has not
been sufficient to lift them out of poverty. Also, because of its pilot project character, the yoghurt
business was still limited in scale after five years, reaching approximately 60 000 people or an
estimated 0.04% of Bangladesh’s total population with one cup of yoghurt a day. The most critical
shortcoming, however, is the fact that Grameen Danone has not yet fully established its desired
health impact. If consumed regularly at least twice a week, Grameen Danone’s product should be
effective in providing adequate nutritional levels. However, this type of regular consumption requires
not only a minimum ability to pay, but also a change in target customers’ consumption patterns.
Source: Humberg, K. (2011), Poverty Reduction through Social Business? Lessons Learnt from Grameen Joint Ventures in Bangladesh,
OekomVerlag, Munich, Germany.
Integrating the poor into value chains can generate new income
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II.16. ENHANCING THE CONTRIBUTION OF SOCIAL BUSINESS TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTCreating a viable social business is complicated
The opportunities outlined above reflect a best-case scenario. It is, however, challenging to
achieve social goals, environmental sustainability and commercial viability at the same time (Box 16.2
and Humberg, 2011). The creation of commercially viable social purpose ventures is complicated,
requiring both capital and technical know-how; it is also important to allow for learning and
experimentation, as changing consumer behaviour in line with a social objective often takes time.
Moreover, even when a social business company reduces target beneficiaries’ vulnerability
(e.g. by improving their health or growing their social capital), it may not offer income opportunities
that are significant enough to lift the poor out of poverty. And finally, the number of proven social
business models that can be scaled up and replicated is still limited.
Lack of access to start-up capital is a big constraint for many social entrepreneurs. Important
sources of funding for social business start-ups in developing countries are friends and family, as well
as the entrepreneur’s own savings. In addition to these private funding options, there are
three principal sources of finance: development grants, banks and private equity investors. However,
each comes with its own problems:
● Official development assistance (ODA) is perceived as arbitrary and volatile, and with strings
attached that lower the value for the social entrepreneur. In addition, many development
co-operation actors prefer to support only the social purpose of a social business, while making
sure that their money is not used for business profit. This separation may be impossible for a social
entrepreneur to achieve.
● Banks often perceive social businesses as risky because they involve unconventional business
models. Furthermore, small but growing social businesses may be too small for average business
loans, but too big for microfinance.
● Currently, private equity risks undermine the primary social purpose of a business in favour of the
private investors’ profit demands. The kind of capital needed would be both patient (equity that
can be paid back over a long period) and accepting of a no-dividend policy (in other words, only the
initial investment is paid back).
This is where development-driven intermediaries, impact investors5 and social business angels6
have a role to play. Development actors and impact investors may be able to fill gaps by providing
targeted finance and social business support services. Successful local entrepreneurs also could link
social business start-ups to their networks and provide advice based on their experience.
Finally, assessing the social impact of businesses tends to be resource-intensive and complicated,
not only because of potential time lags between interventions and impact, but also due to the absence of
universal social reporting standards. Further work is needed to develop standards and best practices in
these assessments.Without universal standards, it is impossible to compare the net impact of different
social businesses, in particular because of the potentially large number of positive and negative side
effects that should be taken into account. It is critical that all positive and negative outcomes be
considered to avoid unintended side effects and to gauge a venture’s net social return on investment.
Social business is not risk-free
Social businesses are also not immune to negative outcomes. For example, the need to be
commercially viable might place pressure on environmental objectives or favourable wage levels, and
lead to exploitative business practices. Some social business companies may also enter into direct
competition with local producers, thus distorting local market structures.
Achieving social goals, environmental sustainability and commercial viability
at the same time is challenging.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014192
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ion,The current micro-credit crisis and debate around profit-maximising credit providers7 point to
another risk. Once a social entrepreneur has succeeded in developing a viable social business model,
the model is open to replication, including by profit-maximising entrepreneurs in search of personal
financial gain, with potentially negative consequences for the poor. In the absence of a clear
regulatory framework (Box 16.3), anyone could claim to run a social business. The problem, however,
in establishing such a regulatory framework is that what is considered “social” is context-dependent.
For example, some communities may see the provision of clean water, albeit at a cost, as a noble
cause, while others may see it as contradicting an inherent human right – access to potable water.
Some communities may see the sale of clean water as a noble cause; others
may see it as contradicting an inherent human right – access to potable water.
Box 16.3. OECD recommendations for policy support to social enterprise* development
Public policies can create an enabling environment for social enterprises if policy makers adopt a systemic vision
social enterprise and fully understand the contribution that it can make to the improvement of economic and soc
development and well-being. The OECD has highlighted some key areas for national and local policy action
developed countries that might apply to developing countries as well (OECD/European Union, 2013):
● Promote a culture of social enterprise entrepreneurship.
● Build enabling legal, regulatory and fiscal frameworks to bring clarity, without over-regulating so as to avoid us
the law for matters that do not necessarily require it. This should be accompanied by a wide range of strategies
support the development of social enterprise.
● Provide sustainable finance that is tailored to the needs of social enterprises, including innovative institutio
arrangements between governments and financial institutions that seek both social and financial retur
Governments can also improve access to capital through tools such as credit guarantees and tax credits that prov
fiscal incentives for potential investors.
● Offer business development services and support structures involving a “braided” system – i.e. support that targ
both traditional and social businesses – to foster and incubate business ideas and projects.
● Support access to markets by creating a level playing field for social enterprises through measures similar to tho
applicable to small and medium-sized enterprises, e.g. tax relief.
● Support programmes and initiatives that strengthen the capacity to build effective strategies to enter the marke
● Make public procurement policies more open to the social enterprise sector.
● Support research and increased knowledge of the sector and its needs, including on issues such as measur
social impact.
● Promote effective social impact measurement driven by a plurality of stakeholders to shape the debate in a way th
supports the alignment of the needs of the various stakeholders.
While a coherent policy framework to support social enterprises is essential to maximise their impact, pol
processes are just as important as the policies themselves. Social enterprise policies are more effective if they are bu
through horizontal (working across silos) and vertical co-ordination (working across levels of government) and
co-operation with the various stakeholders. This reduces information asymmetries and opportunistic behaviours, a
results in greater policy coherence and effectiveness (Noya, 2009; Mendell et al., 2010; OECD/European Union, 2013
* Although the terms social business and social enterprise are sometimes used interchangeably, they do not cover exactly the same realit
These OECD policy recommendations have been designed with social enterprises in mind, although most also apply to social business.
Source: Noya, A. (ed.) (2009), The Changing Boundaries of Social Enterprises, Local Economic and Employment Development (LEED), OECD Publish
Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264055513-en; Mendell, M. et al. (2010), “Improving social inclusion at the local level through the so
economy: Report for Korea”, OECD Local Economic and Employment Development (LEED) Working Papers, No. 2010/15, OECD Publishing, Paris, htt
dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kg0nvg4bl38-en; OECD/European Union (2013), Policy Brief on Social Entrepreneurship, Publication Office of the European Un
Luxembourg, www.oecd.org/cfe/leed/Social%20entrepreneurship%20policy%20brief%20EN_FINAL.pdf.
This box was contributed to the chapter by Antonella Noya, Centre for Entrepreneurship, SMEs and Local Development at the OECD.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 193
II.16. ENHANCING THE CONTRIBUTION OF SOCIAL BUSINESS TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTFinally, even those who start with noble objectives are not immune to “mission drift”. For example,
the lure of financial gainmay lead owners of profitable social business companies to change their target
customers (e.g. from the rural poor to the affluent urban population). This observation points to a
trade-off between profitability and affordability. In their quest for commercial viability, social
businesses may also run the risk of passing over the extreme poor (see also Shrimali et al., 2011).
Is social business a promising development approach?
Social business represents a new development approach with its own set of opportunities,
limitations and risks. If well managed and set up to contribute to poor consumers’ purchasing power,
social business companies can turn poor communities from “aid” beneficiaries into active market
participants, and short-term development programmes into commercially viable business solutions.
Social business companies primarily respond to market conditions and customer demand, rather
than the priorities of development co-operation providers and their partners; social business calls for
experimentation, innovation, replication and growth. The concept furthermore stimulates a
fundamental debate about the role of private and public institutions in development, while opening
up new avenues for cross-sector collaboration in developing countries. The private sector can offer
financial capital, technical expertise and functional business know-how, while partnerships with
research institutions allow for progress in the field of social impact assessment.
The role that development co-operation can play in fostering social business is to some extent
similar to creating an enabling environment for conventional business. In addition, there are several
support mechanisms that can be specifically tailored to social business (such as the examples
developed for social enterprises in Box 16.3). For instance, development co-operation can lend
support to education as a key strategy for advancing the social business approach. Encouraging an
entrepreneurial mindset, fostering critical and creative thinking, promoting ethics and values, and
teaching social problem-solving skills are all essential. Legal forms that permit a combination of
for-profit and non-profit activities are also needed. Much can be learnt from developed country
experiences; the United Kingdom, for instance, has gone far in creating a supportive environment
specifically for social enterprises (Social Enterprise UK, 2013).
It is important to be aware, however, that social business entrepreneurs frequently compete with
traditional development co-operation providers for both resources and customers. A standardised
analysis of the project environment can help to detect, and prevent, such instances.
Finally, emerging social business start-up hubs in megacities such as Nairobi and Accra can help
to promote the concept and its implementation in other places in the developing world. These hubs
offer access to capital, networking, advisors and mentors along with the training and learning
resources required to turn a start-up into a successful business.8
The recommendations below are targeted at all types of support, and apply both to development
co-operation providers and governments – in the North and the South.
Social business entrepreneurs frequently compete with traditional
development co-operation providers for both resources and customers.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014194
II.16. ENHANCING THE CONTRIBUTION OF SOCIAL BUSINESS TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTKey recommendations
● Adopt universal definitions of social business and social entrepreneurship.
● Use development co-operation to create an enabling business environment by supporting the
adaptation of financing mechanisms, improvement of skills and infrastructure, provision of
business advisory services, establishment of government programmes and incubators, and
simplification of legislation and administrative burdens.
● Explore the unintended consequences related to the respective roles of development co-operation
and private initiatives and learn from them.
● Use public policy to support social business, including enabling legal, regulatory and fiscal
frameworks.
● Use education as a key strategy for developing a culture of social business.
● Encourage businesses that address particularly pressing social issues through social business
competitions and targeted financing.
● Establish a strong impact measurement and reporting system to monitor and adjust policies and
support as necessary.
● Foster international learning and sharing of best policies to support social businesses in both
developed and developing countries.
Notes
1. The Grameen Bank is a Nobel Peace Prize-winning microfinance organisation and community development
bank founded in Bangladesh. It makes small loans to the impoverished without requiring collateral. The name
Grameen is derived from the word gram which means “rural” or “village” in the Sanskrit language.
2. The non-distribution constraint states that a non-profit organisation is prohibited from distributing its net
earnings among individuals who oversee the organisation. This includes board members, staff and directors.
3. With reference to Amartaya Sen’s capability approach (2001).
4. Corporate social responsibility is a systemwhich serves as a basis for companies to voluntarily integrate social
and environmental concerns into their activities and their relations with their stakeholders (definition by the
European Union).
5. Investors seeking social impact rather than profit maximisation.
6. A business angel is an affluent individual who provides capital for a business start-up.
7. Purely for-profit micro-credit providers, as opposed to social business providers or even non-profit providers,
have come under intense criticism recently for providing services that harm rather than help the poor
(including high interest rates and unfair loan contracts, which lead to over-indebtedness, etc.).
8. See http://hubaccra.com and www.thegrowthhub.com.
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Chapter 17
How can development co-operation address
global challenges?
by
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and Chairman of the Netherland’sWorking Group on the Future of ODA
Poverty reduction is increasingly dependent on the equal distribution and provision
of global public goods, such as a stable climate, a solid financial environment, fair
trade and freedom from infectious disease. This chapter asks how official
development assistance (ODA) can respond to these global challenges. A new
concept of international development is proposed, with clear targets for global
public goods; targeting of ODA to support the least developed countries and fragile
states; and a view of development co-operation as part of a broader and more
complex global agenda, involving both the public and the private sector, including
civil society. The post-2015 goals offer an important opportunity to better align the
policy agendas of developing and developed countries and to signal a refreshed
commitment to finding new financing sources to fund shared goals. Achieving them
will require greater solidarity among all nations and coherence of both domestic and
foreign policies.199
III.17. HOW CAN DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION ADDRESS GLOBAL CHALLENGES?Since its inception in 1972, the concept of official development assistance (ODA) has been a
successful instrument for promoting development co-operation and orienting development policies.
Development assistance has helped to stimulate growth and reduce poverty by building human and
physical capacity, and has brought about significant improvements in health (Channing et al., 2011).
Over the more than 40 years that ODA has been in existence, however, the global environment
has changed dramatically. Two shifts are particularly notable: on the one hand, more attention is
being focused on global challenges such as climate, security and migration; on the other hand, new
and innovative forms of development financing have emerged, as this Development Co-operation Report
makes clear. This chapter asks what these shifts mean for ODA.
Official development assistance needs to respond to global challenges
Traditional development concepts malfunction in an interconnected world where global
solutions are needed to tackle cross-border problems that inhibit development.1 These solutions
include securing “global public goods”, such as peace and security (Chapter 19), a stable climate
(Chapter 18), health and a sound financial environment.
At the same time, developing countries have become widely differentiated and a one-size-fits-all
ODA concept is no longer attractive to them.While ODA remains an important tool for enhancing the
development prospects of poor and fragile nations where it is the most important source of finance,
new and innovative forms of development financing have emerged, increasing many countries’
options.2 In the countries that have traditionally provided development co-operation, on the other
hand, budgetary pressures make it imperative not only to show results for taxpayer money spent, but
also to increase the leverage of scarce public funds.
We need a wider concept of international co-operation based on a more holistic approach to
development, while preserving the useful elements of ODA. The global post-2015 goals – presently
being defined to succeed the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) – can provide the building
blocks for a new concept of international co-operation. These should include, but not be limited to,
development co-operation. The new concept should include means of measuring contributions for
achieving the new global goals and provide a benchmark for policies to facilitate progress.
The post-2015 agenda will require that developed and developing countries take shared
responsibility for collective action, building on the principles agreed in Accra (2008) and Busan (2011)
and reconfirmed in Mexico.3 Addressing global challenges requires co-ownership and the contribution
of all actors.
DACmembers have agreed to revise the ODA definition in 2014.4Yet, we also need a wider concept
of international co-operation5 based on a more holistic approach to development while preserving the
useful elements of ODA. This situates development co-operation within a broader and more complex
global agenda, incorporating the public and private sector, as well as civil society. The Rio conventions
(described in Chapter 18) and the MDGs can be seen as precursors of this wider agenda.
We need a wider concept of international co-operation based on a holistic
approach to development, while preserving the useful elements of ODA.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014200
III.17. HOW CAN DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION ADDRESS GLOBAL CHALLENGES?A global public goods approach calls for wide political buy-in
There is some fear on the part of developing countries that focusing the post-2015 agenda on
public goods could divert ODA to goals that do not predominantly benefit developing countries, in
particular low-income countries (Kaul, 2013). The vision document on the post-2015 agenda, by the
High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons, outlines a results-oriented agenda that can be instrumental in
defining realistic, clear-cut and measurable targets for global public goods (HLP, 2013). The better
focused this agenda is, the greater the possibility of deriving useful policy implications and
mobilising the financial resources needed.
The financing and policy requirements of this new global agenda need political backing for
commitments, as well as agreement on a system to measure countries’ contributions and the results
achieved. Putting it in place, therefore, poses a number of challenges:
1. It will need to be embraced by all countries as a visible sign of the alignment of developed and
developing countries’ policies towards delivering global public goods.
2. It will require credible commitments from developed and developing countries for substantial
additional funding.
3. It should not lead to a reduction of funding for developing countries.
4. It should not be seen as less binding than the present ODA system.
An integrated approach to meeting these challenges will acknowledge that many actors are
involved, providing scope for co-ordination and alignment with the private sector and civil society.
Financing the new global agenda will require innovation
Achieving results for global public goods will require substantial financial resources.While there
is no accepted estimate of the total volume of global financing required to achieve the results
envisaged, it will certainly largely surpass current ODA levels. For example, under the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, developed country parties have committed to jointly
mobilising USD 100 billion per year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries in
combating and adapting to the impacts of climate change; this funding will come from a wide variety
of sources (Chapter 18).
The new money will have to come from a range of sources, both traditional and new, as outlined
in this Development Co-operation Report. It will need to draw on public finance, but with a much larger
involvement by the private sector and civil society. International institutions can make a solid
contribution by doing work to estimate the amounts needed.
Some global public goods objectives, such as control of infectious diseases, food security and
financial stability, may be best funded through multilateral channels, as this can increase policy
coherence. Yet, while multilateral organisations provide the right setting for co-operation among
developed and developing countries, alignment of their policies can only occur if developing
countries have a stronger voice in the multilateral organisations and international coalitions. More
needs to be done to achieve this.
Results-based funding, or cash-on-delivery aid, offers a new approach to development: providers
pay for measurable and verifiable progress on specific outcomes, such as USD 100 for every child who
completes primary school. Linking payments directly to specific results enables the host country to
decide how it wants to achieve the outcome (Birdsall and Savedoff, 2010).
Funding can also be raised through global taxation or a comparable mechanism, such as levies
on airline tickets,6 if this is appropriate in the light of a specific international target. For example,
leaders of international organisations have repeatedly asked governments to use fiscal policies such
as carbon taxes to combat climate change.7 International taxes and new sources of finance forDEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 201
III.17. HOW CAN DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION ADDRESS GLOBAL CHALLENGES?cross-border mechanisms in support of global public goods have the advantage of creating a level
playing field across countries – addressing unfair competitive edges because of free-rider behaviour –
and could help to redirect funds from developed to developing nations.
Various taxes, levies and user fees have been suggested over the years for financing global public
goods, but the political obstacles to establishing global institutions with tax and redistributive
authority are formidable and as yet support is insufficient. There is a need for new fiscal tools to
promote sustainable development by creating the necessary incentives to shift part of taxation from
the traditional labour and investment base. The broad post-2015 agendamay pave the way for scaling
up some financial incentives that already exist at the national level, such as fiscal facilitation of
energy efficiency and fair trade.
Strengthened co-operation between the public and the private sectors, including civil society,
offers great promise for funding the new global agenda. Such partnerships provide a vehicle for
combining the specialised knowledge of the corporate sector, civil society organisations and
knowledge institutions. The trend towards globally active non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
fits well with the universal character of global public goods.
Previous chapters in this report have looked at the roles of public-private partnerships for
infrastructure and service provision (Chapter 12), of civil society in empowerment of the poor
(Chapter 9), of public funding in support of domestic resource mobilisation (Chapter 14) and of
innovative financing mechanisms such as guarantees (Chapter 11), as well as many other
mechanisms for generating the resources needed.
International co-operation will need to be governed coherently
This new, ambitious global agenda implies that the focus will not only be on “foreign” policies,
but also on better policies at home. The inclusion of development within a wider global agenda
implies that it will no longer be the exclusive terrain of the respective national ministry, and that
development co-operation will have to leave its comfort zone.
This broader approach will foster consideration of the coherence of global policies, more
explicitly linking national policies on issues such as taxation, migration and trade with international
goals for global public goods (see Box 17.1 for an example).
It is also important to reach international agreement on a broader definition and standardisation
of contributions to global public goods and to take shared responsibility for achieving results. A
mechanism that can monitor and compare countries’ efforts towards agreed targets will add
credibility to commitments and provide added incentives. The ODA system created by the OECD’s
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) was designed to do just this, and much can be learnt from
their experience. Currently, providers of development co-operation are assessed against a target of
allocating 0.7% of their gross national income (GNI) as official development assistance (Table 17.1).
Developing countries consider the target as a guarantee of future financial transfers, despite the fact
that many provider countries have still not managed to reach the 0.7% target. In 2013, only 5 of the
26 DACmembers allocated 0.7% ormore of their GNI to ODA; the average ODA expenditure among the
DAC countries is 0.3% of GNI.
The new global agenda will require international solidarity among all countries. The DAC
experience shows that it will be helpful to develop output indicators that can put pressure on
countries to fulfill their commitments and that in some cases address free-rider behavior. These
There is a need for new fiscal tools to promote sustainable development
by creating the necessary incentives.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014202
III.17. HOW CAN DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION ADDRESS GLOBAL CHALLENGES?could take the form of financial targets, along the lines of the ODA target, or some other mechanism
for measuring achieved results (Table 17.1). For the Netherlands, for example, a target for
international co-operation of 2% of GDP has been suggested (Wijffels et al., 2012).
Therefore, the new global agenda should include a firm commitment to a concrete target for ODA
flows to least developed countries and fragile states. This could be in the form of a nominal target, for
example 0.25% of GDP, or of a commitment to provide at least half of national ODA flows to this group
of countries (see Chapter 2). At the very least, there needs to be a firm commitment by all provider
countries to the UN agreed target of allocating 0.15-0.20% of GNI for the least developed countries.
This will help stop the disconcerting downward trend of ODA to these countries and help give
assurances that the new agenda will not result in the diversion of concessional funding.
Since the new post-2015 goals will be developed and adopted in the United Nations General
Assembly, it would be logical that a framework for the registration of all contributions to international
co-operation is also set out in the UN context. Other organisations may provide the necessary input,
including the OECD DAC.
Much debate will be needed to reach international consensus on all of these issues. Yet at the
same time, the process of creating and maintaining the right global environment for sustainable
development will help garner support as the interests of developing and developed countries become
more aligned.
Box 17.1. Policy coherence and its effect on development: The example of Ghana
A recent study has assessed the coherence between Dutch development co-operation policies and
other Dutch policies in Ghana over the period 2006-11. The policies studied were in the areas of trade
(an economic partnership agreement), agriculture (tariffs), taxation (a bilateral tax treaty), migration
and the environment (a voluntary partnership agreement). The assessment found that the
development co-operation policies pursued by the Netherlands over the period in question were
coherent with Ghana’s development objectives. It also found that any negative effects resulting from
incoherence between development co-operation and other policies were generally limited.
Potential incoherencies were found between Dutch and European policies. Nonetheless, these
generally had nomajor negative implications for Ghana. On the other hand, the restriction of Ghana’s
free access to European markets was seen to have major negative implications for Ghana’s national
income.
Source: IOB (2014), “Autonomy, partnership and beyond: An analysis of policy coherence for Ghana”, IOB Study Newsletter,
No. 14-04, IOB, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, The Hague.
Table 17.1. From an official development assistance target to a target
for international co-operation
Target for development co-operation Target for international co-operation
Goal Development and welfare in developing countries Global public goods and global sustainable development and welfare
Target 0.7% of GDP Results-based or GDP-based targets, differing for least developed countries and fragile states
Instrument Financial flows only Financial flows, guarantees and other leverage mechanisms; knowledge transfers
Cost Concessional Concessional and non-concessional if debt sustainability allows
Source Official (public) Official and private sources
Recipients Developing countries Developing countries and global institutions
Least developed countries and fragile states will continue to rely on fully
concessional ODA flows for the foreseeable future.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 203
III.17. HOW CAN DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION ADDRESS GLOBAL CHALLENGES?Key recommendations
● Estimate the price tag for supporting global goals.
● Reach international agreement on a broader definition and standardisation of contributions to
global public goods and take shared responsibility for achieving results.
● Agree on a target for international co-operation, such as 2% of GDP, as well as a concrete target for
ODA to least developed countries and fragile states (e.g. 0.25% of GDP).
● Find new methods for funding global goals, including global taxation.
● Ensure developing countries’ voice in multilateral organisations and international coalitions.
● Promote stronger co-operation between the public and private sectors.
● Establish a framework for registering all contributions to international co-operation within the UN
context with input from other relevant organisations, including the OECD DAC.
Notes
1. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan labelled the great global challenges that transcend the capabilities
and resources of any one nation as “problems without passports”.
2. See Chapters 1, 2 and 20, among others.
3. These represent some key moments and declarations in the development community’s push for more
effective development co-operation: the Accra Agenda for Action endorsed in 2008 at the Third High Level
Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra, Ghana; the Busan Partnership document endorsed at the Fourth High
Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, Korea in 2011; and the High-Level Meeting of the Global
Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, which took place in Mexico City in April 2014. For more
information, see www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness.
4. See Chapter 1.
5. The concept of international co-operation is one policy option put forward in a report of the Interministerial
Policy Review (2013), established by the government of the Netherlands. Severino and Ray (2009) have
developed a similar concept of global policy finance, which combines financing of global public goods and the
traditional ODA targets of economic development and welfare.
6. Discussed in Chapter 15.
7. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, the
President of the World Bank and the Secretary-General of the OECD have all, on various occasions, called for
fiscal policies to combat climate change (various press reports April 2014).
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Chapter 18
Finding synergies for environment
and development finance
by
Jan Corfee-Morlot and Stephanie Ockenden, Development Co-operation Directorate, OECD
Environment and development are inextricably linked: without further policy action,
local and global environmental risks threaten to reverse development gains made to
date by raising water, food and other resource scarcity risks as well as extreme
weather disaster risks. Recognition of the two-way relationship between the
environment and development is a foundation for the design of the Sustainable
Development Goals, which are to replace the Millennium Development Goals post-
2015. Development finance for the environment – and especially climate change – is
on the increase, largely driven by international commitments and financial
mechanisms under the Rio conventions. Effective responses to global environmental
issues necessitate international co-operation and co-ordinated global level action.
This chapter outlines this complex financial landscape and the potential for
countries to take action to tap the potential synergies among growing new sources
of environment finance and traditional sources of development finance.
Transitioning to low-carbon, climate-resilient and sustainable development
pathways requires a holistic approach to finance and investment, shifting public
and private finance from “brown” to “green” investments, scaling-up “green”
finance, and integrating environmental considerations into all relevant investments
and government activities.
This chapter also includes an opinion piece by Manuel Pulgar Vidal, Peru’s
Minister of Environment, on making well-financed climate change action
central to the post-2015 goals.207
III.18. FINDING SYNERGIES FOR ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT FINANCEDeterioration and damage to the global and local environment – notably the consequences of
climate change, loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services, and desertification – threaten well-being
and resilient development. The impact of these changes may fall indiscriminately across countries,
population groups and generations, affecting in particular the poorest, themost vulnerable and those
who have limited control over, and responsibility for, possible solutions.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) recently concluded that the warming of the
global climate system is unequivocal (IPCC, 2013). Inaction on climate change could lead to a continued
rise in global temperatures by 2100 ranging from 2.5°C to 7.5°C above pre-industrial levels (IPCC, 2014a).
This would increase the severity – and in some cases the frequency – of extreme weather events, with
potentially catastrophic consequences for stable economic development, human life and prosperity.
Doing nothing could be costly, equating to a permanent loss of over 14% in average world consumption
per capita (OECD, 2012). Developing countries stand to be disproportionately affected by unabated climate
change, eroding development gainsmade to date (IPCC, 2014a).Assessments suggest that a sizeable share
of development assistance activities might be affected by climate risk, with estimates ranging from
10% to 40% per country depending on the development co-operation portfolio in each country context,
whenmeasured as a share of total official development assistance (ODA) (OECD, 2005).
Inaction to address local environmental risks also carries heavy costs. Without further policy
action, for example, the OECD estimates a doubling of premature deaths from local air pollution
by 2050, with air pollution today already a larger health threat globally than malaria (OECD, 2012).
Natural assets represent over a quarter of the wealth in developing countries today, increasing the
vulnerability of these countries to growing environmental risk, including resource scarcity (OECD, 2008).
Managing environmental sustainability, through natural resource management, biodiversity
protection, and climate change mitigation and adaptation, can give rise to multiple local and
development benefits. Local benefits alone can provide justification for environmental action, and
measures in support of climate change adaptation and improved resilience are often locally focused.
For example, adaptation benefits emerge from “good” development planning, whilst mitigation
actions can provide energy access and security benefits and improve air quality and human health.
There are inextricable links between global and local environmental issues and sustainable
development. Initiatives under the sustainability agenda emerging from the Rio+20 Summit, the
post-2015 development goals and the three “Rio conventions” will need to be compatible, tightly
inter-linked and mutually reinforcing. In recognising the links between environment and
development, the new post-2015 development framework is expected to take the form of a set of
Sustainable Development Goals (UNGA, 2013).1 The financing of these goals must be complementary
to financing commitments under the Rio conventions to ensure co-ordinated action on development
and the environment. This chapter asks how finance can be put to best use to achieve environment
and development objectives simultaneously. In exploring this question, it outlines the financial
resources available today and the sustainable development synergies they offer, as well as the policy
changes needed to maximise these synergies.
It is estimated that up to 40% of development assistance portfolios within
developing countries are affected by climate risks.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014208
III.18. FINDING SYNERGIES FOR ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT FINANCEFinancing global and local environmental sustainability
Achieving global and local environmental sustainability, development and growth will require
shifting as well as scaling up finance to support investment in clean energy, water and sanitation
systems, as well as sustainable land use (Kennedy and Corfee-Morlot, 2012). Transitioning to
low-carbon, climate-resilient and sustainable development pathways requires a holistic approach,
shifting public and private finance from “brown” to “green” investments, scaling-up “green” finance,
and ensuring that environmental considerations and safeguards are integrated into all relevant
activities. This will not be achieved by only stepping up development co-operation finance – it will
also mean mobilising domestic resources, and from both the public and private sector.
Effective responses to global environmental issues necessitate international co-operation and
co-ordinated action at the global level. The Rio conventions have been influential in building the
international architecture for financing global environmental sustainability, outlining developed country
contributions of financial assistance and support to developing countries related to the implementation
of these conventions. Financial commitments and mechanisms linked to the Rio conventions (Box 18.1)
have driven significant growth in international co-operation and financial resources; the goals of these
funds are set in the context of sustainable development and in this way include consideration of poverty
reduction and development alongside of global environmental sustainability.
Robust frameworks to support the measurement and monitoring of these international
commitments will deliver greater transparency, accountability and trust – and which in turn is
fundamental to secure the expected global climate deal in 2015, and the United Nations post-2015
development framework. Building on its effort to enhance and modernise statistics on resource flows to
developing countries beyond aid, the DAC statistical framework, and in particular the system of
“Rio markers”, can provide a solid basis formonitoring environment-related flows (see following section).
Pooled funds for the global environment also exist outside of the Rio conventions, financed
through voluntary contributions and co-finance. Most significant are the Climate Investment Funds
(CIF),2 which provide 48 developing and middle-income countries with resources to mitigate and
manage the challenges of climate change and reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. The Climate
Investment Funds are implemented jointly by the multilateral development banks (MDBs): African
Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank Group. The World Bank also serves as the
Trustee and the administrator for the Climate Investment Funds. This multi-provider initiative
currently pools USD 8bn in ODA pledges and contributions from 14 donors (CIF, 2014). The Climate
Investment Funds are innovative in that they can receive public funds from providers of ODA (grant
or in some cases concessional loans) and also capital contributions, including from the private sector.
Their design aims to pilot the application of innovative strategies that can help to scale-up and
transform policies, institutions and markets for low-carbon climate resilience; these strategies are
integrated within country development plans, taking into account environmental, social, poverty
alleviation and development objectives. In practice, however, the focus on poverty and development
benefits appears mixed. An interim independent evaluation of the Climate Investment Funds found
that for the largest fund – the Clean Technology Fund – only 3 out of a sample of 16 plans cited
poverty reduction or cost-savings to the poorest (ICF, 2013).DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 209
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.Box 18.1. The financial spin-offs from Rio
The 1992 Rio “Earth Summit”1 gave rise to three international conventions, established to address threats to t
global environment and sustainable development and to galvanise international action:
● the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
● the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)
● the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD).
These conventions facilitate international co-operation across developed and developing country parties and acro
a range of commitments, including developed country provision of financial support, capacity building, a
technology and knowledge transfer to support action in developing countries.
Specific financial commitments related to the implementation of these conventions also exist, and vary:
● Under the UNFCCC, developed country parties have committed to “provide new and additional resource
approaching USD 30 billion for the period 2010-12, with a balanced allocation between adaptation and mitigatio
referred to as Fast Start Finance, together with the goal “of mobili[s]ing jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020
address the needs of developing countries…from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral a
multilateral, including alternative sources”.2
● Under the CBD, developed country parties have committed to “double total biodiversity-related internatio
financial resource flows to developing countries, in particular least developed countries and small island develop
[s]tates, as well as countries with economies in transition, by 2015 and at least maintaining this level until 202
including through a country-driven prioritisation of biodiversity within development plans in recipient countrie
Financial mechanisms and other related initiatives under the conventions also take a variety of different forms:
● The Global Environment Facility (GEF) is the main financial mechanism for the UNFCCC,4 the CBD and the UNC
(as well as the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants and the Minamata Convention on Mercur
This partnership for international co-operation involves 183 countries, plus international institutions, civil socie
organisations and the private sector. Funded projects range from national policy reforms to institutional capac
development (GEF, 2014). The GEF is, to date, the largest financial mechanism to promote environmenta
sustainable development: since 1991, the GEF has provided USD 12.5 billion in grants and leveraged USD 58 bill
in co-financing for 3 690 projects in 165 developing countries.
● The UNFCCC’s new Green Climate Fund (GCF) is expected to make a significant and ambitious contribution towa
the goals set by the international community to combat climate change, pooling contributions from a range
sources; it is expected to be capitalised and become operational by the end of 2014 (see also the “In my view” bo
The fund will promote low-emission and climate-resilient sustainable development pathways by providing supp
to developing countries for limiting or reducing their greenhouse gas emissions and adapting to the impacts
climate change. Key design elements include a focus on country ownership and a private sector facility to mobil
private climate finance, with funds to be channelled through local, regional or international implementing agenc
and partners.
● The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) established under the UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol finances mitigat
actions in developing countries to support sustainable development (and to assist developed countries in meet
their greenhouse gas emissions targets). The CDM allows emission-reduction projects in developing countries
earn Certified Emission Reduction credits, each equivalent to one tonne of CO2. These credits are be traded a
used by industrialised countries to meet a part of their emission-reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol. T
mechanism stimulates sustainable development and emission reductions, while giving industrialised countr
some flexibility in how they meet their emission-reduction limitation targets.
● The UNFCCC Adaptation Fund provides an example of an innovative financing mechanism, where funding
developing countries is generated through a 2% levy on Certified Emission Reduction credits issued through t
CDM (in addition to voluntary contributions). This fund was established to finance climate change adaptati
projects and programmes in developing country parties to the Kyoto Protocol that are particularly vulnerable to t
adverse effects of climate change. The Adaptation Fund has achieved its goal of raising USD 100 million by the e
of 2013. It is also innovative in part due to its provisions for “direct access” by developing country governmen
avoiding intermediaries and potentially lowering transaction costs of obtaining external finance to supp
adaptation action.
1. Officially the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development.
2. UNFCCC Decision 1/CP.16, The Cancun Agreements, 2010.
3. COP 11 Decision XI/4, 7(a), 2012, www.cbd.int/decision/cop/default.shtml?id=13165.
4. The GEF also administers the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund, which function under the UNFCCCDEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014210
III.18. FINDING SYNERGIES FOR ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT FINANCEExternal financing for the environment and development
OECD-DAC statistics measure and monitor official development finance from DAC members in
support of global and local environmental issues, such as finance to local environmental objectives
tracked by the “environment” marker since 1992, and finance targeting the global objectives of the
Rio conventions. “Riomarkers”, covering climate changemitigation, biodiversity and desertification,
were introduced in 1998; and one for climate change adaptation was introduced in 2010.3
Every aid activity reported to the OECD DAC is screened and marked as either: 1) targeting the
respective environmental objectives as a “principal” objective or a “significant” objective; or 2) not
targeting the objectives. As such, the markers are considered descriptive, allowing for an
approximate quantification of financial flows targeting the objectives of the Rio conventions. Finance
reported by parties to the Rio conventions against specific quantified finance goals may be based on
alternative definitions and measurement methodologies, and may not be directly comparable to Rio
marker data. However, in most cases the reporting is based upon Rio marker data as a starting point,
withmany DACmembers counting a share of this ODA towards their UNFCCC and CBD commitments
(OECD, forthcoming).
Over 2010-12, total bilateral ODA commitments targeting the global and local environment as
either a principal or significant objective reached USD 31bn per year, representing 24% of total bilateral
ODA commitments by OECD-DAC members (Figure 18.1). This figure represents an increase by over
one-third between 2007-09 and 2010-12 in finance targeting all “green” environmental objectives,
including the local environment and biodiversity, climate change and desertification (OECD-DAC
Credit Reporting System, 2014). The “greening” of ODA indicates that environmental sustainability is
increasingly being mainstreamed into core bilateral agency portfolios, which in turn reflects its
increasing priority in development co-operation.
Figure 18.1. ODA to the environment, 2004-12
Three-year annual averages, bilateral commitments, USD billion, constant 2012 prices
Notes: “Total environment aid” includes biodiversity, climate and desertification development co-operation identified by the
Rio markers, and environment-related development co-operation based on the environment marker. Many activities target
multiple objectives; the total environmental development co-operation adjusts for this to ensure there is no double counting.
“Climate-related aid” covers development co-operation to both climate mitigation and adaptation from 2010 onwards, but only
mitigation pre-2010. Reported figures for 2004 to 2009 may appear lower than in practice, and may reflect a break in the series,
given that pre-2010 adaptation spending is not marked.
For technical reasons, data collection on Rio markers for the United States was not yet available at the time of this publication.The
United States is working to review its data collection methodology and will supply data for 2011 and 2012 in the coming months.
Source: OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System statistics, July 2014, www.oecd.org/dac/stats/rioconventions.htm.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933121905
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III.18. FINDING SYNERGIES FOR ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT FINANCEMost of this increase in aid for the environment has been driven by the remarkable growth in
climate-related ODA – a 150% increase between 2007-09 and 2010-12. Between 2010 and 2012, total
bilateral ODA commitments by OECD-DAC members for climate change averaged USD 21bn per year,
representing 16% of total bilateral ODA commitments; and commitments peaked in 2010, which was
the first year of the Fast Start Finance period (Box 18.1). The UNFCCC Fast Start Finance goals are
narrower than those for total climate-related aid, but appear to have had a broad impact in increasing
the mainstreaming of climate change considerations into development co-operation activities.
“Green” external development finance is often designed and delivered to achieve multiple
objectives. Figure 18.2 illustrates the extent of this, and how 65% of “green” development finance can
target two or more environmental objectives simultaneously.
“Green” external development finance is also available from themultilateral development banks.
In 2012, the MDBs jointly committed to the Rio+20 agenda for inclusive green growth, resulting in
many taking on targets to increase the share of their activities and finance that target environmental
objectives. For example, the Inter-American Development Bank aims to allocate 25% of its total
lending to environmental sustainability and climate-related projects by 2015; it achieved 20% in 2013
(IDB, 2014). Overall, MDB climate finance was estimated at USD 27 bn in 2012 (MDB Joint Report, 2013).
Yet despite this significant amount of environment-related multilateral flows, there is no
comprehensive and integrated system to monitor total “green” external development finance. The
OECD is working with the multilateral development banks and other international financial
institutions to improve the reconciliation of green multilateral flows within its statistical system so
as to establish a common understanding of “total” green development finance across bilateral and
multilateral channels. Though some progress has been made, the evidence on trends is still thin and
total volumes are difficult to estimate. Private finance flows towards greener outcomes are also
considered significant, in particular for climate change, but an area where there is limited statistical
data information to estimate the total magnitude of flows. The OECD is co-ordinating a Research
Collaborative on Tracking Private Climate Finance to provide further evidence.4
Total bilateral climate-related ODA commitments have seen a 150% increase
between 2007-09 and 2010-12.
Figure 18.2. The multiple objectives of environmental development co-operation, 2010-12
Three-year annual average, bilateral commitments, USD billion, constant 2012 prices
Source: OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System statistics, July 2014.
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III.18. FINDING SYNERGIES FOR ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT FINANCEInnovative finance can be transformational in the right policy context
Several chapters in this report outline the growing importance of innovative and private sector
finance for developing countries. Such finance includes foreign direct investment (Chapter 5);
institutional investors such as insurance companies, investment funds and pension funds
(Chapter 6; and see the “In my view” box); and the use of public finance and innovative financial
instruments to leverage private finance and investment (Chapter 11). All these sources have scope for
mobilising finance and investment that promotes environmental sustainability.
It is essential to get the policy and market-based incentives and signals right to induce
environmentally sustainable actions over time, green investment and behaviour at a global and
transformational scale, and in the most cost-effective way. Today’s investment choices and decisions
covering the types, features and location of infrastructure will determine the extent to which
economies are either locked into high-carbon, energy-intensive pathways and also the degree to
which infrastructure is vulnerable to climate change, or capable of achieving low-carbon,
climate-resilient development (Corfee-Morlot et al., 2012). An environmentally sustainable future will
require a shift away from polluting, fossil-fuel intensive infrastructure to low-carbon and
climate-resilient investments and behaviour.
The OECD has conducted substantial analysis of the policy environment needed for
governments to achieve zero net carbon emissions by 2050 (Gurría, 2013). Measures needed include
putting a clear price on carbon, reforming fossil fuel subsidies and ensuring coherence in energy
policies (OECD, 2013a). These initiatives can also offer a “double dividend” – not only reducing
greenhouse gas emissions, but also raising revenue for the environment. For example, carbon
markets offer the potential to generate up to USD 30-50 bn annually (AGF, 2010), and reforming
subsidies and support mechanisms to fossil fuel consumers, which are estimated by the
International Energy Agency (IEA) to be USD 544 billion worldwide in 2012 (IEA, 2013), could also free
up substantial funds for the environment while also incentivising green investment (OECD, 2013b).
Careful management will be needed to make the most of environment
and development synergies
There can be multiple local development benefits from actions targeting global environmental
issues. Actions to adapt and improve resilience to climate change are locally or regionally focused,
and adaptation benefits emerge from “good” development planning; likewise, climate change
mitigation can provide energy access, security benefits and improved air quality and human health.
International efforts such as the UN Sustainable Energy for All initiative,5 which aims to provide
clean, efficient energy and access, can provide solutions for the 1.3 billion people currently lacking
electricity in developing countries and the 2.6 billion who lack clean cooking facilities (IEA, 2013).
To create synergies, environmental considerations need to be mainstreamed into national
development plans and priorities, and into development co-operation practice. This will help to
deliver sustained results and well-targeted and designed policies and programmes at national and
sub-national levels of governance. Such approaches are in keeping with the effectiveness principles
guiding the work of many development co-operation providers6 and initiatives such as the
Partnership for Climate Finance and Development,7 emerging from the 4th High-Level Forum on Aid
Effectiveness in Busan, Korea (OECD, 2011). This voluntary partnership promotes coherence and
collaboration among climate change, development finance and development co-operation
communities at the country, regional and global levels.
The IEA estimates the value of fossil-fuel subsidies amounted
to USD 544 billion worldwide in 2012.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 213
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Well-financed climate change action must be central
to the post-2015 goals
Manuel Pulgar Vidal,
Minister of Environment, Peru
Climate change and sustainable development are inextricably linked. It is critical, therefore, that the post-20
sustainable development agenda fully embeds climate change.
Likewise, achieving adequate finance is critical for a successful global agreement on climate change in 2015.1 T
agreement needs to be ambitious if it is to turn the world’s economy towards a sustainable path by limiting the glo
temperature increase to 2°C.
Countries are already thinking through the future of climate financing to ensure that the world reaches the leve
ambition needed. The 20th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Chan
(UNFCCC), to be held in late 2014 in Lima under Peru’s presidency, will be an important landmark in this sense.
The first thing we need to achieve is greater transparency about climate financing, as well as the results it produc
We need to scale-up climate financing and make sure that the necessary funds and investments get to where they a
needed, with a greater degree of predictability.
Second, countries need to think through what conditions and policy frameworks would enable them to scale-
climate funding and investments in the long-term and effectively manage financial resources. Peru has already tak
action on low-carbon and climate-resilient strategies by:
● promoting public and private funding and investment for various climate change initiatives
● integrating climate-change related risks within the National Public Investment System
● creating fiscal instruments for climate resilience and recovery from natural disasters
● encouraging research and technology for climate change initiatives.
Many ongoing conversations are centred around new and innovative sources of climate finance. The Green Clim
Fund (GCF) was set up in 2013 to co-ordinate and promote these efforts, and countries are currently discussing how
trigger a pledging process. The GCF offers the opportunity to attract new sources of financing and to supp
developing countries’ national financing strategies.We hope that meaningful pledges to the GCF will be made towa
the end of 2014.
Innovative sources of financing are needed if the world economy is to become truly sustainable. This is why
welcome analytical work on attracting financing from institutional investors such as pension funds (Chapter 6);
how to grow the green bond2 market; on instruments and mechanisms of risk mitigation that can help levera
financial resources (Chapter 11); on mobilising domestic resources in developing countries (Chapters 7 and 14); a
also on crowdfunding (Chapter 9). We all need to be part of the solution.
As we move towards the climate conference, Peru hopes to help countries find convergence around key clim
finance issues that increase the level of ambition and prepare the broader roadmap for global agreement on clim
change in 2015.
In my view, the current discussions on climate change financing will – and must – help to meaningfully inform t
post-2015 development agenda to ensure that climate change is fully integrated into the Sustainable Development Goa
1. Editor’s note: This refers to the United Nations Climate Change Conference, COP21, to be held in Paris in 2015. According to the organis
committee, the objective of the 2015 conference is to achieve, for the first time in over 20 years of UN negotiations, a binding and unive
agreement on climate, from all the nations of the world (source:Wikipedia).
2. Editor’s note: Two entities of the World Bank Group – the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Internatio
Finance Corporation (IFC) – have been instrumental to the development of the global green bond market. Proceeds from these bonds
being used for investments that help address climate change. Since 2008, the World Bank has mobilised over USD 5.3 billion thro
61 green bond transactions in 17 currencies, and the IFC has issued USD 3.4 billion in green bonds (World Bank, 2014).DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014214
III.18. FINDING SYNERGIES FOR ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT FINANCESharing the lessons from development co-operation and the development effectiveness
principles can help to support the achievement of environment and development goals (OECD, 2014).
On the financing side, there are inevitable tensions. One example is illustrated in the “country
ownership, country systems” approach advocated by the development effectiveness declarations and
the climate funds approach, which are promoted in some countries and sometimes internationally.
On the one hand, these special purpose funds have been designed to work in innovative ways to pool,
co-ordinate and harmonise financing from both public and private sources, and targeting specific
global issues may require more programmatic and regional approaches. But on the other hand,
vertical mechanisms can create functions that run in parallel to or duplicate developing countries’
own systems and programmes. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change recently called for
assessment of the comparative effectiveness of the two approaches since the evidence around how
these different approaches perform is thin (IPCC, 2014b).
The OECD DAC has played a role over the past decades in producing policy guidance to support
development co-operation providers to address issues of sustainable development in their policies
and operations. In particular through Applying Strategic Environmental Assessment: Good Practice
Guidance for Development Co-operation (OECD, 2006), recognising the commitment to develop and apply
strategic environmental assessments under the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, guidance on
Integrating Climate Change Adaptation into Development Co-operation (OECD, 2009), and most recently
Putting Green Growth at the Heart of Development (OECD, 2013c).
Key recommendations
● Shift, scale-up and mobilise financial resources and investment from both public and private
sources to secure future global and local environmental sustainability, development and growth.
● Implement innovative financing arrangements and mechanisms coupled with domestic policy to
price and regulate “environmental bads” to shift the private sector and individual behaviour
towards environmentally sustainable action.
● Ensure that initiatives under the sustainability agenda emerging from the Rio+20 Summit, the
post-2015 development goals, the three Rio conventions, and the global climate deal expected
in 20157 are compatible, tightly inter-linked and mutually reinforcing.
● Promote international co-operation and co-ordination across institutions and actors; integrate
development considerations into environmental initiatives and mainstream environmental
considerations into national plans, strategies and development co-operation.
● Support developing countries in making their growth green and inclusive, while ensuring that
countries’ own development plans, programmes and policies lead the way for targeted and
effective use of external development finance.
● Seek synergies between global environmental and local sustainable development benefits. Learn
from development co-operation experience in managing inevitable trade-offs so as to achieve
multiple development and environmental objectives simultaneously.
● Robust frameworks to support the measurement and monitoring of future international “green”
finance commitments will be necessary to support greater transparency, accountability and trust;
the DAC statistical framework, and in particular the system of “Rio markers”, can provide a solid
basis for international monitoring of environment-related flows.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 215
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1. See also the latest working document of the Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals at:
http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/focussdgs.html (accessed 23 May 2014).
2. The Climate Investment Funds consist of four funding windows, the Clean Technology Fund (supporting
demonstration and deployment of low-carbon technology), the Forestry Investment Program, the Pilot
Program for Climate Resilience and the Scaling-up Renewable Energy Program.
3. For further information, see: www.oecd.org/dac/stats/rioconventions.htm.
4. See: www.oecd.org/env/researchcollaborative.
5. See: www.se4all.org.
6. Including the principles stated in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), the Accra Agenda of Action
(2008) and the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (2011). See:www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness.
7. See: www.oecd.org/development/environment-development/climate-partnership.htm.
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Chapter 19
Financing peace and security
for sustainable development
by
Tilman Brück and Gary Milante, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Sweden
There is growing recognition that peace and security are fundamental for
socio-economic development, yet these public goods were not explicitly targeted by
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Pursuing them in the post-MDG
development framework will require indicators to measure them as well as a global
funding mechanism. This chapter explores these challenges, as well as the moral
hazard issues associated with identifying and supporting activities to build peace
and security. It considers collective mechanisms for financing security and
development, such as a global tax and “peace bonds”, and finds that action should
prioritise preventing conflict rather than trying to end existing wars, which is the
most costly and risky form of intervention. Critically, traditional development actors
will need to be more involved in the provision of peace and security. This public good
is too important to be left to the security policy community alone.219
III.19. FINANCING PEACE AND SECURITY FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTPeace and security are key, if underappreciated, pre-requisites for sustainable development. The
Millennium Declaration emphasised the importance of security and stability for development, yet
these elements were not explicitly included in the Millennium Development Goals’ (MDG) targets or
indicators (Denney, 2012). Peace and security need to feature more explicitly in the post-2015
development framework if progress is to be sustainable. Indicators tomeasure progress and a funding
mechanism will also be needed. This chapter explores these challenges, as well as the moral hazard
issues associated with identifying and supporting activities to build peace and security. It concludes
by considering collective mechanisms for supporting and financing security and development and
emphasises the important role of traditional development actors in providing peace and security.
Peace is a classic “public good” (see Chapter 17) in the sense that it is neither exclusive nor
rivalrous. Security – the freedom from harm or from the threat of harm – is necessary for production,
investment and all other economic activities that require respect for and protection of property (and
personal) rights. Farmers will not plant young coffee trees, for example, if they expect them to be
vandalised or looted. Traders, likewise, will not send their wares to customers if they cannot be sure
they will receive payment, or be able to enforce payment through an effective justice system.
We also know that peace can be both a pre-condition for and a consequence of sustainable
development. When there is economic opportunity and people have a stake in the future, they are
more likely to resolve conflict peacefully. On the other hand, when conflict is violent, the
development costs can be devastating: in addition to loss of lives, property and production locally,
violence has negative spillovers for neighbours and the global community. It is also important to
remember that conflict leads to fragility and fragility can induce conflict. For this reason, the needs
of both conflict-affected and fragile countries require special attention (see Chapter 20).
In fact, research shows that violent conflict is one of the biggest obstacles to global economic
well-being (Bozzoli et al., 2011). Its burden on development may equal that of climate change. Yet
while some countries suffer serious consequences from war, other countries benefit economically
from the fiscal stimulus of wars fought elsewhere. Hence conflict and fragility may further enhance
global development inequalities.
We need better data on peace and security
There is a paucity of data on peace and security. For example, the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI) publishes military spending data every year for all available countries
(SIPRI, 2014) and the Global Peace Index of the Institute for Economics and Peace provides a
comprehensive metric to gauge how peaceful countries are.1 Yet, each of these efforts remain
incomplete. Military spending is only a part of all security spending, which is not being measured yet
in a systematic way; and an index cannot capture in a single metric the many aspects of peaceful
behaviour (Brück, 2013).
Peace and security are inextricably linked to sustainable development.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014220
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balThere are several reasons for the data gaps on peace and security. To start with, information is,
of course, the first victim of war. Another challenge stems from identifying security spending among
the data, as there are no agreed norms for measuring non-military spending on security (Brück et al.,
2013).While financial assistance for security typically comes directly from bilateral providers, it is not
“counted” as official development assistance (Box 19.1). Also, because states can pursue their own
strategic interests through assistance or intervention, it is difficult to identify the “public good”
component of such support. For example, the support from NATO for Kosovo’s independence,
including the security assistance provided to supplement local capacity, is not interpreted the same
way as the security assistance that the Russian Federation is providing on the grounds of “protecting”
Russians in eastern Ukraine. Or take the case of Afghanistan: Was the whole war effort in fact
development co-operation, provided to help the country develop securely? If not, then how does one
identify those interventions in Afghanistan that are eligible to be considered as official development
assistance (ODA)? If funding is provided to reduce support for rebels (i.e. to win “hearts and minds”),
is that military spending or development aid?
There are no agreed scientific norms for measuring non-military spending
on security.
Box 19.1. What security expenditure can be counted as official development assistance?
Only certain conflict, peacebuilding and security expenditures currently meet the development criteria of offic
development assistance (ODA). In the context of current discussions on redefining ODA (see Chapter 1), the memb
of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) are reviewing these measures.
Key elements of the ODA Reporting Directives concerning the eligibility of security expenditure
Generally eligible Generally not eligible Comments
Financing of military equipment and services. Apart from additional costs incurred for the use of militar
personnel to deliver humanitarian aid or perform developm
services.
Combatting terrorism. Because of perceived links to domestic security.
Expenditure on police training Eligible for routine police functions, but not
for counter-subversion, suppression of political dissidenc
or intelligence gathering on political activities.
Peacekeeping Restricted to expenditures within a United Nations contex
in nine activity areas, including security sector reform
and other rule of law activities.
Management of security expenditure: Strengthening of
civilian oversight and broader public financial management
Enhancing civil society engagement in security management
Security system reform: Non-military competence/capacity
and planning activities to promote accountability
Civilian peacebuilding and conflict resolution Excluding engagement with military strategy and defence
co-operation.
Reintegration of combatants and control of small arms With some limitations.
Removal of land mines and unexploded ordnance
Efforts to prevent and/or demobilise child soldiers
Disarmament of mass-destruction weapons
and anti-proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Not mentioned in the directives but is not considered
as ODA-eligible.
Source: OECD (2014), “Possible new measure of total support for development: Options regarding peace and security, climate change and glo
programmes”, DAC(2014)7, OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/dac/externalfinancingfordevelopment/documentupload/TOSD%20DAC(2014)7.pdf.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 221
III.19. FINANCING PEACE AND SECURITY FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTIn fact, new technologies such as satellite sensing, smartphones and big data are offering new
data collection opportunities. Yet even so, there is no comprehensive system for sorting data on
peace and security.What is required is a system for organising all possible data on peace and security
into a global system of security accounts, which could offer data in a comprehensive and consistent
manner (Brück, 2013). This would be akin to the system of national accounts used by economists.2 For
all but the most war-torn or politically distorted economies there exist macroeconomic data at the
World Bank or the International Monetary Fund that permit systematic analyses and comparisons
and that can inform and guide policy. It is time that peace and security studies command a similar
dataset, which in turn would permit the tracking of peace and security indicators in the post-2015
development framework.
Collecting and publishing data are relatively cheap activities, but they have high value for
research (new data can help advance research) and for policy and media communities (data can help
to focus political attention). International organisations like the United Nations (UN), theWorld Bank
or the OECD could be tasked with collecting data in a global system of security accounts. No new
institution or special financing format are required for this – just the mandate and the corresponding
resources for existing organisations to start the necessary work.
Financing peace and security is a political challenge
If we accept that peace and security are vital for development, and that they can and should be
measured andmonitored as part of the global goals, then how can the provision of these public goods
be funded? Current practice offers little help – there are as yet no large-scale peacebuilding activities
that are funded collectively and there are no pooled finances and few formal mechanisms for
supporting peace and security. This is in stark contrast to the set of BrettonWoods Institutions aimed
at supporting growth, development and economic stability in the world.3
The United Nations peacekeeping missions, for example, are funded on a case-by-case basis,
independently of development and humanitarian activities (see Box 19.2). Regional peacekeeping
missions either have a “costs fall where they may” approach – whereby each pays their own share of
costs arising (in the case of NATO and the European Union missions) – or are externally funded on a
mission-by-mission basis through a trust fund or through centrally managed budgeting.
In part, this state of play reflects the political thinking of the past 50 years. TheWorld Bank has an
“apolitical” mandate: it cannot provide security or any assistance involving a political mission (related
to the survival of a state or government). Similar constraints bind the regional development banks. Yet
if security is a genuine public good, then is financing it really “political”? TheWorld Bank helps to fund
healthcare, which is also a pre-requisite for socio-economic development, as are gender equality
programmes. Understandably, both provider and host countries are wary of issues of “sovereignty” and
political influence. However, if the post-ColdWar era and its watershed wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and
Somalia have taught us anything, it is that tackling underdevelopment also means tackling insecurity
(and vice versa). Therefore, international organisations, as well as provider and host countries, can no
longer dodge the issue. Furthermore, the World Bank’s apolitical mandate does not preclude it from
playing a supportive role in such global initiatives. While the World Bank may not be involved in
peacebuilding per se, trust fund management, data collection and statistical capacity building are
certainly within its mandate, even on issues related to peace and security (the oversight of which could
be contracted out to other actors with comparative advantage in these topics).DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014222
III.19. FINANCING PEACE AND SECURITY FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTCreating mechanisms for global financing of security means clearly distinguishing between
genuine public goods and national strategic interests. For example, protecting the oil tankers of some
nations from maritime piracy is not really a public good.Working to strengthen the justice system in
Somalia, however, probably has a strong public good character. The NATO experience for cost-sharing
on support to joint security provision has a long history and there is rich literature about it, which
could help in creating similar mechanisms.
Box 19.2. How theWorld Bank works to deal with moral hazard in responding
to the needs of fragile and conflict-affected states
The World Bank recently struggled with the moral hazard problem as it revised its financing
modalities to make them more responsive to the needs of fragile states. This includes modifications
to its latest financing regime, known as IDA17.
The global coalition of developed and developing countries which fund the International
Development Association (IDA) have committed a record USD 52 billion for IDA17, agreeing that
increased funding was needed to tackle the toughest issues in fragile and conflict-affected states and
help those countries tip the balance toward stability. Two important steps in that direction are:
1. Reducing the weighting on institutions. Previously the World Bank’s annual assessment of
institutions in its performance-based allocation system resulted in lower per capita allocations to
fragile states than other developing countries; reducing this weighting levels the playing field for
access to financing.
2. Introducing the so-called “turn-around” mechanism, which expands exceptional financing beyond
post-conflict and re-engaging situations to include cases where a significant opportunity exists to
support a transition. This new mechanism is a much more flexible approach than previous
mechanisms as it is founded on a qualitative assessment prepared by the country team, which
identifies windows of opportunity for peaceful development.
The qualitative assessment by World Bank staff is the effective equivalent of a letter of
recommendation and endorsement of a government’s approach to avoiding crisis. It would be a
light-touch, short overview of the current situation and the government’s plan for transition and
could, conceivably, be approved in a matter of weeks or months – significantly faster than the
slow-moving rate of change in theWorld Bank’s normal allocation system.
In the right hands, this more agile mechanism could provide the necessary latitude to ensure
additional financing for proactive development actors in complex and fragile situations; it would also
provide a model that other development actors could apply. Nonetheless, if World Bank country
managers in fragile situations are paralysed by bureaucratic constraints, or if they cannot properly
assess fragility or transition preparedness and/or are risk averse, then this new mechanism will be no
more effective than the current practice.
This type of innovation in responding to situations of conflict and fragility will be necessary if the
World Bank is to meet the goals of its President, Jim Yong Kim, for increasing financing for fragile
situations by 50% over the next three years (Kim, 2013).
Source: World Bank (2013), “Implementation arrangements for allocating IDA resources to countries facing ‘turn-around’
situations”, Background Note, IDA Resource Mobilization Department, October 2013, available at: www.worldbank.org/ida/
papers/IDA17_Replenishment/Implementation-Arrangements-for-Allocating-IDA-Resources-to-Countries-Facing-Turn-around-
Situations-Background-Note-September-2013.pdf.
Creating mechanisms for global financing of security means clearly
distinguishing between genuine public goods and national strategic interests.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 223
III.19. FINANCING PEACE AND SECURITY FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTAnother key lesson from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq is that peace and security cannot
simply be built, made or enforced. No army can guarantee freedom from violence. We must accept
that we do not yet fully understand how peace and security are produced, and that they may well be
a by-product of other activities. Traders who repeatedly interact with each other build trust, which
encourages them to continue to interact peacefully rather than stealing from their business partners
at gunpoint. Attempts to strengthen social cohesion and trust by community-driven development
show mixed results and explicit attempts to engineer social outcomes sometimes fail, but trust
sometimes emerges as a by-product of other interactions (Fearon et al., 2009;Wong, 2012).
Prevention is better than cure
Another limitation to security financing, as currently conceived, is that it is more reactive than
proactive. This bias ignores the fact that prevention and peacebuilding can be far more efficient and
cost-effective than dealing with the costly aftermath of full-blown conflict: rebuilding property and
dealing with loss of life, disability, refugees and foregone production or economic activity. One study
found that the economic cost of Germany’s participation in the war in Afghanistan was around
EUR 2.5-3 billion a year (Brück et al., 2011). Given the relatively minor role of the German army in the
war in Afghanistan, this is a significant cost, especially when measured as a share of the German
national budget or as a share of total German development co-operation (which was about
EUR 6 billion in 2010; Brück et al., 2011).
Prevention and peacebuilding efforts are especially cost-effective when they manage to avert
violent and costly conflict. In practice, however, financing preventive activities could raise a moral
hazard problem in the sense that making resources available for building peace may create perverse
incentives to create a conflict in the first place (Box 19.2). If there were resources available for
prevention and peacebuilding activities, how would the international community identify and
prioritise “real” threats of violence? Surely every political dialogue and negotiation process in the
world could be justified as a “peacebuilding” activity. How can the international community ensure
that collective action and resources are devoted to the “right cases”? And how can these be agreed
upon in light of the public versus private interests described above? These remain unanswered
questions, both in policy discussions and in the academic literature.
Financing peace and security requires innovative thinking
What specific mechanisms or facilities could be created for financing peace and security
activities that are clearly public goods? This Development Co-operation Report offers many examples of
innovative ways of financing development, and many of these could be applied to the concept of
peace and security; for example, international taxes on financial services (Chapter 15) or on carbon
emissions (Chapter 18). Others could include global taxes on arms/other trade or on natural resource
management of the global commons (including mineral rights for sea beds, the Arctic and Antarctic,
and space).
With all of the “war bonds” that have been issued, there has never been
a serious attempt to issue “peace bonds”.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014224
III.19. FINANCING PEACE AND SECURITY FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT“Peace bonds” or a global lottery are also options. With all of the special bonds issued by
governments to finance their own security agendas in times of war (the so-called “war bonds”), no
government or international organisation has ever issued a peace bond.The proceeds of such a global
financing mechanism could be used for peacebuilding activities (Addison and Chowdhury, 2003).
Indeed, a peace bond should be a global initiative, since state-issued bonds are, inherently, aimed at
the stability, solvency and security of the issuing state.4 Herman (2013) proposes a special low-rate
bond with a lottery element (random serial numbers would be awarded a bonus premium). Global
collective action could guarantee such initiatives.
Because preventing violent conflict from erupting is much cheaper than rebuilding security
post-conflict, the UN would benefit from a standby budget for funding peace interventions on very short
notice – for instance, to support a legitimate government faced with violent challenge to its authority or
to avoid the imminent outbreak/escalation of violence. Suchmilitary support in the past could only have
been provided by a few global powers. Having such a standby facilitywould facilitate the use of forces that
are more multinational in nature by helping to pay for the services of smaller countries contributing to
the facility (and providing income opportunities in the fragile areas where the peacekeepers work).
A standing mechanism could also be created that allows for joint underwriting of non-UN
peacekeeping missions by regional actors, or by countries taking the lead on an individual security
matter but with financial support from others. If these missions are truly considered public goods, an
assessmentmethodology similar to the UN assessments could be adopted (Box 19.3). Of course, a first
step towards creating financial solvency for peace activities would be the payment of arrears for
outstanding UN assessments.
Funding global diplomacy and justice is a must
Peacebuilding often takes the form of “soft” power and negotiations to nudge political processes
into the public and constructive sphere of diplomacy and dialogue, and away from escalation into
violence and conflict. A standing facility to support the creation and maintenance of peacebuilding
spaces could replicate concepts like the Chatham House principles of open and confidential debate,
or the advocacy of the Quaker United Nations Office against injustice and war, in the capitals of
countries around the world. These spaces could offer neutral, safe and accessible fora for
off-the-record dialogue and negotiations, thereby reducing costly and time-intensive travel for
one-day meetings in major capitals. These facilities would help in identifying honest attempts to
broker peace, helping to resolve the moral hazard issues described above, and as such should be
supported by the global community. They could perhaps be funded by philanthropists but placed
under public administration, providing a network for global peace diplomacy.
Box 19.3. How does the UN finance peacekeeping missions?
While decisions about establishing, maintaining or expanding a peacekeeping operation are taken
by the UN Security Council, the financing of UN peacekeeping operations is the collective
responsibility of all member states, each of which is legally obliged to pay its respective share. The
General Assembly apportions peacekeeping expenses based on a special scale of assessments under
a complex formula that member states themselves have established.This formula takes into account,
among other things, the relative economic wealth of member states; the five permanent members of
the Security Council are required to pay a larger share because of their special responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security. Although the payment of peacekeeping
assessments is mandatory, as of 30 April 2014, member states owed approximately USD 1.54 billion in
peacekeeping dues.
Source: Based on text from the United Nations Peacekeeping webpage,www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/financing.shtml.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 225
III.19. FINANCING PEACE AND SECURITY FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTReducing violence and insecurity is intricately linked to providing justice. Institutions for global
justice are few and far between, but providing a solid financial structure to organisations like the
International Criminal Court, Interpol or the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
would help to reduce impunity (for example by bringing war criminals to justice and reducing the
incentive to fight or finance fighting). Similar but smaller organisations would benefit from having
sources of independent funding from a few nation states, ideally through an endowment.
Finally, providing security is not always a task for the security forces. Given how intricately peace
and development are linked in so many, yet poorly understood, ways, we must recognise that much
security derives from the process of development itself. In that sense, there are huge security
dividends to be earned from good development policies – just as good security policies also greatly
facilitate socio-economic development. Non-traditional security actors can also be found in the
traditional development communities. If anything, scholarship and policy have underestimated
these externalities, thereby potentially underproviding the levels of security and development
assistance required for sustainable development.
Key recommendations
● Ensure that peace and security feature in the post-2015 goals.
● Agree on norms for measuring non-military spending on security.
● Establish a global system of security accounts and task international organisations with collecting
and publishing global information on security.
● Create and update specific indicators to measure public goods in the area of peace and security.
● Focus action on preventing conflict rather than trying to resolve existing wars, which is the most
costly and risky form of intervention.
● Involve traditional development actors in the provision of peace and security.
● Put in place innovative solutions to fund peace and security, such as global taxes or peace bonds.
● Establish and fund global networks for diplomacy and justice to strengthen peacebuilding.
Notes
1. See: www.visionofhumanity.org/#/page/news/949.
2. See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_accounts.
3. The BrettonWoods Institutions are theWorld Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
4. The term “peace bond” may need to be amended, however, as this means something quite different in Canada
(an order from a criminal court that requires a person to keep the peace and be on good behaviour for a period
of time), and the non-governmental organisation Non-violent Peace Force already issues decorative peace bonds.
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Chapter 20
Backing recovery in fragile states
by
Kathryn Nwajiaku and Jolanda Profos, Development Co-operation Directorate, OECD1
By 2018, most of the world’s poor will be living in fragile states – countries marked
by conflict, instability and poor governance. These developing countries find it much
harder than others to access resources to finance their development. Official
development assistance (ODA) to fragile states is declining, foreign investment is
volatile and reluctant because of the associated risks, and remittances sent home by
migrants – though offering potential for development – are not always used to
finance public goods. This chapter asks how the urgent tasks of recovery and
development in fragile states can be financed. It highlights the need to focus more on
domestic revenue generation – revenue raised within the country – as a source of
social spending, and also as a cornerstone of statebuilding. While the focus on
domestic revenue is not new in the development community, much more and better
support will be needed in order to deliver on its promises.229
III.20. BACKING RECOVERY IN FRAGILE STATESToday, about 1.4 billion people live in fragile states (Box 20.1), including more than one-third of the
world’s extreme poor: people living below the USD 1.25 a day poverty line. If current trends continue,
by 2018 most of the world’s extreme poor will be in fragile states.
This chapter asks:What financial resources are available to fragile states – at home and abroad –
to fund their development?What role does development co-operation play? And what can be done to
close their financing gaps?
Least developed fragile states depend heavily on development co-operation
Over the past decade, official development assistance (ODA) has been the largest and most
reliable source of development finance for the least developed fragile states. After a peak in 2005,
ODA from all development providers to the 51 fragile states on the current list followed an erratic
downward trend.The impact has been particularly severe for the least developed fragile states, as the
analysis of country programmable aid reveals (a specific sub-category of ODA that providers
programme for individual countries).2 After their country programmable aid had steadily grown
between 2000 and 2009, it began declining in 2010 (Figure 20.1).
By 2018 most of the world’s extreme poor will be in fragile states.
Box 20.1. What and where are the fragile states?
Fragile states are countries or economies with weak capacity to carry out basic governance
functions and/or to develop constructive relations between state and society, as well as among
different groups in society.The g7+, a voluntary association of countries that are or have been affected
by conflict, is refining the way in which fragility is assessed. They use the term “fragile” to describe
themselves and see fragility and resilience as interlinked, shifting points along a continuum or
spectrum. Fragility is also a global phenomenon, not restricted to conflict-affected states. It
potentially affects all countries, to differing degrees, depending on their capacities for resilience.
Every year, the OECD compiles a list of countries and economies considered fragile in order to
monitor financial flows to these states.* Fragile states comprise a broad spectrum of contexts – from
the one-party state of North Korea to war-torn Syria and relatively stable Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Two-thirds of fragile states are now found in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa,
and the number of fragile sub-Saharan countries (now 29) and fragile Arab states and economies (now
6) is increasing. Close to half of all fragile states – 23 out of 51 – are middle-income countries and
economies, and many of them are rich in natural resources. The list of fragile states, categorised
according to income, can be found in Figure 2.2 (Chapter 2).
* The list is assembled by combining the latest harmonised list of fragile situations published by the World Bank, African
Development Bank and Asian Development Bank with those countries that have a Failed State Index above 90 on the
Failed States list developed by the Fund for Peace.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014230
III.20. BACKING RECOVERY IN FRAGILE STATESThe least developed fragile states – the ones with the greatest needs – are seeing the sharpest
decline in ODA. Yet these are countries that often depend significantly on ODA: a snapshot of 2011
data shows that in the fragile least developed countries, ODA accounted for 45% of all external
finance (see Chapter 2). Out of eight countries recently identified as appearing as potentially
under-aided, all are least developed countries and seven are fragile or conflict-affected states
(OECD, 2014b). Other fragile states are also neglected because ODA tends to be disproportionately
concentrated in countries of geo-political importance (e.g. Afghanistan, which received
USD 6.7 billion in 2011) or takes little account of population size and need. Fragile states with the
least ODA per capita have tended to be those with the worst human development indicators. In 2011,
44 fragile states – among them some of the poorest countries in the world – each received on average
less than half a percentage of global ODA (OECD, 2014a).
In particular, in the areas of security and justice fragile states often have a greater need for
financing than other developing countries (see Chapter 19). Yet despite recent evidence of the
long-term developmental cost of conflict,3 there is a relative stagnation of support for peace and
security in conflict-affected states. Because of the importance of supporting justice and accountable
security provision and the overall evidence of links between violence and poverty, security and justice
are the first of the five objectives addressed by the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding goals agreed by
the 41 members of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States.4 Yet these goals have not been
matched by funding.
Remittances are an important resource for fragile states
Figures on key sources of finance for these countries show that, in total, remittances from overseas
migrants (Figure 20.2) are the largest financial inflow in fragile states (56%), far outpacing development
co-operation (29%) and foreign direct investment (15%); others – including bonds, export credits,
securities and private grants – represent a comparatively small share of total external resources.
Figure 20.1. Development co-operation to fragile states is falling
Country programmable aid (CPA) to fragile states, 2000-11
Source: OECD (2014a), Fragile States 2014: Domestic Revenue Mobilisation in Fragile States, OECD Publishing, Paris, www.oecd.org/dac/
incaf/FSR-2014.pdf.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933121943
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III.20. BACKING RECOVERY IN FRAGILE STATESRemittances are an important source of finance formany developing countries, especially because of
their counter-cyclical nature: they increase during downturns in the recipient economy – unlike capital
flows such as foreign direct investment – and so play an important role in mitigating economic shocks
(see Chapter 10). To date, however, the extent to which remittances contribute to development is not
clear. Being private income, they are not necessarily spent in line with a state’s development goals. Also,
remittances disproportionately benefit citizens in middle-income countries, who tend to receive much
larger amounts per capita than citizens in low-income fragile states. There are ways in which the
development community can domore to address and strengthen the development impact of remittances
in low-income fragile states. These include making the transfer of remittances cheaper and easier to
access, both for sending and receiving countries; “securitising” future remittance receipts, whereby banks
transform them into securities to raise financing for infrastructure and development projects; and
providing matching funds for remittance-backed local development projects (OECD, 2014a).
Foreign direct investment in fragile states is volatile
Net foreign direct investment in fragile states has followed a continuous downward slide. Since the
start of the global economic crisis, it has been characteristically volatile and extremely unequally
distributed.Almost half of all foreign direct investment in fragile states goes to just three countries: Egypt,
Nigeria and Sudan. Formost fragile states, especially African countries that are not resource-rich, foreign
direct investment is simply not part of the resource equation. Further, the least developed fragile states
have little access to it, as they are often considered less creditworthy thanmiddle-income countries.
Figure 20.2. Major inflows in fragile states: Remittances, aid and foreign direct investment
Constant 2011 USD million
Source: Compiled from OECD CPA data, FDI data from IMF through eLibrary, http://elibrary-data.org, and Remittances from World
Development Indicators, http://worldbank;org:data-catalog:word-develoment-indicators.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933121962
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For most fragile states, foreign direct investment is simply not part
of the resource equation.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014232
III.20. BACKING RECOVERY IN FRAGILE STATESRaising domestic revenue offers both potential and challenges
Revenue raised through taxes and other domestic sources – known as domestic revenue – offers
fragile states a promising and sustainable source of home-grown development finance. The
United Nations estimates that to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), domestic
revenue should represent at least 20% of a country’s gross domestic product (GDP). Yet only two
fragile states have reached that target (Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kenya). On average in 2011,
domestic revenue represented only 14% of the GDP of fragile states; in other developing countries, the
average was 17% and in OECD countries it was 34%.
Developing capacity to raise revenue through taxes is particularly crucial in fragile states. It
reduces their dependence on development co-operation and helps finance human development and
recovery, while at the same time strengthening the contract between the state and its citizens by
enabling the government to provide vital services. It can also fortify intra-society relationships: in
countries with high taxation, economic resources are distributed more equally, leading to greater
social cohesion (see, for example, Haldenwang, 2008).
Yet fragile states face particular challenges in broadening their tax base.To begin with, they often
rely on one or two types of resources for their revenue – typically non-renewable natural resources or
customs revenues. Likewise, they characteristically have weak technical, technological and statistical
capacities required for tax systems. This is compounded by perceptions of a lack of state legitimacy,
which can discourage citizens and corporations from paying taxes. In some cases, citizens’
unwillingness to pay tax reflects “an often accurate perception that officials themselves may be
corrupt, that governments consistently misuse public funds and that expenditure patterns may not
reflect their wishes” (OECD, 2010). Finally, huge potential revenue is lost through the pressure to offer
competitive tax conditions to attract multinational enterprises (Chapter 14); extensive informal and
agricultural sectors, which often lie outside the tax system; and illicit financial flows (Chapter 13).
Yet despite the challenges and opportunities – and despite ODA providers’ strong political and
rhetorical commitment to revenue mobilisation in developing countries – only 0.08% of ODA to
developing countries in 2010/11 supported public financial management and related areas. In fragile
states and economies, the share was even lower – only 0.07%. This is despite compelling evidence
that investments in domestic resource mobilisation can yield significant returns, even in the most
challenging contexts (Box 20.2).
A substantial body of knowledge is emerging on how development co-operation providers can
support revenue systems in fragile states while also encouraging statebuilding (OECD, 2014a):
● They can encourage fragile states to broaden their tax base by focusing on direct taxation (often by
simplifying tax rates).5 Direct taxes, such as income or property tax, are thought to be the most
effective kind of taxation for statebuilding, as they give citizens a voice.
● They can help fragile states design frameworks to manage natural resource revenues better.
● They can strengthen fragile states’ capacity to interact with multinational enterprises, e.g. by
making tax incentives, transfer pricing regimes and supply chains more transparent and efficient.
● They can set an example by being transparent about development co-operation (see Chapter 14).
● They can help fragile states boost tax morale among citizens by strengthening the link between
revenue collection and responsible expenditure (OECD/EUROsociAL, 2013).6
Domestic revenue represented only 14% of the GDP of fragile states
in 2011 – well below the 20% target set by the UN.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 233
III.20. BACKING RECOVERY IN FRAGILE STATESDevelopment co-operation providers can also draw on a recent OECD report (2013b) that outlines
guiding principles for revenue mobilisation in fragile states (Box 20.3) and makes 50 recommendations
for best practice.
Appropriate risk management can promote investment in fragile states
What is holding back development co-operation providers, and other external finance providers,
from investing in fragile states? This is largely a result of their aversion to the perceived risks of
operating in these challenging environments.
The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States – endorsed by 41 countries and organisations
in 2011 – recognises these apprehensions, but emphasises that the risk of not engaging in fragile
states outweighs the risks of getting involved. Appropriate risk taking is essential to delivering results
during transition. This means that international support needs to be tailored to manage risks in
fragile and conflict-affected states.
Box 20.2. Support to tax administrations: An investment that pays off
● In Ethiopia, the UK Department for International Development (DFID), alongside other donors,
supports tax system reform through the Public Sector Capacity Building Programme. The aim is to
increase tax revenue by 87%, from ETB 43.3 billion (Ethiopian birr) in 2010 to ETB 81 billion in 2013.
Every GBP 1 of DFID support is estimated to produce additional revenue of about GBP 20 a year.
● The support to tax collection in El Salvador, extended by the United States’ Agency for International
Development (USAID) – totalled USD 5.3 million between 2004 and 2010 and allowed the country to
increase its revenue by USD 350 million a year (see also Box 14.2 in Chapter 14).
● In the West Bank, a joint programme by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),
Danida, the World Bank, GIZ (the German Federal Enterprise for International Co-operation) and
Japan International Cooperation Agency allowed 60 participating municipalities to almost double
their property tax collection, from USD 16.8 million in 2008 to USD 33 million in 2012.
Source: OECD (2013a), Tax Inspectors Without Borders, Final Report on the Feasibility Study into the Tax Inspectors Without
Borders Initiative, OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-global/TIWB_feasibility_study.pdf; information onWest Bank programme
provided by Sakher AlAhmad, Nicolas Garrigue and Eugenia Piza-Lopez (UNDP).
Box 20.3. Key guiding principles for revenue mobilisation in fragile states
● Leadership and political will for reform by the host country is crucial – development co-operation
alone cannot “buy” effective and lasting reforms.
● How revenue gets collected is just as important as how much gets collected. In fragile states, tax
reform should put emphasis on being equitable and fostering accountability and transparency.
● Reforming the tax system only works when done in conjunction with anti-corruption measures.
Otherwise corruption continues to undermine new tax administrations and policies.
● Strengthening linkages between taxation and governance also involves supporting institutions and
organisations outside the revenue system, such as the justice system, parliament and civil society.
Source: OECD (2013b), Tax and Development: Aid Modalities for Strengthening Tax Systems, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/
10.1787/9789264177581-en.
The risk of not engaging in fragile states outweighs the risks
of getting involved.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014234
III.20. BACKING RECOVERY IN FRAGILE STATESIn fact, there is a range of ways in which development co-operation can be provided to reduce
risks. Development Assistance and Approaches to Risk in Fragile and Conflict Affected States (OECD,
forthcoming) brings together a wealth of concrete examples of risk taking and riskmanagement from
Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Haiti, Myanmar, Nepal, Somalia and
South Sudan, together with practical implications for development co-operation providers. In
addition, as discussed in Chapter 11, guarantee schemes backed by development finance providers
can help mobilise private sector finance by transferring or mitigating risks that private investors
would not be able or willing to take otherwise. Guarantees act as a type of “insurance policy” against
the risks of non-payment, facilitating financial flows to developing countries and high-risk sectors.
They are particularly beneficial to developing country businesses, which often lack creditworthiness
in the eyes of private investors, and have had some success in fragile states.
Key recommendations
● Improve both the quantity and quality of development co-operation to fragile states, especially in
the least developed fragile states which depend upon it the most.
● Support revenue mobilisation in fragile states by following emerging guiding principles in areas
such as: broadening the tax base, managing revenues from natural resources, striking better deals
with multinational enterprises, promoting transparency and boosting tax morale.
● Seek opportunities to harness remittances as a source of development – for instance by making
financial services for remittances cheaper and easier to access, “securitising” future remittance
receipts and providing matching funds for remittance-backed local development projects.
Notes
1. This chapter is based largely on OECD (2014a).
2. Country programmable aid tracks the proportion of ODA over which host countries have, or could have,
significant say. It measures gross bilateral ODA but excludes activities that: 1) are inherently unpredictable
(humanitarian aid and debt relief); 2) entail no cross-border flows (administrative costs, imputed student
costs, promotion of development awareness, and costs related to research and refugees in provider countries);
3) do not form part of co-operation agreements between governments (food aid, aid from local governments,
core funding to non-governmental organisations, ODA equity investments, development co-operation through
secondary agencies and aid which is not allocable by country or region).
3. See the 2014 Global Peace Index at: www.visionofhumanity.org/#/page/news/949.
4. The Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in November 2011 agreed a New Deal for Engagement in
Fragile States. The New Deal identifies five Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals which aim to foster
inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution; establish and strengthen people’s security; address
injustices and increase people’s access to justice; generate employment and improve livelihoods; and manage
revenue and build capacity for accountable and fair service delivery. For more information, see:
www.newdeal4peace.org/peacebuilding-and-statebuilding-goals.
5. Simplified tax rates, such as presumptive direct taxes, can be a pragmatic solution where taxing effective
income is impossible, for instance where the government faces capacity constraints or taxpayers lack
financial transparency. The term “presumptive taxation” generally means that the tax rate is not directly
measured on the basis of the actual tax base (e.g. income), but instead estimated from indicators that are
easier to measure. For example, presumptive taxes are used to tax income for small businesses inTimor-Leste
and Kosovo. They are calculated based on factors such as the type of product sold, the size of the enterprise
and a rough estimate of turnover.
6. Tax morale is people’s motivation to pay their taxes, beyond their legal obligation to do so.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 235
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Chapter 21
Supporting a fair and equal trading system
by
William Hynes, Development Co-operation Directorate, OECD
Throughout history, trade has helped to transform economies, reshaping the
division of wealth and power. More recently, fragmented production chains offer
developing countries the opportunity to enter international markets through
specialisation in specific tasks and intermediate products. In addition, the
international community has taken steps to make the world trading system more
equitable and expanded World Trade Organization (WTO) membership to include
most developing countries, most recently Yemen. The WTO Bali Ministerial in
December 2013 concluded with several decisions which will further accelerate the
integration of poorer countries into the world economy. The Aid-for-Trade Initiative
helps to underwrite this progress by assisting developing countries to analyse,
implement and adjust to trade agreements and to build their supply-side capacity
and infrastructure to compete internationally.
This chapter also includes an opinion piece by Roberto Azevêdo,
Director-General of theWorld Trade Organization, on how the full potential
of trade for development is yet to be tapped.237
III.21. SUPPORTING A FAIR AND EQUAL TRADING SYSTEMToday most economies are interwoven and trade in “many cases is the single most important
external source of development financing” (UNDESA, 2002).1 Trade is essential for the transfer of
knowledge, technology and skills – and thus for development. This powerful developmental role of
trade has been recognised by the High-Level Panel (HLP) set up by the United Nations
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to advise on the global development framework beyond 2015. The
HLP’s 2013 report identified an “open, fair and development-friendly trading system” as one
condition for creating a global environment that will enable “a world in 2030 that is more equal, more
prosperous, more peaceful and more just than that of today” (HLP, 2013). The panel’s report
recognises that countries are leading their own development, and that this dynamism is driven by
trade rather than by development co-operation. Ensuring that the global trading system is open and
fair will create the framework for countries to grow further.
Today, fragmented production chains offer developing countries the opportunity to enter
international markets without having to produce sophisticated final products. Yet while many
developing countries have been able to reap the benefits of international trade, others have not and
many impediments to a fair world trade system remain. This chapter looks at the evolving nature of
trade and the changing role of developing countries in world trade. Next, it analyses how the
international community has helped developing countries integrate into the world trading system. It
concludes by examining the recentWorldTrade Organization (WTO) Bali Agreement andmakes some
recommendations for providers of development co-operation to help further efforts to make the
world trading system more equitable and fair.
The nature of world trade is changing
The share of developing countries in world trade doubled from 16% in 1991 to 32% in 2011. The
economic crisis accelerated this trend, and by 2012 the value of exports from developing countries to
other developing countries (South-South trade) exceeded exports from these countries to rich (OECD)
countries (South-North trade).2 Developing country markets absorb 49% of total exports from the
least developed countries, with the People’s Republic of China being the leading market destination,
absorbing over 20% of least developed countries’ merchandise exports (Cirera, 2013).
Trade is essential for the transfer of knowledge, technology
and skills – and thus for development.
Developing country markets absorb 49% of all exports from least developed
countries.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014238
III.21. SUPPORTING A FAIR AND EQUAL TRADING SYSTEMWorld trade is also becoming more diversified. Fuel and mining products have driven much of
the recent growth in least developed countries’ exports, accounting for more than 60% of the total.
Clothing is the second largest category, followed by food products (15% and 10% of total least
developed countries’ exports, respectively). On average, however, least developed countries are
dependent on these three products for more than 70% of their export receipts, leaving them highly
susceptible to volatile prices and falls in demand for those products (OECD/WTO, 2011). There have
also been small, but important, increases in least developed countries’ commercial services exports,3
which reached USD 25 billion in 2011, corresponding to 0.6% of the world total (UNCTAD, 2013).
There are still impediments to equitable world trade
An important step towards making the world trading system more equitable has been the
expansion of WTO membership since 1994 to include most developing countries. Yet while the
quotas and duties of the past have been replaced by preference programmes and duty-free,
quota-free market access schemes for developing countries, other complications still remain. For
example, “rules of origin” can seriously limit sourcing opportunities for developing countries and in
addition create unnecessary red tape and paperwork. This can curtail the participation of developing
countries and especially the least developed ones – where capacity is limited – in global value chains,
which, in turn, reduces their competitiveness (HLP, 2013).
While poorer countries have traditionally relied on trade taxes, this is much less the case today. For
instance, the share of trade taxes in (sub-Saharan) African gross domestic product (GDP) declined by 5%
every year between 2000 and 2011 (OECD/AfDB, 2013). Today the benefits of trade liberalisation far
outweigh forgone tax revenues;4 continued progress requires a more open trading system that is
rules-based, predictable and non-discriminatory, as envisioned in Millennium Development Goal 8. This
can substantially stimulate development worldwide, benefiting countries at all stages of development
(UNDESA, 2002). To make this happen, a range of concerns have yet to be addressed at the global level.
Trade barriers, technical barriers and trade-distorting subsidies – particularly in agriculture –
need to be removed. The abuse of anti-dumping measures needs to be controlled. Private sanitary
and phytosanitary measures are a further obstacle. There is also a great demand for more and better
transfer of knowledge and technology from developed to developing countries. Finally, special
provisions for the treatment of developing countries in trade agreements need to be made more
precise, effective and workable.
Aid for trade can help countries meet their development goals
Following the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of trade talks in the 1990s, it was clear that
developing countries required assistance to analyse, negotiate and implement trade agreements. Finger
and Schuler (1999) argued that the costs of implementing the Uruguay Roundwere substantial and that
theWTO obligations reflected little awareness of the capacity constraints of developing countries. The
first WTO Ministerial Conference, held in 1996, recognised that the least developed countries faced
these type of constraints.This led to the creation of the “integrated framework” to improve the capacity
of the least developed countries in trade policy formulation and implementation. The intention was to
achieve the full integration of the least developed countries into the multilateral trading system,
thereby increasing their market opportunities (WTO, 2006a). However, the integrated framework had
only modest success, as “trade was inadequately seen, by both donors and recipients, as an integral
aspect of economic development and poverty reduction” (WTO, 2006a). Trade rarely featured as a
priority of either development co-operation providers or developing countries. Development
co-operation providers did scale up support to capacity building for designing trade policy and
regulations, especially from the start of the Doha Development Round in 2001,5 but a greater, more
holistic effort was needed. While ministers at Doha promoted trade liberalisation, they alsoDEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 239
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reciprocal market access because they had little to offer (Suwa-Eisenmann andVerdier, 2007). Ministers
recognised the need to move beyondmarket access and agreed to assist further with building the trade
capacities of developing countries. The breakthrough came at the WTO Ministerial Conference in
Hong Kong, China in 2005, which requested a newWTO work programme on aid for trade (Box 21.1).
Providing assistance for trade capacity building is one of the indicators of progress towards the
achievement of Millennium Development Goal 8, and it is clear that the Aid-for-Trade Initiative helps
the multilateral trade system deliver on its objective of encouraging and contributing to sustainable
development, raising people’s welfare and reducing poverty. The WTO and others have argued that
“economic growth and trade – as a driver of growth – deserve a prominent place in the post-2015
development agenda.We need an agenda that integrates economic growth with social inclusion and
with environmental protection” (Lamy, 2013).
Developing countries are increasingly prioritising trade and mainstreaming trade in their
development strategies. In response, the international community has scaled up support, and
funding has held up well in spite of the financial crisis. Annual aid-for-trade commitments amounted
to over USD 54 billion in 2012, and have doubled since 2005. This has been bolstered by the
commitment of the G20 countries, which have pledged to maintain aid for trade resources
beyond 2011 at 2006-08 average levels. As Hynes and Holden (2013) argue, this increase is seen
principally in the form of increased investments in economic infrastructure and support for building
productive capacity. Aid for trade is also focusing on improving transport times and costs, and
improving standards certification (OECD/WTO, 2013a). This has helped to arrest a decades-long
decline in official development assistance (ODA) to the economic sectors compared to social sectors.6
Support to trade has only recently become a priority for the development
community.
Box 21.1. What is aid for trade?
Developing countries need support to participate in international trade effectively. The WTO-led
Aid-for-Trade Initiative aims “to help developing countries, particularly least developed countries, build
the supply-side capacity and trade-related infrastructure that they need to assist them to implement
and benefit fromWTO [a]greements and more broadly to expand their trade” (WTO, 2006b).
Aid for trade aims to enable developing countries, particularly the least developed ones, to use trade
more effectively to promote growth, development and poverty reduction and to achieve their
development objectives, including the Millenium Development Goals. It is founded on the
assumption that while some countries offer good prospects, most developing countries have low
capacity to trade, and that trade liberalisation alone cannot create the incentives needed for broader
economic reform. Trade-specific development co-operation programmes, accompanied by
complementary economic reforms, can ensure sustainability and have a lasting development impact
(OECD, 2013b). The OECD with the WTO monitors the initiative examining developing country
strategies and priorities and donor programming to assess what is happening, what is not and where
improvements are needed. This monitoring creates incentives for the delivery of more and better aid
for trade so that developing countries can build the capacities to help them capitalise on the
opportunities of international trade.*
* More details on the OECD’s work on aid for trade can be found at: www.oecd.org/dac/aft.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014240
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of the aid-for-trade literature has focused on assessments of the effectiveness of aid for trade. These
have generally been positive at the aggregate level (Newfarmer and Ugarte, 2013; Cali and te Velde,
2011; Basnett et al., 2012). Some emphasise in particular the effectiveness of aid-for-trade facilitation
(Helble et al., 2012) and others focus on the effectiveness of support provided to infrastructure
(Vijil and Wagner, 2012).7 OECD/WTO (2013b) documents numerous examples of development
co-operation programmes that helped countries to adjust to trade liberalisation and trade reform;
technical assistance programmes to mainstream trade in development strategies; and training
programmes for government officials in trade policy.
Nonetheless, while aid for trade is strengthening the role of trade as an engine of development,
it is also necessary to recognise that ODA can potentially distort trade, undermining its own
effectiveness. For instance, if ODA is tied to the purchase of goods from the provider’s country, it can
create a bias towards projects with a large import content in areas of particular export interest to the
originator and towards “commercially interesting” developing countries; this, in turn, can harm the
credibility of providers of development co-operation.8The OECD has estimated that tying reduces the
value of ODA by 15-30% on average (OECD, 1991).While progress on reforming the tying status of ODA
has been slow for decades, DAC development co-operation providers agreed in 2001 to untie aid for
the least developed countries, which can least afford the associated costs of tied aid.
TheWTO Bali Agreement promises to facilitate trade
To further explore options for creating a fairer trading system, the international community
came together in Bali in December 2013 at theWTO Ministerial Conference. The resulting agreement,
which follows many years of negotiations, sets out important measures to streamline trade, allow
developing countries more options to achieve food security, boost least developed countries’ trade
and stimulate development more generally.
The most important aspect of the 2013 Bali Agreement was the area dealing with trade
facilitation. The agreement calls for streamlining and cutting red tape in customs procedures to
expedite the movement, release and clearance of goods. The OECD estimates that these measures
could cut global trade costs by more than 10%, raising annual global output by over USD 400 billion,
and benefiting developing economies themost (OECD, 2013a). Some poorer countries, however, raised
concerns about their ability to make the required capacity upgrades (see Box 21.2 for one example).
The Bali Ministerial decision recognised the particular needs of developing – and especially least
developed – countries in implementing such measures. Providers of development co-operation
agreed to enhance assistance and support for capacity building in this area – to target ODA towards
strengthening administrative trade processes, training custom officials and improving the efficiency
of regulation of cross-border trade, all of which reduce clearance times at borders. Finally, ensuring
transparency on the assistance to help developing countries which implement the trade facilitation
agreement was essential in concluding the deal. The OECD estimates that development co-operation
to trade facilitation amounts to almost USD 477 million annually;9 such flows will play a critical role
in implementing the Bali Agreement (OECD, 2014).
Aid for trade has more than doubled in real terms since 2005.
Measures to facilitate trade could cut global trade costs by more than 10%,
and raise annual global output by over USD 400 billion.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 241
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countries to compete in developed countrymarkets. For example, improvements in preferential schemes
exempt least developed country exports from tariffs and quotas, and the accompanying rules of origin
have been simplified. More broadly, the decision to introduce a monitoring mechanism to review and
strengthen special and differential treatment provisions will benefit all developing countries. As
Roberto Azevêdo, Director-General of theWTO, has stated, “this achievement is vital for the equilibrium
and efficacy of the multilateral system” (Azevêdo, 2014; and see his “In my view” box).
To conclude, in a world linked by value chains, the creation of an equal and fair trading system
would benefit all countries. For decades, advocates of trade have argued for “trade, not aid” as the
long-term sustainable solution to development challenges. Yet, the vast majority of developing
countries have faced difficulties in benefiting from economic and trade reforms, revealing that both
“trade, not aid” and “trade as aid” are rather limited (UNCTAD, 2008). While the global marketplace
offers enormous opportunities, developing countries often lack the human, physical and
infrastructural capacities to compete effectively. Assistance to increase their trade and integration
into the global economy can be delivered through reforms in trade policy (e.g. to create preferential
and market access), by channelling resources and by providing technical assistance to developing
countries through development co-operation.
Box 21.2. Yemen’s efforts to secure trade-based economic security
AbdulWahab al-Awdi,
Director, Policy Development and Capacity Building, Yemen Customs Authority
Yemen, which acceded to the WTO in Bali after 13 years of negotiation, faces major obstacles in
streamlining customs and securing broader economic security. The only least developed country in
the Middle East, Yemen’s objective is to develop its trade policies and improve its performance
indicators and business environment.
Two-thirds of Yemen’s exports are fuel, which is very vulnerable to price fluctuations and the negative
effects of political instability. Nevertheless, Yemen’s trade-to-GDP ratio amounted to 67.5% in 2012, in
spite of the unrest in the country. This indicates how crucial trade is for Yemen’s economic security and
that the government relies heavily on revenues from fuel exports. Nonetheless, the share of tax revenue
in GDP was only 7.3% in 2013 – well below the region’s 18.4% average. Yemen’s failure to recuperate its
potential revenue from tax is largely a result of corruption and weak government institutions.
Substantial support has been provided to help Yemen improve its customs service, and to
modernise and reform its administration, systems and procedures – goals that have been prioritised
by both the government and providers of development co-operation.Yet, despite the political will and
commitment ofYemen’s customs leadership – and the awareness that the modernisation process has
to be inclusive and comprehensive, covering a wide range of customs processes and procedures –
budget constraints have blocked the reform process. Securing support from the international
community – in line with the agreements in Doha and Bali – will be fundamental to take this forward.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014242
III.21. SUPPORTING A FAIR AND EQUAL TRADING SYSTEMIn my view:
The full potential of trade for development is yet
to be tapped
Roberto Azevêdo,
Director-General, World Trade Organization (WTO)
The United Nation’s post-2015 development agenda is gaining momentum.To be truly effective and
meaningful, the agenda has to include trade; it should make full use of the multilateral trading
system to achieve the post-2015 goals.
Trade offers access to new sources of demand and supply; financing and investment; ideas,
knowledge and technology. It offers a way for low-income economies to break out of the constraints
of their domestic markets. Through trade, developing economies can access new sources of external
demand and generate the financial resources, knowledge and production capacity necessary for
sustainable development. In short, trade helps enable growth. Without growth, poverty alleviation
will remain elusive.
Our joint work with the OECD on global value chains highlights new possibilities to use trade to
foster growth, employment and development. The geographical fragmentation of production creates
new opportunities to enter today’s complex value chains. Realising these new possibilities remains a
challenge, though, in particular for the least developed countries.
We can support the post-2015 development agenda by working to connect developing countries,
and in particular the least developed countries, to export markets through actions. On the demand
side, we can strive to offer more and better market access opportunities both by lowering barriers
(including tariffs) and through less market distortion (trade-distortive subsidies, for example, prevent
some small countries from tapping the full potential of global agriculture markets). Delivering a
meaningful Doha Development Agenda* outcome lies at the core of this work.
The good news on the Doha Development Agenda is that we have momentum, especially from the
WTOTrade Facilitation Agreement. This deal, concluded in December 2013 in Bali, will help countries
reduce trade-related costs by streamlining border procedures. It contains specific provisions to help
developing countries implement commitments, notably by linking implementation to the acquisition
of capacity bymeans of related technical assistance. Aid allocated to trade facilitation has amultiplier
effect, helping countries to achieve various development goals.
Trade facilitation support is an integral part of a broader “aid-for-trade” agenda to address supply-
side and infrastructure constraints. Effective and durable results from aid-for-trade activities must
target the full integration of the smallest and poorest countries into global trade, thereby attracting
investments, creating more and better-paid jobs and reducing poverty.
The Bali deal represents the first set of new multilateral trade rules agreed in 18 years. It is
important that we now move fast and conclude the Doha Development Agenda. This would improve
market access conditions, especially for the least developed countries, and reduce distortions that
keep the production and potential production of these countries out of the market.
In my view, the post-2015 development agenda is a defining opportunity to raise awareness about
the benefits of trade and the opportunity trade offers to help finance sustainable development in a
smart way. We must be ambitious in this agenda. But we must also be effective and tap the full
potential of trade and the multilateral trading system to support development.
* The Doha Development Agenda is the latest round of trade negotiations among theWTO membership.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 243
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● Ensure that the World Trade Organization’s members implement the Bali Agreement on Trade
Facilitation and provide the necessary technical assistance to help poorer countries to streamline
their customs procedures.
● Make progress on the remaining items of the Doha Development Round, especially agriculture, in
order to further integrate developing countries into the world trading systems.
● Ensure that G20 providers of trade-related assistance meet their pledge to maintain aid-for-trade
flows beyond 2011.
Notes
1. The typical low-income country is highly integrated into the world economy, with import and export shares of
GDP of about 50% and 30% respectively (World Bank, 2013).
2. Freemantle and Stevens (2012) report a trade increase fromUSD 20 billion in 2001 tomore than USD 250 billion
in 2011 between Africa and a group of ten emerging economies.
3. Commercial services include transport; travel; communications; construction; insurance; financial services;
computer and information services; royalties and license fees; other business services; personal, cultural and
recreational services; and government services.
4. Although some countries found it difficult to replace tariffs with other taxes, such as value added tax
(Aizenman and Jinjarak, 2009).
5. The Doha Development Round or Doha Development Agenda is the current trade-negotiation round of
the World Trade Organization (WTO) which commenced in November 2001. Its objective is to lower trade
barriers around the world, and thus facilitate increased global trade
6. This shift could be partially attributed to the Millennium Development Goals, which helped orientate aid
programmes towards the social sectors (primarily health and education) while diverting funds away from the
economic sectors and the promotion of investment and international trade, “a trend that was further
accentuated by the original Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, which prescribed the promotion
of social policies as a precondition for debt relief” (OECD/WTO, 2009).
7. Assessments of aid for trade’s impact in specific country situations (see ICTSD’s country studies on aid-for-trade
effectiveness) and on reducing poverty have generally been less positive (Turner and Rovamaa, 2013).
8. The influence of tied aid on trade can be over-emphasised. Lloyd et al. (2000) looked at data from 1969-95, the
heyday of tied aid, and found little evidence that aid created trade, though they found that France was more
likely to use trade links as a criterion for aid allocations. Similarly, Tajoli (1999) found that tied aid does not
necessarily generate trade flows and that donors’ export shares were not correlated with the degree of tying.
9. Amounts tracked by the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System.
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This chapter synthesises key findings and emerging trends in development
co-operation from DAC peer reviews. It covers both mid-term reviews and full peer
reviews completed between January 2012 and April 2014.* In identifying trends
in the strategic orientations, organisation and operations of DAC members’
development co-operation emerging from recent peer reviews, the aim of this
chapter is to identify areas of collective progress and collective challenge, with a
view to establishing an agenda for future learning from peer reviews. The chapter
begins with a set of key messages, followed by further detail against the core
dimensions contained within the OECD “DAC Peer Review Reference Guide”.
* Full peer reviews include: Australia, Canada, the European Union, Finland, France, Italy, Korea,
Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. Mid-term reviews include: Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States.
This section was prepared by Rahul Malhotra of the Development Co-operation Directorate, OECD.249
IV. TRENDS IN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE MEMBERS’ DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION: A SYNTHESIS OF PEER REVIEWS, 2012-14Key messages
1. Strategic orientations: This has been a period of unprecedented reform in the strategic orientations
and organisation of development co-operation. Development has been increasingly integrated into
foreign and trade policy; serving national interests has become a more explicit objective for some
reviewed members; and global public goods has risen up the agenda. One consequence of these
trends has been a new, or in some cases renewed, focus on middle-income countries.
2. Policy coherence: The trend towards integration of foreign trade and development policy has, to
some extent, led to stronger whole-of-government approaches to development in most reviewed
member countries. However, this has stopped some way short of ensuring domestic and foreign
policies are analysed and monitored from a development perspective.
3.Allocations: The financial crisis has had a varied impact on official development assistance (ODA)
volumes in this period. Most reviewed members, however, continue to fall well short of the
0.7% ODA/GNI commitment. The vast majority of reviewed members have made efforts to
concentrate their development co-operation both geographically and thematically. In this context,
aid to least developed countries (LDCs) has been declining, despite many reviewed members
maintaining a strong policy focus on LDCs and fragile states.
4. Private sector: All reviewed members are emphasising the important role of the private sector in
development. Many of them have developed private sector strategies and are creating new funding
instruments or delivery mechanisms to support this focus. Several reviews caution members
against merging development objectives with their own commercial interests as well as against
establishing instruments that would lead to an increase in tied aid.
5. Organisation and management:The increased integration with foreign policy and trade has led to
far-reaching organisational reforms for many reviewed members. In many cases, reviews point to
increasing complexity in business practices and procedures, and challenges in protecting a core of
development expertise.
6. Development effectiveness: Reviewed members have continued efforts towards integrating
development effectiveness commitments into their operations. However, incentives are changing.
Country-level predictability, alignment and use of country systems are being complicated by
dispersed funding streams and actors, and uneven progress in the use of programme-based
approaches. This is also affecting commitment to mutual accountability.
7. Results and evaluation: Reviewed members, from different starting points, are making good
progress in their increasing emphasis on and use of evaluation. However, they are all struggling
with embedding results-based management, capable of driving improvements in delivery and
management, whilst being respectful of the principles of country ownership and alignment.
8.Humanitarian assistance: Reviewed members are implementing the Good Humanitarian
Donorship principles in different ways, focusing on their individual strengths, areas of interest and
comparative advantage. Clearer, more rigorously applied funding criteria would help avoid this
unspoken division of labour and ensure that members are consistently adding value through their
humanitarian responses, especially in complex emergencies.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014250
IV. TRENDS IN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE MEMBERS’ DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION: A SYNTHESIS OF PEER REVIEWS, 2012-14Peer reviews continue to be a relevant and effective tool for DAC members to hold each other to
account for delivering on commitments and for learning from one another. In the period covered by
this report (January 2012 through April 2014), 90% of peer review recommendations were either
implemented or partially implemented (see Annex 22.A1). The rest of this chapter summarises
emerging trends from peer review findings and conclusions as they apply to the “DAC Peer Review
Reference Guide” components of analysis.
Strategic orientations
All reviewed members have retained an overall objective on poverty reduction or eradication.
However, there are strategic shifts in development co-operation from the period under review (and
before) that are casting a new light on this objective. More reviewed members are now explicitly
linking their development co-operation to serving “national interests”. Reviewed members such as
Japan and the United States have been developing strategies for the integration of the so-called 3-Ds
(defence, diplomacy and development). Many more reviewed members have structurally embedded
development co-operation into the work of their foreign ministries. This has helped lay the
foundations for integration between development, foreign policy, trade and investment, in countries
like France, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Sweden. Reviews note how these shifts are leading to
improved “whole-of-government” co-ordination. This is manifested by, for example, the introduction
by a few reviewed members of whole-of-government strategies with partner countries (particularly,
but not exclusively, in fragile states). The implications of these shifts on aid allocations and
organisation are discussed in more detail below.
There has been very limited progress on the policy coherence for development agenda. This is an
area where, relatively, most recommendations are not being implemented (see Annex 22.A1); Sweden
and Switzerland, however, were praised for their progress. There are a few examples of innovations in
advancing policy coherence for development, such as through country-level pilot studies (e.g. Belgium,
Finland, Korea and the Netherlands). There are also improvements in domestic, cross-government
co-ordination (e.g. Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Portugal, Switzerland and
the United States). However, almost all reviewed members are far from establishing a prioritised and
time-bound agenda, functioning co-ordinationmechanisms andmonitoring for ensuring that domestic
and foreign policies protect and promote rather than harm development in developing countries.
At least 16 of the reviews in this period noted a new or increasing emphasis on private sector
engagement and development from reviewed members. In at least ten of these, reviews mention the
creation of new funding instruments or delivery mechanisms to support this focus. For a few
reviewed members, the focus is squarely on creating an enabling environment for investment and
business in partner countries, as promoted at the Busan High Level Forum. However, for many
reviewed members, there is a danger that new instruments will increase tied aid and be mainly
supply driven. Several reviewed members in the course of their reviews have been encouraged to
avoid merging development objectives with the promotion of their own commercial interests. This is
clearly an area where members would benefit from sharing experience and identifying synergies
amongst individual efforts.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 251
IV. TRENDS IN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE MEMBERS’ DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION: A SYNTHESIS OF PEER REVIEWS, 2012-14The reviewed period has seen selected reviewed members placing a strong emphasis and
improved mainstreaming practice on the environment and climate change (e.g. Australia, France,
Germany, Japan, Korea, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom). However, in relation to gender
equality andmainstreaming cross-cutting issues in general, full integration into themodus operandi of
reviewed members is constrained by insufficient leadership commitment, resources and
organisational incentives (see OECD, forthcoming).
Allocations
The financial crisis has impacted differently on reviewed members’ aid volumes. There is an
even split between reviewed members that have increased, maintained or reduced their ODA volume
over this period. Those that lag far behind the 0.7% ODA/GNI commitment are not establishing
timelines for meeting the target. Several reviewed members have, however, committed to increase
ODA in less austere times, towards interim targets if not 0.7%.
All reviews identify attempts towards focusing and concentrating aid programmes, both
geographically and thematically. Geographical concentration is helping some reviewed members
achieve a stronger focus and scale in a sub-set of priority countries. Some reviewed members,
however, have found geographical concentration more challenging, impacting on their focus and
scale. There is a continuing, collective challenge around implementing good practice for ensuring
responsible exits from countries. In general, members could do more to co-ordinate plans to
concentrate their development co-operation, in order to deliver a stronger division of labour and to
address the problem of some partner countries being under-funded. For example, in 2012-13, 16 DAC
members categorised Ethiopia and Mozambique as priority countries, whilst Madagascar and Togo
enjoyed priority status with only 2 DAC members.
In line with the integration between development, foreign policy and trade, among other factors,
there has been a noticeable shift in strategies and aid towards middle-income countries (MICs). Many
reviewed members are now evolving their relationships with MICs, focusing on capacity building,
innovation, triangular co-operation and global public goods (e.g. European Union, France, Japan, the
Netherlands, Norway, Spain and the United Kingdom). For a few reviewed members, this shifting
emphasis has blurred the clarity of strategy and focus on least developed countries (LDCs). Others are
developing more of a continuum of relationships, transitioning and graduating countries out of
purely aid and into trading relationships. A strong number of reviewed members retain a clear and
explicit policy focus on LDCs and fragile states (for example, Australia, Austria, Finland, Germany,
Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States). However, in
this mix of contrasting approaches, of concern is the overall decline in the share of aid allocations
going to LDCs.
There are no clear patterns emerging from the reviews from this period in the split between
bilateral and multilateral funding. The bilateral programme is being reduced in member countries
where ODA as a whole is also decreasing rapidly or to a large extent. It is increasing in other counties
(for example, Belgium). In terms of multilateral funding, reviews for manymember countries point to
the welcome adoption of more strategic and differentiated approaches. More members are now
making their multilateral strategies transparent and more are basing funding decisions on
assessments of performance as well as alignment with bilateral priorities. However, this is, in many
cases, leading to more earmarked funding for particular sectors, themes or countries at the expense
of core funding, and more demands for customised reporting. Reviewed members are generally
encouraged to keep transaction costs as low as possible for multilateral partners, including through
participating in joint assessment processes (e.g. MOPAN).DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014252
IV. TRENDS IN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE MEMBERS’ DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION: A SYNTHESIS OF PEER REVIEWS, 2012-14Several reviews point to a lack of strategic involvement of civil society in reviewed members’
development co-operation. A symptom of this for some reviewed members is the lack of
programmatic funding for civil society organisations (CSOs) and the proliferation of small funding
streams, with their associated transaction costs. Australia and Switzerland, in their reviews, were
praised for bucking this trend.
Organisation and management
For some reviewed members, further integration into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has led to
more visibility for development co-operation in domestic policy making (e.g. New Zealand). There
has also been a trend of strengthened division of labour in countries where there continue to be
implementing or executing agencies, between the strategic policy functions of the ministries and the
implementation functions of the agencies (e.g. Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Japan, Korea and
Spain). However, several reviewed members continue to face the challenge of co-ordination within
their institutional structures, and in co-ordinating the ODA activities of, in some cases, up to 30 other
public institutions and ministries across government.
There has been a mixed picture in terms of reviewed members retaining a workforce large
enough and capable enough to deliver aid budgets and results, ensuring in the process a balance
between generalist and development specialist skills. A few of the reviewed members have good
workforce planning systems and practices (e.g. the United Kingdom and the United States). There is
a clear overlap between those reviewed members with good medium-term workforce planning and
those that have succeeded in protecting or increasing the numbers of development professionals in
their ranks. Several reviewed members do not have strong workforce planning. Several reviewed
members have seen staff cuts as part of broader public service retrenchments and some suffer from
high staff turnover. There is a growing reliance on short-term contracted staff to deliver on particular
policy or thematic priorities. All reviewed members face a challenge of maximising the potential
contribution of locally engaged staff.
At least ten of the countries reviewed in this period need to go further in their decentralisation
of staff and delegation of authority to partner countries. For those reviewed countries, it was observed
that further decentralisation would enable them to become stronger and more effective partners for
implementation, policy dialogue and aligned approaches in partner countries. Norway stood out as
having made good progress in this regard.
A number of reviews have found increasing complexity in business planning processes and
procedures. These largely relate to the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of
programmes in partner countries, some of which place heavy burdens on those partners, particularly
in fragile states. At the same time, even more members in the period under review underwent
significant internal or business modernisation reforms (e.g. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland and the United States), partly to address some of these concerns. Future peer
reviews will consider the impact of these reforms and lessons for the DAC, in terms of effective
development co-operation.
Operations and delivery
There are no discernible trends in the types of aid instruments reviewedmembers are deploying.
Some provided more aid in budget support, and some less. A couple, notably Germany and Japan,
have rich experience in technical co-operation, which they continue to expand. Reviewed members
with loan operations are advised to look carefully at the ratio of grants to loans, considering the
economic context and financial governance of recipient countries to ensure debt sustainability.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 253
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actors and funding streams. This presents the risk of aid becoming more fragmented, volatile and
unpredictable, by-passing country systems. It could also potentially affect the coherence of reviewed
members’ efforts in partner countries. A few reviewed members are starting to grapple with this
challenge, in terms of being able to capture and show their entire footprint in any one country.
Aside from this emerging trend, there are more long-standing challenges for effective
development co-operation at the country level. Many reviewed members need to improve the
medium-term predictability of aid for their partner countries. Most reviewed members are far from
living up to the Busan commitment of using country systems as the default approach for development
co-operation in support of activities managed by the public sector. It is not clear that there are
concerted and co-ordinated efforts where partner country systems are considered too risky to build
capacity. Relatedly, several reviewed members are still challenged to support more programme-based
approaches, reversing the trend seen in many of them of a growing number of small, parallel projects,
using a member’s own systems. Despite EU member countries’ commitments, joint programming is
proving a challenge.
Results, transparency and accountability
Reviewed members have been making incremental progress towards establishing a results
orientation. A number of them are starting from very limited experience with measuring and
managing for results. Others, like Norway and Sweden, have more experience and are reviewed as
demonstrating aspects of good practice in results-based management. All reviewed members,
however, are facing similar challenges. Whilst reviewed members have been able to develop their
management of project and programme-level results, these are not always: 1) defined clearly;
2) credibly linked to country, thematic and corporate-level results; and 3) used optimally for learning
and decision making. In many cases, the results systems have become cumbersome and focused on
short-term quantitative outputs. Reporting quantifiable results has been driven by domestic
accountability pressures, rather than a need for learning. Several reviewedmembers need to improve
on their alignment with partner countries’ own results approaches and frameworks.
In contrast, all reviewed members have made good progress in their evaluation culture and
practices. The DAC evaluation criteria are well embedded in reviewed members’ evaluation
strategies. Most reviewed members have brought independence to their evaluation functions, whilst
many are now also introducing stronger accountability throughmanagement responses to evaluation
findings and recommendations. All appear to be making continuous progress towards improving the
quality, usefulness and transparency of evaluations. More reviewed members are also now moving
towards joint evaluations and evaluation capacity development in partner countries.
The increased focus and attention to results and evaluation, and significant investments in
development research, have been accompanied by an acknowledged need for reviewed members to
improve their knowledge management systems and practices. Various tools are being experimented
with, but there is as of now insufficient evidence that these are making a difference in terms of
driving learning and informing management across organisations. The Netherlands, Sweden and
Switzerland have perhaps the most to share in terms of their varied experiences with establishing
knowledge platforms.
Most reviewed members have made concerted efforts, particularly following Busan, to improve
on their transparency practices. A number of countries, such as Australia, Canada, the Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States, are praised for these efforts. A few of
the reviewed countries need to be more open to improving their practices if they are to meet the
Busan commitment on transparency. A common challenge is to ensure that what is published is
easily accessible to partner countries and their populations.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014254
IV. TRENDS IN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE MEMBERS’ DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION: A SYNTHESIS OF PEER REVIEWS, 2012-14By extension of the challenges noted above on domestic accountability partially driving the
results and transparency agendas, peer reviews also note a weakening of commitment towards
mutual accountability. Most, but not all, reviewed members engage in country-level mutual
accountability frameworks where they exist, but there is a lack of co-ordinated effort to support and
increase the capacity of recipient countries to develop and administer robust systems through which
genuine mutual accountability is fostered.
Reviews of 12 members recommend strengthening and adequately resourcing communications
to domestic constituencies, to support commitment towards delivering more and better overseas
development assistance. These recommendations were largely in response to declining or wavering
public support for ODA in those countries. Norway, Sweden and the United States are praised for the
considerable efforts they have channelled into building broad-based political support for ODA.
Humanitarian assistance
There is no one best model for humanitarian donorship; instead, members continue to apply the
Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship in ways that match their comparative
advantage, budget volumes and mandates. Many members are aligning their humanitarian policies
more closely to foreign policy, linking aid to issues such as migration and geographical interests.
Reviewed members are also increasing efforts to strengthen the resilience of people at risk of
crisis – following the lead of Australia, European Union institutions, Japan, the United Kingdom and
the United States; however, members need to involve their development programmes and budgets in
this work and guard against resilience being treated as a purely humanitarian issue.
Although reviewed members are outlining clear areas of interest, and sometimes funding
criteria, in their humanitarian policies, it is difficult to see how the policy criteria have been
translated into actual funding decisions. The resulting lack of information about funding interests
and intentions can lead to an uneven distribution of funding and create or reinforce neglected
emergency situations. Nearly all peer reviews during this period have noted that clearer, more
rigorously applied funding criteria would help avoid this unspoken division of labour and allow
members to focus more consistently on their areas of expertise in humanitarian assistance.
Peer reviews have documented a broad range of tools and partnership models, although funding
complex emergencies remains problematic. Most reviewed members have the right tools to ensure
early funding for rapid response, including pre-positioned funds and stocks, rapid draw-down
mechanisms, rapid response teams and the deployment of civil protection teams; Australia, Canada,
Norway, Sweden and Switzerland were all praised for this. Tools for complex emergencies are less
advanced, with the one-size-fits-all funding model no longer adequate to address the wide range of
crises in today’s world. On the positive side, more members are capitalising on the benefits of
multi-annual funding, including, increasingly, to non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
(e.g. Australia, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the
United States); others could learn from these experiences.
Many members have restructured their humanitarian systems and staff, often in response to
budgetary pressures, but also to ensure that their systems are fit for purpose. However, few members
measure and report on their own performance as a humanitarian donor, and there is not yet
proportionality in the monitoring of partner activities and results.
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Status of peer review recommendations
Figure 22.A1.1. Status of peer review recommendations by reviewed member,1
January 2012-April 2014
1. The peer review of Korea in 2012 was its first, and there were therefore no recommendations to act upon.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933121981
Figure 22.A1.2. Status of peer review recommendations by chapter, January 2012-April 2014
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933122000
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members’ ODA performance in 2013
According to preliminary data, in 2013 member countries of the Development
Assistance Committee provided USD 134.8 billion in net official development
assistance (ODA), representing 0.30% of their combined gross national income
(GNI). Despite continued pressure on budgets in OECD countries, ODA rose by
6.1% in real terms compared to 2012, marking a rebound after two years of falling
volumes, as a number of governments stepped up their ODA spending. ODA grew
steadily from 1997 to a first peak in 2010, but fell in 2011 and 2012 as many
governments took austerity measures and trimmed their aid budgets.
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IV. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE MEMBERS’ ODA PERFORMANCE IN 2013Overall aid trends
In 2013, DACmember countries provided USD 134.8 billion in net official development assistance
(ODA), an increase of 6.1% in real terms over 2012 and representing 0.30% of their combined gross
national income (GNI). ODA in 2013 made a rebound after two years of falling volumes, as a number
of members stepped up their spending on foreign aid.
ODA to developing countries grew steadily from 1997 to a first peak in 2010. It fell in 2011
and 2012 as many governments took austerity measures and trimmed aid budgets. The rebound in
aid budgets in 2013 meant that even when the contribution of the five countries that joined the DAC
in 2013 (the Czech Republic, Iceland, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia) is excluded, DAC ODA
was still at an all-time high in 2013.
The year 2013 was also an exceptional one for the DAC, with five OECD members joining the
committee. It took more than 25 years for these five countries to join the DAC. With its 29 members,
currently, and strengthened collaboration with other providers of development co-operation, notably
the People’s Republic of China and Arab countries and institutions, the DAC is positioning itself as an
important player as it moves into a new era when the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) expire.
2013 proved that the DAC is a heterogeneous group that welcomes different development actors,
including those that may still receive official development assistance and whose bilateral programmes
may focus on sharing their own recent development experience through technical co-operation.
The accession of newmembers enriches discussions within the DAC.The countries that joined the
committee in 2013 may represent a small part of concessional development flows but they have
achieved impressive development results and have valuable experience to share inmany areas that are
central to the DAC’s work. These include political and economic transformation, smooth integration
into the global economy as well as the promotion of democracy and human rights. Membership of the
DAC will further reinforce the position of these countries as important providers of development
co-operation and help them to enhance the effectiveness of their development activities.
In order to stay relevant for the development community and to play an important role
post-2015, the DAC will continue evolving towards a forum where a wide range of development
partners learn from each other’s experiences and explore new ways of working together to achieve
common goals, such as through triangular co-operation.
DAC members’ performance
In 2013, the largest providers of ODA by volume were the United States, the United Kingdom,
Germany, Japan and France. Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway and Sweden continued to exceed the
United Nations’ ODA target of 0.7% of GNI, and the United Kingdom met it for the first time. The
Netherlands fell below 0.7% for the first time since 1974.
Net ODA rose in 17 countries, with the largest increases recorded in Iceland, Italy, Japan, Norway
and the United Kingdom. It fell in 11 countries, with the biggest decreases in Canada, France and
Portugal.
Among DAC member countries, G7 countries provided 70% of total net DAC ODA in 2013, and the
DAC-EU countries provided 52%.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014258
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The annual DAC Survey on Donors’ Forward Spending Plans aims to reduce some of the
uncertainty around aid at the global, regional and country level. The most recent survey provides
estimates of future gross aid receipts of country programmable aid (CPA)1 for all DAC members and
major non-DAC and multilateral donors up to 2017.
The increase in country programmable aid predicted last year for 2013 did translate into
increased overall ODA, and affected lower-income as well as middle-income groups. Global CPA rose
by 10% in real terms in 2013 to USD 103 billion, but with widely differing increases from DAC
members (+0.2%), multilateral agencies (+17.5%) and non-DAC donors (+160%). CPA is projected to
increase slightly by 4.4% in real terms in 2014, due to continued increases by a few DAC donors and
multilateral agencies, and is expected to remain stable beyond 2014.
The survey suggests a continued focus in the medium term on middle-income countries – many
with large populations in extreme poverty – in particular countries such as Brazil, China, Chile,
Georgia, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Uzbekistan, where programmed increases above 5%
are expected up to 2017. It is most likely that aid to these countries will be in the form of soft loans.
By contrast, the survey suggests a continuation of the worrying trend of declines in programmed
aid to least developed countries (LDCs) and other low-income countries, in particular in Africa. CPA
to LDCs and other low-income countries is set to decrease by 4%, reflecting reduced access to grant
resources on which these countries are highly dependent.
Some Asian countries may see increases, however, so that by 2017 overall allocations to Asia are
expected to equal those towards Africa.
As data for 2013 are only preliminary, the analysis and detail presented in the country profiles
are based on data up to 2012. These are shown for each DAC member in Part IV.
Aggregate aid trends by aid types and channels
Country programmable aid
DAC countries’ total CPA, excluding the EU institutions, was USD 56 billion in 2012, a 2.5% decrease
from 2011. This volume represents 55% of DAC countries’ gross bilateral ODA. CPA as a share of total
bilateral ODA has been fairly stable since 2004, apart from a temporary drop in 2005 and 2006 when the
DAC gave exceptionally large amounts of debt relief to Iraq and several African countries.
Figure 23.1. Composition of DAC countries’ bilateral ODA, 2012, gross disbursements
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933122019
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IV. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE MEMBERS’ ODA PERFORMANCE IN 2013Aid by income group
The increase in ODA over the past decade benefitted countries in all income groups, including the
least developed countries; however, close to two-thirds of the increase in ODA to LDCs benefitted only
four countries (Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia and Sudan/South Sudan). A
worrying trend is that in recent years, ODA to LDCs has been decreasing.
The majority of DAC countries still fall short of the UN target of allocating 0.15% of their GNI as
net ODA to LDCs.2 In 2012, only eight member countries reached this target (Denmark, Finland,
Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom). On average, DAC
countries provided 0.09% of their GNI as ODA to LDCs in 2012.This figure takes into account both DAC
countries’ bilateral ODA and imputed multilateral ODA. While the current level, as shown in
Figure 23.3, is historically still relatively high, there has been a sharp decrease from the most recent
peak year in 2010, when 0.11% of DAC countries’ GNI was allocated to LDCs.
Figure 23.2. Bilateral ODA by income group, 2003-12, gross disbursements
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933122038
Figure 23.3. DAC countries’ net ODA to least developed countries as a % of GNI, 1960-2012
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933122057
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IV. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE MEMBERS’ ODA PERFORMANCE IN 2013Untied aid
Untied aid is defined by the DAC as loans and grants whose proceeds are fully and freely available
to finance procurement from all OECD countries and substantially all developing countries. All other
loans and grants are classified either as tied aid (procurement open only to suppliers in the donor
country) or partially untied aid (procurement open to a restricted number of countries which must
include substantially all developing countries and can include the donor). These definitions apply
whether aid is tied formally or through informal arrangements.
The DAC has focused on the issue of untying aid since its inception in 1961. The purpose of
reporting the tying status of aid is to show how much of members’ aid is open for procurement
through international competition. Internationally competitive procurement promotes cost-effective
sourcing of aid inputs, promotes free and open trade, and facilitates the implementation of Paris
Declaration commitments in areas such as co-ordination and alignment. DAC reporting on tying
status does not include multilateral ODA (core contributions to multilateral agencies), as multilateral
ODA is treated as untied by convention. In this field, as in others, the DAC has for many years given
special consideration to the needs of LDCs. In 2001, the DAC agreed the Recommendation on Untying
ODA to the Least Developed Countries. In 2008, it expanded this Recommendation to include those
heavily indebted poor countries beyond those in the LDC group (OECD, 2001; 2008).
The Paris Declaration committed OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) providers “to
continue making progress to untie aid as encouraged by the 2001 DAC Recommendation on Untying
ODA to the Least Developed Countries”, while the Accra Agenda for Action encouraged co-operation
providers to “elaborate plans to further untie aid to the maximum extent”. The Busan Partnership
agreement urges providers to “accelerate efforts to untie aid” and to “improve the quality, consistency
and transparency of reporting on the tying status of aid” (Busan Partnership for Effective Development
Co-operation: para 18e, 2011). Overall, reporting on the tying status of ODA has greatly improved.
In 2012, only 3.5% of ODA did not have its tying status reported, even though reporting on the tying
status of free-standing technical co-operation3 is not mandatory (except for ODA to the LDCs and
heavily indebted poor countries). Most (but not all) DAC members now fully report the tying status of
their technical co-operation, filling a major reporting gap which was hindering accurate and
comparative analysis of individual members’ untying performance (OECD/UNDP, 2014).
The country notes in the following chapters refer to the share of untied aid in DAC members’
total bilateral ODA (excluding donors’ administrative costs and in-donor refugee costs) to all partner
countries. In 2012, 81% of DAC countries’ bilateral ODA was untied (Figure 23.4).
ODA to and through the multilateral aid system
In 2011-12, DAC countries channelled 39% of their ODA to and through themultilateral aid system,
up from 34% in 2007-08.This increase wasmainly due to larger ODA shares allocated to themultilateral
system for specific themes, sectors or country/regions (multi-bi/non-core). While the share of multi-bi
Figure 23.4. Untying status of DAC countries’ bilateral aid, 2012
Note: This measure of untied aid excludes donors’ administrative costs and in-donor refugee costs.
Source: OECD-DAC statistics 2013.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933122076
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IV. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE MEMBERS’ ODA PERFORMANCE IN 2013went from 9% in 2007-08 to 12% in 2009-10 and 2011-12, the share of core contributions increased only
marginally, from 26% in 2007-08 to 27% in both 2009-10 and 2011-12 (Figure 23.5). In 2012, the DAC
country average of core contributions to multilateral organisations was 27%.
ODA allocations to and through civil society organisations
In 2012, DAC countries channelled USD 17 billion in official development assistance to and
through civil society organisations (CSOs) (Figure 23.6). This accounted for 16.8% of total bilateral aid;
slightly higher than the DAC country average of 16.2% in 2011. While the share of bilateral aid
allocated to and through CSOs differs widely among DAC members, the average share of total
bilateral aid for all DAC countries appears to be stabilising at 16-17%.
Figure 23.5. DAC countries’ share of ODA channelled to and through the multilateral
system, two year averages, gross disbursements
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933122095
Figure 23.6. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs, total DAC countries, two year averages,
gross disbursements
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933122114
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IV. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE MEMBERS’ ODA PERFORMANCE IN 2013Development co-operation for gender equality and women’s empowerment
Gender equality is widely recognised as an important end in its own right and a prerequisite for
sustainable development. The Busan Partnership agreement calls for a re-doubling of efforts to
implement commitments in this area. Adequate financing for gender equality and women’s rights
will be critical for making the gender equality commitments of the Busan Global Partnership a reality
and accelerating progress towards gender equality and women’s rights beyond 2015.
The DAC Gender Equality Policy Marker is a statistical instrument to measure aid that is focused
on achieving gender equality and women’s empowerment. Activities are classified as “principal”
when gender equality is a primary objective, “significant” when gender equality is an important but
secondary objective, or “not targeted”. All DAC members except the United States4 screen their
activities against the DAC gender marker. The marker is an important tool for strengthening
accountability and transparency in DAC donor financing for gender equality and women’s rights.
In the profiles of DAC members that follow, ODA supporting gender equality and women’s
empowerment is presented for each country in terms of: 1) the volume of ODA in support of gender
equality; 2) the share of sector-allocable ODA committed for significant or principal activities; and
3) the share of bilateral ODA in support of gender equality by sector. In some cases, fluctuations in a
DAC countries’ ODA for gender equality may be partly due to variations in the way the gender marker
has been applied from one year to the next. As shown in Figure 23.7, in 2012 DAC countries
committed funds for gender equality and women’s empowerment for a total of USD 23.5 billion. The
DAC country average for the share of aid that had a gender equality and women’s empowerment
objective was 28% in 2012.
Development co-operation for the environment, including the Rio conventions
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD) and the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD),
collectively known as the Rio conventions, were established following the 1992 United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro. Signatory countries committed to
incorporating the principles of sustainable development and global environmental concerns into
Figure 23.7. Total DAC countries’ ODA for gender equality and women’s empowerment,
2002-12, commitments
Source: OECD-DAC statistics 2013.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933122133
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IV. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE MEMBERS’ ODA PERFORMANCE IN 2013their national development agendas, while providing developing countries with financial and
technical resources for this purpose. The developed countries that signed the three Rio conventions
in 1992 committed themselves to assist developing countries in implementing them.
Since 1998, the DAC has monitored ODA commitments targeting the objectives of the Rio
conventions through its Creditor Reporting System using the “Rio markers”. Every bilateral
development co-operation activity reported to the Creditor Reporting System should be screened and
marked as either: 1) targeting the conventions as a “principal objective” or a “significant objective”; or
2) not targeting the objective. The Rio markers are descriptive and allow for an approximate
quantification of financial flows targeting the objectives of the Rio conventions. Finance reported to
the UNFCCC and the Convention on Biological Diversity may be based on alternative definitions and
measurement methodologies, and may not be comparable to Rio marker data. In analysing finance
flows we recommend looking at trends, over at least three years, in particular to smooth fluctuations
from large multi-year projects programmed and committed in a given year, such as observed in 2010.
In 2012, total commitments of bilateral ODA by OECD-DAC countries targeting the global
environmental objectives of the three Rio conventions totalled USD 27.1 billion, which corresponded
to 26% of total ODA (see Figure 18.1, Chapter 18). This is higher than 2011 (USD 23.9 billion in 2012
constant prices and exchange rates), but remains below the historic high reached in 2010
(USD 31.3 billion). Of the different global environmental objectives, climate change mitigation
received the largest commitments of bilateral ODA in 2012, totalling USD 13.7 billion (17% of
total ODA).5
External development finance beyond ODA
Most DAC members also provide developing countries with official finance that does not qualify
as ODA either because the operations are not primarily development-motivated (e.g. export-related
operations) or because they are extended at non-concessional terms (e.g. non-concessional loans
from bilateral development finance institutions). In recent years, the DAC has been paying more
attention to these flows, in particular with the aim of exploring ways to better monitor total official
support for development in the post-2015 measurement framework. In 2012, DAC members’ gross
disbursements of other official flows (OOF) decreased by 28% with respect to 2011, after having
recorded a general upward trend during the last decade. Japan, the United States, Canada and Korea
were the largest providers of OOF in 2012.
Beyond official finance, developing countries also receive external financial resources from DAC
members’ private sector. Total net private flows to developing countries at market terms recorded a
slight decrease in 2012 (-6%) totalling USD 307.8 billion, with the United States, the United Kingdom,
Japan and Germany being the largest providers.
With regard to net private grantsmobilised by non-governmental organisations and foundations,
developing countries received from DAC countries USD 30 billion in 2012 compared with
USD 32 billion in 2011 and USD 30.8 billion in 2010. Funds raised privately by non-governmental
organisations based in DAC member countries appear to have stabilised since 2010 and are the
equivalent of 25% of total ODA. The United States alone accounted for 74% of these flows.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014264
IV. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE MEMBERS’ ODA PERFORMANCE IN 2013Notes
1. Country programmable aid (CPA), also known as “core” aid, is the portion of aid donors’ bilateral programme
for individual countries and over which partner countries could have a significant say. CPA is much closer than
ODA to capturing the flows of aid that goes to the partner country, and has been proven in several studies to
be a good proxy of aid recorded at country level. CPA is defined through exclusions by subtracting from total
gross bilateral ODA activities that: 1) are inherently unpredictable (e.g. humanitarian aid and debt relief);
2) entail no cross-border flows (e.g. administrative costs, imputed student costs, promotion of development
awareness, and costs related to research and refugees in donor countries); 3) do not form part of co-operation
agreements between governments (e.g. food aid, development co-operation from local governments, core
funding to NGOs, ODA equity investments, development co-operation through secondary agencies and ODA
which is not allocable by country or region). Read more on CPA at: www.oecd.org/dac/aid-architecture/cpa.htm.
2. Total net ODA to LDCs calculated as DAC countries’ bilateral net ODA and imputed multilateral ODA. Imputed
multilateral ODA is a way of estimating the geographical distribution of donors’ core contributions to multilateral
agencies, based on the geographical breakdown of multilateral agencies’ disbursements for the year of reference.
For more information, see: www.oecd.org/dac/stats/oecdmethodologyforcalculatingimputedmultilateraloda.htm.
3. Free-standing technical co-operation refers to the provision of resources aimed at the transfer of technical and
managerial skills or of technology for the purpose of building up general national capacity without reference
to the implementation of any specific investment projects.
4. In the case of the United States, gender equality-focused aid is not comparable with what is reported by other
donors. The United States has implemented an improved data collection system for the gender equality
marker, and data for 2011 will be available in 2014.
5. This calculation excludes the United States which did not report on the climate mitigation marker in 2012.
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IV. AUSTRALIAAUSTRALIA
Financial flows from Australia to developing countries
Type of flows from Australia to developing countries
14.7 billion USD of private flows at market terms in 2012.These flows weremainly composed of foreign direct investment (59%).
4.9 billion USD of official development assistance (ODA) in 2013 (preliminary data).
0.33 billion USD of other official flows (OOF) in 2012.
1.4 billion USD of private grants in 2012.These resources weremobilised by non-governmental organisations and foundations.
Australia uses ODA to mobilise resources for sustainable development
Australia has a strong focus on private sector development, and seeks to maximise the impact of its ODA by leveraging
knowledge and finance from the private sector and other partners. Strengthening private sector development is one of
two strategic outcomes in its new aid policy framework. Australia will work to expand trade and business opportunities for
developing countries, focusing on improving the business-enabling environment and helping to create better functioning
markets. It is also increasing its focus on engaging with the business community in Australia and in developing countries.
It contributes to the mobilisation of domestic resources in developing countries by supporting their tax systems. In 2012,
it committed USD 10.4 million of its ODA to tax-related activities in partner countries.
It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy.
It committed USD 567 million (15% of its sector-allocable ODA) to trade-related activities in 2012, a decline of 2.7% from 2011.
The trend has been decreasing since 2010. The government’s new aid policy places a greater emphasis on aid for trade.
The government’s development co-operation policy highlights the need for remittances to help reduce poverty. Australia
has led the charge to secure G20 commitments to work towards reducing the global average costs of transferring
remittances to 5% by 2014. In 2012, remittances exiting Australia to developing countries amounted to USD 8.6 billion.
Figure 24.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-12, Australia
Note: Data on private flows at market terms and private grants are not available for 2009.
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IV. AUSTRALIAAustralia’s official development assistance
Australia provided USD 4.9 billion ODA in 2013 (prelimi-
nary data), which represented 0.34% of gross national
income (GNI) and a fall of -4.5% in real terms from 2012.
The government intends to stabilise the aid budget at the
current level, with adjustment only in line with the
consumer price index. This is likely to keep the ODA/GNI
ratio below the target of 0.5%, which remains an aspira-
tion of the government. Australia is the 10th largest donor
of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in terms
of volume. In 2012, its ODA (excluding administrative
costs and in-donor refugee costs) was fully untied. The
grant element of total ODA was 99.8% in 2012.
In 2012, 85% of ODA was provided bilaterally. Australia
allocated 15% of total ODA as core contributions to multi-
lateral organisations, compared with the DAC country
average of 27%. It channelled a further 25% of its bilateral
ODA for projects implemented by multilateral organisa-
tions (multi-bi/non-core). Australia’s use of the multi-
lateral system has been growing in recent years.
In 2012, 72% of bilateral ODA was programmed at partner
country level.Australia’s share of country programmable aid
(CPA) was well above the DAC country average (55%).
Fifty percent of CPA consisted of project-type interventions.
In 2012, USD 618 million of bilateral ODA was channelled
to and through civil society organisations (CSOs).This was
equivalent to 13% of bilateral ODA, compared with the DAC
average of 16.8%. Aid to and through CSOs has increased in
recent years, both in terms of volume (+ 6% between 2011
and 2012) and as a share of bilateral ODA.
Figure 24.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share
of GNI, 2003-13, Australia
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933122171
Figure 24.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through
the multilateral system, two year averages,
gross disbursements, Australia
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933122190
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Figure 24.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2012,
gross disbursements, Australia
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933122209
Figure 24.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs,
two year averages, gross disbursements, Australia
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933122228
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IV. AUSTRALIAIn 2012, bilateral ODA was primarily focused on Asia and Oceania. USD 1.3 billion was allocated to Far East Asia,
USD 1.1 billion to Oceania and USD 658 million to South and Central Asia. USD 374 million was allocated to sub-Saharan
Africa. Bilateral allocations to sub-Saharan Africa are set to decrease in the future in line with government policy.
68% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to Australia’s
top 10 recipients. Its top 10 recipients are in the Indo-Pacific
region where Australia has programmes with 30 countries.
Its support to fragile states reached USD 1.3 billion in 2012
(28% of total bilateral ODA).
In 2012, 28% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least devel-
oped countries (LDCs), reaching USD 1.3 billion. It has been
relatively steady as a share of bilateral ODA in recent years
(28% in 2012). Lower middle-income countries received the
highest share of bilateral ODA in 2012 (39%).
At 0.11% of GNI in 2012, total ODA to LDCs was less than
the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.
Figure 24.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2011-12 average, gross disbursements, Australia
Note: 23% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2011-12. This share is not represented on the map.
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Figure 24.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA
to top recipients, 2012, gross disbursements, Australia
Note: Totals do not add up to total bilateral ODA. A further USD 1.3 billion
was unallocated by country.
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Figure 24.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, 2003-12,
gross disbursements, Australia
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IV. AUSTRALIAHalf of bilateral ODA in 2012 was allocated to social infrastructure and services, representing USD 2.3 billion of bilateral
ODA. There was a strong focus on support to government and civil society (USD 988 million), education (USD 563 million)
and health (USD 338 million).
USD 2 billion of bilateral ODA supported gender equality.
Gender equality continues to be solidly integrated into
Australia’s projects and programmes, with a strong empha-
sis on economic empowerment, leadership and ending
violence against women. In 2012, 59% of its aid had gender
equality and women’s empowerment as a principal or
significant objective. This is a slight increase compared
to 56% in 2011 and is higher than the 2012 DAC country
average of 28%. A high share of Australia’s aid to popula-
tion, reproductive health and education focuses on gender.
USD 795 million of bilateral ODA supported the environ-
ment. Australia is committed to promoting economic
development that benefits the poor, effectively manages
natural resources and social capital, and attracts private
investment. In 2012, 17% of its aid had environment as a
principal or significant objective, compared with the DAC
country average of 26%. In 2012, 13% of Australian aid
focused particularly on climate change, compared with
the DAC country average of 24%.
Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development
Assistance Committee members”.
Reference
OECD (2014), OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Australia 2013, OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews, OECD
Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264196186-en.
Figure 24.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2011-12 average, commitments, Australia
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933122304
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Figure 24.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender
equality by sector, 2012, commitments, Australia
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Figure 24.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global
and local environment objectives, two year averages,
commitments, Australia
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IV. AUSTRIAAUSTRIA
Financial flows from Austria to developing countries
Type of flows from Austria to developing countries
3.4 billion USD of private flows at market terms in 2012.
1.2 billion USD of official development assistance (ODA) in 2013 (preliminary data).
5 million USD of other official flows (OOF) in 2012.
263million USD of private grants in 2012.These resources weremobilised by non-governmental organisations and foundations.
Austria uses ODA to mobilise resources for sustainable development
Austria promotes ODA as a catalyst to bring private sector investment to support development efforts in partner
countries, in particular through its development finance institution, the Development Bank of Austria (OeEB). The Austrian
government has developed a Guideline on Private Sector and Development (ADA, 2010) and engages with the Austrian
business community on private sector development initiatives.
It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy. It
committed USD 72 million to trade-related activities in 2012 (15% of its sector-allocable ODA), an 8% increase from 2011.The
trend has been fluctuating over the past few years.
In addition, remittances exiting Austria to developing countries amounted to USD 2.7 billion in 2012.
Figure 25.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-12, Austria
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933122361
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IV. AUSTRIAAustria’s official development assistance
In 2013, Austria provided USD 1.2 billion ODA (prelimi-
nary data), which represented 0.28% of gross national
income (GNI) and a 0.7% increase in real terms from 2012.
The Austrian government committed to achieving the
0.7% ODA/GNI target in its Work Programme 2013-18,
which will require large and sustained efforts. Austria’s
share of untied ODA (excluding administrative costs and
in-donor refugee costs) has declined, from 44% in 2011
to 37% in 2012, compared to the 2012 DAC average of 81%.
The grant element of total ODA was 100% in 2012.
In 2012, 49% of Austria’s ODA was provided bilaterally.
Austria allocated 51% of total ODA as core contributions to
multilateral organisations, compared with the DAC
country average of 27%. It channelled a further 13% of its
bilateral ODA for specific projects implemented by multi-
lateral organisations (multi-bi/non-core). Austria’s use of
the multilateral system has increased in recent years.
Only 15% of Austria’s bilateral ODA was programmed at
partner country level. Austria’s share of country program-
mable aid (CPA) was low compared to the DAC country
average (55%) in 2012. Project-type interventions accounted
for 52% of CPA. ODA allocated to debt relief was particularly
high in 2012 (18%). In addition, imputed students cost,
refugees in donor country and administrative costs
accounted for 38% of Austria’s bilateral aid in 2012.
USD 49 million of bilateral ODA was channelled to and
through civil society organisations (CSOs). Between 2011
and 2012, Austrian ODA channelled to and through CSOs
decreased, both in terms of volume (-19%) and as a share of
bilateral ODA (from 13% in 2011 to 9% in 2012). This share
was lower than the 2012 DAC country average of 16.8%.
Figure 25.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share
of GNI, 2003-13, Austria
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933122380
Figure 25.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through
the multilateral system, two year averages,
gross disbursements, Austria
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933122399
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Figure 25.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2012,
gross disbursements, Austria
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933122418
Figure 25.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs,
two year averages, gross disbursements, Austria
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933122437
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IV. AUSTRIAIn 2012, bilateral ODA was primarily focused on sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe, representing USD 166 million to
sub-Saharan Africa and USD 131 million to Eastern Europe.
65% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to Austria’s
top 10 recipients. Four of Austria’s 11 priority partner
countries are among its top 10 recipients. The Côte d’Ivoire
received high debt relief in 2012. Austria’s support to fragile
states reached USD 196 million in 2012 (36% of total
bilateral ODA).
In 2012, 11% of Austria’s bilateral ODA was allocated to
least developed countries (LDCs), amounting to
USD 57 million. As a share of bilateral ODA, it has fallen,
from 33% in 2010 to 11% in 2012. Lower middle-income
countries received the highest share of bilateral ODA
in 2012 (33%).
At 0.06% of GNI in 2012, total ODA to LDCs was less than
the UN target of 0.15% GNI.
Figure 25.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2011-12 average, gross disbursements, Austria
Note: 26% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2011-12. This share is not represented on the map.
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Note: Totals do not add up to total bilateral ODA. A further
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Figure 25.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, 2003-12,
gross disbursements, Austria
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IV. AUSTRIAIn 2012, 56% of bilateral ODA was allocated to social infrastructure and services. A total of USD 394 million of bilateral
ODA was allocated to social sectors, with a strong focus on support to education (USD 183 million) and health
(USD 99 million). Debt relief amounted to USD 100 million.
USD 57 million of bilateral ODA supported gender equal-
ity in 2012. Support for gender equality is a priority cross-
cutting issue for all Austrian development co-operation.
In 2012, 12% of Austrian aid had gender equality and
women’s empowerment as a principal or significant
objective, compared with the DAC country average of 28%.
This is a decrease compared to previous years (15% in 2011
and 17% in 2010). A high share of Austria’s aid to popula-
tion and reproductive health focuses on gender.
USD 46 million of bilateral ODA supported the environ-
ment. Tackling global environmental issues is a top
priority for Austria. In 2012, 7% of its aid had environment
as a principal or significant objective and 3% focused
particularly on climate change, compared with the respec-
tive DAC country averages of 26% and 24%. The share of
Austria’s aid in support of the environment has declined
since 2007.
Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development
Assistance Committee members”.
Reference
ADA (2010), Guidelines on Private Sector and Development, Austrian Development Agency, Vienna.
Figure 25.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2011-12 average, commitments, Austria
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Figure 25.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender
equality by sector, 2012, commitments, Austria
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933122532
0
20
40
60
80
100
Economic infrastructure
Education
Government
and civil society
Health
MultisectorOther social infrastructure
Population and
reproductive health
Production
Water and sanitation
Figure 25.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global
and local environment objectives, two year averages,
commitments, Austria
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IV. BELGIUMBELGIUM
Financial flows from Belgium to developing countries
Type of flows from Belgium to developing countries
0.3 billion USD of private flows at market terms in 2012. These flows were composed of private export credits (100%).
2.3 billion USD of official development assistance (ODA) in 2013 (preliminary data).
55 million USD of other official flows (OOF) in 2012.
519 million USD of private grants in 2011. These were mobilised by non-governmental organisations and foundations. Data
concerning private grants are not available for 2012.
Belgium uses ODA to mobilise resources for sustainable development
Belgium promotes ODA as a catalyst to bring private sector investment to support development efforts in partner
countries, in particular through its development finance institution, the Belgium Company for Developing Countries (BIO).
Belgium’s private sector development strategy aims at creating an enabling environment for business investment and
facilitating private investment in developing countries (DGDC, 2004). The strategy also focuses on raising the awareness of
Belgian businesses concerning development in partner countries and corporate social responsibility.
It contributes to the mobilisation of domestic resources in developing countries by supporting their tax systems. In 2012,
it committed USD 125 000 of its ODA to tax-related activities in partner countries.
It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy. It
committed USD 138 million to aid for trade activities in 2012 (20% of its sector-allocable ODA), a 69% decline from 2011.
Commitments have been decreasing since 2009.
Belgium partners with the International Organisation of Migration’s special programme of Migration for Development in
Africa in the Great Lakes, which supports immigrants wishing to invest their knowledge, expertise and resources in the
sustainable development of their country of origin. In 2012, remittances exiting Belgium to developing countries amounted
to USD 1.1 billion.
Figure 26.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-12, Belgium
Note: Data on private grants are not available for 2012.
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IV. BELGIUMBelgium’s official development assistance
In 2013, Belgium delivered USD 2.3 billion ODA (prelimi-
nary data), which represented 0.45% of gross national
income (GNI) and a fall of 6.1% in real terms from 2012. It
is the 9th largest donor of the Development Assistance
Committee (DAC) in terms of ODA as a percentage of GNI;
however, the aid volume and its share of GNI have been
decreasing yearly from a peak in 2010. Belgium’s share of
untied ODA (excluding administrative costs and in-donor
refugee costs) was 96% in 2012, compared to the DAC
average of 81%. The grant element of total ODA was 99.7%
in 2012.
In 2012, 63% of ODA was provided bilaterally. Belgium
allocated 37% of total ODA as core contributions to multi-
lateral organisations, compared with the DAC country
average of 27%. It channelled a further 10% of its bilateral
ODA for specific projects implemented by multilateral
organisations (multi-bi/non-core).
Only 26% of bilateral ODA was programmed at partner
country level.The share of country programmable aid (CPA)
was low compared with the DAC country average (55%)
in 2012. A high share of bilateral ODAwent to debt relief and
support to non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Project-
type interventions accounted for 83% of CPA.
USD 300 million of bilateral ODA was channelled to and
through civil society organisations (CSOs). Belgium’s aid
channelled to and through CSOs fell by 10% between 2011
and 2012; however, as a share of bilateral ODA, it increased
from 17.7% in 2011 to 20.3% in 2012. This share was higher
than the 2012 DAC country average of 16.8%.
Figure 26.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share
of GNI, 2003-13, Belgium
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933122589
Figure 26.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through
the multilateral system, two year averages,
gross disbursements, Belgium
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933122608
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Figure 26.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2012,
gross disbursements, Belgium
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Figure 26.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs,
two year averages, gross disbursements, Belgium
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IV. BELGIUMBilateral ODA in 2012 was primarily focused on sub-Saharan Africa, with USD 755 million allocated to sub-Saharan Africa,
39% (USD 295 million) of which was allocated to the Great Lakes area – a priority region for Belgian development co-operation.
69% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to Belgium’s
top 10 recipients. Nine of its 18 priority partner countries
are among its top 10 recipients. The Côte d’Ivoire – not a
priority country – received high debt relief in 2012.
Belgium’s support to fragile states reached USD 634 million
in 2012 (43% of total bilateral ODA).
In 2012, 30% of Belgium’s bilateral ODA was allocated to
least developed countries (LDCs), amounting to
USD 449 million. The share has decreased from 52%
in 2010 to 30% in 2012. LDCs, however, still receive the
highest share of bilateral ODA, noting that 35% was
unallocated by income compared with the DAC average
of 32%.
At 0.14% of GNI in 2012, total ODA to LDCs was slightly less
than the UN target of 0.15% GNI.
Figure 26.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2011-12 average, gross disbursements, Belgium
Note: 35% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2011-12. This share is not represented on the map.
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Figure 26.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA
to top recipients, 2012, gross disbursements, Belgium
Note: Totals do not add up to total bilateral ODA. A further
USD 516 million was unallocated by country.
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Figure 26.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, 2003-12,
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IV. BELGIUMIn 2012, 37% of bilateral ODA was allocated to social infrastructure and services, for a total of USD 501 million, with a
strong focus on support to education (USD 250 million). Debt relief amounted to USD 272 million.
USD 397 million of bilateral ODA supported gender
equality. Gender equality is a cross-cutting theme of
Belgian development co-operation. In 2012, 63% of
Belgium’s aid had gender equality and women’s empower-
ment as a principal or significant objective, compared
with the DAC country average of 28%. This is an increase
compared to 62% in 2011 and 52% in 2010. A high share of
Belgium’s aid to population and reproductive health
focuses on gender.
USD 248 million of bilateral ODA supported the environ-
ment. Environment is a cross-cutting theme for Belgium.
The share of environment-focused ODA has been increas-
ing since 2007. In 2012, 19% of its aid had environment as
a principal or significant objective, and 9% focused
particularly on climate change, compared with the
respective DAC country averages of 26% and 24%.
Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development
Assistance Committee members”.
Reference
DGDC (2004), Entreprendre contre la pauvreté et pour le développement, April, Directorate General for Development Co-operation, Brussels.
Figure 26.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2011-12 average, commitments, Belgium
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Figure 26.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender
equality by sector, 2012, commitments, Belgium
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933122741
0
20
40
60
80
100
Economic infrastructure
Education
Government
and civil society
Health
MultisectorOther social infrastructure
Population and
reproductive health
Production
Water and sanitation
Figure 26.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global
and local environment objectives, two year averages,
commitments, Belgium
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IV. CANADACANADA
Financial flows from Canada to developing countries
Type of flows from Canada to developing countries
9.2 billion USD of private flows at market terms in 2012. These flows were mainly composed of foreign direct investments.
4.9 billion USD of official development assistance (ODA) in 2013 (preliminary data).
1.6 billion USD of other official flows (OOF) in 2012.
2 billion USD of private grants in 2012. These resources were mobilised by non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
and foundations.
Canada uses ODA to mobilise resources for sustainable development
Canada promotes ODA as a catalyst to bring private sector investment to support development efforts in partner
countries. Through its Sustainable Economic Growth strategy (CIDA, 2011), Canada aims at engaging the private sector in
development, particularly by supporting an enabling environment for business and access to markets for developing
countries. It supports the leveraging of local, Canadian and international investment in private sector-led growth.
It contributes to the mobilisation of domestic resources in developing countries by supporting their tax systems. In 2012,
it committed USD 5 million of its ODA to tax-related activities in partner countries.
It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy.
It committed USD 593 million to trade-related activities in 2012 (27% of its sector-allocable ODA), a 27% increase from 2011.
The trend has been fluctuating in recent years.
In addition, remittances exiting Canada to developing countries amounted to USD 15.6 billion in 2012.
Figure 27.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-12, Canada
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IV. CANADACanada’s official development assistance
In 2013, Canada provided USD 4.9 billion ODA (prelimi-
nary data), a fall of 11.4% in real terms from 2012. It is
the 9th largest donor of the Development Assistance
Committee (DAC) in terms of volume. Canada’s ODA as a
percentage of gross national income (GNI) has fallen, from
0.34% in 2010 to 0.27% in 2013. Canada’s share of untied
ODA (excluding administrative costs and in-donor refugee
costs) was 92% in 2012, well above the DAC average of 81%.
The grant element of total ODA was 100% in 2012.
In 2012, 72% of ODA was provided bilaterally. In 2012,
Canada allocated 28% of total ODA as core contributions to
multilateral organisations, which was close to the DAC
country average of 27%. It channelled a further 41% of its
bilateral ODA for specific projects implemented by multi-
lateral organisations (multi-bi/non-core).
28% of bilateral ODAwas programmed at partner country
level. Canada’s share of country programmable aid (CPA)
was less than the DAC country average (55%) in 2012.
A high share of Canada’s bilateral ODA was categorised
as “other and unallocated”. Contributions to pooled
programmes and funds accounted for 48% of CPA.
USD 767 million of bilateral ODA was channelled to and
through civil society organisations (CSOs). Aid
channelled to and through CSOs slightly decreased
between 2011 and 2012, both in terms of volume and as
a share of bilateral ODA. This share amounted to 19%
in 2012, which was higher than the DAC country average
of 16.8%.
Figure 27.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share
of GNI, 2003-13, Canada
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933122798
Figure 27.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through
the multilateral system, two year averages,
gross disbursements, Canada
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Figure 27.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2012,
gross disbursements, Canada
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Figure 27.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs,
two year averages, gross disbursements, Canada
Note: Data on ODA channelled through CSOs are not available for 2007.
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IV. CANADABilateral ODA primarily focused on sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean. In 2012, USD 1.7 billion of
bilateral ODA was allocated to sub-Saharan Africa and USD 862 million to Latin America and the Caribbean.
52% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to Canada’s
top 10 recipients. Canada has 20 “countries of focus”, 8 of
which are among the top 10 recipients. Côte d’Ivoire and
the Democratic Republic of Congo – not focus countries –
received exceptional debt relief in 2012. Its support to
fragile states reached USD 1.3 billion (32% of total bilateral
ODA) in 2012.
In 2012, 31% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least
developed countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 1.3 billion.
The share has decreased in recent years, from 43% in 2010
to 31% in 2012. LDCs, however, still receive the highest
share of bilateral ODA, noting that 47% was unallocated by
income.
At 0.11% of GNI in 2012, total ODA to LDCs was slightly less
than the UN target of 0.15% GNI.
Figure 27.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2011-12 average, gross disbursements, Canada
Note: 21% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2011-12. This share is not represented on the map.
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Figure 27.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA
to top recipients, 2012, gross disbursements, Canada
Note: Totals do not add up to total bilateral ODA. A further USD 1.9 billion
was unallocated by country.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933122893
167
139
123
123
113
102
101
101
94
66
USD million
Top 10 recipients
28%20%52%
Top 10 recipients Recipients 11 to 20 Other recipients
Haiti
Côte d'Ivoire
Mozambique
Ethiopia
Tanzania
Afghanistan
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Ghana
Mali
Ukraine
Figure 27.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, 2003-12,
gross disbursements, Canada
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IV. CANADAIn 2012, 40% of bilateral ODA was allocated to social infrastructure and services, amounting to USD 1.2 billion. There was
a strong focus on support to health (USD 482 million). Humanitarian aid amounted to USD 424 million.
USD 1.4 billion of bilateral ODA supported gender
equality. Canada has made a long-term effort to main-
stream gender equality across its programmes and to
bring gender equality into its policy dialogue with
partners (OECD, 2013). In 2012, 63% of its aid had gender
equality and women’s empowerment as a principal or
significant objective, compared with the DAC country
average of 28%. This was a slight decrease compared to
66% in 2011.
USD 1.1 billion of bilateral ODA supported the environ-
ment. Environmental sustainability is a cross-cutting
priority for Canada. The share of environment-focused
ODA has been increasing since 2007. In 2012, 32% of
Canadian aid had environment as a principal or signifi-
cant objective and 17% focused particularly on climate
change, compared with the respective DAC country
averages of 26% and 24%.
Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development
Assistance Committee members”.
References
CIDA (2011), “Stimulating sustainable economic growth: CIDA’s sustainable economic growth strategy”, Canadian International
Development Agency, Ottawa, Ontario,www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUImages/EconomicGrowth/$file/Sustainable-Economic-
Growth-e.pdf.
OECD (2013),OECD DevelopmentAssistance Peer Reviews: Canada 2012, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264200784-en.
Figure 27.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2011-12 average, commitments, Canada
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Figure 27.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender
equality by sector, 2012, commitments, Canada
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933122950
0
20
40
60
80
100
Economic infrastructure
Education
Government
and civil society
Health
MultisectorOther social infrastructure
Population and
reproductive health
Production
Water and sanitation
Figure 27.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global
and local environment objectives, two year averages,
commitments, Canada
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IV. CZECH REPUBLICCZECH REPUBLIC
Financial flows from the Czech Republic to developing countries
Type of flows from the Czech Republic to developing countries
In 2013, the Czech Republic provided USD 212 million ODA (preliminary data). This represented 0.11% of gross national
income (GNI) and a fall of 4.7% in real terms from 2012. In its Development Co-operation Strategy (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 2010), the Czech Republic committed to maintaining a gradual increase in its ODA as a percentage of GNI.While the
share of ODA to GNI averaged 0.12% in 2010-12, it decreased in 2013 due mainly to the termination of activities supported
by the Czech Republic in Afghanistan. The Czech Republic’s share of untied ODA (excluding administrative costs and
in-donor refugee costs) was 45% in 2012, compared to the DAC average of 81%. The grant element of total ODA was 100%
in 2012. At present, data on other official flows, private grants (funds raised by non-governmental organisations and
foundations) and private flows at market terms from the Czech Republic to developing countries are not available.
The Czech Republic uses ODA to mobilise resources for sustainable development
Czech development co-operation gives considerable emphasis to the role of the private sector. Private companies
implement an important share of Czech bilateral development projects. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Platform of
Businesses for Development Co-operation strive to motivate Czech business companies to get involved in development
co-operation, to respect corporate social responsibility principles and to develop inclusive business models that offer the
potential for both commercial success and development impact.
The Czech Republic promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration in
the world economy. It committed USD 10 million (22% of its sector-allocable ODA) to trade-related activities in 2012, a
16% decrease from 2011.
In addition, remittances exiting the Czech Republic to developing countries amounted to USD 125 million in 2012.
Figure 28.1. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share of GNI, 2003-13, Czech Republic
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IV. CZECH REPUBLICThe Czech Republic’s official development assistance
In 2012, 30% of ODA was provided bilaterally, totalling
USD 66 million. The Czech Republic allocated 70% of total
ODA as core contributions to multilateral organisations
(USD 153 million), compared with the DAC country
average of 27%. It channelled a further 5% of its bilateral
ODA (USD 3 million) for specific projects implemented by
multilateral organisations (multilateral non-core contri-
butions). While most multilateral ODA is channelled
through the EU, it is also channelled through the UN and
other multilateral organisations.
67% of bilateral ODAwas programmed at partner country
level. The Czech Republic’s share of country program-
mable aid (CPA) was above the DAC country average (55%)
in 2012. Project-type interventions made up 65% of CPA.
In-donor refugee costs accounted for 14% of bilateral ODA.
USD 15 million of bilateral ODA was channelled to and
through civil society organisations (CSOs). The
Czech Republic’s ODA channelled to and through CSOs
slightly decreased in terms of volume between 2011
and 2012 (-4%), but increased as a share of bilateral ODA,
from 21.8% in 2011 to 22.2% in 2012. This share was higher
than the 2012 DAC country average of 16.8%.
Figure 28.2. Share of ODA channelled to and through
the multilateral system, two year averages,
gross disbursements, Czech Republic
Note: Data on multi-bi/non-core ODA are not available prior to 2011.
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Figure 28.3. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2012,
gross disbursements, Czech Republic
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Figure 28.4. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs,
2011-12 average, gross disbursements, Czech Republic
Note: Data are not available prior to 2011.
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IV. CZECH REPUBLICBilateral ODA primarily focused on Eastern Europe and South and Central Asia. In 2012, USD 19 million of bilateral ODA
was allocated to Eastern Europe, and USD 19 million to South and Central Asia.
68% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to the
Czech Republic’s top 10 recipients. Nine of its priority
programme countries and project countries are among its
top 10 recipients. Its support to fragile states reached
USD 31 million in 2012 (47% of total bilateral ODA).
In 2012, 32% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least devel-
oped countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 21 million. As a
share of bilateral ODA, it has fluctuated around 30%
since 2010. Lower middle-income countries received the
highest share of bilateral ODA in 2012 (36%).
At 0.03% of GNI in 2012, total ODA to LDCs was far from
the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.
Figure 28.5. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2011-12 average, gross disbursements, Czech Republic
Note: 17% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2011-12. This share is not represented on the map. Data are not available prior to 2011.
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Figure 28.7. Bilateral ODA by income group, 2003-12,
gross disbursements, Czech Republic
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IV. CZECH REPUBLICHalf of bilateral ODA was allocated to social infrastructure and services. In 2010, the Czech Republic identified five priority
areas for development co-operation: environment, agriculture, social development, economic development and the support
of democracy, human rights and social transition. In 2012, USD 33 million of bilateral ODA was allocated to social sectors,
with a strong focus on support to government and civil society (USD 13 million), education (USD 8 million) and water and
sanitation (USD 7 million).
USD 2 million of bilateral ODA supported gender equal-
ity. Gender equality is one of the cross-cutting issues in
the Czech Republic’s development co-operation. In 2012,
5% of Czech aid had gender equality and women’s
empowerment as a principal or significant objective,
compared with the DAC country average of 28%. Over a
third of Czech aid to health, population and reproductive
health focuses on gender.
USD 14 million of bilateral ODA supported environment.
Protection of the environment and the fight against
climate change is a priority cross-cutting issue for the
Czech Republic and is reflected in all development activi-
ties. In 2012, 21% of Czech aid had environment as a prin-
cipal or significant objective and 8% focused particularly
on climate change, compared with the respective DAC
country averages of 26% and 24%.
Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development
Assistance Committee members”.
Reference
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2010), The Development Cooperation Strategy of the Czech Republic 2010-17, October, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Prague.
Figure 28.8. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2011-12 average, commitments, Czech Republic
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Figure 28.9. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender
equality by sector, 2012, commitments, Czech Republic
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Figure 28.10. Bilateral ODA in support of global
and local environment objectives, 2011-12 average,
commitments, Czech Republic
Note: Data are not available prior to 2011.
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IV. DENMARKDENMARK
Financial flows from Denmark to developing countries
Type of flows from Denmark to developing countries
-242 million USD of private flows at market terms in 2012. These flows were mostly composed of foreign direct investment.
2.9 billion USD of official development assistance (ODA) in 2013 (preliminary data).
-121 million USD of other official flows (OOF) in 2012.
71million USD of private grants in 2012. These resources were mobilised by non-governmental organisations and foundations.
Denmark uses ODA to mobilise resources for sustainable development
Denmark promotes ODA as a catalyst to bring private sector investment to support development efforts in partner
countries. Its private sector development strategy aims at creating an enabling environment for private sector development
in developing countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2011). It uses several tools for engaging with the Danish
business community as partners for development, including Danida Business Partnerships which support the development
of commercial partnerships between Danish companies and partners in developing countries aimed at creating decent jobs
and promoting corporate social responsibility.
Denmark’s Implementation Plan for Tax and Development, aims, among other things, to increase developing country
public sector capacity for tax development and management. In its general budget support contracts, Denmark will also
focus more on efforts to strengthen tax systems and national capacity to collect taxes.
Denmark promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world
economy. It committed USD 384 million to trade-related activities in 2012 (28% of its sector-allocable ODA), a 34% increase
from 2011. The trend has been fluctuating over the past few years.
In addition, remittances exiting Denmark to developing countries amounted to USD 1 billion in 2012.
Figure 29.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-12, Denmark
Note: Data on private grants are not available for 2003.
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IV. DENMARKDenmark’s official development assistance
In 2013, Denmark provided USD 2.9 billion ODA (prelimi-
nary data), which represented a 3.8% increase in real
terms from 2012. After a slight decrease between 2010
and 2012, Denmark’s ODA/GNI share increased from 0.83%
in 2012 to 0.85% in 2013. It is the 4th largest donor of the
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in terms of
ODA/GNI share (0.85%) and one of five DAC members
meeting the UN target of 0.7%. The Danish government
has committed to reaching a 1% target over several years.
In 2012, 96% of Danish ODA (excluding administrative
costs and in-donor refugee costs) was untied. The grant
element of total ODA was 100% in 2012.
In 2012, 72% of ODA was provided bilaterally. Denmark
allocated 28% of total ODA as core contributions to multi-
lateral organisations, compared to the DAC country
average of 27%. It also channelled 17% of its bilateral ODA
for specific projects implemented by multilateral organ-
isations (multi-bi/non-core).
In 2012, 53% of bilateral ODA was programmed at partner
country level. Denmark’s share of country programmable
aid (CPA) was close to the DAC country average (55%).
Project-type interventions made up 78% of CPA.
USD 480 million of bilateral ODA was channelled to and
through civil society organisations (CSOs). Denmark
channelled 24% of its bilateral ODA to and through CSOs
in 2012, compared with the DAC country average of 16.8%.
In recent years, aid to and through CSOs has increased
both in volume (+9% between 2011 and 2012) and as a
share of bilateral ODA (it stood at 21% in 2011).
Figure 29.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share
of GNI, 2003-13, Denmark
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933123197
Figure 29.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through
the multilateral system, two year averages,
gross disbursements, Denmark
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933123216
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Figure 29.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2012,
gross disbursements, Denmark
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933123235
Figure 29.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs,
two year averages, gross disbursements, Denmark
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933123254
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IV. DENMARKBilateral ODA primarily focused on sub-Saharan Africa. In 2012, Denmark allocated USD 753 million to sub-Saharan Africa
and USD 249 million to South and Central Asia.
58% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to the top 10
recipients. All of the top 10 recipients of Danish aid
in 2012 were priority countries – Denmark has a total of
22 priority countries. Its support to fragile states reached
USD 650 million in 2012 (32% of total bilateral ODA).
In 2012, 37% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least devel-
oped countries (LDCs) amounting to USD 757 million. LDCs
received the highest, even if decreasing, share of bilateral
ODA in 2012 noting that in 2012 41% was unallocated by
income group compared to the DAC average of 32%.
At 0.31% of gross national income (GNI), total ODA to LDCs
was well above the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.
Figure 29.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2011-12 average, gross disbursements, Denmark
Note: 35% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2011-12. This share is not represented on the map.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933123273
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Figure 29.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA
to top recipients, 2012, gross disbursements, Denmark
Note: Totals do not add up to total bilateral ODA. A further
USD 830 million was unallocated by country.
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Figure 29.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, 2003-12,
gross disbursements, Denmark
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IV. DENMARKOver 40% of bilateral ODA was allocated to social infrastructure and services in 2012, reaching USD 798 million. There was
a strong focus on support to government and civil society (USD 306 million) and education (USD 206 million).
USD 213 million was allocated to the production sector (mainly to agriculture).
USD 745 million of bilateral ODA supported gender
equality. Advancing gender equality and women’s rights
is a major strategic priority for Denmark. In 2012, 55% of
Danish aid had gender equality and women’s empower-
ment as a principal or significant objective, compared
with the DAC country average of 28%. This is a decrease
compared to previous years (67% in 2009). A high share of
Denmark’s aid to water, sanitation and health focuses on
gender.
USD 650 million of bilateral ODA supported the environ-
ment. Promoting green growth based on sustainable
management and use of natural resources is one of the
four overall goals of Danish development co-operation.
In 2012, 34% of Danish aid had environment as a principal
or significant objective and 19% focused particularly on
climate change, compared with the respective DAC
country averages of 26% and 24%.
Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development
Assistance Committee members”.
Reference
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (2011), Growth and Employment 2011-15, Strategic Framework, March, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of Denmark, Copenhagen.
Figure 29.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2011-12 average, commitments, Denmark
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933123330
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Figure 29.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender
equality by sector, 2012, commitments, Denmark
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933123349
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Figure 29.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global
and local environment objectives, two year averages,
commitments, Denmark
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IV. EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONSEUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS
Financial flows from the European Union institutions to developing countries
Type of flows from the EU institutions to developing countries
15.9 billion USD of official development assistance (ODA) in 2013 (preliminary data).
-1 billion USD of other official flows (OOF) in 2012.
Flows to developing countries from the EU institutions are limited to ODA and OOF.
The EU institutions use ODA to mobilise resources for sustainable development
The EU institutions promote ODA as a catalyst to bring private sector investment to support development efforts in
partner countries. They have developed policies and instruments supporting private investment and the expansion of
partner countries’ private sector in order to ensure inclusive and sustainable economic growth (OECD, 2013).
They contribute to the mobilisation of domestic resources in developing countries by supporting their tax systems and
fighting illicit financial flows. In 2012, they committed USD 8.6 million of their ODA to tax-related activities in partner countries.
They promote aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into theworld economy.They
committed USD 11.3 billion to trade-related activities in 2012 (55% of their sector-allocable ODA), a 56% increase from 2011. This
strong increase is due to the DAC’s decision to include loans of the European Investment Bank in the ODA statistics.
They acknowledge the importance of remittances sent by migrants in the EU back to developing countries and how
fluctuations in these flows can have an impact on the living conditions of recipients. The EU therefore stresses the need to
pursue efforts towards reducing costs of transferring remittances (COM, 2011).
Figure 30.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-12, EU institutions
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933123387
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IV. EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONSThe European Union institutions’ official development assistance
In 2013, the EU institutions provided USD 15.9 billion ODA
(preliminary data), a fall of 13.1% in real terms from 2012.
The level of ODA managed by the EU institutions is
determined within the EU multi-year financial framework.
It steadily grew from 2003 to 2012, reaching a peak of
USD 17.5 billion. The trend was, however, reversed in 2013.
In 2012, the percentage of untied aid was 66% of EU’s ODA
(excluding administrative costs and in-donor refugee costs).
In 2012, 98% of ODA was provided bilaterally. In 2012, the
EU institutions allocated 2% of total ODA as core contribu-
tions to multilateral organisations. They channelled a
further 13% of their bilateral ODA for projects imple-
mented by multilateral organisations (multi-bi/non-core).
The EU institutions are unique among DAC members
because of the dual role they play in development assis-
tance. In contrast to multilateral organisations that exclu-
sively receive transfers from members, the EU institutions
are donors in their own right with their own resources and
budgetary authority.
In 2012, 48% of the EU institutions’ bilateral ODA was
programmed at partner country level. The share of
country programmable aid (CPA) totalled 48% of its
bilateral aid. A high share of bilateral ODA was categorised
as “other and unallocated”. Project-type interventions
accounted for 58% of CPA.
USD 1.9 billion of bilateral ODA was channelled to and
through civil society organisations (CSOs). In 2012, 10% of
bilateral ODA was channelled to and through CSOs.
Although aid to and through CSOs has increased in terms
of volume in recent years (6% increase between 2011
and 2012), it has slightly decreased as a share of bilateral
ODA since 2010, when it stood at 13%.
Figure 30.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume, 2003-13,
EU institutions
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933123406
Figure 30.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through
the multilateral system, two year averages,
gross disbursements, EU institutions
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933123425
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Figure 30.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2012,
gross disbursements, EU institutions
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933123444
Figure 30.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs,
two year averages, gross disbursements, EU institutions
Note: Data on ODA to CSOs are not available for 2010 and 2011.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933123463
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IV. EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONSBilateral ODA primarily focused on Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa. In 2012, USD 5.6 billion was allocated to
Eastern Europe and USD 5 billion to sub-Saharan Africa.
49% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to the top 10
recipients. The European Commission has specific agree-
ments and instruments with 79 Africa, Caribbean and
Pacific countries and 9 European accession countries.
22% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least developed
countries (LDCs) which amounted to USD 3.9 billion
in 2012. The share has decreased from 35% in 2010 to 22%
in 2012. ODA allocated to upper middle-income countries
has strongly increased in recent years, in terms of volume
(USD 6.8 billion in 2012) and as a share of bilateral ODA
(38% in 2012). This is mainly due to the instrument for
pre-accession with nine European countries.
Figure 30.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2011-12 average, gross disbursements, EU institutions
Note: 9% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2011-12. This share is not represented on the map.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933123482
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Figure 30.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA
to top recipients, 2012, gross disbursements,
EU institutions
Note: Totals do not add up to total bilateral ODA. A further
USD 2.9 billion was unallocated by country.
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Figure 30.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, 2003-12,
gross disbursements, EU institutions
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933123520
0
8
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Constant 2012 USD billion
Upper middle-income countries
Lower middle-income countries
Other low-income countries
Least developed countriesDEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014294
IV. EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONSTwo-thirds of bilateral ODA was allocated to social and economic infrastructure and services. In 2012, USD 3.2 billion of
bilateral ODAwas allocated to government and civil society, USD 3.1 billion to transport and storage andUSD 2.2 billion to energy
generation and supply.
USD 3.5 billion of bilateral ODA supported gender
equality. The EU is strongly committed to promoting
gender equality. It has adopted an innovative three-
pronged approach with political dialogue as a key dimen-
sion, along with mainstreaming and focused programmes
(OECD, 2013). In 2012, 28% of its aid had gender equality
and women’s empowerment as a principal or significant
objective, compared to 20% in 2011 and 14% in 2009. A
high share of the EU’s aid to population and reproductive
health focuses on gender.
USD 3.2 billion of bilateral ODA supported the environ-
ment. The European Commission has made an important
effort to promote international consensus for reducing
emissions and for helping developing countries adapt to
climate change. At the same time, progress in main-
streaming environment was slow up to 2012 in the
absence of a strategy. In 2012, 13% of the EU’s aid had envi-
ronment as a principal or significant objective and 10%
focused particularly on climate change.
Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development
Assistance Committee members”.
References
COM (2011), Study on Legal Instruments and Lessons Learned from the Evaluations Managed by the Joint Evaluation Unit, Vol. 1, 2 and 3, COM,
Brussels.
OECD (2013), OECD Development Assistance Peer Reviews: European Union 2012, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/
9789264196124-en.
Figure 30.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2011-12 average, commitments, EU institutions
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Figure 30.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender
equality by sector, 2012, commitments, EU institutions
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Figure 30.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global
and local environment objectives, two year averages,
commitments, EU institutions
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IV. FINLANDFINLAND
Financial flows from Finland to developing countries
Type of flows from Finland to developing countries
180 million USD of private flows at market terms in 2012. These flows were composed of foreign direct investment (100%).
1.4 billion USD of official development assistance (ODA) in 2013 (preliminary data).
3 million USD of other official flows (OOF) in 2012.
17million USD of private grants in 2012. These resources were mobilised by non-governmental organisations and foundations.
Finland uses ODA to mobilise resources for sustainable development
Finland promotes ODA as a catalyst to support private sector investment in developing countries. It has a series of
instruments to enable it to do this, including: Finnfund, Finland’s Development Finance Institution; FinnPartnership, the
Finnish Business Partnership Programme; and a concessional credit scheme. It has a clear strategy for working with the
private sector to promote jobs and trade development (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2012a).
It contributes to the mobilisation of domestic resources in developing countries by supporting their tax systems
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2012b).
It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy.
It committed USD 127 million to trade-related activities in 2012 (26% of its sector-allocable ODA), a decline of 60% from 2011.
The trend has been fluctuating over the past few years.
In addition, remittances exiting Finland to developing countries amounted to USD 185 million in 2012.
Figure 31.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-12, Finland
Note: Data on OOF are not available for 2005 and 2006.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933123596
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IV. FINLANDFinland’s official development assistance
In 2013, Finland provided USD 1.4 billion ODA (prelimi-
nary data), a 3.5% increase in real terms from 2012. It is the
7th largest donor of the Development Assistance Commit-
tee (DAC) in terms of ODA/GNI share (0.55%). Finland’s
ODA has increased considerably since 2007, both in terms
of volume and share of ODA/GNI. Despite this success,
Finland is aware that it will be a challenge to meet its
commitment to 0.7% of ODA/GNI by 2015. Finland’s share
of untied ODA (excluding administrative costs and
in-donor refugee costs) was 95% in 2012, which is higher
than the DAC average of 81%. The grant element of total
ODA was 100% in 2012.
In 2012, 61% of ODA was provided bilaterally. Finland
allocated 39% of total ODA as core contributions to multi-
lateral organisations, compared with the DAC country
average of 27%. It channelled a further 29% of its bilateral
ODA for specific projects implemented by multilateral
organisations (multi-bi/non-core).
48% of bilateral ODA provided by Finland was
programmed at partner country level. Finland’s share of
country programmable aid (CPA) was lower than the DAC
country average (55%) in 2012, due to high spending on
humanitarian and food aid and a large amount of unallo-
cated aid by region or income. Project-type interventions
accounted for 67% of CPA.
USD 173 million of bilateral ODA was channelled to and
through civil society organisations (CSOs). In 2012, 22% of
bilateral ODA was channelled to and through CSOs,
compared with the DAC country average of 16.8%. The
level of aid to and through CSOs has been relatively steady
since 2009, both in terms of volume and as a share of
bilateral ODA.
Figure 31.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share
of GNI, 2003-13, Finland
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933123615
Figure 31.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through
the multilateral system, two year averages,
gross disbursements, Finland
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933123634
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
p
0
0.60
0
1.6
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
Amount of ODA (left axis) ODA as a % of GNI (right axis)
Constant 2012 USD billion % of GNI
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
%
2007-08 2009-10 2011-12
Bilateral ODA, excl. multi-bi
Multilateral ODA
Multi-bi/non-core
ODA channelled
to and through
the multilateral
system 
Figure 31.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2012,
gross disbursements, Finland
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Figure 31.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs,
two year averages, gross disbursements, Finland
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IV. FINLANDBilateral ODA primarily focused on sub-Saharan Africa. In 2012, USD 261 million was allocated to sub-Saharan Africa and
USD 88 million to South and Central Asia.
58% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to Finland’s
top 10 recipients. It has long-lasting partnerships with
eight countries, all of which are among its top 10 recipients.
In 2012, its support to fragile states reached USD 222 million
(28% of total bilateral ODA).
33% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least developed
countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 269 million in 2012.
The share has been relatively steady in recent years. LDCs
received the highest share of bilateral ODA compared with
other income groups, noting that 48% was unallocated by
income group in 2012 compared with the 32% DAC average.
At 0.18% of gross national income (GNI) in 2012, total ODA
to LDCs was above the UN target of 0.15% GNI.
Figure 31.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2011-12 average, gross disbursements, Finland
Note: 35% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2011-12. This share is not represented on the map.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933123691
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Figure 31.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA
to top recipients, 2012, gross disbursements, Finland
Note: Totals do not add up to total bilateral ODA. A further
USD 383 million was unallocated by country.
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Figure 31.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, 2003-12,
gross disbursements, Finland
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IV. FINLANDOver a third of bilateral ODA was allocated to social infrastructure and services. In 2012, USD 269 million of bilateral ODA
was allocated to social sectors, with a strong focus on support to government and civil society (USD 141 million),
USD 94 million to humanitarian aid and USD 68 million to production sectors.
USD 222 million of bilateral ODA supported gender equal-
ity. Finland is committed to integrating gender equality
into its projects and programmes. In 2012, 46% of its aid
had gender equality and women’s empowerment as a
principal or significant objective, compared with the DAC
country average of 28%. This was a decrease compared
with 55% in 2011 and 54% in 2010. A high share of Finland’s
aid to health, education, population and reproductive
health focuses on gender.
USD 170 million of bilateral ODA supported the environ-
ment. Finland is committed to mainstreaming the envi-
ronment into its programming, but challenges remain in
ensuring it is done systematically. In 2012, 21% of its aid
had environment as a principal or significant objective,
and 15% focused on climate change, compared with
respective DAC country averages of 26% and 24%.
Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development
Assistance Committee members”.
References
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Figure 31.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2011-12 average, commitments, Finland
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Figure 31.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender
equality by sector, 2012, commitments, Finland
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Figure 31.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global
and local environment objectives, two year averages,
commitments, Finland
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IV. FRANCEFRANCE
Financial flows from France to developing countries
Type of flows from France to developing countries
18 billion USD of private flows at market terms in 2012. These flows were mainly composed of foreign direct investment
(53%).
11.4 billion USD of official development assistance (ODA) in 2013 (preliminary data).
-0.5 billion USD of other official flows (OOF) in 2012.
Data on private grants – resources mobilised by non-governmental organisations and foundations – are not available.
France uses ODA to mobilise resources for sustainable development
France promotes ODA as a catalyst to bring private sector investment to support development efforts in partner
countries, particularly through its development finance institution, PROPARCO. France has developed a varied range of
instruments in order to steer investments toward developing countries. It supports local private sector development and
strengthens the banking system as well as meso and micro-finance in partner countries (OECD, 2014).
It contributes to the mobilisation of domestic resources in developing countries by supporting their tax systems. In 2012,
France committed USD 514 000 of its ODA to tax-related activities in partner countries.
It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy.
France committed USD 3.5 billion to trade-related activities in 2012 (44% of its sector-allocable ODA), almost three times as
much as in 2011. The trend has been fluctuating over the past few years.
It has developed tools to facilitate transfers of remittances by migrants and encourage productive investments (OECD,
2014). In 2012, remittances exiting France to developing countries amounted to USD 8.4 billion.
Figure 32.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-12, France
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933123805
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IV. FRANCEFrance’s official development assistance
In 2013, France provided USD 11.4 billion ODA (prelimi-
nary data), which represented 0.41% of gross national
income (GNI) and a 9.8% decrease in real terms from 2012.
It is the 5th largest donor of the Development Assistance
Committee (DAC) in terms of volume. France plans to
reach a 0.48% ODA/GNI ratio by 2015. In 2012, 96% of
French ODA (excluding administrative costs and in-donor
refugee costs) was untied, well above the DAC average of
81%. The grant element of total ODA was 79.5% in 2012,
which is lower than the DAC compliance grant element
norm of 86%.
In 2012, 69% of ODA was provided bilaterally. France
allocated 31% of total ODA as core contributions to multi-
lateral organisations, compared with the DAC country
average of 27%. It channelled a further 1% of its bilateral
ODA for specific projects implemented by multilateral
organisations (multi-bi/non-core).
54% of bilateral ODA programmed by France was at partner
country level. France’s share of country programmable aid
(CPA) was close to the DAC country average (55%) in 2012. A
high share of French bilateral ODA went to debt relief and
imputed student costs. Project-type interventions made up
77% of CPA.
USD 122 million of bilateral ODA was channelled to and
through civil society organisations (CSOs). France’s ODA
to and through CSOs has been relatively steady since 2009,
both in terms of volume and as a share of bilateral ODA.
This share (1.5% in 2012) was low compared with the DAC
country average of 16.8%.
Figure 32.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share
of GNI, 2003-13, France
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933123824
Figure 32.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through
the multilateral system, two year averages,
gross disbursements, France
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933123843
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Figure 32.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2012,
gross disbursements, France
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Figure 32.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs,
two year averages, gross disbursements, France
Note: Data on ODA to CSOs are not available for 2012.
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IV. FRANCEBilateral ODA primarily focused on sub-Saharan Africa. In 2012, France allocated USD 3.6 billion to sub-Saharan Africa and
USD 1.4 billion to North Africa.
62% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to France’s
top 10 recipients. France had 17 priority partner countries
in sub-Saharan Africa in 2012. The Côte d’Ivoire received
high debt relief in 2012. Its support to fragile states
reached USD 3 billion in 2012 (32% of total bilateral ODA).
In 2012, 15% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least devel-
oped countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 1.4 billion. The
share has generally decreased over the past decade (its
peak was at 38% in 2004). Lower middle-income countries
received the highest share of bilateral ODA in 2012 (33%).
At 0.10% of GNI in 2012, ODA to LDCs was less than the UN
target of 0.15% GNI.
Figure 32.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2011-12 average, gross disbursements, France
Note: 14% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2011-12. This share is not represented on the map.
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Figure 32.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA
to top recipients, 2012, gross disbursements, France
Note: Totals do not add up to total bilateral ODA. A further USD 1.8 billion
was unallocated by country.
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Figure 32.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, 2003-12,
gross disbursements, France
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IV. FRANCEAlmost half of bilateral ODA was allocated to social and economic infrastructure and services. In 2012, USD 3.2 billion of
France’s bilateral ODA was allocated to social sectors, with a strong focus on support to education (USD 1.4 billion).
USD 2.9 billion was allocated to economic infrastructure and services, mainly to energy generation and supply
(USD 1.5 billion), transport and storage (USD 1.4 billion).
USD 1.7 billion of bilateral ODA supported gender equality.
Gender equality is not yet integrated into France’s projects
and programmes (OECD, 2014). In 2012, 23% of French aid
had gender equality and women’s empowerment as a
principal or significant objective, compared with the DAC
country average of 28%. This was a decrease compared with
36% in 2011 and 30% in 2010. Education is the only sector in
which the focus on gender is strong.
USD 4.5 billion of bilateral ODA supported the environ-
ment. France has made positive steps to integrate the
environment and climate change into its development
co-operation (OECD, 2014). In 2012, 39% of French aid had
environment as a principal or significant objective and
33% focused on climate change, compared with the
respective DAC country averages of 26% and 24%.
Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development
Assistance Committee members”.
Reference
OECD (2014), OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: France 2013, OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews, OECD
Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264196193-en.
Figure 32.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2011-12 average, commitments, France
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Figure 32.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender
equality by sector, 2012, commitments, France
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Figure 32.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global
and local environment objectives, two year averages,
commitments, France
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IV. GERMANYGERMANY
Financial flows from Germany to developing countries
Type of flows from Germany to developing countries
21.4 billion USD of private flows at market terms in 2012. These flows were mainly composed of foreign direct investment
(74%).
14.1 billion USD of official development assistance (ODA) in 2013 (preliminary data).
-0.85 million USD of other official flows (OOF) in 2012.
1.4 billion USD of private grants in 2012.These resources weremobilised by non-governmental organisations and foundations.
Germany uses ODA to mobilise resources for sustainable development
Germany promotes ODA as a catalyst to bring private sector investment to support development efforts in partner
countries, particularly through its development finance institution, DEG. Germany has developed a private sector
development strategy (BMZ, 2011), which aims at creating an enabling environment for business investment in partner
countries. It also encourages the German business community’s involvement in development with a new range of services
and initiatives, such as the Service Point for the Private Sector established within BMZ.
It contributes to the mobilisation of domestic resources in developing countries by supporting their tax systems and
fighting tax evasion. In 2012, it committed USD 3.4 million of its ODA to tax-related activities in partner countries.
It promotes aid for trade to increase developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy.
It committed USD 3.3 billion to trade-related activities in 2012 (32% of its sector-allocable ODA), a decline of 5% from 2011.
The trend has been decreasing since 2010.
Germany helps to shape national and international frameworks for migration in ways that reflect the needs of poor
countries, pushing for rules that make it easier for workers from developing countries to migrate legally to another country
(BMZ, n.d.). In 2012, remittances exiting Germany to developing countries amounted to USD 7.2 billion.
Figure 33.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-12, Germany
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933124014
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IV. GERMANYGermany’s official development assistance
In 2013, Germany provided USD 14.1 billion ODA (prelimi-
nary data), a 3% increase in real terms from 2012 due to a
rise in bilateral lending and higher contributions to inter-
national organisations. It is the third largest donor of the
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in terms of
volume. Germany’s ODA/GNI ratio was 0.38% in 2013, up
from 0.37% in 2012. The share of untied ODA (excluding
administrative costs and in-donor refugee costs) was 79%
in 2012, compared to the DAC average of 81%. The grant
element of total ODA was 88.4% in 2012.
In 2012, 70% of ODA was provided bilaterally. Germany
allocated 30% of total ODA as core contributions to multi-
lateral organisations, compared with the DAC country
average of 27%. It channelled a further 5% of its bilateral
ODA for specific projects implemented by multilateral
organisations (multi-bi/non-core contributions).
48% of bilateral ODAwas programmed at partner country
level. Germany’s share of country programmable aid (CPA)
was less than the DAC country average (55%) in 2012.
A high share of German bilateral ODA was categorised
as “other and unallocated”. Project-type interventions
accounted for 81% of CPA.
USD 1 billion of bilateral ODA was channelled through
civil society organisations (CSOs). In 2012, 10% of German
bilateral ODA was channelled through CSOs, compared
with the DAC country average of 16.8%. Between 2011
and 2012, ODA through CSOs increased both in terms of
volume (+13%) and as a share of bilateral ODA (+6%).
Figure 33.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share
of GNI, 2003-13, Germany
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933124033
Figure 33.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through
the multilateral system, two year averages,
gross disbursements, Germany
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933124052
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Figure 33.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2012,
gross disbursements, Germany
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Figure 33.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs,
two year averages, gross disbursements, Germany
Note: Data on ODA to civil society organisations are not available
after 2007.
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IV. GERMANYBilateral ODA primarily focused on sub-Saharan Africa. In 2012, USD 2.5 billion was allocated to sub-Saharan Africa and
USD 1.7 billion to South and Central Asia.
47% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to Germany’s
top 10 recipients. Germany has bilateral programmes with
50 partner countries. It has regional/thematic programmes
with an additional 29 countries. In 2012, its support to fragile
states reached USD 3.2 billion (32% of total bilateral ODA).
In 2012, 23% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least
developed countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 2.4 billion.
In 2012, LDCs received the highest share of bilateral ODA
compared with other income groups, noting that 30% was
unallocated by income group compared with the 32% DAC
average.
At 0.11% of gross national income (GNI) in 2012, total ODA
to LDCs was less than the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.
Figure 33.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2011-12 average, gross disbursements, Germany
Note: 19% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2011-12. This share is not represented on the map.
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Figure 33.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA
to top recipients, 2012, gross disbursements, Germany
Note: Totals do not add up to total bilateral ODA. A further USD 3 billion
was unallocated by country.
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Figure 33.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, 2003-12,
gross disbursements, Germany
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IV. GERMANYOver 40% of bilateral ODA was allocated to social infrastructure and services, amounting to USD 5.5 billion, with a strong
focus on education (USD 2 billion) and support to government and civil society (USD 1.4 billion). USD 2.7 billion was
allocated to economic infrastructure and services, mainly to energy generation and supply.
USD 4.2 billion of bilateral ODA supported gender equality.
Germany considers gender issues as a key poverty factor,
and therefore targets support to women and girls as an
integral element of its programme. In 2012, 45% of German
aid had gender equality and women’s empowerment as a
principal or significant objective, comparedwith 50% in 2011
and 45% in 2010. The DAC country average was 28% in 2012.
A high share of Germany’s aid to population and reproduc-
tive health and government and civil society focuses on
gender.
USD 5.1 billion of bilateral ODA supported the envi-
ronment. Germany focuses on climate change mitigation
and adaptation, conservation of biodiversity and sustain-
able management of natural resources. The share of
environment-focused ODA – as a principal or significant
objective – has increased since 2007. It reached 41% in 2012,
compared to the DAC country average of 26%. Germany’s
financial commitment to climate change mitigation and
adaptation has doubled over recent years (USD 3.5 billion
in 2012) and represented 28% of its ODA in 2012 compared
to the DAC country average of 24%.
Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development
Assistance Committee members”.
References
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development policy”, BMZ, April, Berlin.
BMZ (n.d.), “Benefiting from migration: Development policy approaches”, BMZ, Berlin, www.bmz.de/en/what_we_do/issues/migration/
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Figure 33.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2011-12 average, commitments, Germany
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Figure 33.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender
equality by sector, 2012, commitments, Germany
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Figure 33.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global
and local environment objectives, two year averages,
commitments, Germany
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IV. GREECEGREECE
Financial flows from Greece to developing countries
Type of flows from Greece to developing countries
579 million USD of private flows at market terms in 2012. These flows were composed of foreign direct investment (100%).
305 million USD of official development assistance (ODA) in 2013 (preliminary data).
0.7 million USD of private grants 2012. These resources were mobilised by non-governmental organisations and foundations.
There were no other official flows (OOF) from Greece in 2012. The latest available data goes back to 2008, when OOF
amounted to USD 1 million.
Greece uses ODA to mobilise resources for sustainable development
Greece supports the crucial role that can be played by the private sector, both in developing countries (development
activities of local private enterprises and local funds originating from savers and investors) and internationally in the form
of private international funds. Greece also supports further mobilisation of government funds at the national (local) level in
the form of taxes and tariffs.
Greece promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world
economy. Its ODA committed to trade-related activities fell from USD 19 million in 2011 to USD 109 000 in 2012 (0.14% of its
sector-allocable ODA).
In 2012, remittances exiting Greece to developing countries amounted to USD 988 million.
Figure 34.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-12, Greece
Note: Other official flows (OOF) were provided by Greece in 2004, 2006, 2007 and 2008 only.
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IV. GREECEGreece’s official development assistance
In 2013, Greece provided USD 305 million ODA (prelimi-
nary data), which represented 0.13% of gross national
income (GNI) and a fall of 7.7% in real terms from 2012,
compared to a decrease of 17% between 2011 and 2012.
Greece’s aid budget started to decline in 2009 as a direct
consequence of the severe economic crisis. Greece’s share
of untied ODA (excluding administrative costs and
in-donor refugee costs) was 6% in 2012, compared with
the DAC average of 81%.The high amount of tied aid is due
to the composition of Greece’s aid with a high share of tied
technical co-operation in its aid portfolio. The grant
element of total ODA was 100% in 2012.
In 2012, 33% of ODA was provided bilaterally. Greece
allocated 67% of total ODA as core contributions to multi-
lateral organisations, compared with the DAC country
average of 27%.
14% of Greece’s bilateral ODA was programmed at partner
country level. Greece’s share of country programmable aid
(CPA) was lower than the DAC country average (55%)
in 2012. This is due to high spending on imputed student
costs and refugees in donor country costs. Scholarships
and training in donor country accounted for 38% of CPA.
USD 0.1 million of bilateral ODA was channelled to and
through civil society organisations (CSOs). Greece’s ODA
channelled to and through CSOs has fallen sharply, from
USD 3.4 million in 2009-10 to USD 0.1 million in 2012. This
represented 0.1% of bilateral aid in 2012 compared with
the DAC country average of 16.8%.
Figure 34.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share
of GNI, 2003-13, Greece
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933124242
Figure 34.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through
the multilateral system, two year averages,
gross disbursements, Greece
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Figure 34.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2012,
gross disbursements, Greece
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Figure 34.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs,
two year averages, gross disbursements, Greece
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IV. GREECEBilateral ODA primarily focused on Eastern Europe. In 2012, USD 49 million was allocated to Eastern Europe and
USD 11 million to the Middle East.
79% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to Greece’s
top 10 recipients. It has 18 priority partner countries. All
Greece’s priority countries feature in the list of top 10
recipients below. In 2012, its support to fragile states
reached USD 18 million (16% of total bilateral ODA).
4% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least developed
countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 4 million in 2012. The
share fell from 10% in 2009 to 3% in 2010, and since then
has remained relatively steady. Upper middle-income
countries received the highest share of bilateral ODA
in 2012 (47%).
At 0.02% of GNI, total ODA to LDCs was far from the UN
target of 0.15% of GNI.
Figure 34.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2011-12 average, gross disbursements, Greece
Note: 27% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2011-12. This share is not represented on the map.
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Figure 34.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA
to top recipients, 2012, gross disbursements, Greece
Note: Totals do not add up to total bilateral ODA. A further USD 31million
was unallocated by country.
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Figure 34.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, 2003-12,
gross disbursements, Greece
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IV. GREECEIn 2012, two-thirds of bilateral ODA was allocated to social infrastructure and services, equal to USD 71 million, with a
strong focus on education (USD 67 million).
USD 71 million of bilateral ODA supported gender equal-
ity. Greece has made gender equality a sector priority over
the past decade. In 2012, 93% of its aid had gender equality
and women’s empowerment as a principal or significant
objective, compared to the DAC country average of 28%.
This is an increase compared to 71% in 2012 and 66%
in 2011. A high share of Greece’s aid to education, water
and sanitation focuses on gender.
USD 0.6 million of bilateral ODA supported the environ-
ment. In 2012, 0.5% of Greek aid had environment as a
principal or significant objective, compared to a 10%
average in 2007-08 and 26% DAC country average in 2012.
The proportion of its aid focused on climate change
was 0.4%, compared to the DAC country average of 24%.
Greece will consider mainstreaming the environment in
programming, as domestic fiscal conditions relax.
Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development
Assistance Committee members”.
Figure 34.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2011-12 average, commitments, Greece
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933124375
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Figure 34.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender
equality by sector, 2012, commitments, Greece
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Figure 34.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global
and local environment objectives, two year averages,
commitments, Greece
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IV. ICELANDICELAND
Financial flows from Iceland to developing countries
Type of flows from Iceland to developing countries
In 2013, Iceland delivered USD 35 million ODA (preliminary data), which represented 0.26% of gross national income (GNI)
and a 27.4% increase in real terms from 2012. Iceland’s ODA has been increasing since 2011, both in volume and as a share
of GNI to ODA. It is committed to achieve 0.7% ODA/GNI. All of its ODA (excluding administrative costs and in-donor refugee
costs) was untied in 2012, compared with the DAC average of 81%. The grant element of total ODA was 100% in 2012.
At present, data on other official flows, private grants and private flows at market terms from Iceland to developing
countries are not available.
Iceland uses ODA to mobilise resources for a sustainable development
Iceland promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration in the world
economy. It committed USD 8 million (46% of its sector-allocable ODA) to trade-related activities in 2012, a 13% increase
from 2011.
In 2012, remittances exiting Iceland to developing countries amounted to USD 30 million.
Figure 35.1. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share of GNI, 2003-13, Iceland
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933124432
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IV. ICELANDIceland’s official development assistance
In 2012, 81% of ODA was provided bilaterally, totalling
USD 21 million. Iceland allocated 19% of total ODA as core
contributions to multilateral organisations (USD 5 million),
compared with the DAC country average of 27%. It chan-
nelled a further 36% of its bilateral ODA (USD 8 million) for
specific projects implemented by multilateral organisa-
tions (multi-bi/non-core contributions). Iceland provides
contributions to multilateral organisations such as the
United Nations agencies and theWorld Bank.
63% of bilateral ODAwas programmed at partner country
level. Iceland’s share of country programmable aid (CPA)
was higher than the DAC country average (55%) in 2012.
Project-type interventions made up 69% of CPA. The
proportion of bilateral ODA categorised as other and
unallocated by channel equalled 27%.
USD 2 million of bilateral ODA was channelled to and
through civil society organisations (CSOs). Iceland’s aid
channelled to and through CSOs increased between 2011
and 2012, both in terms of volume and as a share of
bilateral ODA (from 6% in 2011 to 9.7% in 2012). This share
was lower than the DAC country average of 16.8%.
Figure 35.2. Share of ODA channelled to and through
the multilateral system, two year averages,
gross disbursements, Iceland
Note: Data on multi-bi/non-core ODA are not available prior to 2011.
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Figure 35.3. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2012,
gross disbursements, Iceland
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933124470
Figure 35.4. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs, 2011-12
average, gross disbursements, Iceland
Note: Data on ODA to CSOs are not available prior to 2011.
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IV. ICELANDAlmost half of bilateral ODA focused on sub-Saharan Africa. In 2012, USD 10 million was allocated to sub-Saharan Africa.
97% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to
Iceland’s top 10 recipients. Its three priority partner
countries – Malawi, Uganda and Mozambique – are the
top three recipients of its ODA. In 2012, its support to
fragile states reached USD 9.5 million (45% of total
bilateral ODA).
In 2012, 48% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least devel-
oped countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 10 million. The
share has been decreasing since 2010, when it stood at 54%.
LDCs received the highest share of bilateral ODA in 2012,
noting that 42% was unallocated by income group,
compared to the total DAC average of 32% in 2012.
At 0.10% of GNI in 2012, total ODA to LDCs was less than
the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.
Figure 35.5. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2011-12 average, gross disbursements, Iceland
Note: 34% of ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2011-12. This share is not represented on the map.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933124508
Sub-Saharan
Africa
49%
South and Central Asia
6%
North Africa
and Middle East
6%Latin America
and Caribbean
4%
Europe
2%
Figure 35.6. Bilateral country-allocable ODA
to top recipients, 2012, gross disbursements, Iceland
Note: Totals do not add up to total bilateral ODA.A further USD 8.8 million
of total bilateral ODA was unallocated by country.
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Figure 35.7. Bilateral ODA by income group, 2003-12,
gross disbursements, Iceland
Note: Data concerning other low-income countries are only available
for 2008 and 2009.
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IV. ICELANDIn 2012, over 40% of bilateral ODA was allocated to social infrastructure and services. USD 9.3 million of bilateral ODA was
allocated to social sectors, with a strong focus on government and civil society (USD 2.7 million). USD 4.9 million was
allocated to the production sectors and USD 3.5 million to economic infrastructure and services.
USD 14 million of bilateral ODA supported gender equality.
Iceland has solidly integrated gender equality into its
projects and programmes. In 2012, 78% of Iceland’s aid had
gender equality and women’s empowerment as a principal
or significant objective, compared with the DAC country
average of 28%. Iceland has also been striving to promote
gender equality in its multilateral support, mainly through
the United Nations and theWorld Bank.
USD 14 million of bilateral ODA supported the environ-
ment. Iceland has also solidly integrated the environment
into its projects and programmes. In 2012, 68% of Iceland’s
aid had environment as a principal or significant objec-
tive, and 36% focused particularly on climate change,
compared with the respective DAC country averages
of 26% and 24%.
Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development
Assistance Committee members”.
Figure 35.8. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2011-12 average, commitments, Iceland
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Figure 35.9. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender
equality by sector, 2012, commitments, Iceland
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Figure 35.10. Bilateral ODA in support of global
and local environment objectives, 2011-12 average,
commitments, Iceland
Note: Data are not available prior to 2011.
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IV. IRELANDIRELAND
Financial flows from Ireland to developing countries
Type of flows from Ireland to developing countries
931 million USD of private flows at market terms in 2011.
822 million USD of official development assistance (ODA) in 2013 (preliminary data).
148million USD of private grants in 2012.These resources weremobilised by non-governmental organisations and foundations.
Ireland uses ODA to mobilise resources for sustainable development
Ireland’s policy for international development One World, One Future acknowledges that additional development
finance, beyond aid, is required. It increasingly promotes private sector development in its key partner countries by placing
a greater focus on an enabling environment for investment and trade, tourism and people-to-people links (Government of
Ireland, 2013). Ireland is also facilitating linkages between Irish and African business communities.
In 2013, Ireland issued a new International Tax Strategy and Charter that places a strong emphasis on tackling
international tax evasion and avoidance. In its development co-operation, Ireland is placing a greater emphasis on
supporting partner countries to raise domestic revenues.
It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy.
It committed USD 52 million (16% of sector-allocable ODA) to trade-related activities in 2012, a 20% fall from 2011.
In addition, remittances exiting Ireland to developing countries amounted to USD 1 billion in 2012.
Figure 36.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-12, Ireland
Note: Data on other official flows (OOF) are not available for this period. Data on private flows at market terms are not
available for 2012.
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IV. IRELANDIreland’s official development assistance
In 2013, Ireland provided USD 822 million ODA (prelimi-
nary data), which represented 0.45% of gross national
income (GNI) and a 1.9% decrease in real terms from 2012.
This decrease compares favourably to the 2010-12 three-
year average decrease of 4.4% and the 18.4% decrease
in 2009. At 0.45%, Ireland’s ratio of ODA to GNI ranked 10th
among DAC donors in 2013. Ireland is committed to meet-
ing the 0.7% ODA/GNI target as soon as economic circum-
stances permit. All of its ODA (excluding administrative
costs and in-donor refugee costs) was untied in 2012. The
grant element of total ODA was 100% in 2012.
In 2012, 66% of ODA was provided bilaterally. In 2012,
Ireland allocated 34% of total ODA as core contributions to
multilateral organisations, compared with the DAC
country average of 27%. It channelled a further 23% of its
bilateral ODA for specific projects implemented by multi-
lateral organisations (multi-bi/non-core contributions).
In 2012, 41% of bilateral ODA was programmed at partner
country level. Ireland’s share of country programmable aid
(CPA) was less than the DAC country average (55%). Forty-
two percent of its CPA consisted of contributions to pooled
programmes and funds. Core aid to non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) and humanitarian assistance
accounted for almost a quarter of bilateral ODA.
In 2012, USD 207 million of bilateral ODA was channelled
to and through civil society organisations (CSOs). This
equalled 39% of bilateral ODA compared with the DAC aver-
age of 16.8%. While Irish aid for CSOs has declined
since 2009 in terms of volume, as a share of bilateral ODA it
has remained relatively high and constant.
Figure 36.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share
of GNI, 2003-13, Ireland
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933124641
Figure 36.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through
the multilateral system, two year averages,
gross disbursements, Ireland
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Figure 36.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2012,
gross disbursements, Ireland
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Figure 36.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs,
two year averages, gross disbursements, Ireland
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IV. IRELANDBilateral ODA primarily focused on sub-Saharan Africa. In 2012, Ireland allocated USD 345 million to sub-Saharan Africa
and USD 26 million to Far East Asia.
68% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to Ireland’s
top 10 recipients. All of its nine key partner countries are
among the top 10 recipients. Sierra Leone became a new
key partner country in 2014. Irish support to fragile states
is increasing and reached USD 227 million in 2012 (42% of
total bilateral ODA).
In 2012, 62% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least devel-
oped countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 335 million. The
share has slightly fallen since 2010, when it stood at 65%.
Ireland ranked highest among DAC members for the share
of bilateral ODA allocated to LDCs in 2012.
At 0.24% of GNI in 2012, total ODA to LDCs exceeds the UN
target of 0.15% of GNI.
Figure 36.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2011-12 average, gross disbursements, Ireland
Note: 21% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2011-12. This share is not represented on the map.
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Figure 36.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA
to top recipients, 2012, gross disbursements, Ireland
Note: Totals do not add up to total bilateral ODA. A further
USD 126 million was unallocated by country.
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Figure 36.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, 2003-12,
gross disbursements, Ireland
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IV. IRELANDHalf of bilateral ODA was allocated to social infrastructure and services in 2012, or USD 252 million, with a strong focus on
support to government and civil society (USD 72 million) and health (USD 66 million). Humanitarian aid amounted to
USD 105 million.
USD 186 million of bilateral ODA supported gender
equality. Ireland plays an agenda-setting role on gender
equality and women’s empowerment and continues to
strengthen its mainstreaming approaches. In 2012, 56% of
its aid had gender equality and women’s empowerment as
a principal or significant objective, compared with the
DAC country average of 28%. In particular, about 90% of its
aid to “population and reproductive health” and 80% of aid
to “other social infrastructure” targets gender equality.
USD 112 million of bilateral ODA supported the environ-
ment. Environmental sustainability and climate change
and development are priority issues for Ireland. In 2012,
21% of its aid had environment as a principal or significant
objective compared with the DAC country average of 26%.
Also, 17% of Irish aid focused on climate change compared
with the DAC country average of 24%, and adaptation in
particular.
Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development
Assistance Committee members”.
Reference
Government of Ireland (2013), One World, One Future: Ireland’s Policy for International Development, Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade, Dublin, www.irishaid.ie/about-us/policy-for-international-development.
Figure 36.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2011-12 average, commitments, Ireland
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Figure 36.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender
equality by sector, 2012, commitments, Ireland
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Figure 36.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global
and local environment objectives, two year averages,
commitments, Ireland
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IV. ITALYITALY
Financial flows from Italy to developing countries
Type of flows from Italy to developing countries
8.1 billion USD of private flows at market terms in 2012. These flows were mainly composed of foreign direct investment
(98%).
3.3 billion USD of official development assistance (ODA) in 2013 (preliminary data).
196 million USD of other official flows (OOF) in 2012.
91million USD of private grants in 2012. These resources were mobilised by non-governmental organisations and foundations.
Italy uses ODA to mobilise resources for sustainable development
In 2013, Italy amended the legislation in order to foster the use of joint ventures and other facilities to promote ODA as
a catalyst for private sector-led development. It particularly supports private Italian companies investing in developing
countries through its development finance institution, the Società Italiana per le Imprese all’Estero S.p.A (SIMEST)
(OECD, 2014).
It contributes to the mobilisation of domestic resources in developing countries by supporting their tax systems. In 2012,
it committed USD 388 000 of its ODA to tax-related activities in partner countries.
It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy.
It committed USD 190 million (46% of sector-allocable ODA) to trade-related activities in 2012, an 80% increase from 2011.
The trend has been fluctuating over the past few years.
It has led charge to secure a G8/G20 commitment to work towards reducing the global cost of transferring remittances,
from 10% in 2009 to 5% in 2014. In 2012, remittances exiting Italy to developing countries amounted to USD 9.2 billion.
Figure 37.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-12, Italy
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933124831
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IV. ITALYItaly’s official development assistance
In 2013, Italy provided USD 3.3 billion ODA (preliminary
data), a 13.4% increase in real terms from 2012. It is the
11th donor of the Development Co-operation Committee
(DAC) in terms of volume. It has committed to raising the
ODA/GNI ratio, which was 0.16% in 2013, to 0.28-0.31%
in 2017. The proportion of Italy’s untied ODA (excluding
administrative costs and in-donor refugee costs) was 82%
in 2012, compared with the DAC average of 81%. The grant
element of total ODA was 99.4% in 2012.
In 2012, 26% of ODA was provided bilaterally. Italy
allocated 74% of total ODA as core contributions to multi-
lateral organisations, compared with the DAC country
average of 27%. It channelled a further 12% of its bilateral
ODA for specific projects implemented by multilateral
organisations (multi-bi/non-core contributions).
In 2012, 44% of bilateral ODA was programmed at partner
country level. Italy’s share of country programmable aid
(CPA) was less than the DAC country average (55%) (this
share was only 27% in 2011). The share of bilateral ODA
allocated to refugees in donor country was 34%. Project-
type interventions accounted for 89% of CPA.
USD 67 million of bilateral ODA was channelled to and
through civil society organisations (CSOs). Between 2011
and 2012, aid channelled to and through CSOs fell by
37% in terms of volume, but it increased as a share of
bilateral ODA (from 6% in 2011 to 9% in 2012; the DAC
country average was 16.8% in 2012).
Figure 37.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share
of GNI, 2003-13, Italy
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933124850
Figure 37.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through
the multilateral system, two year averages,
gross disbursements, Italy
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Figure 37.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2012,
gross disbursements, Italy
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Figure 37.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs,
two year averages, gross disbursements, Italy
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IV. ITALYBilateral ODA primarily focused on sub-Saharan Africa. In 2012, USD 133 million was allocated to sub-Saharan Africa
(falling from USD 550 million in 2011) and USD 100 million to South and Central Asia.
56% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to Italy’s
top 10 recipients. It has reduced its number of priority
countries from 35 in 2010 to 24 in 2014. Its support to
fragile states reached USD 221 million (31% of total
bilateral ODA).
In 2012, 23% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least devel-
oped countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 168 million. The
share has fallen from 48% in 2011. LDCs received the high-
est share of bilateral ODA, noting that 46% was unallocated
by income group in 2012 compared to the 32% DAC average.
At 0.04% of gross national income (GNI) in 2012, total ODA
to LDCs was far from the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.
Figure 37.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2011-12 average, gross disbursements, Italy
Note: 35% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2011-12. This share is not represented on the map.
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Figure 37.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA
to top recipients, 2012, gross disbursements, Italy
Note: Totals do not add up to total bilateral ODA. A further
USD 333 million was unallocated by country.
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Figure 37.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, 2003-12,
gross disbursements, Italy
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IV. ITALYAlmost 20%, or USD 164 million, of bilateral ODA was allocated to social infrastructure and services in 2012 with a strong
focus on education (USD 55 million). While humanitarian aid rose to USD 145 million, action related to debt fell to
USD 7 million (this amount was much higher in 2011, due to an important debt relief operation with the Democratic
Republic of Congo).
USD 124 million of bilateral ODA supported gender equal-
ity. Italy approved new guidelines on gender equality
in 2010. Nevertheless, mainstreaming gender remains
challenging (OECD, 2014). In 2012, 30% of Italian aid had
gender equality and women’s empowerment as a principal
or significant objective, compared with 42% in 2011 and
10% in 2010. The DAC country average was 28% in 2012. A
high share of Italy’s aid to production sectors focuses on
gender.
USD 330 million of bilateral ODA supported the environ-
ment. Italy issued environmental guidelines in 2011 and
the share of environment-focused ODA has been increas-
ing in recent years. In 2012, 39% of Italian aid had environ-
ment as a principal or significant objective and 10%
focused particularly on climate change, compared with
respective DAC country averages of 26% and 24%.
Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development
Assistance Committee members”.
Reference
OECD (2014), OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Italy 2014, OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews, OECD
Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264213241-en.
Figure 37.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2011-12 average, commitments, Italy
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933124983
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Figure 37.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender
equality by sector, 2012, commitments, Italy
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933125002
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Figure 37.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global
and local environment objectives, two year averages,
commitments, Italy
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IV. JAPANJAPAN
Financial flows from Japan to developing countries
Type of flows from Japan to developing countries
32.5 billion USD of private flows at market terms in 2012. These flows were mainly composed of foreign direct investment
(96%).
11.8 billion USD of official development assistance (ODA) in 2013 (preliminary data).
5.4 billion USD of other official flows (OOF) in 2012.
487million USD of private grants in 2012.These resources weremobilised by non-governmental organisations and foundations.
Japan uses ODA to mobilise resources for sustainable development
Japan promotes ODA as a catalyst to bring private sector investment to support development efforts in partner countries.
Japan has long been engaged in private sector development and has effective financial instruments to leverage private
investments for developing countries.
It contributes to the mobilisation of domestic resources in developing countries by supporting their tax systems. In 2012,
it committed USD 38 million of its ODA to tax-related activities in partner countries.
It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy. It
committed USD 8.7 billion (58% of its sector-allocable ODA) to trade-related activities in 2012, an 11% increase from 2011.
The trend has been increasing in recent years.
In addition, remittances exiting Japan to developing countries amounted to USD 7.7 billion in 2012.
Figure 38.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-12, Japan
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933125040
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IV. JAPANJapan’s official development assistance
In 2013, Japan provided USD 11.8 billion ODA (prelimi-
nary data), which represented 0.23% of gross national
income (GNI) and a 36.6% increase in real terms from 2012.
It is the 4th largest donor of the Development Assistance
Committee (DAC) in terms of volume. The welcome
increase in 2013 follows five years of stagnation. The
untied share of Japanese ODA excluding technical
co-operation was 86% in 2012. (Japan’s ODA includes a
large technical co-operation programme, but Japan does
not report its tying status. The share of total Japanese
bilateral aid reported as untied was 71% in 2012). The
grant element of total ODA was 88.5% in 2012.
In 2012, 77% of ODA was provided bilaterally. Japan
allocated 23% of total ODA as core contributions to multi-
lateral organisations, compared with the DAC country
average of 27%. It channelled a further 9% of its bilateral
ODA for specific projects implemented by multilateral
organisations (multi-bi/non-core contributions).
Japan programmed 82% of bilateral ODA at partner
country level. Japan’s share of country programmable aid
(CPA) was well above the DAC country average (55%)
in 2012. Project-type interventions totalled 89% of CPA.
USD 503 million of bilateral ODA was channelled to and
through civil society organisations (CSOs). Japan’s aid
channelled to and through CSOs has increased both in
terms of volume (+38% between 2011 and 2012) and as a
share of bilateral ODA (from 2.4% in 2011 to 3.5% in 2012).
The DAC country average for aid to and through CSOs was
16.8% in 2012.
Figure 38.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share
of GNI, 2003-13, Japan
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933125059
Figure 38.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through
the multilateral system, two year averages,
gross disbursements, Japan
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933125078
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Figure 38.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2012,
gross disbursements, Japan
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933125097
Figure 38.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs,
two year averages, gross disbursements, Japan
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933125116
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IV. JAPANBilateral ODA heavily focused on Asia. In 2012, USD 4.8 billion was allocated to Far East Asia and USD 4.1 billion to South
and Central Asia. USD 1.8 billion was allocated to sub-Saharan Africa.
62% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to Japan’s
top 10 recipients. Japan works in over 140 countries;
however, the concentration on the top 10 recipients
is strong. Japan’s support to fragile states reached
USD 4.2 billion in 2012 (29% of total bilateral ODA).
In 2012, 22% of bilateral ODA was provided to least
developed countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 3.2 billion.
The share has slightly fallen from 2011 (when it stood at
25%), but it remains relatively high compared to previous
years. Lower middle-income countries received the
highest share of bilateral ODA in 2012 (49%).
At 0.08% of GNI in 2012, total ODA to LDCs was less than
the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.
Figure 38.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2011-12 average, gross disbursements, Japan
Note: 13% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2011-12. This share is not represented on the map.
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Figure 38.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA
to top recipients, 2012, gross disbursements, Japan
Note: Totals do not add up to total bilateral ODA. A further USD 1.8 billion
was unallocated by country.
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Figure 38.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, 2003-12,
gross disbursements, Japan
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IV. JAPANOver 40% of bilateral ODA was allocated to economic infrastructure and services in 2012, or a total of USD 7 billion, with
a strong focus on transport and storage (USD 5.5 billion) and energy generation and supply (USD 1.2 billion). USD 2.1 billion
was allocated to water and sanitation, as a part of social sector allocation.
USD 2.7 billion of bilateral ODA supported gender equality.
In 2012, 21% of Japan’s aid had gender equality andwomen’s
empowerment as a principal or significant objective,
compared to the DAC country average of 28%. This was an
increase compared with 18% in 2011 and 11% in 2010. A high
share of Japan’s aid to population and reproductive health
focuses on gender. In 2013, the government of Japan
announced a new and significant emphasis on women’s
empowerment in its development co-operation.
USD 7.5 billion of bilateral ODA supported the environ-
ment. Japan has maintained strong financial commit-
ments on the environment and climate. Environmental
safeguards were introduced in 2010. In 2012, 43% of its aid
had environment as a principal or significant objective,
and 38% focused particularly on climate change,
compared with the relative DAC country averages of 26%
and 24%.
Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development
Assistance Committee members”.
Figure 38.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2011-12 average, commitments, Japan
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933125192
9 16 41 9 11 3
0.3
5 6
Education, health
and population 
Other social
infrastructure 
Economic
infrastructure 
Production Multisector Programme
assistance 
Debt relief Humanitarian
aid
Unspecified
Figure 38.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender
equality by sector, 2012, commitments, Japan
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933125211
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Figure 38.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global
and local environment objectives, two year averages,
commitments, Japan
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IV. KOREAKOREA
Financial flows from Korea to developing countries
Type of flows from Korea to developing countries
9.6 billion USD of private flows at market terms in 2012. These flows were composed of foreign direct investment (99%).
1.7 billion USD of official development assistance (ODA) in 2013 (preliminary data).
1.2 billion USD of other official flows (OOF) in 2012.
30 million USD of private grants in 2012. These resources were mobilised by non-governmental organisations and
foundations.
Korea uses ODA to mobilise resources for sustainable development
Korea’s foreign and aid policies present opportunities for it to engage with the private sector and to use ODA to leverage
private resources for development. It particularly focuses on promoting public-private partnerships in partner countries,
and corporate social responsibility among Korean businesses operating in developing countries (OECD, 2013).
It contributes to the mobilisation of domestic resources in developing countries by supporting their tax systems. In 2012,
it committed USD 3 million of its ODA to tax-related activities in partner countries.
It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy.
It committed USD 778 million (47% of its sector-allocable ODA) to trade-related activities in 2012, a 4% increase from 2011.
After having sharply fallen in 2010, this amount has been slightly increasing.
In addition, remittances exiting Korea to developing countries amounted to USD 2.6 billion in 2012.
Figure 39.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-12, Korea
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933125249
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IV. KOREAKorea’s official development assistance
In 2013, Korea provided USD 1.7 billion ODA (preliminary
data), a 4.8% increase in real terms from 2012. Its ODA to
gross national income (GNI) ratio dropped slightly from
0.14% in 2012 to 0.13% in 2013.* However, the Korean gov-
ernment is firmly committed to achieving its national
ODA/GNI target of 0.25% by 2015. The share of Korean
untied ODA (excluding administrative costs and in-donor
refugee costs) was 49% in 2012, compared to the DAC
average of 81%. The grant element of total ODA was 94.2%
in 2012.
In 2012, 75% of ODA was provided bilaterally. Korea
allocated 25% of total ODA as core contributions to multi-
lateral organisations, compared with the DAC country
average of 27%. It channelled a further 11% of its bilateral
ODA for specific projects implemented by multilateral
organisations (multi-bi/non-core contributions).
In 2012, 87% of bilateral ODA was programmed at partner
country level. Korea’s bilateral programme is characterised
by a high proportion of country programmable aid (CPA),
which was well above the DAC country average (55%)
in 2012. Korea’s high CPA figure is caused mainly by its low
levels of other bilateral costs, such as in-donor refugee
costs, humanitarian assistance and debt relief. Project-type
interventions amounted to 75% of CPA.
USD 26 million of bilateral ODA was channelled to and
through civil society organisations (CSOs). Korea’s ODA
channelled to and through CSOs has increased in terms of
volume in recent years. It has, however, been relatively
steady as a share of bilateral ODA since 2010. This share
amounted to 2% in 2012, compared with the DAC country
average of 16.8%.
* Korea does not report to the DAC on ODA eligible assistance to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea). The ODA
eligible portion of its assistance to North Korea was estimated at approximately USD 12.3 million in 2013.
Figure 39.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share
of GNI, 2003-13, Korea
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933125268
Figure 39.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through
the multilateral system, two year averages,
gross disbursements, Korea
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933125287
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Figure 39.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2012,
gross disbursements, Korea
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933125306
Figure 39.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs,
two year averages, gross disbursements, Korea
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933125325
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IV. KOREABilateral ODA primarily focused on Asia. In 2012, USD 416 million was allocated to Far East Asia and USD 255 million to
South and Central Asia.
61% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to Korea’s
top 10 recipients. Seven of its 26 priority partner countries
are among its top 10 recipients. Korea’s support to fragile
states reached USD 355 million in 2012 (29% of total
bilateral ODA).
In 2012, 34% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least
developed countries (LDCs), reaching USD 425 million.
The share has progressively increased over the past
decade (from 22% in 2003 to 34% in 2012). Lower middle-
income countries received the highest share of bilateral
ODA in 2012 (41%).
At 0.05% of GNI in 2012, total ODA to LDCs was less than
the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.
Figure 39.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2011-12 average, gross disbursements, Korea
Note: 12% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2011-12. This share is not represented on the map.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933125344
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Figure 39.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA
to top recipients, 2012, gross disbursements, Korea
Note: Totals do not add up to total bilateral ODA. A further
USD 175 million was unallocated by country.
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Figure 39.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, 2003-12,
gross disbursements, Korea
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IV. KOREAOver 40% of bilateral ODA was allocated to social infrastructure and services in 2012, amounting to USD 768 million, with
a strong focus on support to government and civil society (USD 228 million). USD 488 million was allocated to economic
infrastructure, mainly to transport and storage (USD 325 million).
USD 117 million of bilateral ODA supported gender
equality. Gender equality is placed centrally in Korea’s
Mid-term ODA Policy for 2011-15 as a critical element of its
development co-operation programme. In 2012, 7% of its
aid had gender equality and women’s empowerment as a
principal or significant objective, compared with the DAC
country average of 28%. This share has been fluctuating in
recent years. A high share of Korea’s aid to population and
reproductive health focuses on gender.
USD 271 million of bilateral ODA supported the environ-
ment. Korea committed to increase its green ODA to 30%
by 2020 and is making an effort to improve the integration
of environment and climate change into its development
co-operation. In 2012, 15% of its aid had environment as a
principal or significant objective, and 10% focused on
climate change, compared with the respective DAC
country averages of 26% and 24%.
Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development
Assistance Committee members”.
Reference
OECD (2013), OECD Development Assistance Peer Reviews: Korea 2012, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264196056-en.
Figure 39.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2011-12 average, commitments, Korea
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933125401
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Figure 39.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender
equality by sector, 2012, commitments, Korea
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Figure 39.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global
and local environment objectives, two year averages,
commitments, Korea
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933125439
0
20
15
10
5
0
400
300
200
100
2007-08 2009-10 2011-12
17 17
15
Constant 2012 USD million % of bilateral ODA
Climate-related aid Other environmental aid
Share of total environmental aid in bilateral ODA commitments
(right axis)DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 331
IV. LUXEMBOURGLUXEMBOURG
Financial flows from Luxembourg to developing countries
Type of flows from Luxembourg to developing countries
431 million USD of official development assistance (ODA) in 2013 (preliminary data).
7 million USD of private grants in 2011 (the data are not available for 2012). These resources were mobilised by
non-governmental organisations and foundations.
Luxembourg uses ODA to mobilise resources for sustainable development
Luxembourg promotes ODA as a catalyst to bring private sector investment to support development efforts in partner
countries. It particularly draws on its experience in financial matters to promote the development of micro-finance systems,
with a significant potential for mobilising private financing. The government has established effective partnerships with
private finance players, including specialised agencies such as LuxFlag and private enterprises (OECD, 2012).
On 6 May 2014 it adopted the OECD Declaration on Automatic Exchange of Information in Tax Matters, thereby
contributing to stop bank secrecy for tax purposes. This is an important step as tax fraud and tax evasion deprive
governments of revenues needed to fight poverty and promote sustainable development.
It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy.
It committed USD 41 million (22% of sector-allocable ODA) to trade-related activities in 2012, a 5% increase from 2011. The
trend has been steady in recent years.
As a part of its development co-operation policy, Luxembourg strives to facilitate financial transfers from migrants to
their home countries (OECD, 2012). In 2012, remittances exiting Luxembourg to developing countries amounted to
USD 45 million.
Figure 40.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-12, Luxembourg
Note: Data on private flows at market terms and other official flows (OOF) are not available.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933125458
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IV. LUXEMBOURGLuxembourg’s official development assistance
In 2013, Luxembourg provided USD 431 million ODA
(preliminary data), a 1.2% increase in real terms from 2012.
It has maintained its level of ODA as a percentage of gross
national income (GNI) at 1% in 2013. It is the 3rd largest
donor of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in
terms of ODA/GNI share and one of five DAC members
meeting the UN target of 0.7%. The share of Luxembourg’s
untied ODA (excluding administrative costs and in-donor
refugee costs) was 94% in 2012, compared with the DAC
average of 81%. The grant element of total ODA was 100%
in 2012.
In 2012, 70% of ODA was provided bilaterally. Luxembourg
allocated 30% of total ODA as core contributions to multi-
lateral organisations, compared with the DAC country aver-
age of 27%. It channelled a further 20% of its bilateral ODA
for specific projects implemented by multilateral organisa-
tions (multi-bi/non-core contributions).
In 2012, 61% of bilateral ODA was programmed at partner
country level. Luxembourg’s share of country program-
mable aid (CPA) was above the DAC country average (55%).
Humanitarian and food aid amounted to 17%. Project-type
interventions made up 88% of CPA.
USD 82 million of bilateral ODA was channelled to and
through civil society organisations (CSOs). ODA chan-
nelled to and through CSOs has been relatively steady in
recent years, in terms of volume and as a share of bilateral
ODA. This share amounted to 29.5% in 2012, compared
with the DAC country average of 16.8%.
Figure 40.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share
of GNI, 2003-13, Luxembourg
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933125477
Figure 40.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through
the multilateral system, two year averages,
gross disbursements, Luxembourg
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933125496
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
p
0
1.2
0
500
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Amount of ODA (left axis) ODA as a % of GNI (right axis)
Constant 2012 USD million % of GNI
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
%
2007-08 2009-10 2011-12
Bilateral ODA, excl. multi-bi
Multilateral ODA
Multi-bi/non-core
ODA channelled
to and through
the multilateral
system 
Figure 40.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2012,
gross disbursements, Luxembourg
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Figure 40.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs,
two year averages, gross disbursements, Luxembourg
Note: Data on ODA channelled through CSOs are not available for 2007.
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IV. LUXEMBOURGBilateral ODA primarily focused on sub-Saharan Africa. In 2012, USD 102 million was allocated to sub-Saharan Africa and
USD 34 million to Far East Asia.
69% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to
Luxembourg’s top 10 recipients. Luxembourg has
nine priority partner countries, all of which are among the
top 10 recipients. In 2012, its support to fragile states
reached USD 89 million (32% of total bilateral ODA).
In 2012, 38% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least
developed countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 105 million.
The share has been relatively steady in recent years. LDCs
received the highest share of bilateral ODA in 2012,
compared with other income groups.
At 0.37% of Luxembourg’s GNI in 2012, total ODA to LDCs
was well above the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.
Figure 40.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2011-12 average, gross disbursements, Luxembourg
Note: 23% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2011-12. This share is not represented on the map.
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Figure 40.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA
to top recipients, 2012, gross disbursements,
Luxembourg
Note: Totals do not add up to total bilateral ODA. A further USD 72million
was unallocated by country. Reference to Kosovo is without prejudice to
its status under international law.
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Figure 40.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, 2003-12,
gross disbursements, Luxembourg
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IV. LUXEMBOURGOver 40% of bilateral ODA was allocated to social infrastructure and services in 2012, or USD 120 million, with a strong
focus on education (USD 42 million) and health (USD 36 million). Humanitarian aid amounted to USD 46 million.
USD 44 million of bilateral ODA supported gender equality.
Luxembourg mainstreams gender in its programmes while
also promoting standard-setting in international bodies
(OECD, 2012). In 2012, 38% of its aid had gender equality and
women’s empowerment as a principal or significant objec-
tive, compared with the DAC country average of 28%. This is
an increase compared with 32% in 2011. A high share of
Luxembourg’s aid to population and reproductive health,
“other social infrastructure” and production focuses on
gender.
USD 55 million of bilateral ODA supported the environ-
ment. Luxembourg has developed a holistic approach to
the environment and climate change in its development
co-operation. It is using impact analysis and environ-
mental evaluation more systematically. In 2012, 20% of its
aid had environment as a principal or significant objective
and 9% focused particularly on climate change, compared
with the respective DAC country averages of 26% and 24%.
Reference
OECD (2012), DAC Peer Review of Luxembourg 2012, OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/LUXEMBOURG.htm.
Figure 40.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2011-12 average, commitments, Luxembourg
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Figure 40.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender
equality by sector, 2012, commitments, Luxembourg
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Figure 40.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global
and local environment objectives, two year averages,
commitments, Luxembourg
Note: Data on climate-related aid are not available for 2007-08.
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IV. NETHERLANDSNETHERLANDS
Financial flows from the Netherlands to developing countries
Type of flows from the Netherlands to developing countries
13.9 billion USD of private flows at market terms in 2012. Foreign direct investment made up 23% of these flows.
5.4 billion USD of official development assistance (ODA) in 2013 (preliminary data).
528million USD of private grants in 2012.These resources weremobilised by non-governmental organisations and foundations.
The Netherlands uses ODA to mobilise resources for sustainable development
The Netherlands promotes ODA as a catalyst to bring private sector investment to support development efforts in partner
countries, in particular through its development finance institution, the Entrepreneurial Development Bank (FMO).With its
new development co-operation strategy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013), the government clearly links aid to trade and
investment, and stresses the role of the Dutch business community as an important development partner.
It contributes to the mobilisation of domestic resources in developing countries by supporting their tax systems. In 2012,
it committed USD 1.3 million of its ODA to tax-related activities in partner countries.
It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration in the world economy.
It committed USD 1.1 billion (29% of its sector-allocable ODA) to trade-related activities in 2012, reaching a standstill after
having almost doubled between 2010 and 2011.
The government’s development co-operation policy acknowledges the increasing importance of remittances as a source
of income for partner countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013). In 2012, remittances exiting the Netherlands to
developing countries amounted to USD 2.2 billion.
Figure 41.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-12, Netherlands
Note: Data on other financial flows are not available after 2006.
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IV. NETHERLANDSThe Netherlands’ official development assistance
In 2013, the Netherlands provided USD 5.4 billion ODA
(preliminary data), which represented 0.67% of gross
national income (GNI) and a fall of 6.2% in real terms
from 2012. It is the 6th largest donor of the Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) in terms of ODA as a
percentage of GNI. Although ODA dropped below the
0.7% commitment in 2013 for the first time since 1975 due
to overall budget cuts necessary to put public finances
in order, the Netherlands remains committed to the
0.7% target. The Netherlands’ share of untied ODA
(excluding administrative costs and in-donor refugee
costs) was 98% in 2012, compared with the DAC average of
81%. The grant element of total ODA was 100% in 2012.
In 2012, 70% of ODA was provided bilaterally. The
Netherlands allocated 30% of total ODA as core contribu-
tions to multilateral organisations, compared with the DAC
country average of 27%. It channelled a further 20% of its
bilateral ODA for specific projects implemented by multi-
lateral organisations (multi-bi/non-core contributions).
In 2012, 27% of bilateral ODA was programmed at partner
country level, less than the DAC country average of 55%.
Project-type interventions accounted for 64% of CPA. This
low level of CPA is due to a high amount of unallocated
bilateral ODA provided through central funds, especially
through civil society.
USD 1.2 billion of bilateral ODA was channelled to and
through civil society organisations (CSOs). Since 2010, aid
channelled to and through CSOs has decreased in terms of
volume (-10% between 2011 and 2012). The share of
bilateral ODA delivered by CSOs has, however, remained
relatively steady in recent years. It amounted to 31%
in 2012, almost twice as much as the DAC country average
(16.8%).
Figure 41.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share
of GNI, 2003-13, Netherlands
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933125686
Figure 41.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through
the multilateral system, two year averages,
gross disbursements, Netherlands
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Figure 41.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2012,
gross disbursements, Netherlands
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Figure 41.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs,
two year averages, gross disbursements, Netherlands
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IV. NETHERLANDSThe largest share of bilateral ODA was directed towards sub-Saharan Africa. In 2012, USD 703 million was allocated to
sub-Saharan Africa and USD 176 million to South and Central Asia.
51% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to the
Netherlands’ top 10 recipients. Eight of its 15 priority
partner countries are in the list top 10 recipients. It has
taken steps to concentrate its bilateral ODA on fewer
countries. In 2012, its support to fragile states reached
USD 645 million (16% of total bilateral ODA).
In 2012, 17% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least devel-
oped countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 668 million. The
share has decreased from 27% in 2010 to 17% in 2012. LDCs
received the highest share of bilateral ODA, noting that
74% of bilateral ODA was unallocated by income in 2012,
compared to the 32% total DAC average.
At 0.15% of the Netherlands’ GNI in 2012, total ODA to
LDCs met the UN target of ODA to LDCs.
Figure 41.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2011-12 average, gross disbursements, Netherlands
Note: 67% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2011-12. This share is not represented on the map.
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Figure 41.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA
to top recipients, 2012, gross disbursements, Netherlands
Note: Totals do not add up to total bilateral ODA. A further USD 2.9 billion
was unallocated by country.
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Figure 41.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, 2003-12,
gross disbursements, Netherlands
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IV. NETHERLANDSOver 40% of bilateral ODA was allocated to social infrastructure and services in 2012, for a total of USD 2.3 billion, with a
strong focus on support to government and civil society (USD 973 million) and water and sanitation (USD 465 million).
USD 553 million was allocated to agriculture (accounted as ODA to production sectors).
USD 1.6 billion of bilateral ODA supported gender equality.
The Netherlands systematically integrates gender issues in
its development co-operation policies. In 2012, 43% of its aid
had gender equality and women’s empowerment as a
principal or significant objective, compared with the DAC
country average of 28%.This is an increase compared to 24%
in 2011 and 14% in 2010.A high share of the Netherlands’ aid
to population, reproductive health, water and sanitation
focuses on gender.
USD 583 million of bilateral ODA supported the environ-
ment. The Netherlands focuses on mitigating the effects
of climate change on low- and middle-income countries.
Adaptation is also a priority, notably water management,
climate-smart agriculture and emergency preparedness in
LDCs. In 2012, 12% of its aid had environment as a princi-
pal or significant objective and 9% focused on climate
change, compared with the respective DAC country
averages of 26% and 24%.
Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development
Assistance Committee members”.
Reference
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013), A World to Gain, A New Agenda for Aid, Trade and Investment, April, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
The Hague.
Figure 41.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2011-12 average, commitments, Netherlands
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Figure 41.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender
equality by sector, 2012, commitments, Netherlands
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933125838
0
20
40
60
80
100
Economic infrastructure
Education
Government
and civil society
Health
MultisectorOther social infrastructure
Population and
reproductive health
Production
Water and sanitation
Figure 41.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global
and local environment objectives, two year averages,
commitments, Netherlands
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IV. NEW ZEALANDNEW ZEALAND
Financial flows from New Zealand to developing countries
Type of flows from New Zealand to developing countries
35 million USD of private flows at market terms in 2012. These flows were composed of foreign direct investment (100%).
461 million USD of official development assistance (ODA) in 2013 (preliminary data).
11 million USD of other official flows (OOF) in 2012.
134 million USD of private grants 2012. These resources were mobilised by non-governmental organisations and foundations.
New Zealand uses ODA to mobilise resources for sustainable development
New Zealand is currently increasing its focus on public-private partnerships and using the capabilities of New Zealand
businesses, and is strengthening its own capacity in this area.
It contributes to the mobilisation of domestic resources in developing countries by supporting their tax systems. In 2012,
it committed USD 194 000 of its ODA to tax-related activities in partner countries.
It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy.
It committed USD 83 million (37% of its sector-allocable ODA) to trade-related activities in 2012, a 56% decrease from
the 2011 peak.
In addition, remittances exiting New Zealand to developing countries amounted to USD 1.3 billion in 2012.
Figure 42.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-12, New Zealand
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IV. NEW ZEALANDNew Zealand’s official development assistance
In 2013, New Zealand provided USD 461 million ODA
(preliminary data), which represented 0.26% of gross
national income (GNI) and a fall of 1% in real terms
from 2012. This is a reverse on the increases in ODA seen
since 2010. New Zealand’s share of untied ODA (excluding
administrative costs and in-donor refugee costs) was 84%
in 2012, compared with the DAC average of 81%. The grant
element of total ODA was 100% in 2012.
In 2012, 81% of ODA was provided bilaterally. New Zealand
allocated 19% of total ODA as core contributions to multi-
lateral organisations, compared with the DAC country
average of 27%. It channelled a further 10% of its bilateral
ODA for specific projects implemented by multilateral
organisations (multi-bi/non-core contributions).
In 2012, New Zealand programmed 71% of bilateral ODA
at partner country level. New Zealand’s share of country
programmable aid (CPA) was well above the DAC country
average (55%). Project-type interventions accounted for
37% of CPA.
USD 49 million of bilateral ODA was channelled to and
through civil society organisations (CSOs). ODA chan-
nelled to and through CSOs declined between 2011
and 2012, both in terms of volume (-17%) and as a share of
bilateral ODA (from 17% in 2011 to 13% in 2012). This share
was lower than the 2012 DAC country average of 16.8%.
Figure 42.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share
of GNI, 2003-13, New Zealand
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933125895
Figure 42.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through
the multilateral system, two year averages,
gross disbursements, New Zealand
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Figure 42.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2012,
gross disbursements, New Zealand
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Figure 42.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs,
two year averages, gross disbursements, New Zealand
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IV. NEW ZEALANDBilateral ODA strongly focused on Oceania and Asia. In 2012, USD 228 million was allocated to Oceania, USD 52 million to
Far East Asia and USD 22 million to South and Central Asia.
72% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to
New Zealand’s top 10 recipients. New Zealand has
15 priority partner countries, all of which are among its
top 10 ODA recipients. Its support to fragile states reached
USD 81 million in 2012 (23% of total bilateral ODA).
In 2012, 33% of bilateral ODA allocated to least developed
countries (LDCs), reaching USD 118 million. As a share of
bilateral ODA, it has been fluctuating around 30% in recent
years. LDCs received the highest share of bilateral ODA
in 2012, compared with other income groups.
At 0.09% of New Zealand’s GNI in 2012, total ODA to LDCs
was less than the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.
Figure 42.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2011-12 average, gross disbursements, New Zealand
Note: 13% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2011-12. This share is not represented on the map.
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Figure 42.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA
to top recipients, 2012, gross disbursements,
New Zealand
Note: Totals do not add up to total bilateral ODA. A further
USD 113 million was unallocated by country.
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Figure 42.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, 2003-12,
gross disbursements, New Zealand
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IV. NEW ZEALANDOver half of bilateral ODA was allocated to social and economic infrastructure and services in 2012, representing
USD 112 million, with a strong focus on education (USD 52 million) and support to government and civil society
(USD 37 million). USD 25 million was allocated to transport and storage (accounted as ODA to economic infrastructure).
USD 128 million of bilateral ODA supported gender
equality. In 2012, 57% of New Zealand’s aid had gender
equality and women’s empowerment as a principal or
significant objective, compared with the DAC country
average of 28%. This share has been fluctuating in recent
years. A high share of aid to population, reproductive
health, education and other social infrastructure focuses
on gender.
USD 126 million of bilateral ODA supported the environ-
ment. In 2012, 39% of New Zealand’s aid had environment
as a principal or significant objective and 6% focused
particularly on climate change (mostly on adaptation),
compared with the respective DAC country averages
of 26% and 24%.
Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development
Assistance Committee members”.
Figure 42.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2011-12 average, commitments, New Zealand
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933126028
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Figure 42.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender
equality by sector, 2012, commitments, New Zealand
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Figure 42.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global
and local environment objectives, two year averages,
commitments, New Zealand
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IV. NORWAYNORWAY
Financial flows from Norway to developing countries
Type of flows from Norway to developing countries
-0.7 million USD of private flows at market terms in 2012. Foreign direct investment made up 23% of these flows.
5.6 billion USD of official development assistance (ODA) in 2013 (preliminary data).
-0.2 million USD of other official flows (OOF).
Norway uses ODA to mobilise resources for sustainable development
Norway promotes ODA as a catalyst for stimulating private investment in partner countries, in particular through its
development finance institution, the Norwegian Investment Fund for Development (Norfund). It has developed a range of
aid-funded support programmes to increase partnership with the private sector, including equity investments in renewable
energy, finance and agribusiness (Norwegian Ministry of ForeignAffairs, 2012). Through its Oil for Development programme,
it assists countries in managing their petroleum resources in a sustainable way.
It contributes to the mobilisation of domestic resources in developing countries by supporting their tax systems. In 2012,
it committed USD 18 million of its ODA to tax-related activities in partner countries.
It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy.
It committed USD 990 million (39% of its sector-allocable ODA) to trade-related activities in 2012, an 8% fall from 2011. The
trend has been relatively steady in recent years.
Norway has developed innovative programmes to reduce the cost of transferring remittances (OECD, 2014). In 2012,
remittances exiting Norway to developing countries amounted to USD 685 million.
Figure 43.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-12, Norway
Note: Data on OOF are not available for 2011. Data on private grants – resources mobilised by non-governmental
organisations and foundations – are not available for this period.
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IV. NORWAYNorway’s official development assistance
In 2013, Norway provided USD 5.6 billion ODA (prelimi-
nary data), a 16.4% increase in real terms from 2012. Its
ODA as a percentage of gross national income (GNI) has
increased, from 0.93% in 2012 to 1.07% in 2013. Norway is
the most generous donor of the Development Assistance
Committee (DAC) measured as a share of GNI. It has
consistently maintained its level of development assis-
tance, having spent about 1% of GNI on ODA every year
since 2009. All of Norway’s ODA (excluding administrative
costs and in-donor refugee costs) was untied in 2012,
compared with the DAC average of 81%.The grant element
of total ODA was 100% in 2012.
In 2012, 75% of ODA was provided bilaterally. Norway
allocated 25% of total ODA as core contributions to multi-
lateral organisations, compared with the DAC country
average of 27%. It channelled a further 29% of its bilateral
ODA for specific projects implemented by multilateral
organisations (multi-bi/non-core contributions).
In 2012, 37% of bilateral ODA was programmed at partner
country level.Norway’s share of country programmable aid
(CPA) was less than the DAC country average (55%). This
low CPA figure is caused by, among other things, a high
level of in-donor refugee costs and a large share of its ODA
channelled to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and
local government. Project-type interventions account for
57% of CPA.
USD 934 million of Norway’s bilateral ODA was chan-
nelled to and through civil society organisations (CSOs).
Norway’s ODA channelled to and through CSOs has
slightly decreased in terms of volume in recent years.
However, it remains relatively steady as a share of bilateral
ODA. This share amounted to 25.8% in 2012, compared
with the DAC country average of 16.8%.
Figure 43.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share
of GNI, 2003-13, Norway
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933126104
Figure 43.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through
the multilateral system, two year averages,
gross disbursements, Norway
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Figure 43.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2012,
gross disbursements, Norway
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Figure 43.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs,
two year averages, gross disbursements, Norway
Note: Data on ODA to CSOs are not available between 2007 and 2009.
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IV. NORWAYBilateral ODA primarily focused on sub-Saharan Africa. In 2012, USD 917 million was allocated to sub-Saharan Africa and
USD 334 million to South and Central Asia.
52% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to Norway’s
top 10 recipients. It does not identify priority countries. Still,
its ODA is relatively concentrated on the top recipients.
In 2012, its support to fragile states reached USD 980 million
(27% of total bilateral ODA).
In 2012, 26% of bilateral ODA allocated to least developed
countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 946 million. The share
has decreased over the past decade, from 39% in 2003 to
26% in 2012. LDCs received the highest share of bilateral
ODA in 2012.
At 0.27% of GNI in 2012, total ODA to LDCs was way above
the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.
Figure 43.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2011-12 average, gross disbursements, Norway
Note: 43% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2011-12. This share is not represented on the map.
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Note: Totals do not add up to total bilateral ODA. A further USD 1.8 billion
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IV. NORWAYAlmost 40% of bilateral ODA was allocated to social infrastructure and services in 2012, reaching USD 1.3 billion, with a
strong focus on support to government and civil society (USD 760 million). USD 386 million went to forestry and
USD 390 million was allocated to humanitarian aid.
USD 777 million of bilateral ODA supported gender
equality. Gender is a long-standing focus in Norway’s
development programme, both a thematic priority and a
cross-cutting issue (OECD, 2014). In 2012, 31% of its aid
had gender equality and women’s empowerment as a
principal or significant objective, compared with the DAC
country average of 28%. In particular, a high share of
Norway’s aid to population, reproductive health and
education focuses on gender
USD 1 billion of bilateral ODA supported the environ-
ment. Norway is strongly committed to supporting
environment and climate change-related activities. It is
making progress with mainstreaming these issues in its
development co-operation (OECD, 2014). In 2012, 30% of its
aid had environment as a principal or significant objective
and 25% focused on climate change, compared with the
respective DAC country averages of 26% and 24%.
Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development
Assistance Committee members”.
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Figure 43.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2011-12 average, commitments, Norway
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IV. POLANDPOLAND
Poland uses ODA to mobilise resources for sustainable development
Poland does not have a separate private sector development strategy, but supporting entrepreneurship, and in particular
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in partner countries, is one of the priorities of Polish development co-operation
for 2012-15.
Over recent years Poland has implemented several projects that aimed to help partner countries improve their trade regime.
In 2012, remittances exiting Poland to developing countries amounted to USD 422 million.
Poland’s official development assistance
In 2013, Poland provided USD 474 million ODA (prelimi-
nary data), which represented 0.10% of gross national
income (GNI) and an 8.6% increase in real terms
from 2012. The positive trends in Poland’s aid volume are
in line with its intention, as a member of the European
Union, to fulfil its political commitment to attain the
0.33% ODA/GNI ratio when political and financial
conditions permit.
Poland delivered 29% of ODA bilaterally. It channelled
71% of its ODA to multilateral organisations in 2012,
compared with the DAC country average of 27%. Its multi-
lateral aid consistedmainly of mandatory assessed contri-
butions to the European Union and other international
organisations.
Figure 44.1. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share
of GNI, 2003-13, Poland
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Figure 44.2. Share of ODA channelled to and through
the multilateral system, two year averages,
gross disbursements, Poland
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IV. POLANDBilateral ODA primarily focused on Eastern Europe and Far East Asia. In 2012, USD 32 million was allocated to Eastern
Europe (a declining amount compared with 2011) and USD 63 million to Far East Asia.
92% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to Poland’s
top 10 recipients. Poland divides its geographical priorities
into two groups: Eastern Partnerships and selected countries
of Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East. Its support to
fragile states reached USD 19 million in 2012 (15% of total
bilateral ODA).
In 2012, 9% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least devel-
oped countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 12 million. This
trend has been positive since 2010. Upper middle-income
countries received the highest share of bilateral ODA
in 2012 (61%).
At 0.02% of GNI in 2012, total ODA to LDCs was far from
the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.
Figure 44.3. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2011-12 average, gross disbursements, Poland
Note: 7% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2011-12. This share is not represented on the map.
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Figure 44.4. Bilateral country-allocable ODA
to top recipients, 2012, gross disbursements, Poland
Note: Totals do not add up to total bilateral ODA. A further USD 11million
was unallocated by country.
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IV. POLANDPriority sectors vary from Eastern European countries to
other partner countries. Poland has two priority sectors in
Eastern European partner countries – democratisation
and human rights and support to political and economic
transformation. Partner countries in Asia and Africa are
supported in the areas of education, environment, devel-
opment of small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) and
professionalising the public administration.
Gender equality is a cross-cutting priority.Gender equality
and women’s empowerment are among the focus areas of
Poland’s development co-operation and an integral part of
its thematic priority of democracy and human rights.
Poland supports projects targeted at enhancing the social
and economic status of women and girls in partner coun-
tries such as Afghanistan, as well as in other partner coun-
tries. All projects supported by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs must integrate gender equality and women’s
empowerment as a cross-cutting theme.
A key principle of Polish development co-operation is
caring for the natural environment, the sustainable use
of natural resources and combatting climate change.
Counteracting environmental degradation, climate
change mitigation and adaptation are integrated into
Poland’s sector support. Environmental impact assess-
ments are required for all development projects submitted
to Polish Development Aid. Measures to redress possible
negative impacts must be identified. Poland has recently
hosted international meetings devoted to climate change
(Poznan UN Climate Change Conference in 2008 and
Warsaw UN Climate Change Conference in 2013).
Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development
Assistance Committee members”.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014350
IV. PORTUGALPORTUGAL
Financial flows from Portugal to developing countries
Type of flows from Portugal to developing countries
-114 million USD of private flows at market terms in 2012.
484 million USD of official development assistance (ODA) in 2013 (preliminary data).
2 million USD of other official flows (OOF) in 2012.
7 million USD of private grants in 2012. These resources were mobilised by non-governmental organisations and foundations.
Portugal uses ODA to mobilise resources for sustainable development
Portugal has included private sector and development as a part of its new development co-operation strategy. It
promotes private investment in partner countries through its development finance institution, the Sociedad para o
Financiamento do Desenvolvimento (SOFID).
It contributes to the mobilisation of domestic resources in developing countries by supporting their tax systems. In 2012,
it committed USD 59 000 of its ODA to tax-related activities in partner countries. It is likely that this amount understates the
efforts undertaken by Portugal.
It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance. It committed USD 22 million (15% of
sector-allocable ODA) to trade-related activities in 2012, a 9% decrease from 2011. The trend has been decreasing since 2010.
Portugal’s National Plan for Migrant Integration aims to facilitate remittances, increase immigrants’ access to job offers
and public services, stimulate circular migration and encourage migrants to invest in their home countries. In 2012,
remittances exiting Portugal to developing countries amounted to USD 495 million.
Figure 45.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-12, Portugal
Note: Data on OOF are not available for 2008, 2009 or 2010.
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IV. PORTUGALPortugal’s official development assistance
In 2013, Portugal provided USD 484 million ODA (prelimi-
nary data), which represented 0.23% of gross national
income (GNI) and a fall of 20.4% in real terms from 2012.
In 2012, the share of its untied ODA (excluding administra-
tive costs and in-donor refugee costs) was 25%, compared
to the DAC average of 81%. The grant element of total ODA
was 84.6% in 2012, less than the grant element compliance
norm of 86%.
In 2012, 70% of ODA was provided bilaterally. Portugal
allocated 30% of total ODA as core contributions to multi-
lateral organisations, compared with the DAC country
average of 27%. It channelled a further 2% of its bilateral
ODA for specific projects implemented by multilateral
organisations (multi-bi/non-core contributions).
In 2012, 92% of bilateral ODA was programmed at partner
country level. Its share of country programmable aid (CPA)
was well above the DAC country average (55%). Project-type
interventions made up 93% of CPA.
USD 16 million of bilateral ODA was channelled to and
through civil society organisations (CSOs). Although the
amount of Portugal’s ODA to and through CSOs has gener-
ally increased in recent years, it fell by 14% between 2011
and 2012. The share of bilateral ODA channelled to and
through CSOs has, however, remained steady at 4%. The
2012 DAC country average was 16.8%
Figure 45.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share
of GNI, 2003-13, Portugal
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933126408
Figure 45.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through
the multilateral system, two year averages,
gross disbursements, Portugal
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Figure 45.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2012,
gross disbursements, Portugal
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933126446
Figure 45.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs,
two year averages, gross disbursements, Portugal
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IV. PORTUGALBilateral ODA primarily focused on sub-Saharan Africa. In 2012, USD 323 million was allocated to sub-Saharan Africa and
USD 59 million to North Africa.
99% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to Portugal’s
top 10 recipients. Portugal’s programme is highly focused
on six Portuguese-speaking priority partner countries, all
of which sit among its top 10 recipients. Its support to
fragile states reached USD 62 million in 2012 (14% of total
bilateral ODA).
In 2012, 39% of bilateral ODA allocated to least developed
countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 170 million. As a
share of bilateral ODA, it has decreased in recent years (it
stood at 62% in 2011 and 52% in 2010). Lower middle-
income countries received the highest share of bilateral
ODA in 2012 (53%).
At 0.09% of GNI in 2012, total ODA to LDCs was less than
the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.
Figure 45.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2011-12 average, gross disbursements, Portugal
Note: 4% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2011-12. This share is not represented on the map.
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Figure 45.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA
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Note: Totals do not add up to total bilateral ODA. A further USD 17million
was unallocated by country.
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IV. PORTUGALTwo-thirds of bilateral ODA was allocated to programme assistance. In 2012, USD 244 million of bilateral ODA was
allocated to programme assistance and USD 120 million to social infrastructure and services, with a strong focus on
education (USD 52 million).
USD 56 million of bilateral ODA supported gender equality.
Gender equality is prioritised in Portugal’s policy for develop-
ment co-operation and has been progressively integrated in
the bilateral programming with its main partner countries.
In 2012, 38% of Portuguese aid had gender equality and
women’s empowerment as a principal or significant objec-
tive, compared with the DAC country average of 28%. This is
an increase compared with 36% in 2011 and 15% in 2010. A
high share of Portugal’s aid to population, reproductive
health, water and sanitation focuses on gender.
USD 21 million of bilateral ODA supported the environ-
ment. Portugal’s share of environment-focused ODA has
increased in recent years. Nevertheless, integrating the
environment and climate change throughout its develop-
ment co-operation remains a challenge. In 2012, 5% of its
aid had climate change as a principal or significant
objective, compared with the DAC country average of 24%.
Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development
Assistance Committee members”.
Figure 45.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2011-12 average, commitments, Portugal
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Figure 45.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender
equality by sector, 2012, commitments, Portugal
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Figure 45.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global
and local environment objectives, two year averages,
commitments, Portugal
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IV. SLOVAK REPUBLICSLOVAK REPUBLIC
The Slovak Republic uses ODA to mobilise resources for sustainable development
The Slovak Republic’s Business Partnership programme – one of its eight main programmes – aims to find synergies
between the goals of Slovak development co-operation and the goals of the business sector in partner countries. The
programme focuses on strengthening socio-economic development of local communities and mobilising private financial
resources in order to enhance development activities. The programme helps establish partnerships with local business
entities in partner countries to strengthen their capacities while helping Slovak entities access new markets – without
providing export subsidies.
In 2012, remittances exiting the Slovak Republic to developing countries amounted to USD 32 million.
The Slovak Republic’s official development assistance
In 2013, the Slovak Republic provided USD 85 million
ODA (preliminary data), which represented 0.09% of
gross national income (GNI) and a 2.4% increase in real
terms from 2012. Despite severe fiscal constraints, the
Slovak Republic managed to stabilise its ODA budget over
the past three years. The Slovak Republic is committed to
gradually meet ODA targets adopted at the EU level when
the economy recovers. The grant element of total ODA
was 100% in 2012.
In 2012, 24% of ODA was provided bilaterally. In 2012,
76% of the Slovak Republic’s ODA was channelled to
multilateral organisations, compared with the DAC
country average of 27%.The major share of its multilateral
aid went to fulfil its assessed contribution to the EU
(including the European Development Fund) (i.e. 89%).
It also contributed to several other international orga-
nisations, notably the European Investment Bank; the
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe; the
United Nations system; and theWorld Bank Group.
Figure 46.1. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share
of GNI, 2006-13, Slovak Republic
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Figure 46.2. Share of ODA channelled to and through
the multilateral system, two year averages,
gross disbursements, Slovak Republic
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IV. SLOVAK REPUBLICBilateral ODA primarily focused on Eastern Europe. In 2012, USD 4.5 million was allocated to Eastern Europe and
USD 2.6 million to sub-Saharan Africa.
81% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to the Slovak
Republic’s top 10 recipients. It focuses on 10 priority
partners with three programme countries (Afghanistan,
Kenya, Moldova), six project countries (Albania, Belarus,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo,* Ukraine) and
South Sudan. Seven priority countries sit among its top 10
recipients. In 2012, its support to fragile states reached
USD 4 million (22% of total bilateral ODA).
In 2012, 9% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least devel-
oped countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 1.7 million. The
share fell sharply between 2008 (63%) and 2009 (3%), and
has since then slightly increased. Upper middle-income
countries received the highest share of bilateral ODA
(20%), noting the high share unallocated by income group
(48%) in 2012, compared to the 32% total DAC average.
At 0.02% of GNI in 2012, total ODA to LDCs was far from
the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.
Figure 46.3. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2011-12 average, gross disbursements, Slovak Republic
Note: 53% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2011-12. This share is not represented on the map.
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Figure 46.4. Bilateral country-allocable ODA
to top recipients, 2012, gross disbursements,
Slovak Republic
Note: Totals do not add up to total bilateral ODA. A further USD 9 million
was unallocated by country.
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Figure 46.5. Bilateral ODA by income group, 2003-12,
gross disbursements, Slovak Republic
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IV. SLOVAK REPUBLICA wide range of intervention sectors.The Slovak Republic’s
bilateral co-operation focuses on seven areas: education,
healthcare, good governance and building of civil society,
agriculture and forestry, water and sanitation, energy, and
building a market environment. Priority sectors of enga-
gement are identified in the country strategy papers for
programme countries. The Slovak Republic will support
sectors in its “project” countries on the basis of the diverse
needs of the countries undergoing transformation and the
Slovak Republic’s own experience.
Gender equality, a cross-cutting priority. The Slovak
Republic considers that gender equality and women’s
empowerment are crucial for eradicating poverty and
promoting economic growth and social development. It
plans to mainstream gender equality into its development
co-operation programme.
Integrating environment into development co-operation.
The Slovak Republic strives to integrate environment and
climate change into its development co-operation, in
accordance with its commitments regarding mitigation,
adaptation and protection of biodiversity.
Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development
Assistance Committee members”.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 357
IV. SLOVENIASLOVENIA
Slovenia uses ODA to mobilise resources for sustainable development
Slovenia does not have a specific strategy for supporting private sector development. It does, however, involve domestic
firms in its development co-operation. For example, almost half of Slovenia’s country programmable aid is tendered by
partner countries themselves – according to their own public procurement procedures – and often involves industrial
projects with Slovenian firms.
In 2012, remittances exiting Slovenia to developing countries amounted to USD 118 million.
Slovenia’s official development assistance
In 2013, Slovenia provided USD 60 million ODA (prelimi-
nary data), which represented 0.13% of gross national
income (GNI) and a 0.6% decrease in real terms from 2012.
In 2012, 33% of ODA was provided bilaterally. In 2012,
67% of Slovenia’s ODA was channelled to multilateral
organisations, compared with the DAC country average of
27%. Slovenia principally allocated its multilateral contri-
butions to the European Union (EU general budget and
European Development Fund) to meet its mandatory
contributions. The remainder of Slovenia’s multilateral
ODA consisted of contributions to the World Bank Group,
as well as small contributions to the Global Environment
Facility and United Nations agencies.
Figure 47.1. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share
of GNI, 2005-13, Slovenia
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Figure 47.2. Share of ODA channelled to and through
the multilateral system, two year averages,
gross disbursements, Slovenia
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IV. SLOVENIABilateral ODA primarily focused on Eastern Europe. In 2012, USD 10 million was allocated to Eastern Europe and
USD 1 million to sub-Saharan Africa.
91% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to Slovenia’s
top 10 recipients. Slovenia has eight priority partner
countries and its ODA to the top 10 recipients is strongly
concentrated. In 2012, its support to fragile states reached
USD 3 million (16% of total bilateral ODA).
In 2012, 3% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least devel-
oped countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 0.7 million. The
share has decreased compared with 6% in 2010 and 8%
in 2011. Upper middle-income countries received the
highest share of bilateral ODA in 2012 (41%).
At 0.02% of gross national income (GNI) in 2012, total ODA
to LDCs was far from the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.
Figure 47.3. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2011-12 average, gross disbursements, Slovenia
Note: 35% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2011-12. This share is not represented on the map.
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Figure 47.4. Bilateral country-allocable ODA
to top recipients, 2012, gross disbursements, Slovenia
Note: Totals do not add up to total bilateral ODA.A further USD 6.9 million
was unallocated by country. Reference to Kosovo is without prejudice to
its status under international law.
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Figure 47.5. Bilateral ODA by income group, 2003-12,
gross disbursements, Slovenia
Note: Data are not available prior to 2008.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933126769
0
12
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
2
4
6
8
10
Constant 2012 USD million
Upper middle-income countries
Lower middle-income countries
Other low-income countries
Least developed countriesDEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 359
IV. SLOVENIAPriority is given to social sectors. For the period up to the
end of 2015, Slovenia’s bilateral co-operation focuses on:
1) social services; 2) economic services and infrastructure;
and 3) multi-sectoral priorities (including climate change
adaptation and good governance).
Gender equality is a cross-cutting priority. Women’s
empowerment is one of the cross-cutting themes of
Slovenia’s development co-operation. The Ministry for
Foreign Affairs has developed a Draft Gender Strategy.
Environment is a priority theme. Environmental protec-
tion, with a focus on sustainable water management, is
one of the priority themes for Slovenia’s development
co-operation. In 2011, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs
developed a SustainableWater Management Strategy.
Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development
Assistance Committee members”.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014360
IV. SPAINSPAIN
Financial flows from Spain to developing countries
Type of flows from Spain to developing countries
-63 million USD of private flows at market terms in 2012, which were composed of private export credits (100%).
2.2 billion USD of official development assistance (ODA) in 2013 (preliminary data).
2 million USD of other official flows (OOF) in 2012.
0.34million USD of private grants in 2012.These resources weremobilised by non-governmental organisations and foundations.
Spain uses ODA to mobilise resources for sustainable development
Spain uses its ODA as a catalyst to promote private sector investment in developing countries. CONFIDES, its Development
Finance Institute, is the main instrument it uses and within this, the FIEX and FONDPYME funds the private sector.
It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy. Its
commitment to trade-related activities has, however, been following a decreasing trend since 2010. In 2012, it amounted to
USD 82 million (12% of its sector-allocable ODA), an 86% fall from 2011.
In addition, remittances exiting Spain to developing countries amounted to USD 9.5 billion in 2012.
Figure 48.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-12, Spain
Note: Data on other OOF are not available for 2006, 2008 or 2010. Data on private grants are only available for 2012.
 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933126788
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IV. SPAINSpain’s official development assistance
In 2013, Spain provided USD 2.2 billion ODA (preliminary
data), which represented 0.16% of gross national income
(GNI) and a 3.7% increase in real terms from 2012. ODA
has reached a standstill after having dramatically fallen
between 2008 and 2012, both in terms of volume and as a
share of GNI. Spain is currently not on track to meet its
commitment to deliver its 0.7% ODA/GNI target by 2015.
Spain’s share of untied ODA (excluding administrative
costs and in-donor refugee costs) was 83% in 2012,
compared with the DAC average of 81%.The grant element
of total ODA was 100% in 2012.
In 2012, 50% of ODA was provided bilaterally. Spain
allocated 50% of total ODA as core contributions to multi-
lateral organisations, compared with the DAC country
average of 27%. It channelled a further 12% of its bilateral
ODA for specific projects implemented by multilateral
organisations (multi-bi/non-core contributions).
In 2012, 37% of bilateral ODA was programmed at partner
country level. Spain’s share of country programmable aid
(CPA) was lower than the DAC country average (55%). This
results from the high percentage of unallocated aid and a
relatively high amount of spending on administrative costs.
Project-type interventions accounted for 71% of CPA.
USD 480 million of bilateral ODA was channelled to and
through civil society organisations (CSOs). In 2012, the
amount of Spanish ODA channelled to and through CSOs
fell by 36% compared to 2011. Although the volume has
sharply declined in recent years, the share of bilateral
ODA for CSOs has been increasing, from 20% in 2009
to 39% in 2012 (well above the 2012 DAC country average
of 16.8%).
Figure 48.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share
of GNI, 2003-13, Spain
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933126807
Figure 48.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through
the multilateral system, two year averages,
gross disbursements, Spain
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Figure 48.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2012,
gross disbursements, Spain
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Figure 48.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs,
two year averages, gross disbursements, Spain
Note: Data on ODA channelled through CSOs are not available for 2007.
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IV. SPAINBilateral ODA primarily focused on Latin America and the Caribbean. In 2012, USD 320 million was allocated to the
American continent (a strong decrease compared to 2011 volumes), and USD 256 million to sub-Saharan Africa.
46% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to Spain’s
top 10 recipients. Spain reduced the number of its partner
countries from 50 in 2012 to 23 in 2013. In 2012, its support
to fragile states reached USD 261 million (24% of total
bilateral ODA).
In 2012, 25% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least devel-
oped countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 264 million.
While the volume has fallen since 2009, the share has
progressively increased since 2006 when it stood at 10%.
At 0.04% of GNI in 2012, total ODA to LDCs was far from
the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.
Figure 48.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2011-12 average, gross disbursements, Spain
Note: 23% of ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2011-12. This share is not represented on the map.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933126883
Sub-Saharan
Africa
19%
South and Central Asia
3%
Other Asia and Oceania
4%
North Africa
and Middle East
15%Latin America
and Caribbean
34%
Europe
1%
Figure 48.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA
to top recipients, 2012, gross disbursements, Spain
Note: Totals do not add up to total bilateral ODA. A further
USD 403 million of total bilateral ODA was unallocated by country.
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IV. SPAINOver 40% of bilateral ODA was allocated to social infrastructure and services in 2012, or USD 487 million, with a strong
focus on support to government and civil society (USD 181 million) and education (USD 131 million).
USD 1.7 billion of bilateral ODA supported gender equality.
Gender equality has been integrated into Spain’s projects
and programmes. In 2012, 54% of Spanish aid had gender
equality andwomen’s empowerment as a principal or signif-
icant objective, compared with the DAC country average
of 28%. This is an increase compared with previous years
(24% in 2011 and 32% in 2010). A high share of Spain’s aid to
population and reproductive health focuses on gender.
USD 281 million of bilateral ODA supported the environ-
ment. Spain is committed to ensuring the environment is
mainstreamed into its projects and programmes, but
challenges remain in implementation. In 2012, 25% of
Spanish aid had environment as a principal or significant
objective and 18% focused particularly on climate change,
compared with the relative DAC country averages of
26% and 24%.
Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development
Assistance Committee members”.
Figure 48.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2011-12 average, commitments, Spain
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933126940
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Figure 48.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender
equality by sector, 2012, commitments, Spain
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Figure 48.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global
and local environment objectives, two year averages,
commitments, Spain
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IV. SWEDENSWEDEN
Financial flows from Sweden to developing countries
Type of flows from Sweden to developing countries
8.9 billion USD of private flows at market terms in 2012.These flows weremainly composed of foreign direct investment (97%)
5.8 billion USD of official development assistance (ODA) in 2013 (preliminary data).
-48 million USD of other official flows (OOF) in 2012.
19million USD of private grants in 2012. These resources were mobilised by non-governmental organisations and foundations.
Sweden uses ODA to mobilise resources for sustainable development
Sweden uses its ODA as a catalyst to promote private sector investment in developing countries. It has a number of
instruments to enable it do this, including Swedfund, Sweden’s Development Finance Institution, and Sida’s Business for
Development Programme, which includes public-private development partnerships funds, challenge funds and credit
guarantees.
Sweden contributes to the mobilisation of domestic resources in developing countries by supporting their tax systems.
In 2012, it committed USD 210 000 of its ODA to tax-related activities in partner countries.
It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy.
It committed USD 390 million (20% of its sector-allocable ODA) to trade-related activities in 2012, a 16% increase from 2011.
The trend has been fluctuating in recent years.
Sweden recognises the importance of remittances in contributing to development and is committed to promoting more
secure and cheaper remittance transfers. In 2012, remittances exiting Sweden to developing countries amounted to
USD 1.3 billion.
Figure 49.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-12, Sweden
Note: Sweden counts its contribution to Swedfund as ODA. In 2012, this amounted to USD 59.09 million. As the
geographical distribution of Swedfund’s outflows are also reported to the DAC, the official contribution to Swedfund
has been deducted in order to not double count total flows made by Sweden. The negative level in OOF arises from
the deduction of OOF corresponding to the capital contribution given to Swedfund.
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IV. SWEDENSweden’s official development assistance
In 2013, Sweden provided USD 5.8 billion ODA (prelimi-
nary data), a 6.3% increase in real terms from 2012. It is
committed to delivering 1% of its gross national income
(GNI) to ODA. In 2013 it exceeded this target, delivering
1.02% of its GNI as ODA. It is the 2nd largest donor of the
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in terms of
ODA as a percentage of GNI, and the 6th largest in terms of
volume. Sweden’s share of untied ODA (excluding admin-
istrative costs and in-donor refugee costs) was 93%
in 2012, compared with the DAC average of 81%. The grant
element of total ODA was 100% in 2012.
In 2012, 69% of ODA was provided bilaterally. Sweden
allocated 31% of total ODA as core contributions to multi-
lateral organisations, compared with the DAC country
average of 27%. It channelled a further 29% of its bilateral
ODA for specific projects implemented by multilateral
organisations (multi-bi/non-core contributions).
In 2012, 39% of bilateral ODA was programmed at partner
country level. Sweden’s share of country programmable aid
(CPA) was less than the DAC country average (55%). This is
mainly due to high levels of spending on humanitarian and
food aid; refugees in Sweden; and a large percentage of
bilateral aid that is unallocated. Project-type interventions
accounted for 53% of CPA.
USD 1.03 billion of bilateral ODA was channelled to and
through civil society organisations (CSOs). ODA chan-
nelled to and through CSOs has increased in terms of
volume in recent years (+7% between 2011 and 2012). ODA
for CSOs has, however, been relatively steady as a share of
bilateral ODA in recent years, amounting to 28% in 2012,
compared with the DAC country average of 16.8%.
Figure 49.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share
of GNI, 2003-13, Sweden
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933127016
Figure 49.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through
the multilateral system, two year averages,
gross disbursements, Sweden
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933127035
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Figure 49.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2012,
gross disbursements, Sweden
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Figure 49.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs,
two year averages, gross disbursements, Sweden
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IV. SWEDENBilateral ODA primarily focused on sub-Saharan Africa. In 2012, USD 983 million was allocated to sub-Saharan Africa and
USD 252 million to South and Central Asia.
47% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to Sweden’s
top 10 recipients.All countries featured in the list of top 10
recipients are priority partners for Sweden (it has 32),
which is phasing out several bilateral programmes to
reduce geographical fragmentation. In 2012, its support to
fragile states reached USD 975 million (27% of total bilateral
ODA).
In 2012, 26% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least devel-
oped countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 954 million. The
share has slightly decreased from 33% in 2011. LDCs receive
the highest share of bilateral ODA, noting that 56% was
unallocated by income group in 2012, compared to the
32% DAC average.
At 0.29% of GNI in 2012, total ODA to LDCs was well above
the UN target of 0.15% GNI.
Figure 49.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2011-12 average, gross disbursements, Sweden
Note: 45% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2011-12. This share is not represented on the map.
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Figure 49.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA
to top recipients, 2012, gross disbursements, Sweden
Note: Totals do not add up to total bilateral ODA. A further
USD 2 billion was unallocated by country.
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Figure 49.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, 2003-12,
gross disbursements, Sweden
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IV. SWEDENIn 2012, 41% of bilateral ODA was allocated to social infrastructure and services, for a total of USD 1.3 billion, with a strong
focus on support to government and civil society (USD 826 million). Humanitarian aid amounted to USD 305 million.
USD 2 billion of bilateral ODA supported gender equality.
Gender equality has been solidly integrated into Sweden’s
projects and programmes (OECD, 2014). In 2012, 81% of
Swedish aid had gender equality and women’s empower-
ment as a principal or significant objective, compared with
the DAC country average of 28%. Sweden has also been
striving to promote gender mainstreaming in its multi-
lateral partners’ activities, in particular theWorld Bank.
USD 1 billion of bilateral ODA supported the environ-
ment. Sweden has integrated the environment into its
programmes and projects. In 2012, 32% of its aid had
environment as a principal or significant objective and
18% focused on climate change, compared with the
respective DAC country averages of 26% and 24%.
Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development
Assistance Committee members”.
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Figure 49.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2011-12 average, commitments, Sweden
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Figure 49.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender
equality by sector, 2012, commitments, Sweden
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Figure 49.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global
and local environment objectives, two year averages,
commitments, Sweden
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IV. SWITZERLANDSWITZERLAND
Financial flows from Switzerland to developing countries
Type of flows from Switzerland to developing countries
11.5 billion USD of private flows at market terms in 2012. These flows were mainly composed of foreign direct investment.
3.2 billion USD of official development assistance (ODA) in 2013 (preliminary data).
473million USD of private grants in 2012.These resources weremobilised by non-governmental organisations and foundations.
Switzerland uses ODA to mobilise resources for sustainable development
Switzerland uses its ODA as a catalyst for private sector investment in developing countries. It has number of
instruments enabling it to do this, including the Swiss Investment Fund for Emerging Markets (SIFEM), Switzerland’s
Development Finance Institute and SECO’s Start-Up Fund, which provides credit to Swiss SME start-up projects in
developing and transition countries. In light of the high levels of private flows from Switzerland to developing countries, it
is well placed to play a leadership role internationally to maximise private investment for sustainable development and to
encourage private sector practices that maximise development outcomes (OECD, 2014).
It contributes to the mobilisation of domestic resources in developing countries by supporting their tax systems. In 2012,
it committed USD 21 000 of its ODA to tax-related activities in partner countries. It is likely that this amount understates the
efforts undertaken by Switzerland.
It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ revenues trade performance and integration into the world
economy. It committed USD 307 million (23% of its sector-allocable ODA) to trade-related activities in 2012, a 26% decline
from 2011. The trend has been fluctuating in recent years.
As part of its work on migration, Switzerland is committed to enhancing the development impact of remittances and has
supported the establishment of transparent and cost-effective money transfer systems for diaspora in Switzerland. In 2012,
remittances exiting Switzerland to developing countries amounted to USD 982 million.
Figure 50.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-12, Switzerland
Note: Data on other official flows (OOF) apply only for 2003 and 2006. Switzerland no longer uses OOF instruments.
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IV. SWITZERLANDSwitzerland’s official development assistance
In 2013, Switzerland provided USD 3.2 billion ODA (pre-
liminary data), which represented 0.47% of gross national
income (GNI) and a 3.4% increase in real terms from 2012.
It is the 8th largest donor of the Development Assistance
Committee (DAC) in terms of ODA as a percentage of GNI.
Switzerland is committed to deliver 0.5% of its GNI as ODA
by 2015 and is on track to meet this target. Switzerland’s
share of untied ODA (excluding administrative costs and
in-donor refuge costs) was 93% in 2012, compared with
the DAC average of 81%. The grant element of total ODA
was 100% in 2012.
In 2012, 81% of ODA was provided bilaterally. Switzerland
allocated 19% of total ODA as core contributions to multi-
lateral organisations, compared with the DAC country
average of 27%. It channelled a further 18% of its bilateral
ODA for specific projects implemented by multilateral
organisations (multi-bi/non-core contributions).
In 2012, 36% of bilateral ODA was programmed at partner
country level.The share of country programmable aid (CPA)
was less than the DAC country average (55%) and is a result
of relatively high spending on refugees in Switzerland,
humanitarian and food aid, and core contributions to civil
society. Project-type interventions made up 82% of CPA.
USD 649 million of bilateral ODA was channelled to and
through civil society organisations (CSOs). In recent
years, ODA channelled to and through CSOs has increased
in terms of volume (+15% between 2011 and 2012). It has,
however, slightly decreased as a share of bilateral ODA,
from 28% in 2010 to 26% in 2012 (compared with
the 2012 DAC country average of 16.8%).
Figure 50.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share
of GNI, 2003-13, Switzerland
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933127225
Figure 50.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through
the multilateral system, two year averages,
gross disbursements, Switzerland
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Figure 50.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2012,
gross disbursements, Switzerland
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Figure 50.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs,
two year averages, gross disbursements, Switzerland
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IV. SWITZERLANDBilateral ODA primarily focused on sub-Saharan Africa. In 2012, USD 442 million was allocated to sub-Saharan Africa and
USD 230 million to South and Central Asia.
33% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to
Switzerland’s top 10 recipients. It has 37 priority partner
countries and the concentration of its ODA is weak.
Still, all countries in the list of top 10 recipients are
priority partners. Swiss support to fragile states reached
USD 570 million in 2012 (23% of total bilateral ODA).
In 2012, 19% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least devel-
oped countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 474 million.
LDCs receive the highest share of bilateral ODA, noting that
55% was unallocated by income group in 2012 due princi-
pally to the high in-donor refugee costs.
At 0.11% of its gross national income (GNI) in 2012, total ODA
to LDCs was less than the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.
Figure 50.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2011-12 average, gross disbursements, Switzerland
Note: 48% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2011-12. This share is not represented on the map.
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Figure 50.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA
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Note: Totals do not add up to total bilateral ODA. A further USD 1.4 billion
was unallocated by country. Reference to Kosovo is without prejudice to
its status under international law.
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Figure 50.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, 2003-12,
gross disbursements, Switzerland
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IV. SWITZERLANDHalf of bilateral ODA was allocated to social infrastructure and services in 2012, for a total of USD 723 million, with a
strong focus on support to government and civil society (USD 321 million). Humanitarian aid amounted to USD 345 million.
USD 299 million of bilateral ODA supported gender
equality. Switzerland is committed to integrating gender
equality into its projects and programmes (OECD, 2014),
but challenges remain. In 2012, 22% of Swiss aid had
gender equality and women’s empowerment as a
principal or significant objective, compared with the DAC
country average of 28%. This was a decrease from 2011
(27%). A high share of Switzerland’s aid to population and
reproductive health focuses on gender.
USD 471 million of bilateral ODA supported the environ-
ment. Switzerland is committed to integrating the
environment in its programming and projects. In 2012,
19% of its aid had environment as a principal or significant
objective, compared with the DAC country average of 26%.
This share has strongly increased in recent years. In 2012,
16% of Swiss aid focused on climate change, compared
with the DAC country average of 24%.
Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development
Assistance Committee members”.
Reference
OECD (2014), OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Switzerland 2013, OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews, OECD
Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264196322-en.
Figure 50.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2011-12 average, commitments, Switzerland
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Figure 50.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender
equality by sector, 2012, commitments, Switzerland
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Figure 50.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global
and local environment objectives, two year averages,
commitments, Switzerland
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IV. UNITED KINGDOMUNITED KINGDOM
Financial flows from the United Kingdom to developing countries
Type of flows from the United Kingdom to developing countries
48.5 billion USD of private flows at market terms in 2012.These flows weremainly composed of foreign direct investment (84%).
17.9 billion USD of official development assistance (ODA) in 2013 (preliminary data).
36 million USD of other official flows (OOF) in 2012.
1 billion USD of private grants in 2012. These resources were mobilised by non-governmental organisations and foundations.
The United Kingdom uses ODA to mobilise resources for sustainable development
The United Kingdom promotes ODA as a catalyst to bring private sector investment to support development efforts in
partner countries, in particular through its development finance institution, the CDC, and increased use of returnable
capital instruments. The United Kingdom is shaping a new approach to fostering economic development, under an
ambitious agenda to support growth, remove barriers to trade and investment, and stimulate the development of markets
to create jobs.
It contributes to the mobilisation of domestic resources in developing countries by supporting their tax systems. In 2012,
it committed USD 2.5 million of its ODA to tax-related activities in partner countries.
It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy.
It committed USD 1 billion (42% of sector-allocable ODA) to trade-related activities in 2012, a 35% increase from 2011. The
trend has been fluctuating in recent years.
The Department for International Development, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Home Office work
closely together to shape the UK position in international fora on migration. In 2012, remittances exiting the
United Kingdom to developing countries amounted to USD 15.3 billion.
Figure 51.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-12, United Kingdom
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933127415
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IV. UNITED KINGDOMThe United Kingdom’s official development assistance
In 2013, the United Kingdom provided USD 17.9 billion
ODA (preliminary data), a 27.8% increase in real terms
from 2012. It is the 2nd largest donor of the Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) in terms of volume. The
United Kingdom has put into place firm budget alloca-
tions to meet its 0.7% ODA/GNI target, and reached 0.72%
in 2013. All of its ODA (excluding administrative costs and
in-donor refugee costs) was untied in 2012. The grant
element of total ODA was 100% in 2012.
In 2012, 63% of ODA was provided bilaterally. The
United Kingdom allocated 37% of total ODA as core contri-
butions to multilateral organisations, compared with the
DAC country average of 27%. It channelled a further 35% of
its bilateral ODA for specific projects implemented by
multilateral organisations (multi-bi/non-core contributions).
In 2012, 52% of bilateral ODA was programmed at partner
country level. The United Kingdom’s share of country
programmable aid (CPA) was close to the DAC country
average (55%). A high share of bilateral ODA was catego-
rised as “other and unallocated” aid. Project-type inter-
ventions accounted for 52% of CPA.
USD 1.9 billion of bilateral ODA was channelled to and
through civil society organisations (CSOs). ODA chan-
nelled to and through CSOs has increased in recent years,
both in terms of volume (+14% between 2011 and 2012)
and as a share of bilateral ODA (from 19.2% in 2011 to
21.3% in 2012). The DAC country average share was 16.8%
in 2012.
Figure 51.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share
of GNI, 2003-13, United Kingdom
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933127434
Figure 51.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through
the multilateral system, two year averages,
gross disbursements, United Kingdom
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Figure 51.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2012,
gross disbursements, United Kingdom
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Figure 51.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs,
two year averages, gross disbursements,
United Kingdom
Note: Data on ODA channelled through CSOs are not available for 2007.
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IV. UNITED KINGDOMBilateral ODA primarily focused on the sub-Saharan Africa. In 2012, USD 3.4 billion was allocated to sub-Saharan Africa
and USD 1.7 billion to South and Central Asia.
55% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to the
United Kingdom’s top 10 recipients. It has 28 priority
partner countries and has focused its programme on
fewer countries. Ten of these countries are in the list of
top 10 recipients. In 2012, its support to fragile states
reached USD 3.8 billion (42% of total bilateral ODA).
In 2012, 34% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least
developed countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 3.1 billion.
The share fell from 39% in 2011 to 34% in 2012. LDCs
received the highest share of bilateral ODA in 2012,
compared with other income groups.
At 0.19% of gross national income (GNI) in 2012, total ODA
to LDCs was above the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.
Figure 51.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2011-12 average, gross disbursements, United Kingdom
Note: 33% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2011-12. This share is not represented on the map.
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Figure 51.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA
to top recipients, 2012, gross disbursements,
United Kingdom
Note: Totals do not add up to total bilateral ODA. A further
USD 3.2 billion was unallocated by country.
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Figure 51.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, 2003-12,
gross disbursements, United Kingdom
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IV. UNITED KINGDOMHalf of bilateral ODA was allocated to social infrastructure and services in 2012, for a total of USD 2.1 billion, with a strong
focus on education (USD 658 million) and support to government and civil society (USD 595 million). Humanitarian aid
amounted to USD 646 million.
USD 979 million of bilateral ODA supported gender
equality.The United Kingdom’s focus on women and girls
was reinforced by 2014 Development Act on Gender
Equality. Gender equality is embedded in the bilateral
programme, and issues affecting women and girls are also
raised on the global stage. In 2012, 48% of its aid had
gender equality and women’s empowerment as a
principal or significant objective, compared with the
DAC country average of 28%.
USD 886 million of bilateral ODA supported the environ-
ment. DFID’s new “climate and environment assessments”
review the impact of its programmes on the vulnerability of
poor communities to environmental disasters. In 2012, 15%
of its aid had environment as a principal or significant
objective and 10% focused particularly on climate change,
compared with the respective DAC country averages of 26%
and 24%.
Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development
Assistance Committee members”.
Figure 51.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2011-12 average, commitments, United Kingdom
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Figure 51.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender
equality by sector, 2012 commitments, United Kingdom
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Figure 51.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global
and local environment objectives, two year averages,
commitments, United Kingdom
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IV. UNITED STATESUNITED STATES
Financial flows from the United States to developing countries
Type of flows from the United States to developing countries
107 billion USD of private flows at market terms in 2012. These flows were mainly composed of foreign direct investment (43%).
31.5 billion USD of official development assistance (ODA) in 2013 (preliminary data).
2.5 billion USD of other official flows (OOF) in 2012.
22 billion USD of private grants in 2012.These resources weremobilised by non-governmental organisations and foundations.
The United States uses ODA to mobilise resources for sustainable development
The United States promotes ODA as a catalyst to bring private sector investment to support development efforts in
partner countries, in particular through its development finance institution, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC). The United States is strengthening its support to private sector engagement, with a goal to increase investments in
public-private partnerships to 10% of mission programme funding by 2015. USAID has also substantially strengthened its
Development Credit Authority, which is designed to use loan guarantees to unlock larger sources of local capital.
It contributes to the mobilisation of domestic resources in developing countries by supporting their tax systems. In 2012,
it committed USD 72 million of ODA to tax-related activities in partner countries.
It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy.
It committed USD 4 billion (21% of sector-allocable ODA) to trade-related activities in 2012, an 8% increase from 2011.
The government’s development co-operation policy acknowledges the increasing importance of remittances as a source
of income for partner countries. In 2012, remittances exiting the United States to developing countries amounted to
USD 103 billion.
Figure 52.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-12, United States
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IV. UNITED STATESThe United States’ official development assistance
In 2013, the United States provided USD 31.5 billion ODA
(preliminary data), which represented 0.19% of gross
national income (GNI) and a 1.3% increase in real terms
from 2012. It is the largest donor of the Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) in terms of volume. The
United States’ share of untied ODA (excluding adminis-
trative costs and in-donor refugee costs) was 69% in 2012,
compared with the DAC average of 81%.The grant element
of total ODA was 100% in 2012.
In 2012, 83% of ODA was provided bilaterally. The
United States allocated 17% of total ODA as core contribu-
tions to multilateral organisations, compared with the DAC
country average of 27%. It channelled a further 17% of its
bilateral ODA for specific projects implemented by multi-
lateral organisations (multi-bi/non-core contributions).
In 2012, 59% of bilateral ODA was programmed at partner
country level.The share of country programmable aid (CPA)
was close to the DAC country average (55%). A high share of
bilateral ODA was allocated to humanitarian and food aid.
Project-type interventions amounted to 84% of CPA.
USD 6.3 billion of bilateral ODA was channelled to and
through civil society organisations (CSOs). ODA chan-
nelled to and through CSOs has decreased in terms of
volume in recent years (-5% between 2011 and 2012).
However, it has remained relatively steady as a share of
bilateral ODA (24% in 2012). This share was higher than
the 2012 DAC average of 16.8%.
Figure 52.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share
of GNI, 2003-13, United States
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933127643
Figure 52.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through
the multilateral system, two year averages,
gross disbursements, United States
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Figure 52.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2012,
gross disbursements, United States
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Figure 52.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs,
two year averages, gross disbursements, United States
Note: Data on ODA to CSOs are only available for 2010 and 2012.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933127700
}18%
12%
4% 7%
59%
Of which:
4% of budget support
84% of project-type interventions
5% of technical assistance
8% of contributions to pooled
programmes and funds
Country programmable aid Debt relief
Humanitarian and food aid Imputed student costs
Other and unallocated Refugees in donor country
Support to NGOs Administrative costs
0
8
2007-08 2009-10 2011-12
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
ODA channelled through CSOs ODA to CSOs
Constant 2012 USD billionDEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014378
IV. UNITED STATESThe largest share of bilateral ODA was directed to sub-Saharan Africa. In 2012, USD 8.8 billion was allocated to
sub-Saharan Africa, USD 4.3 billion to South and Central Asia and USD 2.1 billion to the Middle East.
46% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to
the United States’ top 10 recipients. It has 136 partner
countries and slightly sharpened its geographic focus from
140 countries in 2010. Its support to fragile states reached
USD 11.4 billion in 2012 (44% of total bilateral ODA).
In 2012, 36% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least
developed countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 9.4 billion.
The share has progressively increased over the past
decade from 26% in 2003 to 36% in 2012. LDCs received the
highest share of bilateral ODA in 2012, compared with
other income groups.
At 0.07% of gross national income (GNI) in 2012, total ODA
to LDCs was less than the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.
Figure 52.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2011-12 average, gross disbursements, United States
Note: 23% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2011-12. This share is not represented on the map.
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Figure 52.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA
to top recipients, 2012, gross disbursements,
United States
Note: Totals do not add up to total bilateral ODA. A further
USD 7.8 billion was unallocated by country.
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Figure 52.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, 2003-12,
gross disbursements, United States
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IV. UNITED STATESHalf of bilateral ODA was allocated to social infrastructure and services in 2012, totalling USD 13.3 billion, with a strong
focus on population policies and programmes (USD 5.1 billion) and support to government and civil society (USD 4.8 billion).
Humanitarian aid amounted to USD 4 billion.
USD 411 million of bilateral ODA supported gender
equality. Backed by strong political support, the
United States has renewed its efforts to integrate gender
equality and female empowerment. USAID’s new Policy on
Gender Equality and Female Empowerment, focuses on
integrating gender in all USAID programming. Gender has
been mainstreamed in recent presidential initiatives on
food security and health. Until 2009, the United States’
gender marker was assigned based on a text search
through project description (using terms such as “girl” or
“woman”); resulting data on gender equality focused ODA
is not comparable with those reported by other donors.
The United States has implemented an improved data
collection system for the gender equality marker, and data
for 2011 will be available in 2014.
USD 1.8 billion of bilateral ODA supported the environ-
ment.US environment and climate change assistance aims
to help countries grow without harming the environment
by promoting low emissions, climate-resilient development
strategies, including clean energy development and
community-based natural resource management that
protects biodiversity and fights deforestation. For technical
reasons, data collection on aid for climate change for the
United States is not yet available. The United States is
working to review its data collection methodology and will
supply data for 2011 and 2012 in 2014.
Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development
Assistance Committee members”.
Figure 52.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2011-12 average, commitments, United States
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Figure 52.10. Bilateral ODA in support of global
and local environment objectives, two year averages,
commitments, United States
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Trends and profiles of other providers’
development co-operation
This chapter presents information on the volume and key features of the development
co-operation by providers beyond the Development Assistance Committee (DAC)
membership. Eighteen of these providers report to the OECD on their development
co-operation programmes. For another ten providers, the OECD makes estimates
based on official government reports, complemented by web-based research (mainly
on contributions to multilateral organisations). The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation,
the only private funding entity reporting to the OECD, is also included in this chapter.
The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The
use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli
settlements in theWest Bank under the terms of international law.
This section was prepared byWillem Luijkx in collaboration with Pawel Baginski, Michael Laird, Michael Stirnweiss,
Talita Yamashiro Fordelone and Ann Zimmerman of the Development Co-operation Directorate, OECD.381
IV. TRENDS AND PROFILES OF OTHER PROVIDERS’ DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATIONOne of the main changes in the development co-operation landscape in recent years has been the
increasing importance and prominence of providers of development co-operation that are not, at
present, members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). These providers form a quite
heterogeneous group of countries and include the “BRICS” (Brazil, the Russian Federation, India,
China and South Africa) and Latin American and Southeast Asian countries whose development
co-operation is rooted in the tradition of South-South co-operation. These are mostly middle-income
countries (MICs) with a dual role of both recipient and provider of development co-operation.
Arab countries, which have a long tradition of providing development co-operation, also belong to
this group, along with several high-income countries in Central and South Eastern Europe.
As their development co-operation programmes grow, there is an increasing demand for
information on these countries’ programmes. Partner countries need to know what flows are
reaching them. Policy makers need this information to make informed decisions and to co-ordinate
their activities with other countries and institutions. Transparent data also allows researchers to
study these countries’ programmes and the general public to see how public funds are being used.
With the accession of 5 countries to the DAC in 2013, 17 bilateral providers beyond the DAC
currently report to the OECD on their development co-operation programmes, although in different
degrees of comprehensiveness and detail. The OECD DAC engages with many other countries to
exchange ideas and share experiences on how to measure development co-operation. Some
countries do not report to the OECD, but do publish data on their programmes. However, this
information is often incomplete and in all cases not comparable with DAC statistics. In these cases,
the OECD is increasingly making estimates of how much of these countries’ programmes could meet
the criteria for official development assistance (ODA), as defined by the DAC.
As stated in the DAC Global Relations Strategy,1 “monitoring the concessional and
non-concessional development finance flows from public and private actors” is one of the DAC’s
objectives. Therefore, the OECD DAC welcomes additional or improved (i.e. more detailed and more
comprehensive) reporting by major providers of development co-operation. Data submitted and
estimates by the OECD are continuously updated and available on the webpage on development
finance of countries beyond the DAC.2
Estimated global concessional development finance (“ODA-like” flows)
Figure 53.1 provides an overview, in both US dollars and as a percentage of gross national income
(GNI), of gross concessional financing for development for countries with a development
co-operation programme of more than USD 350 000. In total, the OECD estimates that global
concessional development finance reached USD 139 billion in 2012, of which 8.4% was provided by
countries beyond the DAC. It should be stressed that this number is an approximation as regards the
development co-operation provided by countries that do not report to the OECD.
The following sections provide further information on the development co-operation
programmes of selected countries that are not members of the DAC. The first section covers the
17 countries that report to the OECD, with a particular focus on OECD member countries that are not
members of the DAC (Estonia, Hungary, Israel and Turkey), OECD accession countries (Latvia and the
Russian Federation) and major providers of development co-operation that report detailed andDEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014382
IV. TRENDS AND PROFILES OF OTHER PROVIDERS’ DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATIONcomprehensive data to the OECD (the United Arab Emirates, UAE). The second section, on important
providers of development co-operation that do not report to the OECD, similarly focuses on OECD
member countries that are not members of the DAC (Chile and Mexico), OECD accession countries
(Colombia), the OECD Key Partners (Brazil, India, Indonesia, the People’s Republic of China and
South Africa) and Qatar. The final section provides information on the Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation, the only private foundation that reported on its activities to the OECD in 2013
(over 2012 flows).
Providers of development co-operation that report to the OECD
Net concessional development co-operation by the 17 providers that report to the OECD fell from
USD 8.8 billion in 2011 to USD 6.5 billion in 2012. This is mainly due to a significant decrease in
Saudi Arabia’s development co-operation, which fell from USD 5 billion in 2011 to USD 1.3 billion
in 2012. Only six countries’ programmes increased in 2012. Turkey nearly doubled its development
co-operation. More figures and information on trends can be found in the following sections. It
generally concerns 2012 data, but where available, preliminary data on 2013 flows are presented for
individual countries.
Estonia
In 2013, Estonia’s net ODA amounted to USD 31 million, representing an increase of 22% in real
terms over 2012. The ratio of ODA as a share of gross national income (GNI) also rose, from 0.11%
to 0.13%. Multilateral ODA accounted for 66% of Estonia’s total ODA.
Estonia’s development co-operation is provided in line with its second Development Co-operation
Strategy, which was set for the period of 2011-15. This strategy contains detailed provisions concerning
the goals and objectives of Estonia’s development co-operation, its sectoral and geographical priorities,
as well as its financial allocations of ODA. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the key institution
responsible for managing and co-ordinating Estonia’s development co-operation.
Figure 53.1. Gross concessional financing for development (“ODA-like” flows)
Notes: Countries with gross development co-operation ofmore than USD 350 000. Figures are 2012 data unless otherwise specified.
Gross national income (GNI) figures are based on reported figures to the OECD or World Bank data. Non-DAC countries are
presented with gray bars.
1. Estimates.
2. Based on 2011 GNI figures because 2012 data were not yet available.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933127814
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IV. TRENDS AND PROFILES OF OTHER PROVIDERS’ DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATIONIn 2012, Estonia provided its bilateral development co-operation mostly to Afghanistan, Georgia,
Moldova and Ukraine, often in the form of small-scale technical co-operation projects. Its bilateral
development co-operation covers sustainable economic growth, education, health, government and
civil society.
Estonia provided its multilateral ODA primarily through the European Union (accounting for
72% of its multilateral ODA in 2012), as well as through the United Nations and theWorld Bank Group.
Estonia has been a member of the OECD since 2010 and is an observer to the DAC. In 2013, it
participated in the DAC Senior-Level Meeting, a meeting of the DAC Working Party on Development
Finance Statistics and a seminar at the OECD on DAC statistical reporting.
Hungary
In 2013, Hungary’s net ODA amounted to USD 120 million, representing a decrease of 2% in real
terms over 2012 (although in nominal terms Hungary’s net ODA slightly increased). The ratio of ODA as
a share of GNI remained stable at 0.10%. Multilateral ODA accounted for 76% of Hungary’s total ODA.
The International Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid Strategy of Hungary for the
period 2014-20 was approved by the Hungarian government in March 2014. The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs is the key institution responsible for planning, implementing and co-ordinating Hungary’s
development co-operation.
In 2012, Hungary provided its bilateral development co-operation mostly to Ukraine, Serbia,
Afghanistan, India and China. The main sectors of Hungary’s bilateral development co-operation are
political and economic transformation, good governance, education, migration, health, agriculture
and water management. Hungary provides its bilateral development co-operation in the form of
small-scale technical co-operation projects, scholarships and aid to refugees.
Hungary provided its multilateral ODA primarily through the European Union (accounting for
82% of multilateral ODA in 2012) as well as through the United Nations and theWorld Bank Group.
Hungary has been a member of the OECD since 1996 and is an observer to the DAC. In 2013,
Hungary participated in the DAC Senior-Level Meeting, a meeting of the DAC Working Party on
Development Finance Statistics and a seminar at the OECD on DAC statistical reporting.
Israel
In 2013, Israel’s net ODA amounted to USD 186 million, representing a decrease of 6% in real
terms over 2012 (although in nominal terms Israel’s net ODA slightly increased). The ratio of ODA as
a share of GNI remained stable at 0.07%. Multilateral ODA accounted for USD 16 million, representing
8% of Israel’s total ODA.
Israel’s Agency for International Development Co-operation, a division of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, is in charge of planning, implementing and co-ordinating Israel’s development co-operation.
In 2012, Israel provided its bilateral development co-operation mostly to Jordan and the
West Bank and Gaza Strip. The main sectors of Israel’s bilateral development co-operation are water
resources management, desert agriculture and combating desertification, early childhood education,
rural and community development, emergency and disaster medicine, public health and women’s
empowerment. Israel provides its bilateral development co-operation mostly in the form of
small-scale technical co-operation projects. In 2013, Israel supported Syrian refugees, especially
through the provision of medical services.
Israel is also engaged in triangular co-operation, partnering with several international
organisations (e.g. United Nations Development Programme, Food and Agriculture Organization and
World Food Programme) and DAC members (e.g. Germany, Italy and the United States) to support
developing countries in areas in which it has a comparative advantage.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014384
IV. TRENDS AND PROFILES OF OTHER PROVIDERS’ DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATIONIn 2012, Israel provided its multilateral ODA primarily through the World Bank Group
(accounting for 59% of its multilateral ODA in 2012) as well as through the United Nations and some
regional development banks.
Israel has been a member of the OECD since 2010 and is an observer to the DAC. In 2013, it
attended the DAC Senior-Level Meeting as well as the meeting of the DAC Network on Development
Evaluation. In November 2013, the OECD organised a seminar in Israel on managing development
co-operation. Israel also contributed to the DAC’s work on triangular co-operation.
Latvia
In 2013, Latvia’s net ODA amounted to USD 24 million, representing an increase of 12% in real
terms over 2012. The ratio of ODA as a share of GNI also rose, from 0.07% to 0.08%. Multilateral ODA
accounted for 94% of Latvia’s total ODA.
Latvia’s development co-operation is provided in line with the Latvian Development
Co-operation Policy Strategy 2011-15, which defines the goals, principles and directions of Latvia’s
development co-operation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for formulating
development co-operation policy and for co-ordinating aid activities.
In 2012, Latvia provided its bilateral development co-operation mostly to Afghanistan and
Georgia. The main sectors of Latvia’s bilateral development co-operation are fostering a market
economy, good governance, rule of law, education and environment. Latvia provides its bilateral
development co-operation mostly in the form of small-scale technical co-operation projects.
Latvia provided its multilateral ODA primarily through the European Union (accounting for
84% of its multilateral ODA in 2012) as well as through the United Nations and theWorld Bank Group.
In 2013, the OECD decided to open accession discussions with Latvia. In the same year, Latvia
participated, as an observer, in the OECD Development Co-operation Peer Review of Italy.
Russian Federation
In 2013, the Russian Federation’s net ODA amounted to USD 610 million, representing an
increase of 26% in real terms over 2012. The ratio of ODA as a share of GNI rose from 0.02% to 0.03%.
The Russian Federation’s multilateral ODA accounted for 42% its total ODA.
The Russian Federation’s development co-operation is provided in line with the Concept of
Russia’s Participation in International Development Assistance, approved by the President of the
Russian Federation in 2007. The concept sets out the objectives, principles and priorities of the
Russian Federation’s development co-operation, as well as the criteria for providing assistance to
partner countries. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance are jointly responsible
for formulating the Russian Federation’s development co-operation policy and for supervising its
implementation.
The Russian Federation provides its bilateral development co-operation mostly to the members
of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The priority sectors of the Russian Federation’s
bilateral development co-operation are energy, health and education. The Russian Federation
provides its bilateral development co-operation in the form of debt relief, concessional loans,
technical co-operation projects and scholarships, as well as budget support.
The Russian Federation provided its multilateral ODA through theWorld Bank Group (accounting
for 51% of its multilateral ODA in 2012) as well as through the United Nations and regional
development banks.
In 2007, the OECD decided to open accession discussions with the Russian Federation. In 2013,
the Russian Federation participated in the DAC Senior-Level Meeting, a meeting of the DAC Working
Party on Development Finance Statistics and a seminar at the OECD on DAC statistical reporting.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 385
IV. TRENDS AND PROFILES OF OTHER PROVIDERS’ DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATIONTurkey
In 2013, Turkey’s net ODA amounted to USD 3.3 billion, representing an increase of 30% in real
terms over 2012. The large increase in Turkish ODA over the last years is strongly related to its
response to the Syrian refugee crisis. The ratio of ODA as a share of GNI rose from 0.32% in 2012
to 0.42% in 2013. Multilateral ODA accounted for 4% of Turkey’s total ODA.
Turkey’s development co-operation is provided in line with the Law on the Organisation and
Duties of the Turkish Co-operation and Co-ordination Agency (TIKA), adopted in 2011. TIKA designs
and co-ordinates Turkey’s bilateral development co-operation activities and implements projects in
collaboration with other ministries, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the private sector.
Turkey provides its bilateral development co-operation mostly to South and Central Asia and the
Middle East, as well as to Africa. In 2012, Syria was themain recipient ofTurkey’s bilateral development
co-operation. The priority sectors of Turkey’s bilateral development co-operation are social
infrastructure and services, notably education and health, as well as governance and civil society.
In 2012,Turkey provided its multilateral ODA through the United Nations (accounting for 42% of its
multilateral ODA in 2012) as well as through theWorld Bank Group and regional development banks.
Turkey is a founding member of the OECD and is an observer to the DAC. In 2013, the DAC Chair
visited Turkey and the OECD organised a seminar in Ankara on managing development co-operation.
Turkey participated in the DAC Senior-Level Meeting, meetings of the DAC Network on Development
Evaluation and the DAC Working Party on Development Finance Statistics, as well as a seminar at the
OECD on DAC statistical reporting. Turkey also contributed to the DAC’s work on triangular co-operation.
Figure 53.2. ODA key statistics: Turkey
Source: OECD-DAC, www.oecd.org/dac/stats.
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IV. TRENDS AND PROFILES OF OTHER PROVIDERS’ DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATIONUnited Arab Emirates
In 2013, total net ODA of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) reached USD 5.1 billion, representing an
increase in real terms of 375% over 2012. The ratio of ODA as a share of GNI also rose, to 1.25%, up
from 0.27% in 2012. Multilateral ODA accounted for 1% of the country’s total ODA.
In 2013, the Office for Coordination of Foreign Aid was incorporated into the newly established
Ministry of International Co-operation and Development, which is responsible for developing a
foreign aid policy and an aid programme, documenting aid flows, enhancing international
co-operation and assessing the impact of the country’s development co-operation.
In 2012, the UAE provided its bilateral co-operation mostly to Jordan, followed by theWest Bank
and Gaza Strip, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Eritrea and Azerbaijan. The main sectors of the UAE’s bilateral
development co-operation are general programme assistance, economic infrastructure and
education, health and population sectors. The UAE provides its bilateral programme mostly in the
form of grants.
The UAE provided its multilateral ODA primarily through regional development banks
(accounting for 43% of its multilateral ODA in 2012) as well as through the United Nations.
The UAE reports detailed and comprehensive data to the OECD (and, in 2013, started to report
preliminary aggregate data as well). In 2013, the UAE participated in meetings of the DAC Network on
Development Evaluation and the DACWorking Party on Development Finance Statistics, as well as a
seminar at the OECD on DAC statistical reporting.
Figure 53.3. ODA key statistics: United Arab Emirates
Source: OECD-DAC, www.oecd.org/dac/stats.
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IV. TRENDS AND PROFILES OF OTHER PROVIDERS’ DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATIONOverview of other providers that report to the OECD
As previously mentioned, Saudi Arabia experienced a large decrease in its flows to developing
countries of 74% in real terms between 2011 and 2012.The development co-operation provided by the
Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development remained stable at USD 149 million in 2012. However,
this amount does not represent the totality of the development co-operation provided by the Kuwaiti
administration and the OECD welcomes the efforts being launched by the Kuwaiti Ministry of Foreign
Affairs to report more comprehensive data to the OECD.
Among the nine European Union member countries that are not members of the DAC, Estonia
and Hungary (OECD members) and Latvia (an OECD accession country) were discussed above.
Another five European Union member countries report to the OECD; Croatia is the only one of these
countries that did not report to the OECD in 2013 (although Croatia started reporting in 2014).
Concessional development finance for 4 of these countries decreased in 2012: Bulgaria by 15%
(reaching USD 40 million), Cyprus3, 4 by 32% (reaching USD 25 million), Malta by 5% (reaching
USD 19 million) and Romania by 11% (reaching USD 142 million). Lithuania, the largest provider of
development co-operation among the Baltic countries, stabilised the strong increase between 2010
and 2011 to reach USD 52 million in 2012.
Thailand reported that its budget allocation for development co-operation decreased from
USD 31 million in 2011 to USD 17 million in 2012, although this may not include all of Thailand’s
efforts in this area. In 2012, Chinese Taipei’s programme decreased by 18% compared to 2011.
Liechtenstein’s development co-operation decreased slightly, from USD 31 million in 2011 to
USD 29 million in 2012.
Non-reporting countries
A number of important providers of development co-operation do not report to the OECD on
their development finance flows. A cautious estimate by the OECD indicates total non-reporting
concessional development finance amounts to USD 5.1 billion (OECD, 2014a). The development
co-operation programmes of some of the main providers are discussed in this section, namely
two OECD member countries (Chile and Mexico) and the OECD Key Partners (Brazil, India, Indonesia,
the People’s Republic of China and South Africa). Estimates for Qatar are included for the first time
after the recent publication of its foreign aid reports 2010-11 and 2012.
Brazil
In 2013, Brazil published a report on its 2010 development co-operation programme (Ipea and
ABC, 2013). Based on that report, the OECD estimates that USD 500 million of Brazil’s international
co-operation would meet the criteria for ODA. Its development co-operation strongly increased
compared to 2009, mainly due to additional humanitarian and peacekeeping5 expenditure, of which
a large amount was allocated to Haiti after the earthquake in 2010. Of the USD 500 million, 60% was
channelled through multilateral organisations. More recent estimates by the OECD show that Brazil
channelled USD 272 million through multilateral organisations in 2012 (see Table 53.2).
The Ministry of External Relations oversees Brazil’s development co-operation and co-ordinates
its humanitarian assistance, technical co-operation (through the Brazilian Co-operation Agency),
financial co-operation (debt relief and some concessional loans) and multilateral allocations.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014388
IV. TRENDS AND PROFILES OF OTHER PROVIDERS’ DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATIONMost of Brazil’s development co-operation is allocated regionally, to Latin America and the
Caribbean. The modalities of Brazil’s bilateral co-operation are humanitarian assistance, technical
co-operation, scientific and technological co-operation, scholarships and imputed student costs, and
refugee costs.
Brazil is also engaged in triangular co-operation, partnering with several international
organisations (e.g. United Nations Development Programme, Food and Agriculture Organization,
World Food Programme, International Labour Organization, United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime and UNESCO) and DAC members (e.g. Germany, Japan and the United States) to support
developing countries (e.g. South American countries, Lusophone African countries, Haiti and
Timor-Leste) in areas such as agriculture, food security, health and public administration.
Brazil’s development co-operation through multilateral organisations was primarily channelled
through the United Nations (44%).
Brazil is a Key Partner of the OECD. In 2013, Brazil participated in the DAC Senior-Level Meeting.
Table 53.1. Estimates of gross concessional flows for development co-operation
from OECD Key Partners
USD million
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Estimates on gross concessional flows as published in national publications
Brazil 499.7d .. .. .. ..
South Africa1, 2 134.7d 176.1d 189.2d 149.0p 137.7f
Estimates on bilateral flows as published in national publications + multilateral
contributions based on other sources3
China 2 011.2d 2 747.5d 2 845.7d .. ..
of which: Channelled bilaterally 1 857.4d 2 469.9d 2 644.2d 3 146.9f ..
India1 640.2p 789.9p 652.8p .. ..
of which: Channelled bilaterally 576.9p 730.7p 605.0p .. ..
Indonesia 9.9p 7.1p 18.7p .. ..
of which: Channelled bilaterally 3.8p 2.6p 2.6p 2.6p ..
Notes: i) These data are Secretariat estimates of concessional flows for development from countries that do not report in DAC
statistical systems. Contrary to the figures of reporting countries, these estimates are on a gross basis because information on
repayments is not available. ii) Estimates are based on publically available information.Therefore, these estimates are not necessarily
complete or comparable. iii) Data includes only development-related contributions. This means local resources, financing from a
country through multilateral organisations earmarked to programmes within that same country, are excluded. Moreover, as for
reporting countries, coefficients are applied to core contributions to multilateral organisations that do not exclusively work in
countries eligible for receiving ODA. These coefficients reflect the developmental part of the multilateral organisations’ activities.
d = disbursed; p = provisional; f = forward spending information; .. = not available.
1. Figures for India and South Africa are based on their fiscal years. For example, 2012 data correspond to fiscal year 2012/13.
2. The decrease in South African development co-operation from 2013 onwards is strongly related to exchange rate fluctuations.
3. For China, India and Indonesia, the total is the result of summing up bilateral development co-operation and information on
development co-operation channelled through multilateral organisations which is mainly based on data from UN Department
of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), www.aidflows.org and websites of other multilateral organisations.
Sources: IPEA and ABC (2010), Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional 2010, Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica
Aplicada and Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, Brasilia. Government of South Africa (2014), “Estimates of national
expenditure 2014”, National Treasury, Pretoria. Government of China (2013), “The central level expenditure budget table 2013”,
Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of China, Beijing. Ministry of ForeignAffairs, India, various Annual Reports. Government
of Indonesia (2011), “Prospective of Indonesia South-South Cooperation 2011-2014”, National Coordination Team on South-South
and Triangular Cooperation, South Jakarta.
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IV. TRENDS AND PROFILES OF OTHER PROVIDERS’ DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATIONChile
According to OECD estimates, Chile’s concessional finance for development reached
USD 42 million in 2012 (OECD estimate). Chile’s contributions throughmultilateral organisations that
would qualify as ODA amounted to USD 31 million, or 74%.
In October 2013, Chile drafted its first “Policy on International Co-operation”, which describes
Chile’s goals, mission, values and approach, based on the South-South co-operation model. The
Chilean International Co-operation Agency is the main entity responsible for managing Chile’s
international development co-operation.
Table 53.2. Estimated development-oriented contributions to and through multilateral
organisations by OECD Key Partners, 2012
Current USD million
Brazil China India Indonesia South Africa
UNESCO (core contributions, 60% ODA) 1.0 9.9 2.5 6.5 1.0
World Food Programme 28.5 4.6 0.1 0.0 0.0
Food and Agriculture Organization (core contributions, 51% ODA) 12.9 11.5 1.5 0.6 2.8
United Nations regular budget (core contributions, 18% ODA) 7.5 14.8 2.5 1.1 2.8
International Fund for Agricultural Development 0.0 7.0 10.0 3.5 0.0
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 19.4 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.0
International Labour Organization (core contributions, 60% ODA) 5.0 8.2 1.4 0.6 3.9
World Health Organization (core contributions, 76% ODA) 5.5 9.1 1.5 0.7 1.1
United Nations Development Programme 1.5 5.5 2.0 0.8 4.2
International Atomic Energy Agency (core contributions, 33%) 4.0 6.5 1.1 0.5 0.8
United Nations Industrial Development Organization 1.2 4.1 3.3 0.2 0.4
United Nations Relief and Works Agency 7.5 0.1 1.0 0.1 0.5
United Nations Childrens Fund 4.7 1.3 2.1 0.5 0.0
Other United Nations institutions 6.0 7.6 7.4 0.9 0.9
Total United Nations 120.5 90.7 36.8 16.1 18.4
African Development Bank 4.9 42.9 4.9 0.0 37.7
Asian Development Bank 0.0 8.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
Inter-American Development Bank 65.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total regional development banks 70.3 51.7 4.9 0.0 37.7
International Development Association 0.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other World Bank Group 2.2 5.0 5.0 0.0 19.3
Total World Bank Group 2.2 55.0 5.0 0.0 19.3
FOCEM (Fund for Structural Convergence of Mercosur) 70.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
African Union 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.4
Organization of American States 8.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Southern African Development Community 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.4
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 0.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other organisations 1.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 5.3
Total other organisations 79.1 4.0 1.1 0.0 32.0
Total development co-operation channelled through multilateral organisations 272.1 201.5 47.7 16.1 107.4
Notes: i) Data includes only development-related contributions. DAC coefficients are applied to core contributions to organisations
that do not exclusively work in partner countries. Lastly, local resources, financing from a country through multilateral
organisations destined to programmes within that same country, are excluded. ii) The information in this table is mainly based on
data from UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), www.aidflows.org, websites of other multilateral organisations
and national publications of the Key Partners. Not all data on contributions to multilateral organisations are made publically
available, so the presented information may not be complete.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933127890DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014390
IV. TRENDS AND PROFILES OF OTHER PROVIDERS’ DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATIONChile’s priority partner countries are primarily in Latin America and the Caribbean. Its
co-operation programme is spread across a wide range of sectors, including governance and
institutional strengthening; poverty reduction and social development; and support to industry,
innovation and competitiveness. Chile’s bilateral co-operation is mostly provided in the form of
technical assistance and scholarships.
Chile is also engaged in triangular co-operation, partnering with several international
organisations (e.g. the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Food Programme) and DAC
members (e.g. Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Korea, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, Switzerland
and the United States) to support development in other developing countries (e.g. Bolivia, Colombia,
the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala and Paraguay).
Chile’s development co-operation through multilateral organisations was primarily channelled
through theWorld Bank (37%) and the Inter-American Development Bank (32%) in 2012.
Chile has been a member of the OECD since 2010 and is an observer to the DAC. In 2013, the DAC
Chair visited Chile and the OECD organised a seminar there on statistics. Chile also requested a
special review of its development co-operation policies and programme (Box 53.1). Chile participated
in the DAC Senior-Level Meeting in 2013. Chile also contributed to the DAC’s work on triangular
co-operation and aid for trade.
China (People’s Republic of)
In 2013, China’s bilateral co-operation reached USD 3.1 billion, compared to USD 2.6 billion
in 2012 (OECD estimates). Including developmental funds channelled through multilateral
organisations, the OECD estimates that China’s total concessional finance for development reached
USD 2.8 billion in 2012.
The Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to Other Countries, announced
by Premier Zhou Enlai in 1964, set out the core principles of China’s foreign aid. The Ministry of
Commerce’s Department of Foreign Assistance is at the centre of the Chinese system and manages
Box 53.1. “Special review of Chile’s development co-operation policies
and programmes”
The “Special review of Chile’s development co-operation policies and programmes” was conducted
following a request by the Chilean International Co-operation Agency to the DAC. The review was
carried out by advisors from Germany and Switzerland working in conjunction with the OECD
Secretariat. A representative from Colombia participated as an observer. The main objective of the
special review was to provide critical, helpful and respectful insights to the Chilean authorities to
support their own efforts to strengthen their development co-operation programme and systems.
The special review found that Chile’s own development success has attracted considerable interest,
especially from its neighbours in Latin America and the Caribbean, to which it is responding by
providing bilateral and triangular development co-operation as well as substantial support to and
through multilateral organisations. To respond to the growing demand, Chile has set itself the
ambition of improving its development co-operation by strengthening the programme’s foundations
to make them more purposeful, systematic and capable of responding strategically. The special
review found that these efforts can be consolidated and built on further by making the legal and
policy framework more fit for purpose, improving inter-ministerial co-ordination, mobilising more
resources for development co-operation, continuing to modernise management of the programme
and putting systems in place that enable Chile to evaluate its activities and learn from its experience.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 391
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managing foreign aid joint ventures, programming zero-interest loans and grants, and co-ordinating
concessional loans with the China ExImbank.
China does not have specific priority countries (aside fromNorth Korea). Its grant aid is distributed
more or less equally to some 120 partner countries. The main sectors are public facilities, industry and
economic infrastructure. China offers eight different forms of co-operation with complete projects
(turn-key projects) being the major modality. China also provides humanitarian assistance.
China is also starting to become engaged in triangular co-operation, partnering with several
international organisations (e.g. United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations
Industrial Development Organization and theWorld Bank) and DAC members (e.g. New Zealand and
the United States).
China’s development co-operation through multilateral organisations was primarily channelled
through the United Nations (45%), theWorld Bank Group (29%) and regional development banks (26%)
in 2012. Its main multilateral partners were the International Development Association and the
African Development Bank.
China is a Key Partner of the OECD. In 2013, the DAC Chair visited China to open a roundtable
discussion on effective development co-operation organised by the China-DAC Study Group. The
OECD and the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in France also organised a seminar at the
OECD to share views on promoting development. China participated, as an observer, in the OECD
Development Co-operation Peer Review of Switzerland and attended the DAC Senior-Level Meeting. China
also contributed to the DAC’s work on triangular co-operation and aid for trade.
Colombia
According to OECD estimates, Colombia’s concessional finance for development reached
USD 87 million in 2012, compared to USD 22 million in 2011 (OECD estimates). Most of these flows
were channelled to and through multilateral organisations. In 2012, Colombia’s contributions
through multilateral organisations that would qualify as ODA amounted to USD 78 million, up from
USD 21 million in 2011 (OECD estimate).
The National Strategy of International Co-operation 2012-14 sets out Colombia’s strengths and
good practices available to share with other countries. It also introduces a national co-ordination
scheme as well as mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation of development co-operation. The
Colombian Presidential Agency of International Co-operation (APC-Colombia) sets priorities and
ensures alignment of Colombia’s development co-operation with its National Development Plan and
foreign policy. The agency manages and co-ordinates all out-going development co-operation.
Colombia has bilateral programmes with 19 countries in Latin America, the Caribbean and Asia.
The main sectors are technical support and security, social promotion and protection, culture, sports
and education, promotion of economic development, public management and good governance,
reconciliation (including comprehensive attention to victims, reintegration and historic memory) and
cross-cutting issues (e.g. environment and sustainable development). Colombia provides its bilateral
development co-operation in the form of training, internships, knowledge exchange (experts), studies
and research, seminars and financial contributions through its South-South co-operation fund.
Colombia is also engaged in triangular co-operation, partnering with several international
organisations (e.g. Development Bank of Latin America/CAF, Inter-American Development Bank,
International Fund for Agricultural Development, International Organization for Migration,
United Nations Population Fund and World Food Programme) and DAC members (e.g. Australia,
Canada, Germany, Japan, Korea and the United States) to support other developing countries (mainly
in Central America and the Caribbean) in a wide range of areas.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014392
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channelled through the United Nations (85%), of which almost USD 60 million through the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.
In 2013, the OECD decided to open accession discussions with Colombia. In the same year, the
DAC Chair visited Colombia. Colombia also contributed to DAC’s work on triangular co-operation and
aid for trade.
India
According to OECD estimates, India’s total concessional development finance amounted to
USD 653 million in 2012, compared to USD 790 million in 2011 (OECD estimates). India channelled 6%
(USD 47 million) of its development financing through multilateral organisations in 2012.
The Development Partnership Administration within the Ministry of External Affairs manages
grants and the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Program as well as co-ordinating all of
India’s bilateral development co-operation. The Ministry of Finance manages multilateral assistance
and exercises administrative oversight over the concessional loans and lines of credit provided by the
EXIM Bank.
India’s priority partner countries are its neighbours in South Asia. Between 2000 and 2010, Bhutan
received 49% of India’s overall development co-operation. The main sectors of India’s development
co-operation are health, education, energy (hydropower) and information technology.
In 2012, India’s development co-operation through multilateral organisations was primarily
channelled through the United Nations, especially the International Fund for Agricultural
Development (see Table 53.2).
India is a Key Partner of the OECD. In 2013, India participated in the DAC Senior-Level Meeting.
Indonesia
In 2012, Indonesia’s development co-operation amounted to an estimated USD 19 million,
compared to USD 7 million in 2011 (OECD estimates). USD 16 million (86%) was channelled through
multilateral organisations.
Several government regulations, national plans and presidential instructions guide Indonesia’s
development co-operation. The National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS) is responsible for
developing and co-ordinating Indonesia’s national strategy for development co-operation. Together
with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance and the State Secretariat, BAPPENAS
constitutes the National CoordinationTeam on South-South andTriangular Cooperation.
Indonesia co-operates bilaterally with around 40 partner countries,most of them inAsia, in a variety
of sectors. Bilateral co-operation consists mainly of scholarships and technical co-operation projects.
Indonesia is also engaged in triangular co-operation, partnering with several international
organisations and DAC members in Timor-Leste.
In 2012, Indonesia’s development co-operation through multilateral organisations was entirely
channelled through the United Nations agencies; UNESCO (40%) and the International Fund for
Agricultural Development (22%) being its main partners.
Indonesia is a Key Partner of the OECD. In 2013, Indonesia participated in the DAC Senior-Level
Meeting. Indonesia also contributed to the DAC’s work on aid for trade.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 393
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Mexico published figures on its development co-operation programme for the first time in 2014.
According to these figures, Mexico’s international development co-operation reached USD 277 million
in 2012, up from USD 269 million in 2011. Out of the total disbursed in 2012, the OECD estimates that at
least USD 210 million meets the criteria of ODA. Of this amount, 54% was channelled through
multilateral organisations.
The Law on International Co-operation for Development (April 2011) gave the government a
mandate to set up the International Development Co-operation Programme and create the Mexican
Agency of International Development Co-operation (AMEXCID), as well as the tools necessary to
programme, co-ordinate, implement and evaluate development co-operation. The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs has overall responsibility for Mexico’s development co-operation, which is managed byAMEXCID.
Mexico’s priority partner countries are those in Latin America and the Caribbean. The main
sectors of its bilateral development co-operation are public administration, education, science and
technology, agriculture, environmental protection and health. Mexico’s bilateral development
co-operation is provided mainly through technical and scientific co-operation.
Mexico is also engaged in triangular co-operation, partnering with several international
organisations (e.g. the Inter-American Institute for Co-operation on Agriculture/IICA, UNICEF,
United Nations Development Programme and World Trade Organization) and DAC members
(e.g. Germany, Japan and Spain) to support other developing countries, mainly in Latin America and
the Caribbean.
Mexico’s development co-operation through multilateral organisations is primarily channelled
through the United Nations agencies, although the main single recipient of Mexican funds was the
Inter-American Development Bank.
Mexico has been amember of the OECD since 1994 and is an observer to the DAC. In 2013, Mexico
participated in the DAC Senior-Level Meeting and contributed to the DAC’s work on triangular
co-operation and aid for trade.
Qatar
Qatar’s development co-operation amounted to USD 486 million in 2012, compared to
USD 684 million in 2011 (OECD estimates). Qatar channelled 1% of its development co-operation
through multilateral institutions.
Qatar views development co-operation as an integral part of its foreign policy. The Office of the
Minister’s Assistant for International Co-operationAffairs in the Ministry of ForeignAffairs is responsible
for development co-operation and humanitarian assistance. Within the ministry, the Department of
International Development is the central unit, in charge of policy design and implementation.
Qatar’s priority partner countries are Syria, Tunisia, Sudan, the West Bank and Gaza Strip and
Haiti. The main sectors are construction, reconstruction, education and culture.
South Africa
South African concessional finance for development reached USD 149 million in 2013, compared
to USD 189 million in 2012 (OECD estimates). Measured in South African rand, its development
co-operation actually increased between 2012 and 2013; the decrease in USD is related to exchange
rate fluctuations. In 2012, 57% of South Africa’s total development co-operation was channelled
through multilateral organisations.
The Strategic Plan (2010-13) of South Africa’s Department of International Relations and
Co-operation (DIRCO) includes “the African continent” and “strengthening South-South relations” as
priorities. DIRCO is the main institution responsible for planning, implementing and co-ordinatingDEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014394
IV. TRENDS AND PROFILES OF OTHER PROVIDERS’ DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATIONSouth Africa’s development co-operation. It also manages the African Renaissance and International
Cooperation Fund, which South Africa plans to replace with the South African Development Agency,
to be created under DIRCO.
South Africa prioritises co-operation with the African continent, with a strong focus on member
countries of the Southern African Development Community. The priority sectors of its bilateral
development co-operation are peacekeeping, security and governance. South Africa provides its
bilateral development co-operation mostly in the form of technical co-operation.
South Africa is also engaged in triangular co-operation, partnering with several DAC members
(e.g. Canada, Germany, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United States) to support other developing
countries (mainly in Africa) in areas such as governance, public security and post-conflict resolution.
South Africa’s development co-operation through multilateral organisations is primarily
channelled through the African Development Bank and the African Union.
South Africa is a Key Partner of the OECD. In 2013, South Africa participated in the DAC
Senior-Level Meeting.
Private development flows
Some private organisations also deliver significant amounts of financing for development. At
present, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation is the only private entity reporting to the OECD on its
activities with developing countries (grants, loans and equity). Disbursements by the Gates
Foundation reached USD 2.6 billion in 2012, almost the same level as 2011. Close to two-thirds of its
geographically allocated grants target African recipients directly or indirectly.
In 2012, 73% of its sector-allocable disbursements, which exclude core contributions of
USD 260 million to multilateral organisations working in the health sector, were extended in the
health sector (including reproductive health). The Gates Foundation represents the fourth largest
international donor for health after the United States, the Global Fund for Fighting Aids, Tuberculosis
and Malaria (GFATM) and the United Kingdom. A significant part of the Gates Foundation’s
expenditures is channelled through NGOs from both partner and donor countries, international
NGOs, universities and other teaching or research institutes, and multilateral agencies. The World
Health Organization (WHO), GAVI Alliance and UNICEF are the main institutions with which the
foundation collaborates.
Notes
1. The DAC Global Relations Strategy is available at: www.oecd.org/dac/dac-global-relations/promotingdialoguebeyond
thedacdacglobalrelationsstrategy.htm.
2. See: www.oecd.org/dac/dac-global-relations/non-dac-reporting.htm.
3. Note by Turkey: The information in this document with reference to “Cyprus” relates to the southern part of
the Island. There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the Island.
Turkey recognises the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is
found within the context of United Nations, Turkey shall preserve its position concerning the “Cyprus issue”.
4. Note by all the European Union Member States of the OECD and the European Union: The Republic of Cyprus
is recognised by all members of the United Nations with the exception of Turkey. The information in this
document relates to the area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.
5. Most peacekeeping expenditure is excluded from ODA in DAC statistics.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 395
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Statistical annex
Figure A.1. DAC members’ total net resource flows to developing countries, 1970-2012
1. Net OOF flows were negative in 2000-01, 2003-04 and 2006-08.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933133590
Figure A.2. Net official development assistance, 1960-2013
1. Total DAC excludes debt forgiveness of non-ODA claims in 1990, 1991 and 1992.
 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933133609
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ANNEX AFigure A.3. Donor shares of net official development assistance, 1970-2012
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933133628
Figure A.4. Trends in sector-specific aid, 1973-2012
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933133647
100
90
80
70
30
20
10
60
50
40
0
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
20
10
20
12
DAC EU19 United States Japan Other DAC Other donors
% of net ODA at constant 2012 prices
2003-12
1993-2002
1983-92
1973-82
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
%
Production
Education
Multisector
Health and population
Other (non-sector aid)
Other social sectors Economic infrastructureDEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014398
ANNEX ATable A.1. DAC members’ net official development assistance in 2013
Preliminary data for 2013
2013 2012 % change
2012 to 2013
in real terms1
ODA
(USD million current)
ODA/GNI
(%)
ODA
(USD million current)
ODA/GNI
(%)
Australia 4 851 0.34 5 403 0.36 -4.5
Austria 1 172 0.28 1 106 0.28 0.7
Belgium 2 281 0.45 2 315 0.47 -6.1
Canada 4 911 0.27 5 650 0.32 -11.4
Czech Republic 212 0.11 220 0.12 -4.7
Denmark 2 928 0.85 2 693 0.83 3.8
Finland 1 435 0.55 1 320 0.53 3.5
France 11 376 0.41 12 028 0.45 -9.8
Germany 14 059 0.38 12 939 0.37 3.0
Greece 305 0.13 327 0.13 -7.7
Iceland 35 0.26 26 0.22 27.4
Ireland 822 0.45 808 0.47 -1.9
Italy 3 253 0.16 2 737 0.14 13.4
Japan 11 786 0.23 10 605 0.17 36.6
Korea 1 744 0.13 1 597 0.14 4.8
Luxembourg 431 1.00 399 1.00 1.2
Netherlands 5 435 0.67 5 523 0.71 -6.2
New Zealand 461 0.26 449 0.28 -1.0
Norway 5 581 1.07 4 753 0.93 16.4
Poland 474 0.10 421 0.09 8.6
Portugal 484 0.23 581 0.28 -20.4
Slovak Republic 85 0.09 80 0.09 2.4
Slovenia 60 0.13 58 0.13 -0.6
Spain 2 199 0.16 2 037 0.16 3.7
Sweden 5 831 1.02 5 240 0.97 6.3
Switzerland 3 198 0.47 3 056 0.47 3.4
United Kingdom 17 881 0.72 13 891 0.56 27.8
United States 31 545 0.19 30 687 0.19 1.3
Total DAC 134 838 0.30 126 949 0.29 6.1
Average country effort 0.40 0.39
Memorandum items:
EU Institutions 15 925 .. 17 479 .. -13.1
DAC-EU countries 70 725 0.42 64 724 0.40 5.2
G7 countries 94 812 0.27 88 538 0.25 8.0
Non-G7 countries 40 026 0.40 38 411 0.40 1.7
1. Taking account of both inflation and exchange rate movements.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933133685DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 399
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133704Table A.2. Total net flows from DAC countries by type of flow
Net disbursements at current prices and exchange rates
USD million % of total
1996-97
average
2001-02
average
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
1996-97
average
2001-02
average
2008 2009 2010 2011
I. Official development assistance 52 204 55 711 122 784 120 558 129 066 134 670 126 949 27 61 44 36 25 27
1. Bilateral ODA 35 861 38 174 87 113 83 938 90 988 94 446 88 574 19 42 32 25 18 19
of which:
General budget support - 639 2 915 2 723 1 396 1 391 721 - 1 1 1 0 0
Core support to national NGOs 1 005 1 245 2 517 2 131 1 569 1 474 1 483 1 1 1 1 0 0
Investment projects 4 524 4 480 8 337 10 582 10 984 13 763 7 363 2 5 3 3 2 3
Debt relief grants 2 428 3 319 8 835 1 712 3 666 4 138 2 867 1 4 3 1 1 1
Administrative costs 2 801 3 021 5 408 5 302 5 981 6 002 6 684 1 3 2 2 1 1
Other in-donor expenditures1 732 1 345 2 843 3 513 3 940 4 865 4 660 0 1 1 1 1 1
2. Contributions to multilateral
institutions 16 343 17 536 35 671 36 620 38 078 40 224 38 376 9 19 13 11 7 8
of which:
United Nations 4 232 5 065 5 900 6 233 6 519 6 571 6 637 2 6 2 2 1 1
European Institutions 4 778 5 316 13 507 14 242 13 611 13 672 11 963 2 6 5 4 3 3
International Development Association 4 037 3 445 8 161 7 188 8 072 9 441 7 696 2 4 3 2 2 2
Regional development banks 1 555 1 661 3 212 3 107 3 156 4 059 3 929 1 2 1 1 1 1
II. Other official flows 6 019 -877 -55 10 148 5 878 8 603 9 792 3 -1 -0 3 1 2
1. Bilateral 6 257 817 -643 8 050 5 393 8 931 10 729 3 1 -0 2 1 2
2. Multilateral -238 -1 693 588 2 097 485 -327 -937 -0 -2 0 1 0 -0
III. Private flows at market terms 127 892 28 987 130 026 181 608 344 386 326 593 307 772 67 32 47 54 68 65
1. Direct investment 69 684 52 153 187 013 116 189 179 317 219 571 207 138 36 57 68 35 35 44
2. Bilateral portfolio investment 59 222 -20 924 -53 573 44 199 144 158 105 735 92 433 31 -23 -19 13 28 21
3. Multilateral portfolio investment -3 537 -3 616 -9 986 18 767 -6 157 -9 291 -881 -2 -4 -4 6 -1 -2
4. Export credits 2 523 1 375 6 571 2 452 27 069 10 579 9 082 1 1 2 1 5 2
IV. Net grants by NGOs 5 495 8 063 23 787 22 048 30 775 31 969 29 753 3 9 9 7 6 6
Total net flows 191 611 91 884 276 542 334 360 510 106 501 836 474 267 100 100 100 100 100 100
Total net flows at 2012 prices and exchange
rates2 277 639 123 456 281 247 350 642 529 787 489 853 474 267
1. Includes development awareness and refugees in donor countries.
2. Deflated by the total DAC deflator.
Source of private flows: DAC members’ reporting to the annual DAC Questionnaire on total official and private flows.
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133723Table A.3. Total net flows by DAC country
Net disbursements at current prices and exchange rates
USD million % of GNI
1996-97
average
2001-02
average
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
1996-97
average
2001-02
average
2008 2009 2010 2011
Australia -1 882 988 3 828 3 133 14 531 18 522 21 906 -0.48 0.27 0.41 0.33 1.23 1.28
Austria 1 821 1 373 10 831 3 273 6 372 8 075 4 534 0.84 0.71 2.71 0.87 1.70 1.94
Belgium -2 511 820 4 425 3 224 7 896 1 185 2 703 -0.98 0.34 0.89 0.68 1.68 0.23
Canada 8 609 1 791 24 069 7 340 22 642 13 548 18 515 1.48 0.25 1.63 0.56 1.46 0.79
Czech Republic .. 36 249 215 228 250 219 .. 0.06 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12
Denmark 1 938 2 111 5 150 3 757 4 794 2 818 2 400 1.15 1.28 1.50 1.18 1.52 0.82
Finland 798 577 -222 3 185 4 312 1 016 1 519 0.65 0.46 -0.08 1.34 1.78 0.38
France 15 733 10 528 40 641 38 420 35 198 34 216 29 578 1.05 0.75 1.44 1.43 1.35 1.21
Germany 191 611 6 776 35 727 29 130 41 637 56 202 34 876 0.91 0.35 0.98 0.86 1.24 1.54
Greece 184 262 1 166 850 761 485 907 0.15 0.21 0.35 0.26 0.26 0.17
Iceland 4 11 48 34 29 25 26 0.00 0.14 0.47 0.35 0.29 0.20
Ireland 347 1 102 6 101 4 188 2 695 2 444 956 0.59 1.19 2.71 2.27 1.57 1.37
Italy 6 414 605 5 581 5 569 9 608 11 912 11 186 0.54 0.05 0.25 0.27 0.47 0.55
Japan 33 798 9 186 31 805 45 482 48 249 61 828 48 977 0.74 0.22 0.63 0.88 0.86 1.02
Korea 1 957 778 10 700 6 442 11 834 11 509 12 415 0.37 0.15 1.14 0.77 1.17 1.03
Luxembourg 95 146 426 428 411 417 394 0.52 0.80 0.99 1.08 1.07 0.99
Netherlands 9 099 -2 459 -14 022 6 045 13 013 22 046 19 943 2.38 -0.62 -1.61 0.77 1.67 2.62
New Zealand 164 151 433 387 426 536 629 0.28 0.31 0.38 0.35 0.32 0.35
Norway 1 658 1 882 3 759 4 977 5 876 4 755 4 506 1.06 1.05 0.83 1.29 1.41 0.96
Poland .. 25 373 375 378 417 421 .. 0.03 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08
Portugal 1 141 975 1 528 -1 060 162 -1 299 475 1.10 0.86 0.67 -0.48 0.07 -0.57
Slovak Republic .. 7 92 75 74 86 80 .. 0.03 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09
Slovenia .. .. 68 71 59 63 58 .. .. 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.13
Spain 5 835 9 847 30 087 12 812 10 340 20 145 1 977 1.06 1.61 1.96 0.89 0.74 1.38
Sweden 2 048 2 654 5 896 7 164 5 127 6 598 14 156 0.89 1.16 1.22 1.77 1.10 1.20
Switzerland -2 464 1 569 12 246 8 853 23 444 11 965 15 007 -0.81 0.55 2.53 1.69 4.01 1.80
United Kingdom 21 064 8 626 41 878 24 713 25 632 46 851 63 461 1.70 0.57 1.57 1.11 1.12 1.91
United States 65 361 31 514 13 678 115 276 214 378 165 222 162 440 0.83 0.31 0.09 0.82 1.46 1.09
Total DAC 191 611 91 884 276 542 334 360 510 106 501 836 474 267 0.83 0.37 0.67 0.85 1.25 1.14
of which: DAC-EU countries 84 404 44 013 175 974 142 435 168 696 213 927 189 844 1.01 0.52 1.01 0.89 1.07 1.25
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 401
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liminary
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133742Table A.4. Net official development assistance by DAC country
Net disbursements at current prices and exchange rates
USD million % of GNI
1997-98
average
2002-03
average
2009 2010 2011 2012
2013
preliminary
1997-98
average
2002-03
average
2009 2010 2011 2012
pre
Australia 1 011 1 104 2 762 3 826 4 983 5 403 4 851 0.27 0.25 0.29 0.32 0.34 0.36
Austria 477 512 1 142 1 208 1 111 1 106 1 172 0.23 0.23 0.30 0.32 0.27 0.28
Belgium 823 1 462 2 610 3 004 2 807 2 315 2 281 0.33 0.53 0.55 0.64 0.54 0.47
Canada 1 876 2 017 4 000 5 214 5 459 5 650 4 911 0.32 0.26 0.30 0.34 0.32 0.32
Czech Republic 16 68 215 228 250 220 212 0.03 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12
Denmark 1 670 1 696 2 810 2 871 2 931 2 693 2 928 0.98 0.89 0.88 0.91 0.85 0.83
Finland 388 510 1 290 1 333 1 406 1 320 1 435 0.32 0.35 0.54 0.55 0.53 0.53
France 6 024 6 370 12 602 12 915 12 997 12 028 11 376 0.41 0.39 0.47 0.50 0.46 0.45
Germany 5 719 6 054 12 079 12 985 14 093 12 939 14 059 0.27 0.28 0.35 0.39 0.39 0.37
Greece 176 319 607 508 425 327 305 0.15 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.13
Iceland 7 15 34 29 26 26 35 0.00 0.16 0.35 0.29 0.21 0.22
Ireland 193 451 1 006 895 914 808 822 0.30 0.40 0.54 0.52 0.51 0.47
Italy 1 772 2 382 3 297 2 996 4 326 2 737 3 253 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.20 0.14
Japan 9 999 9 081 9 467 11 058 10 831 10 605 11 786 0.24 0.22 0.18 0.20 0.18 0.17
Korea 184 322 816 1 174 1 325 1 597 1 744 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.14
Luxembourg 103 170 415 403 409 399 431 0.60 0.82 1.04 1.05 0.97 1.00
Netherlands 2 994 3 655 6 426 6 357 6 344 5 523 5 435 0.80 0.80 0.82 0.81 0.75 0.71
New Zealand 142 144 309 342 424 449 461 0.26 0.22 0.28 0.26 0.28 0.28
Norway 1 314 1 870 4 081 4 372 4 756 4 753 5 581 0.86 0.91 1.06 1.05 0.96 0.93
Poland 19 21 375 378 417 421 474 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09
Portugal 255 321 513 649 708 581 484 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.29 0.31 0.28
Slovak Republic .. 11 75 74 86 80 85 .. 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
Slovenia .. .. 71 59 63 58 60 .. .. 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.13
Spain 1 305 1 837 6 584 5 949 4 173 2 037 2 199 0.24 0.25 0.46 0.43 0.29 0.16
Sweden 1 652 2 206 4 548 4 533 5 603 5 240 5 831 0.75 0.81 1.12 0.97 1.02 0.97
Switzerland 904 1 119 2 310 2 300 3 051 3 056 3 198 0.31 0.34 0.44 0.39 0.46 0.47
United Kingdom 3 648 5 595 11 283 13 053 13 832 13 891 17 881 0.27 0.33 0.51 0.57 0.56 0.56
United States 7 832 14 805 28 831 30 353 30 920 30 687 31 545 0.09 0.14 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.19
Total DAC 50 502 64 119 120 558 129 066 134 670 126 949 134 838 0.21 0.24 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.29
of which: DAC-EU countries 27 234 33 641 67 947 70 399 72 897 64 724 70 725 0.32 0.34 0.43 0.45 0.43 0.40
Memorandum item:
Average country effort 0.33 0.35 0.42 0.42 0.40 0.39
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9.1
20.3
126.9
85.9
ations
133780Table A.5. Total net private flows1 by DAC country
Net disbursements at current prices and exchange rates
USD million % of GNI
1996-97
average
2001-02
average
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
1996-97
average
2001-02
average
2008 2009 2010 2011
Australia -3 222 -141 314 .. 9 511 11 904 14 740 -0.82 -0.03 0.03 .. 0.80 0.82
Austria 945 824 8 878 2 035 5 150 6 751 3 380 0.44 0.41 2.22 0.54 1.37 1.62
Belgium -3 446 -313 1 816 147 4 530 -2 126 333 -1.47 -0.13 0.36 0.03 0.96 -0.41
Canada 5 679 88 16 184 3 140 14 124 5 714 9 194 0.97 0.01 1.10 0.24 0.91 0.33
Czech Republic .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Denmark 153 467 2 303 599 1 779 -356 -242 0.09 0.30 0.67 0.19 0.56 -0.10
Finland 248 138 -1 422 1 741 2 922 -1 498 180 0.20 0.14 -0.53 0.73 1.21 -0.57
France 8 948 5 388 29 962 25 524 22 856 21 289 18 078 0.60 0.40 1.06 0.95 0.88 0.75
Germany 12 747 -720 20 583 15 495 27 595 40 921 21 383 0.57 -0.03 0.56 0.46 0.82 1.12
Greece .. 20 460 241 243 60 579 .. 0.02 0.14 0.08 0.08 0.02
Iceland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Ireland 102 666 4 500 3 000 1 500 1 000 .. 0.17 0.70 2.00 1.62 0.88 0.56
Italy 3 068 -1 233 207 2 181 6 612 7 689 8 161 0.27 -0.11 0.01 0.10 0.33 0.35
Japan 21 711 2 404 23 738 27 217 32 837 47 594 32 494 0.47 0.06 0.47 0.53 0.58 0.78
Korea 1 676 458 7 863 5 018 8 716 7 772 9 616 0.31 0.08 0.84 0.60 0.86 0.70
Luxembourg .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Netherlands 5 717 -6 098 -21 345 -923 5 999 15 472 13 891 1.50 -1.54 -2.46 -0.12 0.77 1.84
New Zealand 11 17 29 24 26 28 35 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
Norway 249 30 -247 895 1 504 -0 -1 0.16 0.01 -0.05 0.23 0.36 -0.00
Poland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Portugal 797 677 906 -1 577 -492 -2 013 -114 0.78 0.64 0.39 -0.72 -0.22 -0.88
Slovak Republic .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Slovenia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Spain 4 469 8 022 23 220 6 225 4 391 15 968 -63 0.83 1.33 1.51 0.43 0.32 1.10
Sweden 158 797 1 108 2 473 372 1 097 8 946 0.07 0.36 0.23 0.61 0.08 0.20
Switzerland -3 553 450 9 810 6 186 20 731 8 448 11 479 -1.19 0.16 2.03 1.18 3.54 1.27
United Kingdom 17 416 3 530 29 938 12 798 12 246 32 428 48 508 1.42 0.24 1.12 0.58 0.54 1.32
United States 54 017 13 519 -28 781 69 168 161 234 108 451 107 194 0.68 0.13 -0.20 0.49 1.10 0.71
Total DAC 127 892 28 987 130 026 181 608 344 386 326 593 307 772 0.55 0.12 0.31 0.46 0.84 0.74
of which: DAC-EU countries 51 324 12 164 101 115 69 959 95 704 136 682 123 021 0.61 0.14 0.58 0.44 0.61 0.80
1. Excluding grants by NGOs.
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Table A.6. Official development finance to developing countries
Constant 2012 USD billion
1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Official development finance (ODF) 102.2 102.2 104.0 96.0 99.5 92.6 94.3 141.1 126.1 131.7 152.4 181.6 181.4 161.2
1. Official development assistance (ODA) 78.3 78.1 88.0 71.7 94.3 95.2 97.5 128.5 123.8 116.0 129.8 132.8 136.4 137.5
of which:
Bilateral donors1 59.2 60.2 64.0 49.4 66.7 71.2 70.8 101.9 94.7 85.4 97.6 94.3 100.2 100.2
Multilateral organisations 19.1 17.9 24.1 22.3 27.6 24.0 26.7 26.6 29.1 30.7 32.2 38.5 36.2 37.2
2. Other ODF 23.9 24.2 16.0 24.3 5.3 -2.6 -3.2 12.6 2.2 15.7 22.6 48.9 45.0 23.7
of which:
Bilateral donors1 6.8 11.4 10.6 8.0 8.4 5.5 1.4 12.1 3.7 1.4 1.8 11.1 5.7 9.4
Multilateral organisations 17.1 12.8 5.4 16.3 -3.1 -8.1 -4.6 0.5 -1.5 14.2 20.8 37.8 39.2 14.3
For cross reference
Total DAC net ODA2 69.3 76.3 90.7 71.2 89.2 92.6 97.5 128.4 122.1 112.2 124.9 126.4 134.0 131.5
of which: Bilateral grants 33.9 42.4 51.4 46.1 60.4 67.8 70.3 99.3 92.5 81.9 90.8 86.1 91.2 90.9
1. Bilateral flows from DAC countries and non-DAC countries (see Table A.12 for the list of non-DAC countries for which data are available).
2. Comprises bilateral ODA, as above, plus contributions to multilateral organisations in place of ODA disbursements from multilateral organis
as shown above.
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ANNEX ATable A.7. ODA by individual DAC country at 2012 prices and exchange rates
Net disbursements, USD million
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013p
Australia 2 728 2 903 3 533 3 843 4 049 3 993 4 459 4 967 5 403 5 158
Austria 809 1 841 1 704 1 849 1 633 1 113 1 218 1 046 1 106 1 113
Belgium 1 782 2 334 2 274 2 009 2 283 2 557 3 033 2 646 2 315 2 174
Canada 4 057 5 291 4 728 4 805 5 440 4 921 5 643 5 494 5 650 5 007
Czech Republic 152 178 198 192 224 207 224 230 220 209
Denmark 2 551 2 571 2 645 2 714 2 705 2 787 2 871 2 775 2 693 2 795
Finland 814 1 074 976 1 022 1 119 1 264 1 368 1 337 1 320 1 367
France 10 037 11 651 11 942 9 952 10 165 12 077 12 889 12 199 12 028 10 854
Germany 8 461 11 248 11 491 12 212 13 082 11 571 12 944 13 219 12 939 13 328
Greece 389 457 487 511 650 568 494 390 327 302
Iceland 19 22 34 34 43 39 30 24 26 33
Ireland 631 729 992 1 044 1 136 926 880 850 808 793
Italy 2 925 5 940 4 136 4 039 4 577 3 150 2 998 4 068 2 737 3 104
Japan 10 929 16 583 15 042 10 621 11 789 10 543 11 827 10 723 10 605 14 486
Korea 499 789 444 650 869 981 1 235 1 315 1 597 1 674
Luxembourg 329 342 360 411 429 440 419 390 399 404
Netherlands 4 876 5 789 6 004 6 171 6 444 6 128 6 322 5 942 5 523 5 181
New Zealand 314 372 372 389 433 424 391 431 449 445
Norway 3 800 4 237 4 088 4 595 4 329 5 128 4 975 4 700 4 753 5 534
Poland 164 246 341 354 311 385 370 390 421 457
Portugal 1 192 425 430 456 561 476 629 652 581 462
Slovak Republic 43 82 74 74 87 72 74 81 80 82
Slovenia .. 41 51 55 62 66 58 58 58 58
Spain 2 901 3 442 4 135 4 948 6 129 6 082 5 774 3 857 2 037 2 112
Sweden 3 386 4 217 4 807 4 706 4 916 5 289 4 930 5 419 5 240 5 568
Switzerland 2 220 2 545 2 327 2 224 2 392 2 693 2 570 2 890 3 056 3 161
United Kingdom 8 297 11 179 12 417 8 823 11 043 12 276 13 931 13 901 13 891 17 755
United States 23 213 31 886 26 060 23 503 27 973 30 273 31 490 31 460 30 687 31 080
Total DAC 97 519 128 411 122 092 112 205 124 873 126 429 134 046 131 454 126 949 134 698
of which: DAC-EU countries 49 739 63 786 65 464 61 541 67 557 67 434 71 425 69 450 64 724 68 119
Memorandum item:
Total DAC at current prices and exchange rates 80 130 108 296 105 415 104 917 122 784 120 558 129 066 134 670 126 949 134 838
p = Preliminary data.
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Table A.8. ODA from DAC countries to multilateral organisations1 in 2012
Net disbursements, USD million
of which:
Other
multilateral
of which:
EDF IMF2 GAVI
Global
Fund
- 193 - 57 62
90 19 - - -
118 88 - - 27
- 592 - 15 200
17 6 5 - -
72 74 - 4 25
54 44 - - 5
741 956 132 13 463
769 485 - 13 257
54 5 - - -
- 1 - - -
35 24 - 4 15
475 75 - - -
- 1 004 - 9 343
- 20 4 0 1
9 7 1 1 1
181 121 - 14 51
- 23 - - -
- 326 - 104 77
45 5 - - -
38 3 - - -
7 2 2 - -
6 1 - - -
278 29 - - -
101 208 1 - 140
- 99 4 - 9
519 950 - 204 -
- 1 945 - 130 1 206
3 609 7 303 149 569 2 882
3 609 3 102 141 253 985
2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933133818Total
World Bank
Group
of which: Regional
development
banks
of which: United
Nations
agencies
of which:
EU
IDA
African
Dev. Bank
Asian
Dev. Bank
IFAD UNDP WFP UNICEF UNHCR
Australia 852 257 146 103 - 103 299 - 32 48 35 22 -
Austria 570 181 176 72 51 11 23 - 2 0 - 1 275
Belgium 882 189 177 9 6 2 145 9 27 - 24 13 450
Canada 1 598 550 493 263 165 48 193 38 - 25 18 14 -
Czech Republic 153 17 6 5 - - 8 - 0 - - - 118
Denmark 771 115 83 52 50 4 289 4 62 32 28 28 241
Finland 521 80 76 55 46 9 154 6 26 8 22 9 188
France 4 100 575 542 262 206 47 211 - 18 - 6 20 2 097
Germany 4 355 789 754 314 236 66 337 - 29 30 8 10 2 430
Greece 220 - - 1 - - 10 - - - - - 204
Iceland 5 2 2 - - - 2 0 0 - 1 - -
Ireland 272 31 30 1 - 1 88 3 11 11 11 8 128
Italy 2 113 230 166 105 54 44 188 32 0 16 2 - 1 516
Japan 4 202 1 550 1 401 969 189 735 679 37 80 7 17 22 -
Korea 414 154 124 126 29 79 114 2 5 0 3 3 -
Luxembourg 122 28 21 4 1 3 52 2 8 1 7 2 31
Netherlands 1 665 257 203 127 7 - 555 22 82 46 65 49 605
New Zealand 88 2 2 16 - 16 47 - 6 5 5 5 -
Norway 1 230 173 154 108 92 13 624 14 132 25 77 50 -
Poland 310 2 2 - - - 17 - - - 0 - 285
Portugal 184 2 2 14 2 6 11 - 1 0 0 0 154
Slovak Republic 61 1 1 - - - 3 - - 0 0 0 54
Slovenia 39 5 3 0 - - 2 - - - - 0 31
Spain 1 052 - - - - - 64 - - - - - 959
Sweden 1 602 261 254 140 119 17 647 - 102 82 71 91 345
Switzerland 598 225 212 69 53 16 206 8 58 5 21 15 -
United Kingdom 5 179 1 263 1 173 410 325 58 705 54 138 16 70 30 1 852
United States 5 216 1 609 1 492 699 279 290 962 26 82 - 132 - -
Total DAC 38 376 8 550 7 696 3 923 1 911 1 567 6 637 256 902 356 624 391 11 962
of which: DAC-EU countries 24 172 4 027 3 669 1 570 1 105 268 3 511 132 506 241 314 261 11 962
1. Unearmarked contributions. Includes recoveries on multilateral grants and capital subscriptions.
2. IMF PRGT and PRG-HIPC Trust.
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Table A.9. Aid by major purposes in 2012
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Social and administrative
infrastructure 49.8 55.8 37.5 34.7 49.8 41.4 32.7 28.5 44.9 65.8 44.0 47.8 19.3 25.9 43.8 42.9 46.5 41.9 38.3 .. 29.8 .. .. 42
Education1 12.1 25.9 18.6 7.7 12.2 10.7 4.0 12.5 16.3 62.8 7.5 8.1 6.5 4.6 7.3 14.9 2.9 19.5 6.7 .. 13.0 .. .. 11
of which: Basic education 3.3 0.1 4.1 4.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.9 1.8 .. 5.9 2.3 1.3 1.2 0.8 1.9 0.7 6.6 4.2 .. 0.1 .. .. 1
Health 7.2 14.1 7.1 14.3 3.0 8.9 2.0 0.7 2.8 2.1 9.1 12.4 5.2 4.7 10.7 12.8 4.8 6.0 5.8 .. 3.6 .. .. 6
of which: Basic health 4.1 0.4 2.8 12.3 1.6 5.1 1.7 0.5 1.9 .. 8.9 6.1 2.6 2.4 5.8 7.8 2.1 3.1 1.7 .. 0.3 .. .. 3
Population2 4.1 0.0 1.0 1.7 0.5 1.0 1.9 0.9 1.4 .. 1.4 3.3 0.6 0.8 0.6 1.4 7.5 1.7 1.6 .. 0.1 .. .. 1
Water supply and sanitation 3.6 6.1 1.9 2.4 10.7 2.2 4.9 8.1 11.3 0.1 3.0 1.2 0.8 12.4 10.7 5.4 9.5 2.0 0.8 .. 0.1 .. .. 2
Government and civil society 21.2 7.5 5.8 7.6 20.0 15.9 17.1 1.2 11.8 .. 12.4 14.4 2.9 2.3 13.0 5.3 20.0 12.0 21.6 .. 3.8 .. .. 15
Other social infrastructure/service 1.7 2.2 3.1 0.9 3.4 2.7 2.8 5.0 1.3 0.9 10.6 8.4 3.2 1.1 1.5 3.2 1.9 0.7 1.7 .. 9.3 .. .. 4
Economic infrastructure 6.1 7.0 3.6 8.2 6.1 8.9 7.2 25.9 21.7 0.1 16.4 1.3 14.4 40.5 27.9 8.5 8.5 15.7 10.2 .. 5.1 .. .. 1
Transport and communications 3.8 3.0 1.2 0.9 0.4 4.7 2.5 12.1 0.9 0.1 - 0.0 2.1 33.5 24.4 0.1 0.8 7.9 0.2 - 0.2 - - 0
Energy 1.0 1.4 0.9 4.5 4.8 3.4 3.4 13.5 10.9 .. 16.4 0.0 1.1 6.8 3.2 2.3 1.6 5.6 7.3 .. 4.6 .. .. 0
Other 1.4 2.6 1.5 2.8 1.0 0.8 1.4 0.3 9.8 (0.0) - 1.3 11.2 0.3 0.2 6.1 6.1 2.2 2.6 - 0.3 - - 0
Production 6.1 3.2 6.7 9.4 8.5 11.0 8.2 4.9 5.5 .. 23.0 8.5 7.8 9.7 16.6 6.2 14.1 9.8 18.0 .. 0.3 .. .. 6
Agriculture 5.2 2.1 5.9 7.4 7.0 9.6 6.9 3.6 3.3 .. 22.1 8.1 7.5 4.8 15.3 5.4 12.1 5.2 15.4 .. 0.2 .. .. 5
Industry, mining and construction 0.4 1.1 0.4 1.7 1.2 1.4 1.0 0.9 2.0 .. 0.8 0.1 0.2 3.9 0.9 0.1 1.3 0.6 2.0 .. 0.0 .. .. 0
Trade and tourism 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.2 - - 0.2 0.1 1.0 0.4 0.7 0.7 4.0 0.5 - 0.0 - - 0
Multisector 18.7 2.2 5.2 13.6 2.1 9.2 10.2 11.2 13.1 5.6 2.0 5.4 8.0 10.1 5.9 8.9 8.3 3.8 5.9 .. 0.9 .. .. 9
Programme assistance 1.1 0.5 0.0 1.5 0.1 2.1 8.2 4.1 1.6 0.0 .. 7.6 1.3 3.0 0.1 0.4 1.1 5.1 2.0 .. 60.7 .. .. 1
Action relating to debt3 0.3 14.1 20.3 5.9 .. .. .. 13.8 4.4 .. .. .. 0.8 0.0 .. .. 2.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. 6
Humanitarian aid 7.4 2.7 5.5 12.6 7.5 9.1 11.5 0.4 3.1 0.2 4.1 19.5 17.0 4.3 0.9 16.6 3.7 6.3 11.1 .. 0.0 .. .. 8
Administrative expenses 7.2 4.4 6.8 8.4 7.5 6.8 9.7 4.3 4.3 9.5 8.2 6.5 4.2 4.6 3.4 7.4 8.2 11.9 7.4 .. 2.8 .. .. 16
Other and unspecified 3.4 10.0 14.4 5.7 18.4 11.4 12.2 7.0 1.4 18.6 2.3 3.5 27.2 2.0 1.4 9.2 7.2 5.4 7.3 100.0 0.4 100.0 100.0 7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100
Memorandum item:
Food aid, total 1.9 0.4 1.3 7.8 1.0 0.2 2.2 0.5 1.4 0.0 1.6 3.3 1.0 1.6 0.2 1.2 2.0 0.9 0.8 - - - - 2
. Including students and trainees.
. Population and reproductive health.
. Including forgiveness of non-ODA debt.
. Including IDA and IBRD.
. Including the African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank and Inter-American Development Bank.
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ANNEX ATable A.10. Distribution of ODA by income group1
Net disbursements as a % of total ODA
ODA to LDCs ODA to other LICs ODA to LMICs ODA to UMICs
2001-02 2011-12 2001-02 2011-12 2001-02 2011-12 2001-02 2011-12
Australia 31.7 40.5 1.9 2.8 56.8 51.5 9.5 5.2
Austria 31.6 31.8 1.5 2.4 40.6 36.0 26.3 29.7
Belgium 50.7 50.5 2.7 2.4 26.9 30.2 19.7 16.9
Canada 40.7 58.1 2.5 3.9 39.2 31.7 17.7 6.3
Czech Republic 27.4 32.3 1.6 2.4 48.6 31.8 22.4 33.5
Denmark 52.0 57.2 3.4 6.5 31.2 28.1 13.4 8.1
Finland 47.3 51.5 4.1 5.3 25.5 26.7 23.1 16.5
France 40.9 31.0 1.7 2.7 34.6 32.7 22.7 33.6
Germany 34.0 37.0 3.5 4.3 30.4 31.2 32.0 27.5
Greece 24.1 20.1 2.1 1.9 17.6 25.4 56.2 52.7
Iceland 64.5 74.4 1.2 1.5 14.5 20.1 19.8 4.0
Ireland 68.9 67.0 3.5 4.4 13.8 16.8 13.8 11.8
Italy 58.5 42.7 2.4 2.8 21.5 25.2 17.6 29.4
Japan 25.7 55.3 1.9 4.5 48.8 46.9 23.6 -6.8
Korea 26.2 43.2 1.2 2.3 52.7 45.0 19.9 9.6
Luxembourg 41.8 49.3 1.0 1.7 33.3 36.3 23.9 12.7
Netherlands 45.4 51.4 2.6 3.7 33.5 28.4 18.4 16.6
New Zealand 39.7 45.2 2.1 1.8 42.7 39.0 15.4 14.0
Norway 52.8 55.4 2.7 3.8 27.3 26.1 17.1 14.7
Poland 61.8 23.5 1.0 2.4 16.0 25.7 21.2 48.4
Portugal 68.5 44.9 1.3 0.8 19.0 40.3 11.2 14.0
Slovak Republic 44.2 27.1 5.3 5.1 38.2 25.1 12.3 42.8
Slovenia .. 24.8 .. 1.9 .. 26.0 .. 47.2
Spain 22.1 36.7 1.6 2.0 46.7 30.2 29.6 31.1
Sweden 47.5 55.0 3.6 6.2 30.9 25.2 18.1 13.7
Switzerland 44.1 46.4 4.3 6.2 29.4 34.1 22.3 13.3
United Kingdom 42.5 50.8 3.6 4.9 30.3 30.8 23.6 13.4
United States 30.8 51.4 4.0 5.5 42.5 28.7 22.6 14.5
Total DAC 36.7 46.8 2.9 4.3 37.8 32.4 22.7 16.5
of which: DAC-EU countries 42.1 42.6 2.8 3.9 31.6 30.2 23.5 23.3
LOC: least developed country; LIC: low-income country; LMIC: lover middle-income country; UMIC: upper middle-income country.
1. Including imputed multilateral ODA. Excluding more advanced developing countries and territories and amounts unspecified
by country.
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408 Table A.11. Regional distribution of ODA by individual DAC donors
1
% of total net disbursements
Europe Latin America and the Caribbean
2006-07 2011-12 2001-02 2006-07 2011-12
0.3 0.4 1.0 1.0 1.8
11.8 24.5 11.3 3.8 6.4
5.0 8.9 9.6 8.9 8.4
3.7 2.5 15.5 14.8 17.2
21.4 30.5 6.3 11.0 5.9
3.7 5.2 9.5 7.8 5.9
6.6 9.4 9.0 9.8 9.3
6.1 9.7 6.2 6.1 13.3
7.1 12.0 11.1 6.9 10.7
31.6 43.6 5.2 6.5 6.0
2.6 2.9 2.3 6.0 6.3
3.4 7.2 5.4 5.8 4.6
10.2 22.0 5.3 7.5 6.8
2.2 2.4 9.6 6.9 2.9
5.4 2.1 6.0 8.9 7.1
7.2 10.1 14.7 13.7 12.3
4.8 9.8 12.6 9.2 8.6
0.7 0.6 3.3 3.4 1.6
6.1 5.0 8.0 10.0 12.3
17.1 36.6 1.9 10.5 6.1
11.3 9.1 3.2 4.4 3.6
15.3 35.2 3.0 5.6 6.7
.. 42.9 .. .. 6.2
8.0 15.2 40.4 29.7 22.1
8.2 9.7 11.9 9.3 6.3
12.6 10.7 11.8 11.2 10.7
4.7 6.8 8.9 0.0 4.8
3.3 2.6 14.0 9.6 9.9
5.4 7.2 11.2 8.1 9.0
6.9 11.1 11.1 7.5 9.4
l distribution of multilateral disbursements
2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933133875South of Sahara South and Central Asia Other Asia and Oceania Middle East and North Africa
2001-02 2006-07 2011-12 2001-02 2006-07 2011-12 2001-02 2006-07 2011-12 2001-02 2006-07 2011-12 2001-02
Australia 10.1 10.0 15.1 16.2 10.9 18.5 69.4 61.6 60.3 2.5 16.1 3.9 0.9
Austria 41.7 44.3 41.3 9.9 6.6 11.9 6.0 3.4 8.2 9.3 30.2 7.8 21.8
Belgium 59.2 66.0 61.2 7.6 6.3 8.0 7.1 5.3 5.3 6.5 8.6 8.3 10.0
Canada 40.0 46.2 55.2 17.1 20.9 14.7 12.6 8.8 6.1 4.8 5.5 4.3 10.0
Czech Republic 20.1 26.7 27.9 26.5 13.8 16.6 14.6 9.9 7.5 5.7 17.1 11.7 26.7
Denmark 50.3 57.4 56.0 15.1 13.9 17.4 12.8 8.8 7.3 5.7 8.4 8.1 6.6
Finland 44.2 49.4 48.7 16.6 14.5 16.0 11.2 10.7 8.7 8.2 9.1 7.9 10.8
France 53.0 54.1 46.3 5.6 5.4 7.3 9.3 7.0 8.3 17.5 21.3 15.1 8.4
Germany 34.4 43.5 36.6 13.4 11.3 19.5 12.4 8.4 10.3 12.6 22.7 10.9 16.2
Greece 22.3 29.1 23.4 10.7 12.4 7.4 3.6 3.6 3.4 10.1 16.8 16.1 48.2
Iceland 78.2 55.0 69.4 10.4 29.7 11.1 4.5 3.3 2.0 2.5 3.4 8.2 2.0
Ireland 68.0 69.6 67.6 8.7 8.7 7.9 4.2 7.3 6.7 5.5 5.2 6.1 8.3
Italy 57.5 44.1 43.5 10.8 7.5 12.5 3.6 4.2 3.8 9.7 26.5 11.3 13.1
Japan 19.1 46.2 39.0 27.2 14.5 46.2 38.5 18.9 3.5 4.5 11.2 6.0 1.1
Korea 12.0 18.5 26.0 26.2 22.5 26.2 44.7 28.0 33.4 3.7 16.7 5.2 7.3
Luxembourg 42.3 50.5 49.0 10.3 9.5 9.7 12.3 12.5 13.5 9.9 6.6 5.5 10.6
Netherlands 44.7 59.1 52.4 15.5 12.5 15.7 11.6 8.0 5.6 6.4 6.4 7.9 9.2
New Zealand 11.5 11.4 8.7 11.3 9.4 10.0 70.6 72.0 77.3 2.6 3.1 1.8 0.7
Norway 44.4 50.3 49.5 19.4 17.0 17.6 7.6 7.8 7.0 9.0 8.8 8.6 11.5
Poland 10.4 38.9 23.8 14.3 8.5 10.9 14.8 15.0 10.9 53.3 10.0 11.7 5.3
Portugal 48.9 53.4 67.4 8.3 8.0 3.9 29.0 14.8 7.1 4.0 8.1 8.8 6.5
Slovak Republic 37.4 54.5 30.9 24.6 10.0 10.1 10.2 4.4 4.1 6.9 10.1 13.0 18.0
Slovenia .. .. 26.7 .. .. 9.3 .. .. 4.4 .. .. 10.4 ..
Spain 23.3 31.4 33.0 7.4 7.4 8.6 7.0 6.1 3.9 10.3 17.5 17.2 11.5
Sweden 44.6 49.4 54.7 16.9 12.1 13.7 10.1 8.9 6.2 6.9 12.1 9.4 9.7
Switzerland 37.5 44.1 41.8 22.6 19.1 19.6 8.9 6.8 9.5 5.4 6.3 7.7 13.9
United Kingdom 43.5 63.2 52.0 21.7 19.0 24.8 7.1 6.3 4.9 6.2 6.8 6.7 12.6
United States 31.7 34.9 46.4 20.9 17.4 23.5 9.8 5.3 6.2 14.2 29.5 11.4 9.4
Total DAC 36.1 45.8 44.5 17.7 13.3 20.2 16.3 9.5 9.4 9.6 17.8 9.7 9.1
of which: DAC-EU countries 44.4 51.5 46.5 12.9 10.9 15.2 9.5 7.2 7.1 10.2 16.1 10.6 11.9
1. Including imputed multilateral flows, i.e. making allowance for contributions through multilateral organisations, calculated using the geographica
for the year of reference. Excluding amounts unspecified by region.
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ANNEX ATable A.12. Concessional flows for development from non-DAC providers
of development co-operation
Net disbursements
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Memorandum item: 2012
Share of bilateral
co-operation
ODA/GNI
USD million %
OECD non-DAC
Estonia 22 18 19 24 23 37 0.11
Hungary 107 117 114 140 118 18 0.10
Israel1, 2 138 124 145 206 171 85 0.07
Turkey 780 707 967 1 273 2 533 96 0.32
Other providers
Bulgaria .. .. 40 48 40 0 0.08
Chinese Taipei 435 411 381 381 305 79 0.06
Cyprus3, 4 37 46 51 38 25 37 0.11
Kuwait (KFAED) 283 221 211 145 149 100 n.a.
Latvia 22 21 16 19 21 5 0.07
Liechtenstein 24 26 27 31 29 84 n.a.
Lithuania 48 36 37 52 52 42 0.13
Malta .. 14 14 20 19 63 0.23
Romania 123 153 114 164 142 23 0.09
Russian Federation .. .. 472 479 465 46 0.02
Saudi Arabia 4 979 3 134 3 480 5 095 1 299 74 n.a.
Thailand 178 40 10 31 17 30 0.00
United Arab Emirates 1 266 834 412 737 1 070 94 0.27
Total 8 442 5 902 6 509 8 883 6 478 .. ..
Note: This table does not reflect development co-operation provided by several other non-OECD countries, as they do not report to
the OECD.
1. The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such
data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West
Bank under the terms of international law.
2. These figures include USD 43.6 million in 2008, USD 35.4 million in 2009, USD 40.2 million in 2010, USD 49.2 million in 2011 and
USD 56 million in 2012 for first year sustenance expenses for persons arriving from developing countries (many of which are
experiencing civil war or severe unrest), or individuals who have left due to humanitarian or political reasons.
3. Footnote by Turkey: The information in this document with reference to “Cyprus” relates to the southern part of the Island.
There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the Island. Turkey recognises the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of the United Nations,
Turkey shall preserve its position concerning the “Cyprus issue”.
4. Footnote by all the European Union Member States of the OECD and the European Commission: The Republic of Cyprus is
recognised by all members of the United Nations with the exception of Turkey. The information in this document relates to the
area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.
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133913Table A.13. Concessional and non-concessional flows by multilateral organisations1
USD million, at current prices and exchange rates
Gross disbursements Net disbursements
1996-97
average
2001-02
average
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
1996-97
average
2001-02
average
2008 2009 2010 2011
Concessional flows
International financial
institutions
AfDB 634 758 1 932 3 175 2 414 2 355 2 548 590 602 1 802 2 750 1 830 2 272
AsDB 1 198 1 100 2 331 2 790 1 930 1 940 1 835 1 056 859 1 654 1 943 1 023 863
CarDB 19 81 83 85 75 72 64 0 47 64 68 55 39
EBRD 18 30 7 - - - - 18 30 7 - - -
IDA 6 107 6 925 9 291 12 793 12 123 11 703 12 163 5 488 5 552 6 689 9 006 7 779 6 995
IDB Sp.Fund 626 485 552 1 025 1 994 1 703 1 620 348 221 310 380 1 287 1 497
IMF2 1 017 1 746 1 038 2 605 2 973 1 455 1 506 253 667 307 1 825 1 230 772
Nordic Dev. Fund 59 34 104 76 65 70 56 59 32 91 64 50 52
Total IFIs 9 678 11 158 15 339 22 549 21 575 19 297 19 793 7 813 8 011 10 924 16 035 13 253 12 490
United Nations3
IFAD 219 252 491 399 520 621 631 131 157 347 230 284 382
UNAIDS - - 209 243 246 265 242 - - 209 243 246 265
UNDP 613 278 495 631 613 494 487 613 278 495 631 602 490
UNFPA 215 311 275 348 316 315 349 215 311 273 346 314 314
UNHCR 271 589 278 301 393 441 424 271 589 278 301 393 441
UNICEF 595 584 987 1 104 1 050 1 104 1 155 595 584 984 1 086 1 046 1 089
UNRWA 250 376 473 473 545 608 667 250 376 473 473 545 608
UNTA 338 438 645 - - - - 338 438 645 - - -
WFP 325 365 317 293 244 345 355 325 365 316 290 243 337
WHO - - - 437 366 452 397 - - - 437 366 452
Other UN4 - - 120 121 151 145 148 - - 120 120 151 145
Total UN 2 827 3 193 4 291 4 348 4 443 4 792 4 855 2 739 3 098 4 141 4 157 4 189 4 523
EU Institutions 5 445 5 701 12 868 13 161 12 638 17 947 18 082 5 209 5 334 12 868 13 159 12 496 17 045
GAVI - - 719 469 772 819 1 068 - - 719 469 772 819
GEF5 - 427 814 711 530 474 539 - 427 814 711 530 471
Global Fund - - 2 172 2 337 3 031 2 647 3 359 - - 2 168 2 333 3 003 2 612
Montreal Protocol 21 66 76 29 21 10 5 21 66 76 29 21 8
OSCE - - - - 150 151 135 - - - - 150 151
Arab Funds6 97 340 1 790 1 827 1 864 1 599 1 569 -37 142 1 058 965 993 730
Total concessional 18 067 20 884 38 068 45 432 45 022 47 735 49 404 15 744 17 077 32 767 37 859 35 406 38 850
Non-concessional flows
AfDB 967 647 1 121 3 626 2 042 3 051 3 510 129 -425 405 2 475 1 152 2 050
AsDB 3 933 2 957 6 472 7 898 5 272 5 626 6 900 2 095 716 4 574 6 035 3 230 3 155
CarDB 31 79 101 114 247 83 36 18 44 29 54 132 36
EBRD 367 588 2 759 3 606 3 629 4 034 3 336 310 157 1 988 2 300 2 033 2 357
EU Institutions 760 1 048 6 195 6 674 8 259 982 762 570 607 4 448 4 693 5 583 -794
IBRD 12 144 10 209 13 393 21 408 26 511 15 971 15 136 1 454 -869 3 786 11 519 18 215 1 810
IDB 4 314 5 762 7 158 11 415 10 175 7 187 6 508 2 053 2 759 2 411 6 852 4 518 2 655
IFAD 28 27 53 38 44 49 63 4 1 22 6 11 11
IFC 1 575 1 235 5 022 4 471 4 184 4 733 6 414 574 27 3 210 2 245 1 693 1 426
Arab Funds6 - - - 362 1 983 2 297 1 752 - - - 259 1 448 1 899
Total non-concessional 24 119 22 552 42 274 59 613 62 347 44 013 44 419 7 206 3 017 20 872 36 439 38 015 14 605
1. To countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients.
2. IMF concessional trust funds.
3. The data for UN agencies have been reviewed to include only regular budget expenditures. This has led to revisions of UNDP data since 19
WFP and UNHCR, revisions have only been possible from 1996 onwards, while for UNICEF the data are revised from 1997. Since 2000, U
operates an Annual Programme Budget which includes country operations, global operations and administrative costs under a unified b
However, data shown for UNHCR as of 2004 cover expenditures from unrestricted or broadly earmarked funds only. For UNFPA, data prior
include regular budget and other expenditures.
4. IAEA, UNECE and UNPBF.
5. Until 2010, the data for GEF are on commitment basis.
6. AFESD, BADEA, Isl. Dev. Bank and OFID.
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133932Table A.14. Deflators for resource flows from DAC donors1 (2012 = 100)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Australia 44.92 38.07 39.61 37.19 34.30 37.16 45.50 53.52 57.88 60.10 69.44 72.96 69.16 85.80 100.31 100.00
Austria 70.64 69.81 67.07 58.63 57.98 61.92 74.94 83.78 85.48 87.95 97.80 104.93 102.61 99.24 106.27 100.00
Belgium 66.00 66.24 63.70 56.19 55.72 59.82 73.13 82.14 84.12 86.95 97.08 104.47 102.07 99.06 106.10 100.00
Canada 51.72 48.19 49.02 51.12 49.83 49.75 57.65 64.07 71.00 77.90 84.91 88.14 81.28 92.41 99.36 100.00
Czech Republic 44.87 48.32 46.23 41.95 44.61 53.19 62.45 71.13 76.03 81.07 93.24 111.14 103.85 101.73 108.79 100.00
Denmark 62.64 62.52 60.98 54.21 54.01 58.31 71.05 79.86 82.04 84.53 94.41 103.64 100.83 100.00 105.63 100.00
Finland 69.15 69.39 67.09 59.54 59.60 63.52 75.63 83.57 83.98 85.52 96.06 104.18 102.09 97.43 105.13 100.00
France 68.67 68.66 65.91 57.91 57.41 61.75 75.51 84.41 86.05 88.77 99.32 107.30 104.34 100.21 106.55 100.00
Germany 77.05 76.39 73.35 63.02 61.93 66.11 80.12 89.04 89.64 90.81 100.64 106.87 104.39 100.32 106.61 100.00
Greece 64.88 63.09 62.79 54.30 53.79 58.52 72.91 82.54 84.14 87.03 98.07 108.21 106.87 102.80 109.05 100.00
Iceland 81.45 85.40 86.65 82.50 72.34 81.49 97.92 109.66 125.90 123.22 142.02 111.87 89.32 96.37 104.82 100.00
Ireland 67.11 66.88 66.08 60.19 62.00 68.83 85.58 96.34 98.63 102.94 114.22 116.92 108.56 101.69 107.46 100.00
Italy 64.48 64.92 63.15 55.68 55.66 60.46 74.74 84.15 85.71 88.04 98.30 106.20 104.67 99.94 106.34 100.00
Japan 79.37 73.32 83.19 86.81 76.10 72.70 77.19 81.64 79.15 74.03 72.47 81.44 89.79 93.49 101.01 100.00
Korea 85.11 60.62 70.80 75.05 68.29 72.72 79.12 84.76 95.40 102.51 107.16 92.33 83.21 95.06 100.72 100.00
Luxembourg 55.12 54.10 54.61 48.19 46.84 50.32 63.87 71.52 74.96 80.82 91.47 96.79 94.21 96.00 105.02 100.00
Netherlands 64.63 64.76 63.24 56.95 58.15 63.54 77.83 86.21 88.35 90.80 100.86 108.51 104.86 100.55 106.77 100.00
New Zealand 58.95 48.02 47.63 41.77 40.34 44.89 57.19 67.65 73.49 69.62 82.22 80.44 72.92 87.57 98.34 100.00
Norway 41.38 38.48 39.71 40.70 40.50 44.80 52.00 57.85 65.93 72.05 81.28 92.54 79.58 87.86 101.19 100.00
Poland 57.12 59.57 55.63 54.45 59.84 61.36 64.58 71.79 83.11 87.88 102.56 119.79 97.49 102.10 107.15 100.00
Portugal 63.48 64.07 63.36 56.59 56.95 62.17 76.78 86.52 88.73 92.10 103.29 110.56 107.73 103.10 108.50 100.00
Slovak Republic 41.47 41.57 38.02 37.22 37.40 41.43 53.78 64.91 69.01 74.36 90.34 105.82 104.76 100.13 106.84 100.00
Slovenia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 84.23 86.82 98.67 108.26 107.98 101.61 107.91 100.00
Spain 59.94 60.20 59.10 52.88 53.54 58.80 73.42 84.00 87.69 92.22 103.87 112.04 108.25 103.04 108.19 100.00
Sweden 70.74 68.34 66.38 60.70 55.02 59.42 72.74 80.38 79.71 82.28 92.20 96.25 85.99 91.97 103.40 100.00
Switzerland 56.86 56.65 54.77 49.50 50.14 54.67 63.80 69.63 69.62 70.75 75.75 85.18 85.79 89.48 105.56 100.00
United Kingdom 74.03 76.30 76.13 71.80 69.87 74.59 82.93 95.27 96.36 100.34 111.63 104.14 91.91 93.70 99.50 100.00
United States 74.38 75.18 76.26 77.99 79.78 81.00 82.62 84.89 87.61 90.30 92.70 94.51 95.24 96.39 98.28 100.00
Total DAC 68.36 67.13 68.26 65.92 63.33 65.79 75.16 82.17 84.34 86.34 93.51 98.33 95.36 96.29 102.45 100.00
EU Institutions 74.38 75.18 76.26 77.99 79.78 81.00 82.62 84.89 87.61 90.30 92.70 94.51 95.24 96.39 98.28 100.00
1. Including the effect of exchange rate changes, i.e. applicable to US dollar figures only.
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ANNEX ATable A.15. Annual average dollar exchange rates for DAC members
1 USD = 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Australia Dollars 1.2800 1.0902 0.9692 0.9660 1.0367
Austria Euro 0.7181 0.7550 0.7192 0.7780 0.7532
Belgium Euro 0.7181 0.7550 0.7192 0.7780 0.7532
Canada Dollars 1.1410 1.0302 0.9891 0.9992 1.0302
Czech Republic Koruna 18.9895 19.0795 17.6722 19.5383 19.5585
Denmark Kroner 5.3465 5.6218 5.3604 5.7899 5.6169
Finland Euro 0.7181 0.7550 0.7192 0.7780 0.7532
France Euro 0.7181 0.7550 0.7192 0.7780 0.7532
Germany Euro 0.7181 0.7550 0.7192 0.7780 0.7532
Greece Euro 0.7181 0.7550 0.7192 0.7780 0.7532
Iceland Krona 123.3520 122.2420 116.0580 125.1180 122.1541
Ireland Euro 0.7181 0.7550 0.7192 0.7780 0.7532
Italy Euro 0.7181 0.7550 0.7192 0.7780 0.7532
Japan Yen 93.4000 87.7606 79.7068 79.8136 97.5910
Korea Won 1 273.9100 1 155.4313 1 107.3024 1 125.9300 1 094.6380
Luxembourg Euro 0.7181 0.7550 0.7192 0.7780 0.7532
Netherlands Euro 0.7181 0.7550 0.7192 0.7780 0.7532
New Zealand Dollars 1.5988 1.3876 1.2664 1.2349 1.2203
Norway Kroner 6.2784 6.0445 5.6046 5.8149 5.8780
Poland Zloty 3.1092 3.0145 2.9621 3.2518 3.1596
Portugal Euro 0.7181 0.7550 0.7192 0.7780 0.7532
Slovak Republic Euro 0.7181 0.7550 0.7192 0.7780 0.7532
Slovenia Euro 0.7181 0.7550 0.7192 0.7780 0.7532
Spain Euro 0.7181 0.7550 0.7192 0.7780 0.7532
Sweden Kroner 7.6322 7.2022 6.4892 6.7689 6.5132
Switzerland Francs 1.0839 1.0427 0.8872 0.9375 0.9268
United Kingdom Pound Sterling 0.6402 0.6475 0.6238 0.6311 0.6396
EU Euro 0.7181 0.7550 0.7192 0.7780 0.7532
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ANNEX ATable A.16. Gross national income and population of DAC member countries
Gross national income (USD billion) Population (thousands)
2002-03
average
2011 2012 2013
2002-03
average
2011 2012 2013
Australia 440 1 450 1 497 1 433 19 730 23 200 22 910 23 420
Austria 227 416 395 412 8 040 8 440 8 430 8 470
Belgium 278 523 488 508 10 345 10 950 10 950 11 130
Canada 786 1 707 1 789 1 798 31 600 34 610 35 000 35 300
Czech Republic 75 201 182 185 10 205 10 510 10 510 10 510
Denmark 190 344 324 344 5 390 5 580 5 600 5 630
Finland 146 265 247 259 5 210 5 400 5 430 5 450
France 1 631 2 828 2 657 2 794 59 605 65 350 65 590 66 000
Germany 2 188 3 644 3 481 3 724 82 500 81 840 80 490 80 720
Greece 153 290 250 242 10 985 11 320 11 300 11 290
Iceland 9 12 12 14 290 320 330 330
Ireland 113 178 172 183 3 940 4 590 4 590 4 590
Italy 1 314 2 183 1 998 2 059 57 700 60 850 59 690 59 680
Japan 4 220 6 089 6 125 5 084 127 530 127 770 127 490 127 260
Korea 577 1 118 1 135 1 316 48 015 49 780 50 000 50 220
Luxembourg 21 42 40 43 445 510 520 540
Netherlands 456 842 778 813 16 195 16 670 16 730 16 780
New Zealand 64 154 162 174 3 975 4 420 4 450 4 470
Norway 207 493 511 519 4 560 4 990 5 050 5 110
Poland 103 496 468 496 38 215 38 210 38 540 38 500
Portugal 132 229 207 215 10 340 10 560 10 560 10 490
Slovak Republic 30 94 90 94 5 380 5 400 5 400 5 420
Slovenia .. 49 45 47 .. 2 060 2 060 2 060
Spain 746 1 457 1 307 1 362 41 945 47 190 47 270 47 130
Sweden 271 550 538 573 8 960 9 520 9 560 9 640
Switzerland 328 666 653 685 7 320 7 950 8 010 8 110
United Kingdom 1 712 2 459 2 472 2 491 59 090 62 260 63 710 63 710
United States 10 736 15 211 16 515 16 798 289 630 311 590 313 910 316 130
Total DAC 27 153 43 990 44 539 44 665 967 140 1 021 840 1 024 080 1 028 090
of which: DAC-EU countries 9 787 17 090 16 140 16 844 434 490 457 210 456 930 457 740
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933133970DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 413
ANNEX BANNEX B
Methodological notes on the Profiles of Development
Assistance Committee members
General point: Unless otherwise stated, the figures in the profiles refer to gross bilateral
disbursements and are expressed in constant USD 2012. All of the data presented in the profiles are
publicly available at: www.oecd.org/dac/stats.
Data specificities on the Development Assistance Committee’s most recent members: In 2013,
five new countries joined the DAC: Iceland (March 2013), the Czech Republic (May 2013), the
Slovak Republic (September 2013), Poland (October 2013) and Slovenia (December 2013).
Data for these members are not as complete as the data collected on other DAC members. This
includes:
● Data on flows other than ODA (other official flows, private flows at market terms and private
grants) are not available for these five members.
● Data on ODA composition (including CPA), ODA to and through CSOs, ODA allocation by sector,
ODA in support of gender equality and women’s empowerment and ODA in support of global and
local environment objectives are not available for Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia.
The remainder of this note explains the basis of calculation on: Tax and development, Aid for
trade, Remittances, the Gender equality marker, the Environment markers.
Tax and development
To estimate the amount of ODA that supports tax-related activities, the OECD uses the DAC’s
Creditor Reporting System (CRS) database. This database registers information on the purpose of aid
using a sector classification specifically developed to track aid flows and to permit measuring the
share of each sector or other purpose category in total aid. There are 26 main sector/purpose
categories. Each has a prescribed list of attributes to ensure proper activities are correctly classified.
Most of themain sectors then have a number of sub-codes which allows for a breakdown of activities.
The methodology is currently under review by theWorking Party on Statistics.
Source: CRS Aid Statistics, OECD. The data cited in the profiles does not include the IMF.
Aid for trade
According to the WTO Task Force on Aid for Trade, projects and programmes are part of aid for
trade if these activities have been identified as trade-related development priorities in the partner
country’s national development strategies. Furthermore, the WTO Task Force concluded that to
measure aid for trade flows the following categories should be included: technical assistance for trade
policy and regulations, trade-related infrastructure, productive capacity building (including trade
development), trade-related adjustment, other trade-related needs.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014414
ANNEX BThe DAC’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS) database was recognised as the best available data source
for tracking global aid-for-trade flows. It should be kept inmind that the CRS does not provide data that
match exactly all of the above aid-for-trade categories. In fact, the CRS provides proxies under four
headings: trade policy and regulations, economic infrastructure, building productive capacity (BPC),
trade-related adjustment. The CRS covers all ODA, but only those activities reported under the above
four categories can be identified as aid for trade. It is not possible to distinguish activities in the context
of “other trade-related needs”.To estimate the volume of such “other” activities, donors would need to
examine aid projects in sectors other than those considered so far – for example in health and
education – and indicate what share, if any, of these activities have an important trade component. A
health programme, for instance, might permit increased trade from localities where the disease burden
was previously a constraint on trade. Consequently, accurately monitoring aid for trade would require
comparison of the CRS data with donor and partner countries’ self-assessments of their aid for trade.
Source: CRS Aid Statistics, OECD.
Remittances
According to theWorld Bank data, worldwide remittances to developing countries reached their
highest level in 2012, at USD 351 billion. The estimates given in the profiles are based on the
methodology developed by Ratha and Shaw, 2007, “South-South Migration and Remittances”,
Development Prospects Group, World Bank (www.worldbank.org/prospects/migrationandremittances).
The remittance data is for 2012, disaggregated using host country and origin country incomes
from 2011, and estimated migrant stocks from 2010.
Source: World Bank, allocation based on Bilateral Remittance Estimates for 2012 using Migrant Stocks, Host
Country Incomes, and Origin Country Incomes (million USD) (May 2013 version).
Gender equality marker
The DACGender Equality PolicyMarker is a statistical instrument tomeasure aid that is focused on
achieving gender equality and women’s empowerment. Activities are classified as “principal” when
gender equality is a primary objective, “significant” when gender equality is an important but
secondary objective, or “not targeted”. Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia do not report on the
gender equalitymarker, while the United States uses a differentmethodology (see individual footnote).
In the profiles of DAC members, the basis of calculation is bilateral sector allocable, screened aid.
Source: CRS Aid Statistics, OECD.
Environment markers
The chart “Bilateral ODA in support of global and local environment objectives, two year
averages, commitments” presented in each DAC member profile nets out the overlaps between Rio
and environment markers: it shows climate-related aid as a sub-category of total environmental aid;
biodiversity and desertification are also included (either overlapping with climate-related aid or as
additional – other – environmental aid) but not separately identified for the sake of readability of the
graph. One activity can address several policy objectives at the same time. This reflects the fact that
the three Rio conventions (targeting global environmental objectives) and local environmental
objectives are mutually reinforcing. The same activity can be marked for e.g. climate change
mitigation and biodiversity, or for biodiversity and desertification.
“Climate-related aid” covers both aid to climatemitigation and to adaptation from 2010 onwards,
but only mitigation aid pre-2010. Reported figures for 2006 to 2009 may appear lower than in practice,
and may reflect a break in the series, given pre-2010 adaptation spend is not marked. In the profiles
of DAC members, the basis of calculation is total bilateral ODA. Details are all available at
www.oecd.org/dac/stats/rioconventions.htm.
Source: CRS Aid Statistics, OECD.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 415
ANNEX CANNEX C
Technical notes on definitions and measurement
The coverage of the data presented in the Development Co-operation Report has changed in recent
years. The main points are as follows.
Changes in the concept of official development assistance (ODA) and the coverage
of gross national income (GNI)
While the definition of official development assistance has not changed since 1972, some
changes in interpretation have tended to broaden the scope of the concept. The main changes are:
the recording of administrative costs as ODA (from 1979), the imputation as ODA of the share of
subsidies to educational systems representing the cost of educating students from aid recipient
countries (first specifically identified in 1984), and the inclusion of assistance provided by donor
countries in the first year after the arrival of a refugee from an aid recipient country (eligible to be
reported as of the early 1980s but only widely used since 1991).
Precise quantification of the effects of these changes is difficult because changes in data
collection methodology and coverage are often not directly apparent from members’ statistical
returns. The amounts involved can, however, be substantial. For example, reporting by Canada
in 1993 included for the first time a figure for in-Canada refugee support. The amount involved
(USD 184 m) represented almost 8% of total Canadian ODA. Aid flows reported by Australia in the
late 1980s have been estimated to be approximately 12% higher than had they been calculated
according to the rules and procedures that applied 15 years earlier (Scott, 1989).*
The coverage of national income has also been expanding through the inclusion of new areas of
economic activity and the improvement of collection methods. In particular, the 1993 System of
National Accounts (SNA) co-sponsored by the OECD and other major international organisations
broadens the coverage of gross national product (GNP), now renamed gross national income (GNI).
This tends to depress donors’ ODA/GNI ratios. Denmark’s and Norway’s ODA/GNI ratios declined by
6% to 8% as a result of moving to the new SNA in the mid-1990s. Australia and Finland later showed
smaller falls of 2% to 4%, while some other countries showed little change. The average fall has been
about 3%. All DAC members are now using the new SNA.
* S. Scott (1989), “Some aspects of the 1988-89 aid budget”, inQuarterlyAid Round-Up, No. 6, AIDAB, Canberra, pp. 11-18.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014416
ANNEX CRecipient country coverage
Since 1990, the following entities were added to the DAC List of ODA Recipients at the dates
shown: the Black Communities of South Africa (1991; now listed as South Africa); Kazakhstan, the
Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (1992); Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia
(1993); Palestinian Administered Areas (1994; now listed as West Bank and Gaza Strip); Moldova
(1997); Belarus, Libya and Ukraine (2005); Kosovo (2009); South Sudan (2011).
Over the same period, the following countries and territories were removed from the list of ODA
recipients at the dates shown: Portugal (1991); French Guyana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Réunion, and
St. Pierre and Miquelon (1992); Greece (1994); Bahamas, Brunei, Kuwait, Qatar, Singapore and
United Arab Emirates (1996); Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Chinese Taipei, Cyprus, Falkland Islands,
Hong Kong (China) and Israel (1997); Aruba, the British Virgin Islands, French Polynesia, Gibraltar,
Korea, Libya, Macao, the Netherlands Antilles, New Caledonia and the Northern Marianas (2000);
Malta and Slovenia (2003); Bahrain (2005); Saudi Arabia, and Turks and Caicos Islands (2008);
Barbados, Croatia, Mayotte, Oman, and Trinidad and Tobago (2011).
From 1993 to 2004, several Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC)/New Independent
States (NIS) countries in transition and more advanced developing countries were included on a
separate list of recipients of official aid. This list has now been abolished.
Donor country coverage
Portugal, one of the founding members of the DAC in 1961, withdrew from the DAC in 1974 and
re-joined in 1991. Spain joined the DAC in 1991; Luxembourg joined in 1992; Greece joined in 1999;
Korea joined in 2010; and the Czech Republic, Iceland, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia
joined in 2013. Their assistance is now counted within the DAC total. ODA flows from these countries
before they joined the DAC have been added to earlier years’ data where available. The accession of
new members has added to total DAC ODA, but has usually reduced the overall ODA/GNI ratio, since
their programmes are often smaller in relation to GNI than those of the longer established donors.
Treatment of debt forgiveness
The treatment of the forgiveness of loans not originally reported as ODA varied in earlier years.
Up to and including 1992, where forgiveness of non-ODA debt met the tests of ODA, it was reportable
as ODA. From 1990 to 1992 inclusive, it remained reportable as part of a country’s ODA but was
excluded from the DAC total. The amounts treated as such are shown in Table C.2. From 1993,
forgiveness of debt originally intended for military purposes has been reportable as other official
flows, whereas forgiveness of other non-ODA loans (mainly export credits) recorded as ODA is
included both in country data and in total DAC ODA in the same way as it was until 1989.
The forgiveness of outstanding loan principal originally reported as ODA does not give rise to a
new net disbursement of ODA. Statistically, the benefit is reflected in the fact that because the
cancelled repayments will not take place, net ODA disbursements will not be reduced.
Reporting year
All data in this publication refer to calendar years, unless otherwise stated.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 417
ANNEX C
ries
)Table C.1. DAC List of ODA Recipients
Effective for reporting on 2012 and 2013 flows
Least developed countries
Other low-income countries
(per capita GNI  USD 1 005 in 2010)
Lower middle-income countries and territories
(per capita GNI USD 1 006-3 975 in 2010)
Upper middle-income countries and territo
(per capita GNI USD 3 976-12 275 in 2010
Afghanistan Kenya Armenia Albania
Angola Korea, Democratic Republic Belize Algeria
Bangladesh Kyrgyz Republic Bolivia Anguilla1
Benin Tajikistan Cameroon Antigua and Barbuda
Bhutan Zimbabwe Cape Verde Argentina
Burkina Faso Congo, Republic Azerbaijan
Burundi Côte d’Ivoire Belarus
Cambodia Egypt Bosnia and Herzegovina
Central African Republic El Salvador Botswana
Chad Fiji Brazil
Comoros Georgia Chile
Congo, Democratic Republic Ghana China
Djibouti Guatemala Colombia
Equatorial Guinea Guyana Cook Islands
Eritrea Honduras Costa Rica
Ethiopia India Cuba
Gambia Indonesia Dominica
Guinea Iraq Dominican Republic
Guinea-Bissau Kosovo2 Ecuador
Haiti Marshall Islands Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Kiribati Micronesia, Federated States Gabon
Laos Moldova Grenada
Lesotho Mongolia Iran
Liberia Morocco Jamaica
Madagascar Nicaragua Jordan
Malawi Nigeria Kazakhstan
Mali Pakistan Lebanon
Mauritania Papua New Guinea Libya
Mozambique Paraguay Malaysia
Myanmar Philippines Maldives
Nepal Sri Lanka Mauritius
Niger Swaziland Mexico
Rwanda Syria Montenegro
Samoa Tokelau1 Montserrat1
São Tomé and Príncipe Tonga Namibia
Senegal Turkmenistan Nauru
Sierra Leone Ukraine Niue
Solomon Islands Uzbekistan Palau
Somalia Viet Nam Panama
South Sudan West Bank and Gaza Strip Peru
Sudan Serbia
Tanzania Seychelles
Timor-Leste South Africa
Togo St. Helena1
Tuvalu St. Kitts-Nevis
Uganda St. Lucia
Vanuatu St. Vincent and Grenadines
Yemen Suriname
Zambia Thailand
Tunisia
Turkey
Uruguay
Venezuela
Wallis and Futuna1
1. Territory.
2. This is without prejudice to the status of Kosovo under international law.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014418
ANNEX CTable C.2. Debt forgiveness of non-ODA claims1
USD million
1990 1991 1992
Australia - - 4.2
Austria - 4.2 25.3
Belgium - - 30.2
France 294.0 - 108.5
Germany - - 620.4
Japan 15.0 6.8 32.0
Netherlands 12.0 - 11.4
Norway - - 46.8
Sweden 5.0 - 7.1
United Kingdom 8.0 17.0 90.4
United States 1 200.0 1 855.0 894.0
Total DAC 1 534.0 1 882.9 1 870.2
1. These data are included in the ODA figures of individual countries but are excluded from DAC total ODA in all tables showing
performance by donor.
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GLOSSARYGlossary
Associated financing: The combination of official development assistance (ODA), whether
grants or loans, with other official or private funds to form finance packages.
Balance of payments accounts are an accounting record of all monetary transactions between a
country and the rest of the world.
Basket financing: A financing mechanism commonly established by governments to channel
support from different providers to fund specific activities through an autonomous account rather
than transferring funds into the host government’s general budget.
Bilateral flows: Financial flows that are provided directly by a provider country to a recipient
country.
Blended loans: Blended loans offer a middle ground between pure grant and finance at market
rates. They combine a concessional and a non-concessional component and thus soften the terms
and conditions of the final financial package (e.g. lower interest rate, longer tenor).
Brownfield investment: An investment approach where companies or government entities
purchase or lease existing production facilities to launch a new production activity. The alternative to
this is a greenfield investment, where a new facility is constructed.
Budget support: A transfer of resources from a provider to the partner government’s national
treasury.The transferred funds are managed in accordance with the recipient’s budgetary procedures
and are thus excluded from earmarking for specific purposes by the provider.
Commitment: A firm obligation, expressed in writing and backed by the necessary funds,
undertaken by a provider to contribute specified assistance to a recipient country or a multilateral
organisation.
Concessional loans: Loans that are provided at far lower thanmarket rates, for longer terms and
with conditions which allow grace periods for payments.
Country programmable aid (CPA): A subset of gross bilateral official development
assistance (ODA). Country programmable aid tracks the proportion of official development assistance
over which host countries have, or could have, significant say. It measures gross bilateral official
development assistance but excludes activities that: 1) are inherently unpredictable (humanitarian aid
and debt relief); 2) entail no cross-border flows (administrative costs, imputed student costs, promotion
of development awareness, and costs related to research and refugees in provider countries); 3) do not
form part of co-operation agreements between governments (food aid, assistance from local
governments, core funding to non-governmental organisations, ODA equity investments, assistance
through secondary agencies and assistance which is not allocable by country or region).
Creditor Reporting System (CRS): The central database for development co-operation compiled
by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which is the official source of
development co-operation statistics for all DAC member countries.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014420
GLOSSARYDebt: In finance, debt is a means of using anticipated income and future purchasing power in the
present before it has actually been earned. Some companies and corporations use debt as a part of their
overall corporate finance strategy. Governments issue debt to pay for ongoing expenses aswell asmajor
capital projects. Government debt may be issued by sovereign states as well as by local governments.
Development assistance: Development assistance includes projects and programmes, cash
transfers, deliveries of goods, training courses, research projects, debt relief operations and
contributions to non-governmental organisations.
Development Assistance Committee (DAC): The committee of the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) which deals with development co-operation matters. A
description of its aims and a list of its members are available at: www.oecd.org/dac.
DAC List of ODA Recipients: For statistical purposes, the OECD Development Assistance
Committee uses a list of ODA recipientswhich it revises every three years. Annex C of this report – Notes
on Definitions and Measurement – gives details of revisions in recent years.
Development finance institutions: Banks or institutions specialised in providing finance to
developing countries with the aim of supporting private sector development. Development finance
institutions operate according to market rules, supporting and catalysing private investment in
countries with limited access to capital markets using loans, equity, guarantees and other
risk-mitigating instruments. Key actors include bilateral development finance institutions, private
sector finance corporations established by the regional development banks and the International
Finance Corporation established by theWorld Bank.
Disbursement: The release of funds to or the purchase of goods or services for a recipient; by
extension, the amount thus spent. Disbursements record the actual international transfer of financial
resources, or of goods or services valued at the cost to the provider.
Doha Declaration on Financing for Development: Outcome of the International Conference on
Financing for Development in Doha, Qatar in 2008, which reviewed the implementation of theMonterrey
Consensus. The document called for even stronger efforts in the areas of domestic and international
resourcemobilisation and underlined the need to review global economic governance arrangements.The
declaration is available at: www.un.org/esa/ffd/doha/documents/Doha_Declaration_FFD.pdf.
Domestic revenue: The generation of savings from domestic resources and their allocation to
economically and socially productive investments. Such resource allocation can come from both the
public and private sectors. The public sector does this through taxation and other forms of public
revenue generation.
Dutch disease: The relationship between a large inflow of foreign currency (e.g. through
remittances) and a decline in the manufacturing or agricultural sector. The assumption is that an
increase in revenues makes a given nation’s currency stronger compared to that of other nations
(manifest in the exchange rate), which in turn makes the nation’s other exports more expensive,
reducing the competitiveness of the manufacturing sector and deteriorating the trade balance
(increasing imports and decreasing exports).
Equity investment: An investment in ownership interests of stockholders in a firm, usually in
the form of stock (not bonds).
Export credits: Government-backed loans, guarantees and insurance extended by official export
credit agencies to corporations working internationally.
Foreign direct investment: Investments by individuals or firms from one country into another,
either by buying an existing firm (through mergers and acquisitions), setting up a new operation
(greenfield investment) or by expanding the operations of an existing business. The three main
components of foreign direct investment are equity investment, inter-company loans and re-
invested earnings.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 421
GLOSSARYFragile states: Fragile states are commonly characterised by a weak capacity to carry out basic
governance functions and to develop mutually constructive relations with society. Fragile states are
vulnerable to internal or external shocks such as economic crises or natural disaster, as well as
domestic or international conflicts.
Global public goods: Goods or services which are available to everybody. A public good becomes
a global public good if it is quasi-universal in terms of countries (covering more than one group of
countries), people (accruing to several, preferably all, population groups) and generations (extending
to both current and future generations, or at least meeting the needs of the current generations
without foreclosing development options for future generations). Natural global public goods include
oceans/rivers, sunlight/moonlight and the atmosphere; the sustainable management of natural
global public goods (e.g. climate stability) is also a global public good. Food security, peace, economic
stability, protection from communicable diseases, inclusive healthcare, international communication
and transport networks, access to information and knowledge are other global public goods. Most
global public goods call for cross-border co-operation among different actors and as a consequence,
their provision suffers from obstacles to collective action.
Grants: Transfers made in cash, goods or services for which no repayment is required.
Grant element: Reflects the financial terms of a commitment, e.g. interest rate, maturity and
grace period (interval to first repayment of capital). It measures the concessionality of a loan,
expressed as the percentage by which the present value of the expected stream of repayments falls
short of the repayments that would have been generated at a given reference rate of interest. The
reference rate is 10% in DAC statistics. This rate was selected as a proxy for the marginal efficiency of
domestic investment, i.e. as an indication of the opportunity cost to the donor of making the funds
available. Thus, the grant element is nil for a loan carrying an interest rate of 10%; it is 100% for a
grant; and it lies between these two limits for a loan at less than 10% interest. If the face value of a
loan is multiplied by its grant element, the result is referred to as the grant equivalent of that loan
(see concessional loans).
Greenfield investment: An investment approach where companies or government entities
invest in the creation of a new facility and/or infrastructure (as opposed to investment in an existing
facility; see brownfield investment).
Green growth: Economic growth which ensures that natural assets continue to provide the
resources and environmental services on which human well-being relies. It combines an increase in
economic output with a reduction in pollution and greenhouse gas emissions, a minimisation of
waste, an avoidance of inefficient uses of natural resources and the maintenance of biodiversity. For
more information on green growth see: www.oecd.org/greengrowth.
Guarantees: A financial instrument in which a guarantor agrees to pay any or all of the amount
due on a loan instrument in the event of non-payment by the borrower.
Guarantee schemes are designed to facilitate the mobilisation of finance by transferring or
mitigating risks that private investors would not be able or willing to take. Developing countries can
particularly benefit from this type of instrument as they often lack creditworthiness in the eyes of
private investors.
High-income country: A World Bank classification based on a gross national income per capita
of USD 12 616 or more.
Illicit financial flows: Financial flows are illicit when they are generated by methods and
practices aimed at transferring financial capital out of a country in contravention of national or
international law. Common practices include money laundering, bribery by international companies
and tax evasion.
Impact investors: Investors seeking social impacts rather than profit maximisation.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014422
GLOSSARYInclusive growth: Economic growth that creates opportunity for all segments of the population
and distributes the dividends of increased prosperity, both in monetary and in non-monetary terms,
fairly across society. Important dimensions of inclusive growth, in addition to economic output,
include a rise in productive employment, higher income for low-income groups, an improvement in
the quality of jobs and the skills of the labour force, as well as the health and education status of the
population. For more information on inclusive growth see: www.oecd.org/inclusive-growth.
Innovative finance for development: Initiatives that either aim to raise new funds for
development (“innovative sourcing”) or to optimise the use of traditional funding sources
(“innovative spending”).
Institutional investors: Public and private investors – in particular pension funds, life insurers
and sovereign wealth funds – with investment portfolios built around the two main asset classes
(bonds and equities) and an investment horizon tied to the often long-term nature of their liabilities.
Least developed country (LDC): A definition established by the United Nations. To be classified
as a least developed country, a country must fall below thresholds established for income (adjustable
criterion: three-year average gross national income per capita of less than USD 992, which must
exceed USD 1 190 to leave the list as of 2012), economic diversification and social development (based
on indicators of nutrition, health, education and adult literacy).
Loans: Transfers for which repayment is required. Only loans with maturities of over one year
are included in DAC statistics. The data record actual flows throughout the lifetime of the loans, not
the grant equivalent of the loans (see grant element). Data on net loan flows include deductions for
repayments of principal (but not payment of interest) on earlier loans. This means that when a loan
has been fully repaid, its effect on total net flows over the life of the loan is zero.
Low-income country:AWorld Bank classification based on a gross national income per capita of
USD 1 035 or less.
Mezzanine finance: Mezzanine financing is a hybrid between debt and equity. In a multi-tiered
financing of an operation, for instance, the sources of money will be senior debt, senior subordinated
debt, subordinated debt, mezzanine debt and finally, the owner’s own equity.
Middle-income country:AWorld Bank classification based on a gross national income per capita
of USD 1 036-12 615.
Modality: The way development co-operation provider support is channelled to the activities to
be funded. This includes: 1) budget support (which is integrated into the national budget of the host
country); 2) parallel support (which is kept separate from the general resources in the national
budget); and 3) in-kind support (in the form of goods or services).
Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development: Outcome of the 2002 United Nations
International Conference on Financing for Development held in Monterrey, Mexico. The document
identified a broad range of national and international financial resources available to fund the
United Nations Millennium Development Goals and proposed actions for mobilising and increasing
the effective use of these resources, including development assistance (see also Doha Declaration on
Financing for Development). It is available at: www.un.org/esa/ffd/monterrey/MonterreyConsensus.pdf.
Multilateral agencies: In DAC statistics, those international institutions with governmental
membership that conduct all or a significant part of their activities in favour of development and aid
recipient countries. They include multilateral development banks (e.g. the World Bank, regional
development banks), the United Nations agencies and regional groupings (e.g. certain
European Union and Arab agencies). A contribution by a DAC member to such an agency is deemed
to bemultilateral if it is pooled with other contributions and disbursed at the discretion of the agency.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 423
GLOSSARYMultilateral development banks: An institution created by a group of countries which provides
financing and professional advice for the purpose of development. The main multilateral
development banks are theWorld Bank, the European Investment Bank (EIB), the Asian Development
Bank (ADB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Inter-American
Development Bank Group (IDB or IADB), the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the Islamic
Development Bank (IsDB).
Multilateral flows: Financial flows that are channelled through multilateral agencies. In tables
showing total receipts of recipient countries, the outflows of multilateral agencies to those countries
are shown, not the contributions which the agencies received from providers of development co-
operation.
Mutual fund: A type of professionally managed collective investment scheme that pools money
from many investors to purchase securities. The term is most commonly applied only to those
collective investment vehicles that are regulated and sold to the general public. Mutual funds are
sometimes referred to as “investment companies” or “registered investment companies”.
Net flow: The total amount disbursed over a given accounting period, less repayments of loan
principal during the same period, no account being taken of interest.
Net transfer: In DAC statistics, a net transfer is the net flow minus payments of interest.
Official development assistance (ODA): Grants or loans to countries and territories on the DAC
list of ODA recipients andmultilateral agencies (available at:www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclist) which are
undertaken by the official sector at concessional terms (i.e. with a grant element of at least 25%) and
that have the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as their
main objective. In addition to financial flows, technical co-operation is included in ODA. Grants,
loans and credits for military purposes are excluded.
Other official flows: Transactions by the official sector which do not meet the conditions for
eligibility as official development assistance, either because they are not primarily aimed at
development or because they have a grant element of less than 25%.
Remittances: Financial transfers which are usually sent by national or international migrants to
support recipients from their country or region of origin. Remittances include the transfer of cash and
non-cash items through both formal and informal channels.
Risk capital: Private equity provided to corporations or projects. It can be provided in the form of
equity or quasi-equity financing such as mezzanine capital or convertible debt.
Securitisation:The process through which certain types of assets are pooled so that they can be
repackaged into interest-bearing securities: financial instruments that can be readily bought and sold
in financial markets.
Senior debt: Senior debt is debt that has priority for repayment in the case of a liquidation.
Sovereign wealth fund: State-owned investment funds that invest in real and financial assets
such as stocks, bonds, real estate or precious metals, or in other investments such as private equity
funds or hedge funds. They are created either to ensure that a country’s resources are preserved for
future generations or to stabilise government fiscal and/or foreign exchange revenues and
macroeconomic balances.
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): Likely successors of the MillenniumDevelopment Goals
which will build upon the Millennium Development Goals and the Rio+20 process. In July 2014, the
Open Working Group which was tasked to propose a new set of goals, published its final report that
includes 17 goals. For further information see: http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/
4518SDGs_FINAL_Proposal%20of%20OWG_19%20July%20at%201320hrsver3.pdf.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014424
GLOSSARYSyndicated loan: A syndicated loan is provided by a group of lenders (called a syndicate) who
work together to provide funds for a single borrower. The main objective of syndicated lending is to
spread the risk of a borrower default across multiple lenders that would not have been able to provide
the same loan amount and/or terms on their own.
Tied aid: Official grants and loans where procurement of goods and services is limited to
suppliers from the provider country. In contrast, untied assistance is procured through open
international competition (e.g. international competitive bidding).
Total receipts: The inflow of resources to recipient countries includes, in addition to official
development finance, official and private export credit and long-term private transactions. Total
receipts are measured net of amortisation payments and repatriation of capital by private investors.
Transfer pricing: A transfer price is the price charged by a company for goods, services or
intangible property to a subsidiary or other related company. Abusive transfer pricing occurs when
income and expenses are improperly allocated for the purpose of reducing taxable income.DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REPORT 2014 © OECD 2014 425

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION
AND DEVELOPMENT
The OECD is a unique forum where governments work together to address the economic, social and
environmental challenges of globalisation. The OECD is also at the forefront of efforts to understand and
to help governments respond to new developments and concerns, such as corporate governance, the
information economy and the challenges of an ageing population. The Organisation provides a setting
where governments can compare policy experiences, seek answers to common problems, identify good
practice and work to co-ordinate domestic and international policies.
The OECD member countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. The European Union takes
part in the work of the OECD.
OECD Publishing disseminates widely the results of the Organisation’s statistics gathering and
research on economic, social and environmental issues, as well as the conventions, guidelines and
standards agreed by its members.
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE
To achieve its aims, the OECD has set up a number of specialised committees. One of these is the
Development Assistance Committee (DAC), whose mandate is to promote development co-operation and
other policies so as to contribute to sustainable development – including pro-poor economic growth,
poverty reduction and the improvement of living standards in developing countries – and to a future in
which no country will depend on aid. To this end, the DAC has grouped the world’s main donors, defining
and monitoring global standards in key areas of development.
The members of the DAC are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the
European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.
The DAC issues guidelines and reference documents in the DAC Guidelines and Reference Series to
inform and assist members in the conduct of their development co-operation programmes.
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